ML19322C568
| ML19322C568 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1979 |
| From: | Wessman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322C566 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001170894 | |
| Download: ML19322C568 (6) | |
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H..C.' Dance,. Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 1,
-RONS Bran.ch FROM:
R.' II. Fe~ssman, Reactor Inspector, Reactor R.'
.-Pf6]ects'Se'ction No. 1, RONS Branch K.
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SUBJECT:
OBSERVITIONS RELATING TO PERSONNEI., PROCEDURES, AND ORGANIZATIONS RESULTING FROM THREE MILE ISLAND The atached observations are submitte..s a result of my personal reflec-t tions on the Three Mile Island accident.
They are colored by my experiences-2n the nuclear navy, working for a NSSS supplier, five years of inspection act1.ity (including two weeks at TMI) and recent conversations with other
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They are submitted for your review, and transmittal to head-t f,*
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$'y I.wauld be glad to discuss these more fully with you.
I would also be vulla; to participate in any program leading to the implementation of l
t he.:e. or similar suggestions originated by others.
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OBSERVAT. IONS TELATING TO PERSONNEL, PROCEDURES, AND ORGANIZATIONS I
-RESULTING FROM THREE MILE ISLAND
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. Increase Contro17 Room Manning.
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Requiring'the addition of one licensed operator (RO) to the control room staff of each unit-asstires that there will be two men at the
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console at' alf t'ines to cope with transients or emergencies.
It is my Lelief.that the control room is too big a place for one man, particu-larly when transients occur.
Under current regulations, Technical Specifications could be satisfied with one man at the console and other licensed personnel elsewhere in the plant. Examples include Browns g.
Terry 3 or Crystal River 3.
j!;i.:t It may also be appropriate to require that the shift supervisor (SRO) r remain in the control room (or shift supervisor's office) at all times to assure a managed / directed response to casualties.
If the shift tupervisor is to go elsewhere in the plant, an assistant shif t super-visor (SRO) could be required to remain in the control room / shift L'Jpervisor's office. The additional personnel in the control room area h*'
W :ld assist in supporting the administrative activities, conduct of ff s2rveillances, or training when not directly supporting accident response.
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Te ;uire Biar.nual Operator Exams Administered by the NRC Present reliance on the utility's approved requalification program seems insufficient. A reliance cn the utility's inhouse requalifi-cation program (eventhough its iuspected) and relatively automatic reissue of an oprator's license may tend toward complacency.
An inlependent NRC exam may also provide greater assurance or operator iii.
quality.
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The Navy's neulear power program does not rely solely on the individual snipboard training and requalification program.
The Navy uses outside examiners (from the fleet
- commander or Naval Reactors Division) to 2.dr.inister an Operational Reactor Safeguards Exam (ORSE) on a 1-2 year j
tasis.
This incentive (and threat of failure) keeps operators at a higher state of readiness.
3.
Increase the IE/0LB Interface i
The presence of an OLB examiner in the region has improved the exchange of information between the two organizations, although it has been
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-frequently 'inf'ormal'in nature. ' Sharing observations, and experiences
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have been benefitial.to both groups.. It is suggested that the NRC consider the,followinge.'.-J p
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556 b6 hew;Oiip'e6Ciperator performance (IE inspector simulator f
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.. training:is.a-$tep in' this direction).
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Increa"se 0LB'~ representation.in all regions.
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to inspect in the area of licensed operator activity.
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-Emphasize (such as via regional instruction) feedback mecha-f nisms to assure that observations concerning operator per-i formance are added to an individual's docket file.
[M Look more closely at LER's for events attributable to /
operator error.
4 Expand Scope of Licensing for Plant Personnel b
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There are several groups of individuals whose activities affect plant.
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operations, as well as public health and safety, who could be subject F
to NRC licensing. Exahples are auxiliary operators (operating waste processing equipment and nuclear auxiliaries), chemists, or health phvicists.
They are all subject to the constraints of ANSI N18.1 IStandard for the Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Person-nel).
Additional training and qualification may currently be specified
'y tne utility and/or union agreements. A specific NRC license, sep-
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arate and distinct to the RO license, appears as an appropriate ad-N.:
diticnal requirement.
5.
F.:. hance Communication of Industry / Regulatory Experience to the pperator Level 9
h is not clear that information vehicles such as IE Bulletins, Circulars, C
.nd Notices reach the operators, when appropriate. These documents are seen by plant supervision but, based on my own experience, are not e
.iivays passed on to the operators.
The same may be true for industry
.uhicles from vendors, EFRI, or AlF.
3: quire Simulator Refresher Training for RO's and SRO's c.
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Requiring simulator refresher training will maintain operator capa-
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Siiities for accident response.
This is the only place to " practice" V'
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for transients and accidents.
An annual requirement of one week at the simulator seems appropriate and could be made part of the requalification I
p r ogram.
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heauire More In-plant Drills.
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.An annual emergency drill, and an occasional fire drill seem insufficient.
Operating Naval reactors hold drills on a far more frequent basis.
Various in plant casualties, such as pump trips, instrumentation failures, i
isilures of automatic control systems, and radiological " accidents" can i
te simulated to enhance
- proficiency and procedures.
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Development of Post-Accident Procedures U
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!.'any of the procedures developed during the recovery from the TMI l
tecident have applicability at all facilities and may be required regardless of the initial accident.
These should be postulated and developed in advance to avoid the extensive procedural generation effort in the midst of a casualty.
Examples are:
k t-Loss of critical instrumentation ff is Sampling when fission products are present
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High auxiliary building radiation levels limiting access to critical components Plant operations with high level contamination in the reactor building atmosphere k-.
Reactor coolant pump operations when solid or under
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Handling of high level waste I
3.
Development of Post-Accident Command, Control, and i
Conaunications Structure Tor each utility / facility the post-accident command,' control, and communications structure needs development. Three Mile Island demonstrated the magnitude of such an organization and revealed various erganizational weaknesses.
Such a structure must identify interfaces eetueen groups such as the NRC, the facility, the utility's corporate ga erganization, vendors, the A-E, and other state or federal bodies.
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Communication and control paths require definition.
Plans must exist yl
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j - o e / I in advance to coordinate the actions of large numbers of personnel and diverse organizations into a directed accident response team. The NRC's role (and the role of various NRC offices) requires c arification. Syvstem IUneup Verification on Safety-Lelated Systems _ ~ 10. y I CI..ent practice does not require an independent verification of system lineup subsequent to surveillance testing on safety-related systems. ' Ibis extra check seems appropriate. The NRC has required this type of independent verification upon the installation or removal of jumpers and upon initial systed lineup. Currently, we only rely on the surveil-lance test procedure, which may be fully executed by one person. Naval submarine practice has been to require such an independent verification upon " rig-for-dive" and wheneur the rig-for-dive is broken and then [{ restored, to assure ship safety. F t p t. 1. I... p th. h. g.. t-g.. v.. i l l i ---m.- "m -.;m a:nr~;~ v-n- -.7. .n..,....,. n q?n.' ;p.e[.:i:hqqQ i@p,r,w i.sp;1-!j$,J. 4.13gyj;ghw@.ij;1],g;b.h,gdie g;m.; j f . y.., '.' ~ i ;.. ',..;;.J.;.. ~~'
o ENCLOSURE 2 NRC Organization With Responsibilities Related To Mr. Wessman's Observations Item ~ 1. NRR/0LB 2. NRR/0LB 3. NRR/0LB, IE ~ 4. NRR/0LB 5. SD - possible revision to existing Regulatory Guide. NRR - possible revision to Section 6 of the Technical Specifications. 6. NRR/0LB 7. NRR - possible STS or Appendix to 10 CFR 50. SD - possible input for RG. 8. SD - possible revision to_RG 1.33. 9. SD - possible input for RG. NRR - possible Appendix to 10 CFR 50. 10. NRR/STS - incorporate language in Section 4.0 of TS which would delineate requirements for such independent verification. SD - include in possible revision to RG 1.33 or other Guide. 3 O}}