ML19322C256
| ML19322C256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1975 |
| From: | Pendergrass M ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Cavanaugh W, Mcclintock W, Woodward J ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001160701 | |
| Download: ML19322C256 (2) | |
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o ENCLOSURE 1 i
SSINS No.: 6870 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 8005050050 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON. D.C.
20555 IE Iaformation Notice No. 80-21 Date:
May 16, 1980 Page 1 of 2 ANCHORAGE AND SUPPORT OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Description of Circumstances:
Seismic design evaluations in connection with the NRC Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) have indicated a potential safety deficiency in the anchorage and support of safety-related electrical equipment.
This subject was high-lighted for more in-depth evaluation after site visits to several facilities.
The site reviews indicated tha*. equipment was supported in a non-uniform In some cases, design modifications were required to render acceptable manner.
seismic design margins.
The deficiencies in anchorage and support may be due to the fact that earlier engineering design criteria did not require rigorous analyses.
Letters were issued in January 1980 to the SEP plants which requested a review of the anchorage of safety related electrical equipment.
The findings from the reviews at Haddam Neck, Big Rock Point, Dresden 2, Oyster Creek, and Palisades identified various safety-related electrical equipment that did not have positive anchorage.
The reviews at other SEP plants are continuing.
A summary is provided below of those items so far identified.
Station Service Transformers Motor Control Centers (4160 V - 480V)
Cable Trays DC to-AC Inverters Computer Emergency Diesel Generator Control Panels - MG Set Room Heater
- Air Compressor Batteries - Emergency Diesel
- Control Room Generator Instrument Rack
- Diesel Fire Pump Battery Room Main Breaker and
- Station Distribution Panel Station Battery Rack A related item has been identified at Comanche Peak (under construction) in which the welds to the floor supports for the main control panels were found to be undersized and improperly spaced.
Also, the SEP reviewers observed that non-seismic Category I ancillary items (dolleys, gas bottles, block and tackle gear, ductwork, etc.) may be located such that they could potentially dislodge, impact, and damage safety related equipment during an earthauake.
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IE Information Notice No. 80-21 Date:
May 16, 1980 Page 2 of 2 The type of anchorage systems utilized in the SEP plants ano their expected For example, high uncertainty exists relative to the capacities vary widely.
capacity of non-engineered tack welds and attachments that rely on frictional clamping ' forces.
In some cases, equipment has been found free standing with no means of positive lateral support.
(Friction being the only lateral load carrying mechanism).
Most often, heavier equipment is anchored using (1) tack welds to steel angles embedded in concrete; (2) clips that rely on frictional resistance; (3) concrete embedded anchor bolts; or (4) external braced frames.
Lighter equipment housed in cabinets or attached to panels or racks has been anchored using (1) bolts; (2) sheet metal screws; (3) tack welds; and (4) braced racks.
The potential concern is that certain pieces of equipment may not have adequate levels of seismic resistance capability due to limited anchorage capacity.
The potential problems relate to overturning and/or sliding of large equipment and gross movement or unacceptable forces on smaller attached equipment that For certain large battery may render it inoperable during an earthquake.
racks, this judgment is supported by analysis that predict unacceptable seismic behavior.
Section 3.10 of the Standard Review Plan provides acceptance criteria for the seismic qualification of Category I electrical equipment. These criteria include IEEE Std. 344, " Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations", first issued in 1971.
Facilities designed before about 1971 without benefit of such design and testing criteria may have some anchorage deficiencies.
1 The NRC staff is continuing to evaluate this issue on the SEP plants as part i
of the seismic review in the SEP. Remedial actions have been planned for the affected plants.
This Information Notice is provided as notification of a possibly significant It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible matter.
applicability to their facilities.
No specific action or response is requested at this time.
If NRC evaluations so indicate, additional actions may be requested or required.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
ENCLOSURE 1 SSINS No.: 6830 UNITED STATES Accession No.:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8005050052 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 IE Circular No. 80-12 Date:
May 14, 1980 I
Page 1 of 2 VALVE-SHAFT-TO-ACTUATOR KEY MAY FALL OUT OF PLACE WHEN MOUNTED BELOW HORIZONTAL AXIS Description of Circumstances:
l Tennessee Valley Authority has identified and reported to the NRC a non-conformance on a Bettis Robot-Arm actuator installed on a Pratt butterfly valve at the Sequoyah nuclear plant.
It is reported (ref, attached 10 CFR 50.55(e) report) that a valve became inoperable when the valve-shaft-to-actuator key fell out of place.
It is further noted that the orientation of this valve assembly was such that the operator was on the bottom of the valve (below the horizontal axis).
The Pratt butterfly valve furnished with Bettis actuator is designed with a press-fit keyway connection valve / actuator.
We believe other manufacturers' connections may be of similar construction and therefore subject to this failure mode.
On May 1,1980, Pratt Company se.it letters to their customers who have these connections (attached list).
They recommended that their customers review their installation of such connections, and if the keyway is oriented below horizontal, make one of the following field modifications:
1.
Add a spacer bushing, or shim plate to fill the void between the top of the shaft and the indicating plate on the actuator.
2.
Locally upset the end of the valve shaft in the area of the keyway using a hand punch in such a way that the key could not work loose.
3.
Install new keys of longer length which extend above the end of the valve shaft whereby the key is up to the actuator plate and could not slip down if inverted.
Recommended Action for Licensee Consideration:
We request that all plants make the above recommended inspection of all connections similar to the above described Bettis/Pratt connection, whether or not supplied by those particular manufacturers.
If connections are found that are susceptible to failure, one of the above recommended actions or other appropriate action should be taken to correct the potential problem.
IE Circular No. 80-12 Date:
May 14, 1980 Page: 2 of 2 No written response to this Circular is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Attachments l
O Attachment to IE Circular 80-12 ATTACHMENT 1 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 hCR 19P 10 CFR 50.55(e)
REPORT NO. 1 (FINAL)
LOOSE KEY IN BETTIS ROBOT-ARM VALVE ACTUATORS Description of Condition A containment isolation valve in Unit 1 became inoperable when the key which locks the actuator to the valve shaft fell out of place. This problem could occur with Bettis Robot-Arm valve actuators (model numbers 732C-SR80, 721C-SR60, 521C-SR60, CB525-5R60) when installed upside down or sideways.
With the valve shaft mounted below.orizontal, there is a potential for the key to work itself loose.
Safety Implications If the valve actuator were to fall out, it would result in a loss of valve control.
Since these valve actuators are on safety-related valves, this condition could have adversely affected or reduced the redundancy of safety-related systems, i
i Corrective Action TVA has identified 51 suspect operators in the Purge Air System, Emergency Gas Treatment System and the Chilled Water Systcm.
Those operators that are i
installed so that the key can work loose will have spacer bushings installed
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in the actuator as recommended by the vendor.
Installation of the spacer bushings will be completed before fuel loading.
All TVA design project managers are being asked to ensure that this problem does not occur at other TVA nuclear plants.
~.
Attachment to IE Circular 80-12 ATTACHMENT 2 LIST OF ADDRESSEES FOR MAY 1 LETTER FROM HENRY PRATT COMPANY Metropolitan Edison - Three Mile Island #2 Arkansas Power & Light Arkansas Nuclear One 1 Wisconsin Public Service - Pioneer Service Kewaunee Northern States Power - Prairie Island 1 & 2 Baltimore Gas & Electric - Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Florida Power Corporation - Crystal River #3 Florida Power & Light - St.
Lucie #1 & 2 Toledo Edison - Davis-Besse #1 Alabama Power Company - Joseph M. Farley 1 & 2 Tennessee Valley Authority - Sequoyah 1 & 2 Pennsylvania Power & Light - Susquehanna 1 & 2 Mississippi Power & Light - Grand Gulf 1 & 2 Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company - Perry 1 & 2 Commonwealth Edison Company - Zion 1 & 2 Rochester Gas & Electric - Robert E. Ginna 1 Westinghouse Hanford/FFTF Westinghouse - Phil11 pines Northeast Utilities - Millstone #3 Tennessee Valley Authority - Stride
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_. _ am SSINS No.: 6830 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 8002280662 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
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May 13, 1980 IE Circuler No. 80-11 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL COOLER FAILURES Description of Circumstances:
Within a two week period (August 27 to September 11,1979), the tube sheets failed in the lube oil coolers of both emergency diesel generators for Arkansas The introduction of water into the diesel lube Nuclear One (ANO) Unit No. 1.
The oil system resulted in trips of both diesels during surveillance testing.
diesels were not considered capable of sustained operation.
These events were previously identified to all operating license and construction permit holders by Information Notice 79-23, Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler on September 25, 1979. The emergency diesel generators involved were manufac-tured by the Electro-Motive Division (EMD) of the General Motors Corporation The failed and the failures occurred on engines 71-Al-1117 and 71-Al-1130.
lube oil coolers were manufactured by the Young Radiator Company.
An analysis of the failed coolers performed by EMD resulted in the conclusion that the failures were caused by severe corrosion of the solder which sealed the tubes to the tube sheets. The corrosion inhibitor in use at ANO was Calgon CS, a borate-nitrite type inhibitor. The manufacturer of this type of inhibitor EMD does not has recommended the use of hard solder in CS treated systems.
recommend the use of Calgon CS since the puddle solder used in EMD radiators and oil coolers is considered to be soft solder of a lead-tin composition.
Recommended Action for Licensees' Consideration:
Based on the above, it is recommended that licensees:
Verify that the corrosion inhibitor used in cooling water systen of the 1.
emergency diesel generators is compatible with all materials wetted by l
the cooling water and the engine manufacturer's specific recommendations.
Also, by means of the engine maintenance history, verify that the system corrosion inhibitor has been properly monitored and maintained at the f
recommended concentration.
If Item 1 cannot be successfully performed, the affected components 2.
should be inspected in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.
No written response to this Circular is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
L
IE Circular No. 80-11 Enclosure May 13, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject Date of Issued to No.
Issue 80-10 Failure to Maintain 4/29/80 All holders of Reactor Environmental Qualification OLs and cps of Equipment 80-09 Problems With Plant Internal 4/28/80 All holders of a power Communications Systems reactor OL or CP 80-08 BWR Technical Specification 4/18/80 All General Electric Inconsistency - RPS Response BWR's holding a power Time reactor OL 80-07 Problems with HPCI Turbine 4/3/80 All holders of a power Oil System reactor OL or CP 80-06 Control and Accountability 4/14/80 Medical licensees in Systems for Implant Therapy Categories G and G1 Sources 80-05 Emergency Diesel-Generator 4/1/80 All holders of a power Lubricating Oil Addition and reactor OL or CP Onsite Supply 80-04 Securing of Threaded Locking 3/14/80 All holders of a power Devices on Safety-Related reactor OL or CP Equipment 80-03 Protection from Toxic Gas 3/6/80 All holders of a Hazards power reactor OL 80-02 Nuclear Power Plant Staff 2/1/80 All holders of Reactor Work Hours Ols, including research and test reactors, and cps 80-01 Service Advice for GE 1/17/80 All licensees of Induction Disc Relays nuclear power reactor operating facilities and holders of nuclear power reactor cps 1
.