ML19322C364

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Responds to NRC 710913 Request for Info Re Doel Unit 1. Submits Description of Facility.Requests Info Re Postulated LOCA Originating in Vapor Portion of Pressurizer
ML19322C364
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/14/1971
From: Dopchie H
BELGIUM
To: Beck C
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001160900
Download: ML19322C364 (3)


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ASSOL,ATION V/NQOTTE -1640 R110DE-SAI!TI-dENESE - BELGIUM.

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Ct.&qas Postaux: ;$/7 U2 Socible G&ndrale 'de Banque: 78 222 Dr. C11iford K. BECK Banque de Bruxe!!es: A. 02/2165 Deputy Director of Regulation Banque do Paris et dos Pays Bas: 30635 DGPARTEMENT SGCURITG NUCLGAIRE U.S.A. - WASilINGTON D.C. 20545.

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Dear Dr. Beck,

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I received on october 5 the letter dated september 13, 1971, and v'

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signed by Dr. Stephen D. llanauer,in your absence at Ceneva where we 6

met.

I an deeply inpressed by the attention your staff provided to ray concerns, in the midst of your ECCS review. For this, and for our i

amiable conversation in Geneva, I reiterate my expresion of continued i

gratitude.

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Please find hereunder the information requested by your letter; it concerns one Doel unit:

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- reactor type : Westinghouse P.W.R.,

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- reactor power : 1192 FM-th, j

- station power : 390 W-e net, i

- number of loops : 2, 3

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- containment free volume : 43',000 m.,

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- purging rate (2 alternate motors for one inlet ventilator, 2 alter-

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nate motors for one outlet ventilator) : 60,000 or 150,000 m / hour, 3

- purging valves closure time (2 valves per duct) : 2 seconds, (plus I valve per duct for secondary containment, closing automatically at a later presently unavailable time),

- safety injection and containment closure and containment full inter-2 nal ventilation, high containment pressure set point : 0.29 kg/cm crt.

4.1 psig'(2 out of 3 system),

- containment spray, high containment pressure set point : 1.45 kg/cm2ef f = 20.6 psig (2 out of 3 system, fully independant from 1-system above),

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- containment closure, high radioactivity set point : not available (1 out of I systen for radioactive gases, 1 out of I system for radioactive dust).

I do hope that the present unavailability of the high radioactivity set point shall not preclude your exanination of our problem. Indeed, if the loss-of-coolant accident originating in the vapor portion of the pressurizer, should occur at hot shut-down, while the containtnent is being purged at full flow, it appears that

- the high radioactivity signal could be a single 1 out of I system to close the containnent building, allow the pressure to rise, and finally generate the safety injection signal,

- the initial radioactivity in the containment atmosphere and in the priciary water could be 109, hence delaying the containment closure until fission products start escaping.

Indeed I should be obliged if you would care to specify the set

point, a

The questions I raised in my previous letters are as follows :

1. Is the present situation acceptabic, in view of the postuJated loss-of-coolant accident originating in the vapor portion of the pressurizer ?
2. If not, vould you suggest a solution, such as a safety injection and containment closure signal, to supplement the low Icvel signal in the coincident prescurizer low-pressure-low-level signal (a high 1cvel signal may not be adequate, as indicated in my letter of June 25, 1971) ?
3. In the examination of this postulated accident, should a larger breach than a rupture of the largest connecting pipe be assured ?

A nan-way is provided on top of the pressurizer.

I would take advantage of your continued cooperation to raise a fur-ther question, which is presently under discussion here. This question is related to a loss-of-ccolant accident originating anywhere in the primary circuit.

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4. Since there does not seem to be any fundamental difference betueen a loss-of-coolant accident occurring at hot shut-down, and a loss-of-coolant accident occurring at full reactor power : should contain-cent purging be prohibited while the reactor is at powcr ? If not, would you provide an c>:planation ?

I thank you much again, and renain, Sincerely yours m

. DOPCIIIE Directeur.

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