ML19322C239
| ML19322C239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1979 |
| From: | Wilburn R PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001160666 | |
| Download: ML19322C239 (58) | |
Text
-
- t. m i i p) :
.~ j t,..
i,.s
,.j M.. ; s., )
e e-
. >.a l
N U C L E A R R E G U 8. A T C R '.' C O M M I S S ! C N s
I IN THE MATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITION l
l DEPOSITION OF:
DR. ROBERT C. WIL3CRN l
(
i l
1 plag,.
HARRISBURG, PA.
Date -
September 19, 1979 Pages 1 thru 41 w%n.:
( C2)347 3700 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
. _. - s c j,'n 7 i
>' ~ n F'I
' i OffkulReponers
,2;r I[L y@l i' i e
- " 'i s y e d a,1 1
au Nonb Capitol Street Washington. D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY 00011 h((
1 NOR-4895 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA bp 2
X 3
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S :
4 TMI SPECIItL INQUIRY GROUP 5
ON 6
THE ACCIDENT AT T11REE MILE ISLAND :
7
x 8
(Oral deposition of DOCTOR ROBERT C. WILBURN) 9 10 11 APPEARANCES:
12 1
NRC's Special Inquiry Group I
13 Robert Chin, Esquire Malcolm Ernst 14 Frederick Herr Robert Schamberger 15 16 17 TAKEN AT:
18 Iloliday Inn Town 10:00 a.m., Wednesday Second and Chestnut Streets September 19, 1979 19 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 20 21 l
22 23 24 25 MONsCM $7 t NOO A A P**'C SE nveC E.
149 3 OLO esiLL ROa D. wvotes SSING. P A 19410
2 I
" EEEE 2
WITNESS:
E>atMINED BY:
PAGE NUMBER 3
Robert C. Wilburn Mr. Chin 3-4 4
Mr. Ernst 5 - 39 5
~
6 7
EXIIIBITS e
8 Number Marked 9
1 Letter of confirmation to Doctor 3
Wilburn from the NRC TMI Special 10 Inquiry Group 11 2
Four page resumo entitled 4
" Robert C. Wilburn" 12 3
Eleven page document entitled 40 13
" Chronology ot TMI Incident" 14 15 16 17 18
'~
19 20 0
21 22 23 24 25
..c. ses.o..... /.
...c.....i o m. a.o..
}
3 1
PROCEEDINGS 2
MR. ERNST:
I would like to state for the record 3
that we are at the Holiday Inn Town Motor Hotel in Harrisburg, 4
It is 10:00 a.m.,
September 19, 1979.
The 5
purpose is to take a deposition with regard to events during i
6 the Three Mile Island accident.
7 If you would stand and raise your right hand.
8 DOCTOR ROBERT C. WILBURN, was called as a witn'ss and, having been duly sworn, was 9
e 10 examined and testified as follows:
11 MR. ERNST:
Be seated and state your full name and 12 office, please.
13 THE WITNESS:
Robert Charles Wilburn, Secretary of 34 Budget and Administration for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
(Exhibit No. 1 marked.)
15 16 BY MR. CHIN:
17 Q
Doctor Wilburn, I will show you what is marked as 18 Exhibit 1.
Is this a copy of the letter sent to you by the 19 NRC-TMI Special Inquiry Group confirming your deposition 20 hearing this morning?
21 A
Yes, it is.
22 0
Do you understand the information set forth in this l
23 letter including the general nature of the inquiry, your right 1
24 to have an attorney present and the fact that information you 25 give today may become public at some time?
MO%iCK 51 E NOG R A Pe**C 's t a veC E 14 3 3 OLD MIL L #Ca0 W Towe s sa % G Pa 1e610
4 1
A Yes, I do.
2 Q
Doctor Wilburn, are you represented by counsel 3
today?
4 A
No, I am not.
5 MR. CHIN:
I would like to note for the record that 6
the witness is not represented by counsel today.
7 BY MR. CHIN:
8 Q
Doctor Wilburn, if at any time during the course of 9
this interview you feel that you need an attorney or attorney 10 present, please advise me and I will adjourn this proceeding 11 and afford you the opportunity to make one present.
Is this 12 procedure all right with you?
13 A
Yes, that's right, fine, ja Q
Did you bring a resume with you today?
A Yes, I did.
15 MR. CHIN:
I mark as Exhibit 2, which is a resume, 16 37 I believe -- excuse me, a four page memorandum entitled
" Robert C. Wilburn. "
18 THE WITNESS:
Right.
39 20 BY MR. CHIN:
21 Q
Does this resume accurately summarize your employ-22 ment and educational background?
23 A
Yes, it does.
24
'MR. CHIN:
Thank you.
This is marked Exhibit 2.
l 25 (Exhibit 2 marked.)
l wohicm syshoona. ic stavict tais oto uitt mono. wvouissimo..a issio i
5 I
MR. CllIN :
Mr. Ernst.
2 BY MR. ERNST:
3 Q
First, a couple of questions of a general background 4
information of your activities during the Three Mile Island 5
accident emergency response.
The first one is that according to the testimony of Mr. J.C. Waldman before the President's 6
7 Commission on April 26, the Governor ordered an accelerated 8
review of emergency plans and indicated that you quickly 9
tightened up the five-mile plan.
I think he also testified that the Governor and his immediate staff did not feel comfort-10 11 abic regarding adequate and accurate information for the first 12 seven days after the event.
We were wondering when the Governor requested that 13 14 you conduct this review of emergency plans.
15 A
It was Saturday morning approximately 10:00 o' clock.
16 Q
That would be April 1st?
17 A
March 30th -- 31st.
18 Q
Okay.
Saturday.
19 A
Thirty-first.
20 0
All right.
In your review of the emergency -- first, I guess the energency plans that you reviewed, was that the 21 original five-mile plan or some modified plans, or just which 22 i
l 23 reviews were they?
l 24 A
When I began my review, we had in place a five-mile Plan for the counties that were affected, which was originally 25 MO%eC M SY f h0G.a *'asC '5 t #V eC E 9 413 OL D **iLL ROA D WTOM'95tNG Pa testo
6 1
drafted by the counties.
In addition to that, at that point 2
in time, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency was in 3
the process of developing a 20-mile plan -- both a 10 and 20-4 mile plan.
So, they were all in the process as of that 5
morning.
0 What deficiencies did you find in the original five-6 7
mile plans?
8 A
The original five-mile plans by county differed 9
greatly in the level of specificity.
By that time, while the 10 written plans did not reflect a completeness, I think that the 11 actual plans that people were dealing with did -- had come 12 a 1 ng ways ver the last -- over the prior three days.
13 My role was one of doing, I suppose, what the ja Governor would do had ha the time to go down and ask questions 15 ry ng ge answers and trying to get a degree of confi-an dence in the plans -- how comfortable we felt with the plans.
16 I tried to cross-examine the plans and poke holes in them to 37 18 see that they were attempting to address all the questions.
39 I asked questions like, "Well, who is going to drive the school buses now that we have them?"
In some cases, the 20 21 answers were not as good as I would have liked to have thought 22 they would be.
But, of course, aa soon as the question was raised, then it is checked and double checked in going out to 23 the counties.
And in some counties, response would be better 24 than others.
25 MONaCa tif NoseapMsC gthweC E 14 8 3 OLD M4LL WO AD W7DMet tt46. pa 19650
7 1
The questions -- I tried to question each aspect of 2
the plan concerning -- questions like, "Who would drive the 3
school buses?
Are there any difficulties in the transit router?
4 Are they sure that they have in fact -- that they don't have 5
any counties being evacuated in one direction and another 6
county going in the other direction?"
I think logical ques-7 tions, making sure that they were
's aking at the forest and g
not just the trees.
9 My initial reaction in the morning of -- Saturday 10 morning was that the plans were reasonably good, that there
~ ~, _ _
p were a lot of answers that people in the Emergency Management Agency did not have and I had some concerns about the traffic 12 l
13 flows and issues like that.
Subsequently, during the day I continually called ja vari us people to try to get crosschecks on what was being 15 done.
I had discussions with General Scott who is the 16 Adjutant General of the Pennsylvania National Guard, or the 17 General in charge of the National Guard; discussions with 18 Dan Dunn, who is the Commissioner of the State Police; dis-j j9 cussions with Gordon MacLeod, who is the 11ealth Secretary,in 20 attempting to do crosschecks on evacuation plans to make sure 21 that they were comfortable with their functional areas and 22 how they were being handled in the plans.
23 I f und in that process that the questions that 24 PEMA was not able to answer was being addressed very carefully 25 MohiCm ST shocaapmeC,St eveCf 1493 OLD MsL4 noap wrout$$ SNG Pa 196t0
8 1
by each of these cabinet secretaries, and I felt in the 2
evening much more comfortable than I did in the morning.
3 0
This is on Saturday?
4 A
On Saturday.
And by Saturday night, I felt reason-5 ably comfortable that we could conduct certainly a five-mile 6
evacuation, and with a 10-mile evacuation with a reasonable 7
degree of success and minimal amount of loss as far as injuries, 8
property damages, personal damage of all kinds.
Which again, 9
you know, it was a gradual process through the day of asking 10 questions and making sure that at least somebody was in ij c'large of that particular area and that we were not going to run afoul.
12 13 Just as a specific example would be with the ja Transportation Department in the fact that the Transportation Department, while many of the questions could not be answered 15 16 by PEMA in the morning, as the day progressed, I found out the Transportation Department was running simulated models of j7 traffic flows, that they knew what the traffic would likely 18 be in all directions, that they had actually stationed barriern j9 and roadblocks and maintenance sheds and brought them in from g
surrounding areas to make sure that they would have the g
equipment available.
They had placed the maintenance people 22 on standby call so that they could'bc called in to rearrange 23 24 barriers if massive traffic changes were required.
So, I think that is one example.
25
-o.c. m ~ o.....e....c r. i m oso - m.o... m e.......
E 9
1 I found the same kinds of response with the National 2
Guard, the same kind of response with the state police.
3 As the day went along, I was giving more positive responses 4
to the Governor.
I also gave an evaluation of our evacuation 5
plans to General Eidenberg at the White House and also to 6
Jack Watson who is Mr. Eidenberg's boss.
All of this was done, 7
unfortunately, orally.
We weren't thinking of making reports 8
at that particular point in time.
And other than the plans 9
that we were working on, there is very little documentation 10 of that.
ji Q
So, you went from agency to agency then, or did the agencies communicate with each other?
Like the State Police 12 and the National Guard, did they talk to each other?
13 A
Yes, we have what is called a PEMA Council in which 14 all the affected cabinet members sit.
There is a meeting of 15 that group that I attended the previous day on Friday at --
16 I believe it was 1:30 or 2:00 o' clock in the afternoon.
17 Although I am not a member of that council, the Governor asked 18 me to go as his personal representative to that council.
j9 The role that I played from Saturday and subsequently 20 through this incident -- I mean the pieces were falling in g
place as they were supposed to fall in place.
The protocol g
I was being followed.
There was coordination among the depart-23 l
l ments.
But the Governor, recognizing his kind of unique 24 1
responsibility of making sure that everything comes together m,c., ~ o...... e,.. m c c
...,oto..u..o.
m o-,..,~..,.
....c
10 1
as it is supposed to come together, did not want to leave any-2 thing to chance and asked that I go in and kind of make sure 3
that all these pieces were coming together in the ways they 4
were supposed to be coming together.
And it was really a 5
double checking of everything.
6 We were very careful that in no way would we inter-7 fere with the Emergency Management Agency and very careful to 8
be as invisible as possible as far as not to in any way weaken 9
the authority of the director of the Pennsylvania Emergency 10 Management Agency or, you know, the counties.
And tried to be ij as invisible to the county structure as possible.
I think we were successful.
I don't think they really knew that was 12 13 g ing on for the Governor.
14 O
Do you happen to know the responsibilities that were 15 delegated from the Council to the PEMA director?
16 A
' e responsibilities that were delegated?
I'7 Q
I think the state law, if you don't know it -- we 18 will -- but I think the state law talks about responsibilities 19 of PEMA, which is the Council, and then also it says the 20 Council shall delegate whatever authority -- not the delegation 21 of responsibility but the delegation of authority as appro-22 priate to the director.
23 Q
I really can't answer those questions.
I didn't do 24 a management review.
I was just there trying to sa-
"Are we 25 missing anything?
Are there big holes in this plan?"
i i
)
uovc= stenos a.uc,scav cr. un c6o u.u omo. wrouissmo. na issio I
11 1
And frankly, as far as the Pennsylvania system is 2
concerned, I had very little involvement before that point and 3
probably would have little involvement afterwards unless --
4 Q
Fine.
You mentioned PEMA could not answer some 5
questions.
Do you have a specific on -- of the kinds of ques-6 tions that you found most difficult to work out or find 7
answers to?
8 A
Most of them were traffic related questions, traffic 9
flow questions.
I mentioned the one about the bus drivers, 10 and'it was one simply that the answer was in the counties.
It 11 wasn't that the answer wasn't available.
They just didn't 12 have it centrally.
13 At that time there was a layer of concern that was ja being overlaid on the whole plans because of the uncertainty 15 about the radius of evacuation, and that was causing great 16 concern I think on everybody's part about whether we were 17 going to be asked to do a five or 10-mile evacuation.
And at 18 that time there was even speculation about a 20-mile evacuation, 39 which was heightened that day by Washington that there could be a 20-mile evacuation.
You know, we spent a considerable 20 amount of time asking questions about the interaction of a 21 five, 10 and 20-mile evacuation.
If we had a five-mile 22 23 evacuation, could we then go to a 2'0-mile evacuation, or will 24 we have evacuated everybody from the five miles into a 10-mile radius?
Those kinds of sequential questions.
25 MONICm Ef t%CC#apHIC SERW'Ct. 14 t B OLD MILL #040 wv0Ms55ame pa testo
12 y
1 I don't know if they had been addressed in part or 2
had been raised before or if that was the initiation of them 3
being addressed.
It is difficult for me to assess.
But 4
certainly, during the day we became very attuned to these 5
kinds of issues.
~
6 O
Is it fair to characterize then that the existing 7
emergency plans were rather general in nature, did not have 8
too many specifics as to people and exact routes and --
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
-- and detailed responsibilities, and this was the
~
11 area that you were checking into?
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
PEMA didn't have those details either, and you had ja to --
A I think it is important to keep in mind that there 15 16 were two sets of emergency plans.
There is the ones that were 17 developed by the Radiation Bureau and the Department of 18 Environmental Resources, which is a protocol for calling evacuation.
PEMA has the execution phase, if you will, of 19 that evacuation.
20 The degree of specificity, I think, was fairly good 21 in terms of the Department of Environmental Resources' kinds 22 of-response to give levels of radiation and so forth.
23 The counties are charged with -- the principal 24 responsibility in evacuations, as I understand it, and PEMA 25 MohsCm STENoceaewtC'stayect les s OLD MILL woap wv0MstsehG pa testo
13 1
serves as the coordinator over all agencies.
The level of 2
detail varied considerably by county, and I think to a large 3
extent it depended upon the individuals that were in those 4
counties.
5 And I would hasten to add that I don't think that 6
those plans really -- the written plans are reflective of the 7
capabilities of the individuals and what can be done in a 8
crisis.
I think if you looked at the plans or if you looked 9
at the counties, you might find little coordination in that 10 regard.
But nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that 11 certain counties are very vague in exactly how they would 12 evacuate and in what direction and --
13 Q
Did you talk to the coordinators of each of the ja counties in this review process, or did you have big meetings, O# DU"
~~
15 A
No, what was done with the counties was really done 16 j7 through the National Guard.
I requested that the National i
18 Guard be sure that they had at least one representative in 19 each county that would at least serve as sort of an independent check and that would report back to General Scott on an inde-20 pendent assessment of how well the county was being -- that 21 was being done in a manner not to interfere or in any way 22 question the authority of the kind'of people who have the 23 authority'to evacuate.
And we relied on that information flow 24 c
and that was through General Scott to me as just an independent 25 MONiCE ST E NOG n a pwic.S a m veC E 1413 OLD M'LL nOa 0 W VOM' S S BNG Pa isst0
14 1
crosscheck on their plans.
2 Those reports were coming in late Saturday and 3
through -- well, through the remainder of the incident and 4
were generally very positive as far as their capability of what 5
work was being done.
6 Q
You mentioned the 10-mile and 20-mile plans.
7 A
Yes.
8 0
Did you review this as time went on and these plans 9
were developed, or did you stay in d.is review process for 10 the next several days and get familiar with the 10 and 20-mile 11 Plans?
12 Yes, in fact on Saturday we were reviewing the five, A
13 10 and 20-mile plans all day long.
It wasn't just focusing 7
i n.the five and 10.
We were looking at the 10 and 20-mile
[-
14 i
Plans through Saturday and Sunday, I would say, culminating l
15 bySundayafternoon,wereachedtheconclusionthattherewasfi 16 1 ttle use in planning for a 20-mile evacuation because we 17 were unable to determine scenarios under which a 20-mile i
18 evacuation would be required.
39 20 We then focused all of our attention on the five 21 and 10-mile plans and dismissed the 20-mile plan.
I shouldn't 22 use the term dismissed because what we found in this process 23 was that it made no sense to talk about a five and 10-mile 24 plan without recognizing the consequences beyond that radius.
25 We began to focus on what we called a 10-mile plan with 20-mile M ONiC 84 SithCGR APM*C SERveCE 1413 OLD usLL ROAD Wy TOMIS$1NG. PA 19810
15 I
consequences.
2 I think I could explain that very easily.
One of 3
the problems that we were having concern about -- having con-4 cern to a certain extent -- was checking on the institutions 5
in the area to make sure they were continually being staf fed.
6 There were a. lot of rumors -- the rumors were incredible about 7
institutions being without staff and getting calls from 8
various responsible people saying that we had to close certain 9
hospitals because there was'Ix) staff there.
One example --
10 and I do not remember the name of the hospital -- but they said there was only a third of the staff had showed up --
11 12 professional staff showed up to take care of the patients, 13 and that we had to close the hospital.
ja After doing an investigation of that, we found that 15 it was true, that they were down by two-thirds as far as the 16 staff was concerned, but they also had released patients so 37 that a third of the patients were left, and it was notan 18 imminent problem but one that had to be watched and monitored very closely.
39 20 Q
How did the chicken and egg work on this?
Did they 21 reduce staff because the patients were reduced because they 22 were going elsewhere, or did they have to release the patients 23 because the staff was not available?
24 A
No, this was a decision made early on to reduce down 25 to only those patients that could not be released.
And I MONaces SYt h0Cma PMtC S t ev'C E.
1413 CLD MtLL #O A D. W T O M s S SING PA 19610 l
16 1
think that was a very wise decision because that meant if you 2
had an evacuation, it would proceed more smoothly.
3 The staff problems, I can't respond to why they 4
occurred.
You can speculate as well as I.
The -- what I 5
started to talk about, this radius and the consequences into 6
the 20 miles -- the hospitals happened to be located at, I 7
think, between 10 and 20 miles, and we were having problems 8
prior to an evacuation in that 10 to 15-mile area.
We were 9
convinced if we ordered a 10-mile evacuation we would also 10 have to evacuate thoce hospitals, even though they were 11 technically outside that 10-mile radius.
12 So, we began to talk about a new concept, a radius 13 of evacuation with consequences going out considerably further ja than that radius.
And I think that is something that is going 15 to be very important for future planning in these events.
One 16 lesson I think that was learned is that it is important to 17 establish different radiuses and don't change them during the 18 process.
And it is, I think, a very inexact science, and it 39 is hard to argue the difference between a 10 and 15-mile radius.
And it would be better to stick with a 10-mile radius 20 21 r whatever the radius is that the experts decide is 22 appropriate.
23 And the second thing is, once that radius is deter-24 mined, you had better prepare for the perimeter.
And if you 25 have major installations on the perimeter, you had better be W O Ni C 81 ST E NOGna PWC.s t av 8C E tel5 OL D MILL #0ap wv0MISS8NG. FA 19610
17 1
prepared to evacuate those.
2 Q
You mentioned criteria or scenarios of consequences.
3 A
Yes.
4 0
Where did you get these scenarics or types of 5
consequences?
What was your source of information?
6 A
Well, a principal source of information was Mr.
7 Denton, liarold Denton.
We met with him at least once a day e, and talked with him on the phone periodically during the days.
9 We relied on him to give us those scenarios.
10 We also had input from a man named Doctor Wald, who jj is, as I understand, a leading expert in nuclear medicine.
12 And he worked with us on what the effects on human beings are i
-- how -- what those radiuses or radii can be.
13 14 And it was on Sunday that -- by Sunday we had determined, largely through input from Mr. Denton and Doctor 15 Wald, that the 10-mile radius was the worst possible case that g
we could logically plan for.
And it was confirmed Sunday j7 evening in a meeting with Mr. -- Doctor IIendrie came and met 18 with the Governor that night.
And his conclusion was really 19 a 10-mile -- 10-mile radius of evacuation.
Now, he did talk 20 about, again, consequences beyond a 10-mile radius, but he 21 was talking about making it a warning to stay indoors or some-22 lthingtothateffect.
e 23
~
But there was no scenario that he presented or dis-24 cussed at that meeting which would have -- The worst case 25 MONsC m S T E NOGm a PeoC 's t av eC C 9413 OLD MILL moap wrouestsNG. Pa 194 0
18 1
plan called for a 10-mile evacuation.
2 So, we were very pleased that at least we were 3
coming together on what the appropriate radiuses or radaii 4
were for consideration.
5 Q
'You mentioned a good deal of coordination with the 6
National Guard.
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
A couple of things.
Number one, in the meeting that 9
we had in Harrisburg a few months ago with G3neral Carroll, 10 I believe his name was, he indicated some concern I think on ji his part as to whether guardsmen would easily go into areas 12 f high radiation because of the lack of equipment to monitor 13 radiation.
ja I also understand that sometime back there was 15 an ther review of General Scott, I think, where there was some 16 statement that guardsmen will never go into areas of dangerous radiation.
17 18 Do you have any observations on whether or not the 39 Guard -- what kind of consequences might be -- exist and would 20 still have a Guard that would be willing to go in and perform emergency services?
Is that a problem?
21 A
22 I really have no way of answering that.
I can't 23 make -- I can make a few comments a' bout my feelings with the 24 total population that we were dealing with, and to the extent 25 l that spills over in the National Guard.
When people make t
WON *C m ST E NOGp A PHf C *5 t nveCt. 14 9 3 OL D M.L L poa p. wvownt$iNG. PA 19610
19 l
I flippant comparisons between something like this occurring and 2
floods and other kinds of national disasters, I think they
)
3 really do not understand the degree of fear that existed in 4
the general population and how that had to Unpact on everything 5
that we did, everything from whether or not deciding to close 6
additional schools or to open additional schools.
That you 7
wanted in no way to communicate that anything was not correct 8
as far as whether or not the degree of crisis had heightened 9
or stayed the same or lessened.
And we tried to make sure 10 that all of our actions were portraying the fact that that 11 was the level of crisis at that particular point in time.
12 It is difficult to pinpoint specific things that 13 occurred that gave one this sense that the people were in such 14 a state of emotional frenzy, b"t there were little things 15 that happened throughout that kept reminding you.
16 There was a news story that came out on Saturday 17 night about the bubble might explode, and it was flashed across 18 the TV.
And it was only a matter of minutes that we were 19 getting reports of some traffic jams on a Saturday night in, 20 you know, a portion of the greater metropolitan area.
And you 21 had those kinds of indications from time to time that people 22 really were frightened and that --
23 So, you know, how that spills over into the National 24 Guard, I think -- It has to be a concern because these people l
25 are human beings.
But whether or not they would perform their l
t l
MohicM S?tNOGnaPMec stavect tot 3 oto uitt nono wyo.eigsi%c pa
,,,,o I
20 i
l 1
mission, I have no way of answering that.
2 O
Your comments are enlightening.
Thank you.
3 This may be related to the first question, but maybe 4
not.
On August 31st, Governor Thornburg testified before the I
5 President's Commission that he had requested you to monitor 6
the performance of PEMA.
Is this a separate action from the 7
review of plans or an additional responsibility?
8 A
No, this was referring to the review of the plans, 9
you know, how they were being carried out at that particular 10 Point in time.
11 Q
I see.
12 A
It was not a long-term charge.
13 Q
You did mention one council meeting,I believe you j
s ja said --
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
-- on Friday afternoon.
17 A
That's right.
18 Q
Was that the first council meeting, or can you 19 describe to me the activities or actions of the Council itselfi 20 during this time period.
21 A
Okay.
The only -- all that I am aware of is the 22 meeting that I attended.
I do not know if there had been a f
23 council meeting prior to that time.
It was clear at that l
l l
24 meeting there had, at least, been prior discussions among i
25 indiyidual members.
Whether they had met as a group, I am no:
l M O h'C M $TE NOG #aposer AtaveCE 14 t 3 OLD M+LL RO A D ve TOutSS NG Pa 10s10
21 1
aware of.
2 At that meeting, it was principally going through 3
each department and discussing what their particular responses 4
had been and were being and planned to be for the incident.
5 It was very clear at that meeting that this was not 6
the first informational meeting.
I don't know if they had y
met as a group or if they had been contacted individually.
8 But they were at that meeting prepared to respond to what was 9
being done in each department, and everyone seemed to be, I 10 would say, reasonably well aware of the consequences of their department and what had happened.
ij 12 Q
Were there any subsequent meetings to your knowledge 13 of the Council?
14 A
Not that I am aware of.
15 0
You say there is no written report.
And you men-16 tioned scme actions you were taking.
Did you have any overall 17 recommendations to the Governor or anyone else regarding prep-18 aration for emergency as a result of your work?
19 A
Yes, we did come up with recommendations for 20 executive orders that would have to be promulgated in the 21 event that an evacuation occurred.
Some of these are quite 2;
minor but were details to be covered.
23 These included such things as taking over the turn-l 24 pike, for example.
Minor thing to make sure that no one tried l
l 25 to collect tolls.
Taking over the gas stations to make sure
-o
.c... ~o....
,c....,c.
... m
-,u
22 1
that -- we assumed that we would have to have the National 2
Guard actually operate many of the gas stations and be pre-3 pared to make sure that the National Guard had equipment to 4
cut off locks of the pumps and so forth and actually get the 5
cars moving because cars would be the principal means of evacuation.
6 7
We had coordinated with the oil companies to make 8
sure that they were moving in extra reserves.
This was during 9
the energy shortage.
There was at least an energy shortage at 10 that time, if you remember.
We were moving in tanker trucks 11 at this particular point in time.
I had this series of 12 executive orders that would have to be promulgated simultan-13 eously with a declaration of emergency.
We communicated those 14 to the Attorney General.
I assume that they were drafted.
I 15 never saw them.
But I assume that they were drafted in 16 preparation for evacuation.
l'7 Q
Did you determine the consequences of an evacuation le from a liability standpoint or maybe a health and safety stand-
~
19 point might be a significant problem or --
20 A
I never heard anyone address really the liability 21 concerns.
The health and safety were paramount I think to 22 everything that we did.
23 The great concern about an evacuation as far as 24 health and safety is the -- if you think about it for a moment,
25 the hospitals were down to a third -- the population was down MONiCm Sit %QGera PHIC SinveC E.
1413 OLD Mit h moaD. wroMisteNG Pa teet0
23 1
to almost a third to what they had been.
And the only patients 2
that were left were the ones that it would be difficult for 3
them to go home on their own.
You have a large number of 4
people on life-support systems.
You have people that have 5
undergone surgery recently and some in intensive care.
6 You have children, the babies in incubar. ors.
These 7
are things that I never thought of before, the potent.ial loss 8
of life in ordering an evacuation that isn't necessary.
9 And when you can't contain the evacuation when we 10 were convinced -- It is one thing to -- if we would have 11 ordered a five or 10-mile -- or the Governor would have order-12 ed a five or 10-mile evacuation at some point, that would have 13 immediately heightened the concern.
We already had people y
leaving within considerable distances because of this fear of the unknown.
15 16 That is just difficult to anticipate, what would have 37 happened in the hospitals.
Could we have kept them?
Would we 18 have been forced to continue the evacuation out some distance?
39 Would we have lost lives in moving these people?
Those are 20 great concerns.
And we discussed them considerably.
~
We tried to make sure if,an evacuation became 21 22 necessary that we would have the ambulances available, the l
23 litters.
We were working very closely with Mr. Adamcik to 1
24 get federal assistance.
l 25 0
Would it have required a substantial federal response wowc= sm.oon.. ic senwice sais oto u.66 nomo w ro u....
o, p.
i..io
24 I
1 from a resource standpoint to evacuate 10 miles or more?
2 l
A The 10-mile evacuation, if I remember correctly, did i
3 not require a substantial amount of resources in the near term.
4 In the long term, of course, if these people would be at the 5
evacuation centers, the more difficulty we have.
6 The biggest requirement was for ambulances, and those 7
were being moved into position, as I understand it, by the 8
federal government.
9 A 20-mile radius, of course, would have required a 10 considerabic amount of blankets and beds and so forth beyond 11 what we could get from the American Red Cross and other 12 agencies.
But the Red Cross was able to supply most of the 13 equipment that was required, with the exception of the 14 ambulances.
15 0
I assume you were at most if not all of the press 16 conferences and major meetings and so forth held by the 17 Governor, at least from Friday on if not before?
18 A
Right.
Prior to Friday I had intentionally stayed 19 away from the Governor's office.
I thought at that point 20 there were enough resources involved.
And I think the magni-21 tude of the crisis certainly escalated between Wednesday and 22 Friday morning.
So, I am relatively unaware of what happened 23 other than what I read on Wednesday and Thursday.
24 From Friday morning through the following Wednesday 25 or Thursday, I was, with a few notable exceptions, present at WOhicot STthocaapusc trav8CE 1413 OL D MILL AC AO wf 0MtS$1NG PA 19650
25 1
those meetings.
2 0
At these meetings, was Colonel llenderson or his 3
representative present for most of them?
4 A
Most of the meetings, he was present.
5 0
He was present?
6 A
Yes.
7 0
Apparently, the Governor decided at some time early 8
on, I guess, to rely primarily on his press conferences to 9
disseminate information to the public.
And there was some 1
IL concern, apparently, at the county level and even at PEMA, 11 apparently, that they were getting information late or after 12 the press and public.
13 We were wondering why there was not maybe a simul-taneous information release to the counties or PEMA or other ja state agencies at or about the same time as the press con-15 ferences.
16 A
If you look at press conferences for what I think 77 18 they were was a public statement of exactly what the position was at that point in time.
And if you look at the time lapse 39 between the attainment of the information and the statement to 20 the press, you will find in almost every case it was a matter 21 f minutes.
22 23 One thing that impressed me throughout this whole l
24 series of* meetings was the fact that virtually everything was released to the press 'and everything was released publicly 25 l
l WONtCK ST E NOGh a poeic,s g a y ec t g483 OLD M'LL SOa D. WrousSS'NG Pa stelo
26 1
very shortly after it was received by the Governor, and that 2
Mr. Denton certainly maintained a complete flow of information 3
both to us.
And normally we would hear it and he would walk 4
out and give it to the press.
5 The same thing was true with the Governor as far as 6
all the information that we had.
I suppose if we would have addressed those releases perhaps differently, it would have 7
8 made people feel differently.
I am not sure it would have 9
changed the flow of information.
10 I think the information was there as soon as it 11 possibly could have been there.
It was maybe the means of 12 communication that bothered people as far as -- I think it was 13 almost more -- I don't want to say it -- how do I want to say 14 it?
A feeling that just had no substantiation, that there was 15 more information than they were getting.
It just wasn' t true.
16 Maybe that feeling could be ameliorated by taking some other 17 action.
18 Q
I was wondering about the timing of what one might, 19 call a normal official established means of communication 20 through PEMA and the counties, if that could have been done 21 simultaneously, or if there was a decision to do it --
22 A
It was being done simultaneously, but it was being 23 done through the vehicle of a press statement.
And, you know 24
-- under normal times, one would tell all concerned parties 25 before the press statement was made, but there really wasn't l
o~ica sitwoon.
.c ssavice iso oto mitt no o w,ouissino p.
... o I
27 1
that kind of time lapse.
2 Q
Was PEMA and the other state agencies -- maybe 3
Dauphin County -- advised as to the time of the press confer-4 ences ahead of time?
5 A
PEMA certainly would have been.
At least I say they 6
were.
To the best of my knowledge they were.
l l
7 O
APparently, the Governor established what one might I
8 call a command center to collect and evaluate information.
9 I guess it was staffed by.Mr. Waldman, yourself and several 10 others.
Could you identify the others that were customarily 33 involved in this process.
A Yes.
I am not sure the term command center -- I 12 13 i don't know if that is the right terminology or not.
Some of I
ja us were in the presence of the Governor more than others.
And 15 maybe -- I don't think there was any kind of designation as such.
16 37 The people that were pres,ent most of the time were, 18 certainly, the Lieutenant Governor, myself, Mr. Waldman, Paul Critchlow and Jim Seif.
j9 The next level or degree of contact which was maybe 20 n t there quite all the time but almost was Gordon Macleod, 21 Secretary of Health, Secretary of Environmental Resources.
22 23 And when I say these people, they would bring different aides and have different aides with them and some of their staff.
24 25 But they were sort of the focal points.
M O h eC et ST E h0G R a #M'C,S E RveC E 1413 O L O w L L nC a D WTOMistehG PA 194t0
28 1
And not quite as often as those two, but toward --
2 as the incident began to develop, Mr. Penrose Holowell, 3
Secretary of Agriculture.
Certainly Gordon MacLeod and Cliff 4
Jones were involved.
The Secretary of Environmental Resources 5
and Secretary of Health from the very beginning were present, 6
I would say, at almost all major meetings.
7 0
Did you mention a Mr. Seif?
8 A
Yes, he is Special Assistant to the Governor.
He 9
was present at a lot of meetings.
Mr. Henderson was present 10 at almost all the early meetings.
He was present at most of jj the meetings.
12 0
When did this group sort of come into being?
A There was no specific time.
It evolved.
When I 13 y
became involved on Friday morning, certainly it was -- for all practical purposes, it had already come together.
15 0
What were the basic sources of information supplied 16 to this group?
On whom were you basically relying?
j7 A
It really depended on the issue.
There was -- the 18 Lieutenant Governor was clearly responsible for the -- all of j9 20 the PEMA operations,and PEMA'does report to the Lieutenant G vern r.
All the information on radiation levels, on the 21 l
environment, of course, was coming through Secretarf Jones.
22 23 When we got into the problems -- with potential 24 problems With water and milk and so forth, the Secretary of 25 Agriculture also became involved, particularly with the milk.
M ONs C 4 Sif %OGR A PHIC et.veC t, tota OLD atsLL nonD wf0 wests %0 PA testo
1 29 1
The information principally came -- the technical 2
information came from Mr. Denton once he was -- And it really
)
3 became almost a sounding board for Mr. Denton.
Believe me 4
nothing he said was accepted at face value.
It was examined 5
and cross-examined and turned inside out, upside-down, until 6
we believed -- first that we understood what he was saying, 7
and secondly, that there was some faith in what he was saying.
8 Secondly, we relied in the early stages on Chairman 9
.Hendrie in calling him.
I believe if you look at the itinerary, 10 we probably had three phone calls -- three very long phone 11 calls.
And most of them were on the speaker phones with most i
12 of the people I have mentioned in the room.
13 Q
Friday morning --
14 A
There was one, I believe, Friday morning at 10:00 15 o' clock.
There was one at 11:45,and one later in the after-16 noon.
We had a call with Mr. Denton on the speaker phone in l'7 the afternoon, a meeting with Mr. Denton that evening.
18 You P.now, those -- the information was coming in, 19 and it was a question of filtering the information, of making 20 sure that you believe the information and making sure that 21 you are asking the right questions so that you are getting 22 full information.
And not even necessarily that these people 23 are trying to keep information from you, but it is just what 24 is important to you, they may not appreciate.
And so that was 25 the role played by this group, if you call it a group, to 1
MONsCm ST tNOGR A P*seC.S E pvsCE tel3 OLD MtLL ROAD wv0Ms5 51%G. Pa 19650
30 1
1 serve that function.
2 0
So, is it fair to say that basically the cognizant 3
state agencies you were relying on was the NRC?
4 A
For substantive information.
5 0
You did mention Doctor Wald.
Were there any other 6
consultants,so to speak, or outside --
7 A
No.
And Doctor Wald was brought in at the suggestion 8
of the Secretary of 11ealth, and, as I understand it, he was
~
9 largely responsible for drafing the guidelincs for the NRC.
l So, he was a very credible source.
10 I
11 Q
You mentioned one lesson that might be learned from 12 TMI, namely that while one might plan f.or a specified, such 13 as a 10-milo radius of evacuation, one should also plan for a ja ripple effect.
Are there any other lessons that you think --
15 A
Well, that is certainly one lesson.
Another lesson 16 is the need for NRC or the appropriate agencies to re-think I'7 what those radiuscs are prior to an accident and develop some 18
-- you know, if you read the guidelines as I understand they 19 existed before, it wasn't even really a five-mile radius.
It 20 was, I believe, a radius of low population density, which in the case of Three Mile Island was two and a half miles.
21 i
l 22 So, you have all these conflicting kinds of numbers.
23 You have a two and a half mile-radius, you have a five-mile l
radius.
Then, we get into the discussion of this crisis and l
24 l
numbers were flippantly thrown around.
There was a press 25 Mo h e C IL STr%OGnApeesC,Stav'CE. 1412 OL D M'LL A0a D wv0 MIS Ss NG. Pa 19610
31 1
interview in -- Saturday in Washington in which Chairman 2
Hendrie said it might be 10 to 20 miles.
And that one small 3
statement and the problem that it caused in trying to put the 4
lid back on the population in Pennsylvania, it is hard to 5
exaggerate.
6 It seems to me if we had some reasonable basis for i
7 what the difference in those areas are and we established some 8
kind of radiuses and then stuck with them when we get into a 9
problem, we would be a lot.better off.
Plus'the fact that you 10 can't draw the line clearly and you have to be prepared for 11 the consequences, I think is important.
12 The other thing I think is important in emergency 13 preparedness for people to address is the whole concept of 14 fatigue and what it means to get into a crisis which is not 15 of a limited duration.
They all approached this as they do 16 a hurricane in which the thing is over in 24 or 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
17 And I have been on the periphery of some of these operations 18 in the Defense Department.
I at least have observed some 19 previously in long-term vigils, if you will, incidences that 20 were occurring around the world and the discipline that is 21 required in situations like this to.make sure that you get a 22 certain amount of sleep every day and that important decisions 23 may not occur in the first 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> but may occur three or i
24 four days down the road.
I think they weren't prepared to l
l 25 deal with that kind of a situation, and that is something that l
I t*O Na C R ST E h 0G R A Pte8 0,S E R W'C f.
1413 OL D M s L L RO a 0 WTOMtSSING. PA 19410
32 1
as we train people to deal in emergency preparedness, it is 2
very important that people -- people looked very shell shocked 3
Saturday.
4 It was a discipline that we established in the 5
Governor's office almost immediately.
There was always some-6 body around that was responsible.
But they made sure that we 7
didn't extend ourselves to the point that we became disfunc-8 tional.
I don't think that same principle was being applied 9
in the emergency management center.
By Saturday the people 10 looked overfatigued.
And we tried to insist that schedules jj be established that -- because you don't know when the impor-l tant decisions were going to be made.
And you had to have 12
\\
13 lsome reasonable degree of performance.
You know, those are ja the kinds of lessons that I suppose --
Had we had an evacua-tion, I suppose we would have learned much, much more.
15 16 0
Are there any ways in your mind that perhaps the 17 federal or even state agency response could have been a lictle 18 more effective?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Pragmatically effective?
O 21 A
Yes.
Mr. Denton's arrival on Friday afternoon, had 1
22 he arrived -- a person of that level and that credibility, t
23 had he arrived two days earlier would have made a fairly l
l 24 important difference.
Second, had we had the same response i
l l
25 as visibly on the evacuation site would have helped.
Mr.
MO hic K S T t h00 m a pMsC,$ t h weC E.
14 5 3 OLD MILL moa O. w ronsiste %G Pa 19480
33 1
Adamcik was detailed by the President and was given that 2
authority.
It wasn't communicated as clearly as it may have 3
been.
4 And had we known -- it took time to understand and 5
realize --
It took also -- from the very beginning I don't 6
believe that Mr. Adamcik understood what his charge was and 7
that we rcally clarified -- we had to clarify that through 8
calls to Mr. Watson.
Had you had a similar response on the 9
outside of the issue and had it occurred on Wednesday, let's 10 say, I think we could have had a very coordinated and smooth 11 running operation if we had had a federal advisor -- an 12 evacuation plan and a federal advisor on the technical aspects 13 on site on Wednesday.
14 of course, it is easy, obviously, to do these things 15 in retrospect.
And for tic future I think it is important, and 16 to very clearly identify their responsibilities.
17 Mr. Denton came knowing that he was the President's 18 special representative on the scene and had all kinds of 19 authority.
It took a little longer for Hr. Adamcik.
I don't I
20 think he was given as clear a mandate as he could have been l
21 given.
22 And the other thing I think that was important was 23 to make sure that these advisors know each other and, you 24 know, are prepared -- not that that was a problem here, but 25 it could have been.
That they know each other and are prepared.
M0h*CR ST f h00 ma sseeC.St evtC E tela OLD MILL ROAD WVoutSSING PA 19910
i 34 1
to work together.
I think that would have helped.
It would 2
have helped immeasurably in this particular thing.
1 3
Are you asking the questions as far as response to 4
an incident?
5 0
Yes. Yes.
I think the same question might be asked 6
as far as planning for an incident, but the question was with 7
regard to response.
8 Did the state suffer from perhaps the same kind of 9
a problem, a coming together?
You seemed to come together 10 once you realized that you had a serious event, and that is 11 human nature.
12 A
Yes, we did have the advantage.
I think the advan-13 tage in the state is that it is smaller than or focused on 14 the scene and that the Governor is in charge.
And, of course, 15 you don't have these problems as far as who is responsible.
16 Everybody knows who is responsible.
Everybody was cooperating 17 and working together.
I don' t think we had that problem.
18 I am not sure -- it seems difficult to analyze your-19 self as easily as it is to analyze others.
Maybe I will let 20 l somebody else analyze our response.
21 Q
You mentioned a difference between the response 22 per se and the planning.
Do you have any observation or more 23 effective planning or readiness?
24 A
Well, I --
a large part of the plans that exist l
25 really do depend upon the plan itself and the operators of the l
l uom.cn svamoomarme,stavice. iets oto usu nono wrouiss.=o na sesso l
35 1
plan.
You know, your protocols as far as the radiation side 2
of it, the evacuation side of it, are all triggered by infor-3 mation received from the plant.
4 It seems to me that somebody has to have clear 5
responsibility for making sure that the resources exist within
~
6 the plant and that is either the state government or the 7
federal government.
I believe at the current time, it is the 8
federal government that has that responsibility.
And I think, 9
you know,you can't start talking about evacuation plans from 10 the time -- you know, down the road.
You have to get back to 11 the very first day.
12 And I think one of the major shortcomings -- and 13 again I hate to be in a position of pointing the finger. at 14 everybody else -- but the capability from my observation just 15 simply wasn't there.
Again, I am not an expert.
16 Q
That is Met-Edison at the plant?
17 A
As far as early response, the technical expertise 18 that existed -- and that is the first step in all the evacua-19 tion plans as well as it is in the prevention of ea accident occurring.
So, I think -- that is very important.
20 j
21 Apart from that, one could talk-about having much 22 better, more detailed plans.
I think it is an important 23 exercise, but it is an exercise.
And when you get into the 24 actual incident occurring, you really have to adjust those plan s 25 dramatically anyway.
I am not sure we can do all that much me O h
36 1
betrer as far as it really being prepared if you have a change 2
of wind and -- you know.
But a better understanding, 3
obviously, it would help a lot.
Just a better understanding 4
of things I mentioned before and how the cycles change.
5 0
In your judgment -- and it is a judgment question, 6
I recognize -- but since you were rather heavily involved in 7
the plans themselves, and pragmatically involved rather than 8
a paper exercise, as you say, how long do you think that it 9
might have taken from the. time of notification, say, on 10 Wednesday to conduct a five-mile evacuation?
11 A
Again, it is very subjective.
Let me work back-wards.
On Saturday I think that could have been done in two 12 13 to three hours on a five-mile evacuation.
All I could say, ja it would be several times that amount, I believe, on Wednesday m rning.
You had more people in the area.
You had institu-15 16 ti ns -- at least a very large nursing home that had not been evacuated.
It had been by Sunday.
You also did not have the 37 18 psychological preparation for it.
19 It is very difficult for me to answer it other than 20 saying what it was by Saturday.
And Saturday, I think two to 21 three hours is a reasonable estimate.
So, we are talking about, 22 oh, pick a number as far as what it might be on Wednesday.
23 1
0 To your knowledge, did anyone look at the cost of 24 evacuation?
I don't really mean just the financial institu-25 tional cost but all the other kinds of costs, too, and maybe w o * 'C M ST E NOGn a ppsC *E t hy'C E lat a OLD ulLL noap wroutSssNe Pa 19410
37 I
the cost to society, loss of business and things like that.
2 Were there any estimates made of the balance on 1
3 I evacuation costs versus health and safety benefits of an 4
evacuation?
5 A
You know, it is interesting.
We kept looking at the 6
health and safety costs of an evacuation.
I don't think we 7
really looked at the economic cost of an evacuation.
I don't 8
remember it being a discussion, but we continually talked 9
about what was likely to be the cost of evacuation in terms 10 of human life, how we could control that.
11 Q
Were there any documents that you are aware of givine 12 estimates of this nature, perhaps from some of the hurricane 13 evacuation or statistics of that nature?
14 A
No.
No, but you know, in a hurricane evacuation, 15 if I understand correctly, usually a lot of people are not 16 evacuated from the hospitals.
And the reason they are not 17 evacuated from the hospitals is the risk of moving them is 18 greater than the risk of leaving them there.
19 We did have considerable discussions with the 20 Secretary of Health and others as to whether we could have 21 that kind of a situation.
I was not' convinced you could.
22 I really am not sure people would have stayed behind.
23 People are very neroic and -- Nurses and lab technicians in 24 staying behind who are threatened with their life.
But they 25 know what they are dealing with.
And it is interesting -- it
~
l l
womeen strwoonamme,senwice-tein oto west moao wron essewo. ra tesso I
i l
38 1
is like the question with the National Guard.
I think there 2
is no question that you could send the National Guard into a 3
flooding situation or hurricane situation.
What the response a
would be in this kind of situation is very difficult to say 5
because it has not been dealt with before.
6 But I don't believe you could take everybody out of
~
7 hospitals in a hurricane evacuation simply because we are 8
talking about -- we were really talking about a total evacua-I 9
tion.
And persons walking.into that hospital -- and he doesn't 10 know if' he is being exposed or not -- is one thing.
It is a y
lot different than a situation in going in a boat to the second floor.
12 13 0
The state law of 1978 -- I believe it was passed ja last year -- on emergency response appears to hinge emergency 15 response on the Governor's declaration of a disaster emergency.
16 Did the lack of such a declaration have any substantial effect j7 on state agencies and their ability to respond or react or 18 whatever is necessary?
A Not that I am aware of.
I think everybody responded 39 with the utmost capability to respond.
Certainly nobody held 20 back.
This was discussed certainly.
1 21 Again y u have to remember the pop"lation was one j
22 that was consumed with fear, at least from my
.-.arpretation, 23 l
24 during that period of time.
Anything that heightened that fear caused a response that was difficult to control.
And that 25 MON
39 l was always in the back of our minds.
1 I
2 The same thing with declaring it a state of national 3
emergency.
We discussed that with President Carter.
It was discussed with Mr. Watson and it was the same kind of conclu-4 5
sion.
That, steady as you go and try to be able to control response of individuals to the extent that we can as to what 3
7 the real danger is.
And --
8 0
Is it fair to say then that was the controlling 9
. reason why the emergency disaster was not declared by the 10 Governor?
A That and the assurances that were received from Mr.
jj Watson that we would receive an identical degree of federal 12 assistance if it were not declared.
And statewise, we really 13 had the capability, I believe, to do everything we could do.
ja There was nothing to be gained, and there was a risk.
15 Q
Anything else at this time that you would like to 16 state personally for the record that would enlighten us as to j
37 y ur activities or suggestions or observations regarding the 18 TMI incident?
39 A
I don't think so.
I think we pretty well covered 20 my limited involvement.
21 MR. ERNST:
Any questions from the Board?
77 l
l 23 MR. I! ERR:
No.
l 24 MR. SCilAMBERGER:
No.
25 MR. CIIIN :
Doctor Wilburn, you have been referring uosica straconarme, ssavecs iet s oto u LL nomo. wvouissis.o ra tosio
4 a__ _.
I to some notes.
May we request those notes?
2 TifE WITNESS:
Sure.
This is the chronology of the 3
TMI incident which we put together af ter the f act that would 4
help us remember what happened when.
5 MR. Cl!1N :
I would like to note for the record the 6
" Chronology of the T.M. I.
Incident" for the period March 28th 7
to April 1, Office of the Governor, 11 pages,as Exhibit No. 3.
8 (Exhibit No. 3 marked.)
9 MR. ERNST:
I want to thank you very much for your 10 time.
I found your statements to be very enlightening and n
helpful to our inquiry, 12 In conclusion, let me say this is an ongoing inves-13 tigation, and although I have completed the questions I have y
for you today, we may need to bring you back at come later time.
We will, however, make every effort to avoid having to 15 do so.
16 j7 I will now recess this deposition rather than
- g terminate it.
And thank you for your time and effort in being 19 here today.
Thank you.
20 (Thereupon, the deposition of Doctor Wilburn was 21 recessed.)
22 23 24 25 asOh,Ca Si t hoon a **seC st aveCt. tot 3 OLD usLL noap. wwoneesseNG PA t.650
41 1
CERTIFICATE 2
I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence 3
are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me 4
on the hearing of the foregoing cause, and that this copy is 5
a correct transcript of the same.
6 7
8 041Mi
$$/ b$"
Nancy O'Ut;/ill-Reucing, Reporte 9
Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 10 MONICK STENOGRAPIIIC SERVICE
~
11 12 My commission expires December 13, 1982.
13 14 15 16 17 1B 19 i
l 20 t
l 21 22 23 24 25 wo.eu src=oona*=.c scavect. ius o6e witt no o. wvouissiwa. ea i,sio i
[pa ascg'o UNITED STATES E"
'j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
..'l WASHING ton, D. C. 20555 a
September 4, 1979
$i,"
In Reply Refer to:
NTFTM 790904-01
,+
Dr. Robert C. Wilburn Secretary of Budget & Administration Room 238, capitol Building Harrisburg, Pa.
17120
Dear Dr. Wilburn:
I am writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for September 19, 1979 at 10:00 a.m.,
in a meeting room at the Holiday Inn Town motel, 2nd and Chestnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pa.
Picase bring with you a copy of your resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official NRC files, including any diary or personal working file.
The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
This Group is being directed independently of the NRC by the law firm of Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommendations for change. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the deposi-tion is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you.
However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place. Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person ~he wishes accompany him at the deposition as his representative.
I You should realize that while we will try to respect any requests for confiden-l tiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can make no guar-antees.
Names of witnesses and the information they provide may eventually become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem i
2 appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Information Act.
Moreover, other departments and agencies of government may request access to this information pursuant to the Prlvacy Act of 1974.
The informa-tion may tiso be made available in whole or in part to committees or sub-committees of the U.S. Congress.
A If you have testifled previously with respect to the Three Mile Island accident, it would be useful if you could review any transcripts of your previous statement (s) prior to the deposition.
~
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely, s1%).4$.$.
M Mitchell Rogovin, Director NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group e
0
ROBERT C. WILBURN
/ Room 238 Main Capitol Building / Harrisburg / Pennsylvania / 17120 /
EDUCATION Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey Doctor of Philosophy, Public Affairs (Economics), 1970 Dissertation Topic:
The Supply of Military Manpower Princeton University, Master in Public Affairs, 1967 Major enphasis on Macroeconomics, International Trade and Development, Quantitative Methods and Labor Economics -- Honors:
1965-66 Woodrow Wilson School Fellow and 1966-67 Public Affairs Fellow United States Air Force Academy, Colorado, Bachelor of Science (Economics), 1965.
Captain of Debate Team and Member of Cadet Forum.
MILITARY SERVICE Captain, United States Air Force.
Air Force Commendation Medal and Joint Services Commendation Medal.
EXPERIENCE From January 16, 1979 to the present -- Secretary of Budget and Administration, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
September, 1975 to January, 1979 -- President, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Indiana, Pennsylvania October, 1974 to August, 1975 -- Vice President and I
Director of Financial Planning Group, Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
1972 to 1974 -- Vice President and Director of Management Science Division, Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
1970 to 1972 -- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), Department of Defense.
Economist and Policy Analyst 1969 to 1970 -- Staff Economist for The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, White House 1969 -- Project Volunteer Study Group, Headquarters, United States Air Force.
Chairman, Air Force Project Volunteer Incentives Panel.
1967 to 1969 -- Directorate of Personnel Plans, Headquarters, United States Air Force.
Econometrician in the Analysis Division.
PERSONAL Married Patti-Ellen (Zuidema).
Two children, Jason, 8 and Jesse, 1.
j MEMBERSHIPS, Serve on the boards of several professional and PUBLICATIONS charitable organizations (list available on request).
Have published and co-authored five books during my 1
military career (list available on request).
l l
i
PUBLICATIONS: Municipal Developatnt in Guatemala: Matzatenango and Retalhulcu Casa Studies, publish:d in Spanish by Instituto Nacional de Administracion Para el Desarrolo, Novzmber 1966 (with J. I. Scheiner).
Economic Analysis of First-Term Re-Enlistment in the Air Force, AFFDPL-PR-69-017, September 1969 (with J. M. Quigley).
The Supply of Military Manpower: The Impact of Income, the Draft and Other Factors on the Retention of Air Force Enlisted Men, AF/DPXY-MR-70-009, August 1970.
A portion of this report was published in Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-
~
Volunteer Armed Force, November 1970.
A portion was also presented at the Southern Economic Association meetings in November 1970.
Cost-Benefit Analysis of AFIT Advanced Education, AF/DPXY-70-002, August 1970 (with S. W. Chapel).
Career Choice and the Supply of Military Manpower, P-896, published by the Institute of Defense Analysis, September 1972 (with G. Nelson).
Presentations to Professional Seminars:
Southern Economic Association, Annual Meeting Operation Research Society of America, Annual Meeting Numerous financial presentations rt O
l t
o 4
OTHER ACTIVITIES:
1974-1975 Committee for the New York Philharmonic 1975 American Cancer Society of Indiana County Board of Directors 1975 American Council on Education 1975 Big Brothers / Big Sisters Board of Directors 1975 Center for Community Affairs at Indiana University of Pennsylvania Established 1975 Indiana Arts Council Assisted in Establishing 1975 Operation Up-Lift Board of Directors 1975 United Way Board of Directors 1976 Pennsylvania Commission of State Vice Chairman for 1976 College and University Presidents Chairman for 1977-79 1976 Phi Mu Alpha Honorary Member 1976-1979 Trinity College Trustee Executive Committee Washington, DC 1977 Benjamin Franklin Symposium Address to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania 1977 American Economic Association 1977 Pennsylvania Association of State Executive Committee Colleges and Universities 1977 Phi Delta Kappa 1977 Opera Guild 1977 Pennsylvania Postsecondary Education Planning Commission's Standing Committee on Federal Programs 1977 State Board of Education Committees:
Task Force on Finance 1202 Commission Advisory Committee to State Board of Education.
1977 American Association of State Colleges I
and Universities Committees:
Council on College / Corporate l
j Relations l
Committee on Public Relations 1977 1-Cap Supported Work Program Advisory Committee i
1978 Bela Bartok Society of America, Inc.
Board of Directors 1978 Pennsylvania Council on Economic Education President i
1978 Indiana County Airport Advisory Committee Board member l
1978 Ur.ited Way of Indiana County Executive Committee member 1
1978 American Council on Education's Member Comm.'.ssion on Military-Higher Education Relations I
MARITAL STATUS Married, two children AND HEALTH:
Excellent Health i
4 I'
f J
l 1 e m
+
f Y
L% epry 0">
Chronology of THE T.M.I.
INCIDENT March 28 - April 1, 1979 Office of the Governor UEDNESDAY - MARCH 28, 1979 7:02 a.m.
TMI Supervisor notifies Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) watch officers that there is a " site emergency".
7:04 a.m.
PEMA notifies Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER).
7:08 a.m.
PEMA notifies Dauphin County.
7:12 a.m.
PEMA notifies Lancaster County.
7:20 a.m.
PEMA notifies York County.
7:36 a.m.
TMI notifies PEMA of " general emergency" status.
7:40 PEMA re-notifies 3 counties and appropriate Departments 7:50 a.m.
of Pennsylvania Government.
7:50 a.m.
PEMA notifies Governor of accident at TMI.
8:20 a.m.
PEMA notifies Lt. Governor.
9:05 a.m.
Governor calls Lt. Governor; requests report.
9:37 a.m.
Lt. Governor calls Governor; briefs him by phone.
10:55 a.m.
Lt. Governor Press Conference (See Transcript) 11:30 a.m.
Meeting:
Governor Lt. Governor DER Official Governor's Staff Lt. Governor's Staff
(..
mm
WEDNESDAY - MARCH' 28, 1979 (continued) 2:30 p.m.
Meeting in Lt. Governor's Office Mr. Herbine - Met Ed TMI Plant Manager Senator Ross Paul Critchlow - Governor's Office Mark Knouse - Lt. Governor's Office Dave Milne - DER Tom Gerusky - DER Peter Duncan - DER Bill Anderson - Department of Justice Gerusky reports on a release occurring between 11:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. and complains about lack of notification.
Herbine reports on procedures in use; this is a " normal ventilation"; remarks that "we might have to have some contro12ed steam venting."
When confronted regarding 11:00-1:30 venting, admits it and says "it didn't come up" during his press conference.
Notes "possible fuel damage."
4:30 p.m.
Lt. Governor's Press Conference (See Transcript) 6:00 p.m.
Knouse invites Higgins and Gallina of NRC to visit Lt. Governor (First NRC contact?)
8:45 p.m.
Meeting in Lt. Governor's Office:
Lt. Governor Galinna - NRC Higgins - NRC Fricss - DOE Jay Waldman - Governor's Office Paul Critchlow - Governor's Office
~
Mark Knouse - Lt. Governor's Office Tom Gerusky - DER Rep. DeWeese Galinna says " future emissions, if any, will be less than today's venting from auxiliary building";
also notes possibic core exposure.
9:33 p.m.
Lt. Governor calls Governor to brief and arranges later briefi a c' Governor's Home.
10:00 p.m.
Lt. Governor's Press Conference #3 (See Transcript) i 10:00 p.m.
Governor meets citizens at gate of Governor's Home.
l
WEDNESDAY MARCII 28, 1979 (continued) 11:00 p.m.
Meeting -- Governor's !!ome:
Governor Lt. Governor Iliggins - NRC Friess - DOE Galinna - NRC Tom Gerusky - DER Dave Milne - DER Mark Knouse - Lt. Governor's Office Paul Critchlow - Governor's Office Roland Page - Governor's Office p
' Ginny Thornburgh
(
John Thornburgh O
e 6
TIIURSDAY - MARCH 29, 1979 Morning:
Met Ed Press Conference Morning:
Lt. Governor calls members of Pennsylvania Congressional Delegation.
Morning:
Lt. Governor discusses possible site visit with his staff and Governor's staff.
10:30 a.m.
Governor authorizes Lt. Governor's visit.
12:30 -
3:15 p.m.
Lt. Governor at T.M.I.
2:30 p.m.
Signal Corps " hot-line" installed in Governor's Office.
3:45 p.m.
Lt. Governor reports to Governor and Governor's staff, plus Iliggins and Galinna.
5:15 p.m.
Governor's Press Conference (See Transcript) 7:00 p.m.
Critchlow roccives report of possible discharge of 40,000 gallons of water; phones Governor; begins " digging".
10:00 p.m.
Higgins calls Critchlow; discusses possibility of fuel damage and continued emissions.
10:00 -
Intermittent calls between Governor and Critchlow.
Midnight Midnight DER Secre.tary Cliff Jones issues statement about water discharge.
9 l
l
FRIDAY - MARCH 30, 1979 Early a.m.
PEMA reports emission to Lt. Governor.
8:58 a.m.
Lt. Governor reports emission to Governor's Office.
(Governor in transit to his office.)
9:00 -
9:45 a.m.
Critchlow confirms with Abraham of NRC that there was an emission, and that a Harold Collins of NRC
~
" recommends evacuation".
9:06 a.m.
Governor calls Lt. Governor; learns of emission, and the Collins recommendation.
9:24 a.m.
Lt. Governor calls Governor; further discussion.
9:59 a.m.
Governor places call to Chairman Hendrie.
10:00 a.m.
Lt. Governor visits PEMA.
Henderson (PEMA) calls Critchlow, advises that DER figures do not indicate evacuation.
10:00 a.m.
Governor reaches Hendrie; receives advice that people should stay inside, discusses children and pregnant women.
10:25 a.m.
Governor appears on WHP (live) to deal with evacuation rumors.
11:00 a.m.
Governor's staff begins legislative notification process.
11:15 a.m.
President Carter calls Governor:
1.
Concurs in the "no evacuation" decision.
2.
Inquires about Signal Corps line.
3.
Informs the Governor that Jessica Tuchman Matthews of his staff is assigned to this matter.
4.
Informs the Governor that his on-site personal representative will be Harold Denton.
l
FRIDAY - MARCH 30, 1979 (continued) 11:40 a.m.
Hendrie calls Governor:
1.
Says there will be future emissions.
2.
Reports on water pumping attempts.
3.
Advises that pregnant women and children should evacuate.
12:30 p.m.
Governor's Press Conference (See Transcript) 1:30 -
Jay Waldman speaks with Jessica Matthews; learns 3:00 p.m.?_,
that the situation is unprecedented; that the " worst case" was meltdown, and that lead time on meltdown could be 4-6 hours only.
Matthews also reports that Jack Watson will be coordinating for the White House.
2:00 p.m.
Waldman calls Jack Watons; asks to have Harold Denton visit Governor's Office.
3:08 p.m.
Governor calls Matthews, who confirms Waldman's conversation, and adds:
1.
There is a gas bubble present.
2.
The situatica is stable.
3.
There was a " conscious" venting this morning.
4.
There is a constant leak.
5.
There is work being done on the drain pipes.
6.
The core is hot, and its top is not covered.
7.
There is nobody with a good pictdre c; the situation.
8.
Denton and Fouchard are on the way.
3:25 p.m.
Jack Watson calls Governor.
0 FRIDAY - MARCH 30, 1979 (continued) 3:45 p.m.
Hendrie calls Governor 1.
Says core damage is serious, and Met Ed agrees that,it is.
2.
Bubble is present, but stable.
3.
No need for off-site protective response; explosion potential is los.
4.
1% meltdown chance, but 5% of chance of large unplanned releases.
4 :05 p.m. - Denton calls Governor; has been on site one hour and has assigned 4 task forces to study the situation.
1.
Release off-site is routine noble gas; no threat.
2.
1 - 20 mr/hr on the island.
3.
Fuel damage is significant.
4.
Bubble on top of core, possibly expanding.
5.
Need several days of analysis.
6.
Discussion of need for public briefing.
After the call, arrangements made for Denton's visit to.the Governor's Office.
4:30 p.m.
Watson calls Waldman; discusses declaration of emergency / disaster; feeling is that such an
~
action would generate public panic, and that, in any event, Pennsylvania is already receiving the same type and amount of assistance as if there was a declaration.
Also designates Bob Adamcik as federal liaison for emergency preparedness.
8:30 p.m.
Denton visits Governor's Office.
1.
Fuel damage is great, making this a unique case.
2.
No immediate need to evacuate, but Governor's order regarding pregnant women and children should stay in effect.
FRIDAY - MARCH 30, 1979 (continued) 8:30 p.m.
3.
There is still a slight chance of inter-(cont.)
mittent release.
4.
Worst case:
meltdown; with " billion dollar effect" and only " hours" of lead time.
5.
Non-evacuation,given its own dangers, can't be faulted, but you should have a plan ready.
6.
The bubble must be manipulated; critical
" puzzle" is that pressure must be lowered for cooling, but that would expand the bubble.
7.
Met Ed is " thin" on technical proficiency.
10:00 p.m.
Governor's Press Conference (See Transcript) e O
SATURDAY - MARCH 31, 1979 9:40 a.n.
Governor discusses PEMA with Jay Waldman.
10:00 a.m.
Governor assigns Dr. Robert Wilburn to review PEMA and operation.
10:05 a.m.
Wilburn meets with Lt. Governor.
10:30 a.m.
Waldman advises Watson of Wilhurn's " mission".
11:00 -
Wilburn at PEMA.
12:00 noon 1:00 p.m.
Denton briefs press.
2:00 p.m.
Governor, Lt. Governor visit evacuees at Hershey Park Arena.
2:45 p'.2.
Hendrie Press Conference in Washington, D.C.
3:00 p.m.
Wilburn briefs Governor on PEMA.
3:45 p.m.
Governor calls Denton; discusses Met Ed report that bubble is down by 1/3, learns that recort is in error.
Also discusses various percentages for hydrogen flammability / explosion.
4:25 p.m.
Governor calls Hendrie to clarify matters raised in Hendrie's press conference.
Hendrie recommends keeping pregnant women and pre-school children away for another night.
"Better today than 24 hrs, ago."
No precautionary evacuation is necessary, but procedure dictates readiness.
5:00 p.m.
Governor issues statement.
(See Attached) 5:45 p.m.
Critchlow and Jody Powell agree to coordinate fed / state public statements.
7:00 p.m.
Critchlow calls Gene Eidenberg (Watson's office) to discuss White House assessment of Pennsylvania Emergency Plan; learns the meeting to assess is still in progress.
8:15 p.m.
Eidenberg calls Critchlow; expresses "high degree of satisfaction" with plan; but mentions concerns over hospitals and nursing homes.
SATURDAY - MARCH 31, 1979 (continued) 8:27 p.m.
Governor receives copy of wire story about possible bubble explosion; this story touches off general confusion in the area.
Critchlow calls Denton to check the story and learns that the "explosiion" was simply a
" hypothetical", a " postulation".
Critchlow calls Governor, discusses possible statement.
9:30 p.m.
Denton arrives at Capital; Governor suggests his diversion to Capital newsroom to put explosion story to rest.
10:10 p.m.
Governor and staff meet with Denton and Fouchard:
1.
"No'near-term explosion problem" though bubble is still 90% of its original size.
2.
Recommends schools stay closed.
3.
Discusses general technical situation.
4 Med Ed is " thin" on technical personnel.
During this meeting, President Carter's visit the next days is confirmed.
11:00 p.m.
Governor and Denton's Press Conference (See Transcript) a 9
s-
SUNDAY - APRIL 1, 1979 9:00 a.m.
Lt. Governor, Secretary Wilburn, Senator Gekas and Dauphin County officials meet to discuss pre-paredness plans.
12:20 p.m.
Governor departs for Middletown for President Carter's visit.
1:00 -
3:00 p.m.
President Carter at T.M.I.
4:20 p.m.
Lt. Governor hosts meeting in Governor's Conference Room for emergency preparedness personnel, including Adamcek.
1.
Discussion of evacuation radius; NRC requires only 5 miles (regulation) and 10 miles is absolute limit, medically.
No further discussion of 20 miles.
2.
Governor arrives, asks Adancek for assess-ment of local preparations by next morning.
3.
Sacretary McLeod (Pennsylvania Department of Health) notes that available stock of potassium iodide is defective, with no labels on half the bottles, poor instruc-tions and droppers which don't fit.
7:00 p.m.
Governor issues statement.
(See Attached)
G:45 p.m.
Governor, Lt. Governor meet with Hendrie and Denton:
1.
Discussion of bubble status.
2.
Governor raises "Mr. Collins" evacuation I
statement, and Hendrie disclaims knowledge.
9:50 p.m.
Governor briefs Pennsylvania legislative leaders at his home.