ML19322C234
| ML19322C234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1979 |
| From: | Henderson O PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001160661 | |
| Download: ML19322C234 (95) | |
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N U C L E A R R E G U L AT O R 't COMMIS5!CN i
i IN THE MATTER OF:
l THPIE MILE ISLAND i
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS i
I DEPOSITION OF ORAN K.
HENDERSON i
I I
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I Place -
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Date -
Thursday, 20 September 1979 Pages 1 - 86 Telechone:
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1 CR 7186 I
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Ui!TED STATES CF A:1 ERICA 9/20/79 2h iUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3'
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4l In the Matter of:
Sj THREE MILE ISLAND l
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS 6
______________y, 7l 8
INTERVIEW OF ORAN K.
HE'IDERSON 9;
Holiday Inn Town 2nd and Chestnur Streets 10 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania i
ll i Thursday, 20 September 1979 j
9:00 a.m.
12 :i l
APPEARANCES:
13 1i l
ROBERT CHIII, ESQ.
14 fiALCOLM L.
ERNST FREDERICK HERR 15 ROBERT SCIIAMBERGER NRC Special Inquiry Group on T:iI 16 6935 Arlington Road Bethesda, Maryland 17 l
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2 rco 9/20/79 C O N T E li TS 2f WIT:!ESS E X A ".I::A T I O N i
3' Oran K.
Henderson 4
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8 EXHIBIT IDE:TIFIED 94 i
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PROCEEDINGS 2 i!
Whereupon, I
3' t
ORAN K.
HENDERSON l
4i was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 5
was examined and testified as follows:
i 6'
MR. ERNST:
State your full name and position for t
e 7-the record?
8:
THE WITNESS:
Oran K.
Henderson, Director, I9'I Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, Commonwealth of i
10 Pennsylvania.
11 l MR. CHIN:
Colonel Henderson, I will show you a i
12 1 document, marked Exhibit 1, inviting your testimony this 13 morning before the nuclear Regulatory Agency Special 14 Inquiry Group.
Is this tne document marked Exhibit l?
15 THE WITNESS:
Yes, I have that.
16 (Henderson Exhibit No. 1 identified.)
17 MR. CHIN:
Do you understand the information 18 contained in the lutter concerning the inquiry and the 19 fact that you may have an attorney present if you choose 20 and that the information you provide today may eventually l
21 become public?
l 22 THE WITNESS:
I do, and I do not elect to have i'
23 an attorney present.
24 l w. e n,.., e,,,,
MR. CHIN:
Thank you.
I would like to note for 25 the record tha-Colonel Henderson is not represented by m[
la Mk IM);S5thh no L
4 I
Il counsel today.
2 Colonel, at any time during this interview you feel that 3l you need a counsel or elect to have a counsel present, 4
please advise me and we will adjourn rhis meeting so you 5
can make the necessary arrangements.
Is this procedure 6'
agreeable with you?
7:
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
8l MR. CHIN:
Is this document, labeled Exhibit 2, 9
with your name, Colonel Henderson, at the top, a resume
~10 you brought for this deposition?
11 THE WITNESS:
That is correct.
Except it doesn't 12 have colonel at the top.
13 MR. CHIN:
I see.
It's marked Oran K.
Henderson.
14 (Henderson Exhibit No. 2 identified.)
15 MR. CHIN:
fir. Ernst?
16 EXAMINATION 17 BY MR. ERNST:
18 Q
Colonel Henderson, what responsibility does 19 PEMA have for assuring the existence of county and local 20 plans and that such plans and staffing are adequate and plans 21 capable of being implemented?
l 22 A
PEMA, by law, ha' the responsibility to assist the counties within the Commot.5 alth of Pennsylvania to I
24
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develop all risk / hazard plans.
Under the PE!!A Act, we 25 have the authority to review these plans and to direct
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changes.
2 I f
I would point out, however, that the PEMA Act is an 3!
l act that came into being the 26th of :Tovember of 1978.
4l l
Under our previous act, we did not have such authority.
S{i I would also point out that the staffing at the county 6l' level is the responsibility of the county elected officials
~
7l and that the coordinator is directly responsible to the i
8l county commissioners and not to PEMA, except in a cooperative 9
type of a manner.
10 O
As perhaps a point of clarification, when we 11 are speaking of PEMA, as we did in the last minute or so, 12 are you thinking of the element of PEMA of which you are 13 director or the entirety of PEtiA which includes the council?
14 l
In other words, dobs your specific staff organization have 15 the responsibility you described or the council as a whole?
16 A
Well, I'm speaking of the agency necessarily, 17 because I am the director of that agency.
There is a council 18 over the PEMA agency which is responsible for providing 19
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overall guidance and direction to the agency.
20 Q
So your reply is with respect to your organization?
21 A
Well, my reply as far as the authority, I'm 22 referring to the act itself which directs each and every 23 l
municipality within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 24
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to establish an emergency management organization, but it I
25 1 does not make any arrangements for the direct control o$ $
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C 1(l these subordinate agencies to either the council or the 2h
- l PEMA agency.
3!
i O
Your statement that PEMA reviews and may direct i
4 changes to emergency plans, that is your organization of St I
which you are director?
t 6;
A That is correct.
7!
l 0
State law, as I guess you just pointed out, 8I does require that each political subdivision establish 9!
i an organica. tion for civil defense and to develop plans 10 l 1
in accordance with the state plan and program and to provide i
Il l training.
Were all local emergency coordinators within the 12 l 20-mile radius of TMI appointed at the time of TMI?
13 A
All county emergency management coordinators, yes.
14 Q
But not local?
15 A
Not necessarily.
We had -- I can't state the 16 exact number of letters requesting appointment, something 17 in the neighborhood of 80 to 100 throughout the commonwealth 18 in our hands or in process at the time of the TMI incider.t.
19 So I am uncertain as to whether any of those were in the jg 20 20-mile area or not.
t 21 i
Q This 00 to 100 is the sum total of appointments 22 or requests for appointments ac that time?
l A
That is correct.
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24 l w.,sw non.,,, inc, Q
And is it correct that there are about 2200 such 1
l 25 i
political subdivisions in the Commonwealth?
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l 1q, There's 2637 political subdivisions within the A
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r Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
3 Q
What local plans applicable to TMI were in effect i
4 at the time of THI?
i 5
A The local plans were the county five-mile evacuation 6l plans.
I 7
Q But no local plans -- I'm differentiating from the 8
state, county, and local.
There are no local plans?
9l A
I understand that.
As far as I am aware, there were i
10 l no written local plans directly addressed to TMI.
11 Q
There were county plans though?
12 A
Correct.
13
15 A
They were on file at PEMA and reviewed.
As to 16 whether they had been commented upon or not, I rather doubt 17 it.
Under our old law, State Council Civil Defense Act of 18 1951, there was no provision in that law for the state to f
19 compel any changes.
i k
20 Q
Who in your organization would be responsible for f
21 the review and comment of local plans -- of county plans?
22 A
The person responsible for the filing of the plans t
23 and the maintenance of those plans is my operations 24 section, headed by Dick Lamison L-a-m-i-s-o-n.
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23 Q
What was done during the TMI accident, that period i
I
0 I
1 j
of time of a week after the TMI accident, with regard to I
2 [! establishing adequate local p?ans?
3 l
A Immediately upon notification on the 23th of 4,
March that an incident had occurred at Three Mile Island, i
1 5l I did review the local -- the county plans chat we had in 6
our possession.
We also requested the three affected 7l counties at that particular time for them to also review l
8f their plans and to upgrade them as necessary.
9!
l On Friday, when the parameters for possible protective 10 I action were increased to ten miles, wo immediately initiated 11 action at our headquarters and at the county level to i
12 1 increase their planning out to a range of ten miles.
13 When the information was given to us that it would be more 14 prudent to have plans out to 20 miles, we then commenced 15 a major revision, since none of the five-mile plans lent 16 '
themselves to merely being extended out to 20 miles.
In all of the five-mile plans, each of the three affected 18 counties could take care of their own people within their 19 county boundaries.
Generally, within the ten-mile area, 20 they could, with some minor exceptions, the counties could do the same.
However, when the protective action range had 22 been increased to a distance of 20 miles, only two counties, 23 Perry and Lebanon, were capable of housing any evacuees into 24 their own counties.
The other four counties would have l
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25 needed extensive support from other counties for a total of 6
i E.
i 9
j!
l 22 or 23 additional support counties to provide the kind of 2i hosting facilities that would be required.
3!
Q Is it fair to say then that the local planning i
4I for this was sort of done in conjunction with the preparation I
5-1 of the county plans at that time?
6' A
Yes.
7 0
There were not discrete local plans being developed, Bi; they were under the auspices of a county plan?
I 9
A They were under the auspices of the county, 10 and generally, the county emergency management coordinator 11 1 l
l and or the county commissioners brought in the local 12 emergency management coordinators or the local elected 13 officials from the various segments of the communities i
14 such as the chamber of commerce, the police, the fire 15 representatives, and detailed the planning that was being 16 done and the requirements that would be placed upon them.
That is correct.
18 l
0 What is the current status of appointment of local i
19 coordinators?
20 A
All local coordinators, from whom we have applica-21 tions from the elected officials for appointment, have been made with the exception of maybe 15 or 20 that might be 4
23 in process through -- we have a procedure upon receipt of i
24 4..>
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a request for appointment to process it through the 25 Pennsylvania State Police for an agency background check i,
I i
If
10 Ijl before we make recommendatiens to the governor for the 2h appointment.
So all local appointments have been made excent 3
for those that are in process.
4l Q
When you say "all local" you mean the 2600?
i A
Well, I don't mean exactly the I600.
I mean more 5
6' in the neighborhood of 2200, since we have approximately 400 municipalities that because of their location or 7
because of an agreement that they have entered into with gl.
9l either the county or another municipality, they do not, l
under our standards, require to have an iridependent 10 i
i 11 l coordinator.
I 12 l Q
So in essence, you have processed, since TMI, 13 about 2100 appointments and recommendations to the governor?
14 Thereabouts?
15 A
No.
That's our total.
We experience about a ten 16 percent turnover in local municipal directors each year, 17 so we're talking about, say, 220 each year that we have to 18 process for reappointment.
At the time of TMI, approximately 19 30 to 100 were in process and had not at that particular k
20 time been appointed.
21 O
Nell, maybe we better go back on the record then.
22 My first question was --
23 A
I didn't realize we were off the record.
24 Q
No, I mean go back in the record a little bit.
Ace-Leret Hoporte,1, Inc.
25 I think I can resurrect my original question.
My original i
4
i 11 l'
l, question was, how many local coordinators had been appointed 2l J
at the time of TMI, and I thought you had responded that 3l 8
there were 80, 90, thereabouts, either appointed or in process.
i s'
A No.
There are approximately 2200 local 5.I I
coordinators within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
These 6!'
have all previously been appointed by former governors of the 7
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
8l Q
And you had 80 or so in process at the time for 9
reappointment?
10 A
80 or so who were being replaced; that is correct.
11 0
I think that's an important clarification of the record.
Thank you.
13 l What legal or administrative measures were taken to 14 insure that emergency planning at the county or local 15 level was adequate and eompatible to the state plan?
16 I should say, had been taken, since you had no local plans 17 at the time of TMI.
We're interested in what measures 18 have been taken to insure the development of adequate 19 i
local plans since TMI?
20 l l
A Well, under our organizational arrangement, the state is responsible for the county, the county is 22 l
responsible for the local governnent.
We do not, at the state level, work directly with local government in the 24 a 4 e c.oon.,. ine.
development of plans.- We assist the county government 25 where they request that assistance in the development of i
l l
e 12 I
1 I
plans or the providing of training to local directors.
But.
2 0 I
basically, by law, the training of local directors is the i
3' i
responsibility of the county coordinators.
I 4
We condact, on a regular basis, training seminars designed to improve the professionalism of the county 6
emergency management coordinator and his staff in the planning
'l and to make them more effective managers for disasters.
I8' This is an ongoing program.
l 9
Q But PEMA has no responsibility or authority for 10 i the review and comment on local plans?
11 A
That is correct.
12 !
Q That is a county function?
13 A
That is correct.
i 14 O
What funding for equipment and people is present 15 for civil defense at the county and local levels?
16 A
It varies at each county from zero monies in 17 Green county to several hundred thousand dollars in other, 18 in the more highly-populated counties.
19 At the local level, I know within the Commonwealth of i
20 only nine boroughs or townships that provide any funding 21 for civil defense or emergency management.
22 Q
And that includes predominantly state funding or 23 predominantly federal?
24 A
Predominantly local funding matched with some A=4ews neomn. =.
25 federal funding.
4
12 l
4 1
Q Do you have a so-called emergency operation center 20 f
that's located in your headquarters?
3i 1
A Yes.
i 4!
O What is the equipment and staffing at that center for i.
5; a response like TMI?
I 6'
A We have our own staff which numbers at our central j
7:
l headquarters here approximately 45 people.
We have three i
6' area headquarters that also have underground protected 9
facilities, and I have five personnel in each of those.
i 10 t We also maintain a warehouse at Fort Indiantown Gap, 11 j
and a radiological instrument shop at Fort Indiantown 12 1 l
Gap.
During periods of emergency, we have what we term i
13 "a response team mechanism" wherein each of the 15 or 16 14 state agencies plus volunteer organizations such as the 15 Mennonites and the American Red Cross send representatives 16 to our emergency operations center.
17 We conduct quarterly training excercises with these i
18 response team members to keep them familiar with our 19 operational procedures.
They, in turn, have the authority 20 from their respective secretaries to act for and on behalf I
21 of that secretary and to commit resources of that 22 department in support of the state's response to the 23 particular disaster or emergency.
24
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We have approximately 100 tslephone lines coming into 25 3
our agency.
We have another 100 telephone lines that are I
l 14 1,
y in reserve, need only to hook a telephone on the end of them.
2i]
We have a teletypewriter communications system, dedicated 3
i teletypewriter communications system, that ties together 4:
i our office with our three area headquarters and with all G7 5
counties.
It is also tied into the Defense Civil Preparedness 6!
Agency at Olney, Maryland, and it is tied into the National 7r Weather Service in Harrisburg.
8l We have a radio capability which we share with the 9
Pennsylvania Game Commission that ties our headquarters 10 '
with our three area headquarters.
We have approximately 11 110 to 115 portable radios available in our emergency 12 1 l
operations center.
We have an emergency communications 13 van that has the capability of interfacing with all of the 14 i
various communications means used by other agencies of the 15 Commonwealth which we can crosspatch one to the other if 16 the need arises.
17 0
These telephone lines, are any of them dedicated, 18
+
or do they all go through a switchboard?
19 A
Only eight lines go through the switchboard.
The 20 other lines bypass the switchboard.
At the time of TMI, 21 we installed six dedicated lines, one to each of the risic 22 counties.
O The 92 lines or whatever that do not go through a 24 i
Am. ewes Roomn. W.
switchboard, where do they go?
l 25 A
Each of our response teams' members, each state i
1
I 15 1
1 agency has its own emergency telephone number.
During of
^l periods of activation of our emergency operations center, 3
the response team member from the state agency is required 4
to flick a switch on his desk in his normal office, and the 5l f
phone starts ringing then down in our EOC.
This is 6!
one of the lines.
I 7'
He also has, each agency also has a telephone line that 8'
functions through our switchboard.
And he has o third i
9 telephone which is independent of the switchboard and 10 independent of this emergency number that he always has 11 direct access to for outside calls.
That number is not published.
The only number that ir published is the 13 number that goes through our switchboard, plus the agency l
14 emergency number.
I 15 i
O Then all hundred of these lines go through an 16 exchange, might not go through your switchboard, but go 17
'hrough an exchange?
18 A
That's correct.
19 O
None of these are dedicated lines?
20 A
That's correct, none of them are dedicated.
21 Q
I understand.
22 A
Now, also, I have a direct line to the governor's 1
23 i
switchboard from my desk which is, in effect, a dedicated i
24 line.
It is only used for emergency purposes.
I also have 25 a similar line to the lieutenant governor's office.
i i
I I
16 l
l' Additionally, we have the DCPAs or NAWAS, National 2 "1 Warning System telephone hookup, into our agency.
3 Q
What role does PEMA play in coordinating out-of-state 4I i
responses such as DCPA and FDAA?
i 5
l A
Well, we are the principal acency for interfacing 6-Defense Civil Preparedness Agency; and in times of disaster, 7
with the FDAA, under a presidential-declared disaster.
8l.
I am also, by law, the state coordinating officer, so 9
I would interface directly with the federal coordinating 10 officer following a presidential declaration and the 11 appointment of a federal coordinating officer.
12 0
Then you or your office was the principal state 13 coordinating group with these federal agencies during TMI?
14 A
That is correct.
15 0
According to the state law, there is a provision 16 that states that the council may delegate authority to the 17 director in the areas of -- whatever authorities they choose to, in the area of fiscal planning, administrative, opera-19 tional and other duties.
What authorities have been delegated 20
~
to you as director of PEMA by the council?
(
21 A
I would disagree with your interpretation of the 22 law.
It is my recollection that the law states that the 23-council will hire a director who will have the overall 4
24 A...
n m n.im.
responsibility for the administration, fiscal planning, 25 training, et cetera, of the agency.
17 l
1I l
(Paus e. )
j 2
THE WITNESS:
Well, after having reviewed that, 3i l
do agree with you that it appears that the council is 4
charged in the act with assigning certain specific I5' l
responsibilities.
I have no record that would indicate 6i that the council specifically charged me with anything 7j l
except the total mission of the agency which I have assumed all along under the previous administration as well as this 9
administration.
10 MR. ZRNST:
Off the record, please.
11 (Discussion off the record. )
12 MR. ERHST:
Back on the record.
I 13 BY MR. ERNST:
14 Q
After the TMI accident, when were Pennsylvania 15 Emergency Management Council meetings held?
16 A
We held the first and only council meeting 17 on Friday afternoon, the 30th of March, at approximately 18 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />.
As required by law, the chairman must call 19 the council into session within 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> following a 20 disaster.
21 Q
How long did this council meeting last?
22 A
Approximately 45 minutes.
i O
And do you recollect what was discussed at the 24 44 o n==n.n, ve.
' meeting, or what was decided?
l' 25 A
Basically, the lieutenant governor gave a i
10 1l recap of his understanding of the incident at Three Mile 2l Island.
Each of the council members then gave a report 3i of what their agency was involved in in relation to Three l
4' Mile Island.
I then gave a recap of what I expected from l
5l' each agency as far as their response team membership was 6;
concerned.
7' O
The lieutenant governor is the designated head I
1 8'
of the council, chairman of the council?
9 A
He is the chairman of the council, appointed by l
10 the governor in late January of 1979.
11 Q
Were any charges of responsibility made by 12 the lieutenant governor to any of the agencies including 13 '
yourself?
14 A
I cannot recall of any specific direction.
15 O
The state emergency plan appears to specify 16 different radiological responsibilities for PEMA for 17 nuclear bomb, fallout, or war, s opposed to nuclear power 18 plant accidents.
Why is this?
19 A
Prior to the TMI incident, the responsibility for 20 l planning or response to a fixed nuclear incident was the 21 responsibility of our bureau of radiation detection, DER, 1
t 22 the Department of Environmental Resources.
The 23 Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and its predecessor 24 organization, the State Council of Civil Defense, has, Ace Fw..,9 Reporte,s, Inc.
25 through the years, received approximately 50 percent of its
i
_n I
funding from the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency which 2
is a Department of Defense agency.
And as a consequence, 3
the thrust of our earlier programs has aluays been i
d!
enemy-attack related.
t I
5' It was only in the, perhaps, late 60s or early 70s that 6;;
we began taking an increased interest and role in natural 7
disasters, although we had participated in the late 50s in 8
the natural disaster scene.
It was always an annual i
9 debate with the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency as to-how far we could legally go utilizing DCPA funds to prepare 10 II ourselves for the natural man-made kinds of disasters.
I 12 Approximately two years ago, the director of the 3
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency issued for the first time Id a policy statement which authorized the states to utilize i
IS Defense Civil Preparedness Agency funds for plans and programs,
16 I
associated with emergencies of a non-war nature.
I7 Q
Did you at that time then pick up responsibility I8 for fixed facilities from DER or some -- let me go back.
I9 As I understand it, you had very little to do with fixed 20 facilities before, then you picked up some responsibilities i
4 21 in communications and resources, areas like that.
But 22 DER still has a large responsibility in assessment of i
i i
23 radiological hazard.
Is that true?
Did you pick up some a
24 responsibilityforfixedfacilitiesacoupleofyearsago,butf we.o.o n.conen, inc.
25 1
c.).early not all?
i i
l
3 20 l
1 i
i:
A A couple of years ago, when we issued -- which 2
would have been in August or September of 1977 -- our 3I l
present state disaster and operations plan, we recognized a 4
void in the response planning for fixed nuclear sites.
l At that time, DER was working and had been working on a 6'
statewide plan.
i 7
In the absence of an approved plan, we, PEMA, arbitrarily 8'
published Annex E as a stopgap measure to our operations 9
plan, believing that eventually DER would come up with 10 I
a total response packet.
Simultaneously, we, perhaps 1
11 '
recognizing something of a shortcoming in this area, 12 entered into an agreement between myself and the i
secretary of the Department of Environmental Resources, 14 i
outlining our responsibilities.
15 This agreement basically provided that DER would 16 l continue to be the lead agency in fixed site planning.
It 17 was only after the 28th of March that PEMA reassuned, 18 with the council's concurrence, the responsibility for 19 fixed nuclear site planning.
O Do you think the current arrangements are 21 adequate operationally?
2
A Are you speakinc of the current arrangements 23 between DER and ourselves?
I 24 O
Under the 1977 emergency plan where there is Ace howW Reconen, Inc.
responsibility in DER for assessment, radiological assessment, i
l' 71 I
i l'
i and you are responsible, as I understand it, for b,
2 '!
I communications and resources and other 'ypes of protective i
3i measures?
2 t
4 A
Well, yes, the arrancement is satisfactory.
5 i
I don't believe that either the Bureau of Radiation 6 i Protection nor the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency 7
is adequately funded or staffed to do what now appears to al i
be the job that needs to be done.
O It seems that the public law of last year in 10 the emergency planning area does not recognize a difference 11 between radiological catastrophes from war #are as compared
~
12 to fixed facilities.
Is this true that PEMA could r
13 be construed to have the same responsibilities for both types 1
14 t
of radiological occurrences under state law?
15 i
A Well, it is my translation of the law that we 16 j
have total responsibility for all disaster response planninc 17 or for planning and response, whether it be from natural i
disasters, man-made disasters, and or enemy attack.
We also i9 have a provision in our law that we may not duplicate the 1
20 functions or activities of any other state agency.
Therefore, 21 not only legally -- well, therefore, legally, we must 22 function through other state agencies.
And ours is a 23 coordinating role.
24 AwFMwel Roorws. W.
O So you are still maintaining the coordinating 25 role under your agreement or memo of understanding with DER I
i l
l 1
1 I
on those shared responsibilities?
ij 4
2 'L A
Well, the memorandum of understanding is basically I
3 i
no longer -- although it is still, the instrument is still 4
in effect.
At our last council meeting, which -- it was 5
either April or May; I can't recall the date of it --
t 6
we informed the council of our proposed course action.
l 7'
And the council concurred in this actior to reassume full 8
responsibility for the response plan, for the planning 9l for response to fixed nuclear sites.
10 So this, in effect, negates the agreement between myself and 11 the secretary of DER.
O This then will require a change in the state
~
plan of 1977?
l 14 A
Absolutely.
O The State Disaster Operations Plan of 1977 16 states that direction and control of state emergency 17 operations will be exercised by the state director of I
18 civil defense, which is now PEMA.
Also it states that 19 centralized direction, control, and coordination of
- k 20 major emergency operations will be effected through the 21 state emergency operations center.
22 It would appear that these words are somewhat different than the words that I've been hearing in the past that 24 PEMA's function is mainly coordination.
Could you explain pp.,,,_, %
25 a little more?
23 1;
q A
Under the philosophy of emergency management 2
within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, each municipality 3'
is required to commit all available resources to the 4l 1
emergency and then to call upon the next higher level 5l' of government, which would be county, to augment those 6i resources and to meet any unmer needs.
7
When the county resources ha e been exhausted, then the 8
county comes to our area headquarters and our area headquarters j
then uses the resources of other counties and government agencies within that area.
When those resources have 11 i'
been used or as many of them committed as can, then the 12 area comes to state and the state applies the total resources !
13 of the state.
And then, in turn, we go to the federal i
I4 i
government for our further unmet needs.
15 i
AAJo, it is stated in law that when two or more i
16 municipalities or instruments of government are involved in a disaster, the next higher level assumes the coordination role; though a disaster applicable to one county would 19 be generally handled within one county.
Where it crosses k
20 county boundaries, it would be coordinated through one of l
21 my areas or of the state, and simultaneously.
j 22 And if it involved two or more areas, it would be 23 I
coordinated by state.
We basically have no resources 24
- S.pe,e n
,,, ine except for a small engineering stockpile at Fort l
- th.,
Indiantown Gap.
We have a half a dozen stockpiles of i
i i
t
f I
24 1
i i
equipment throughout the Commonwealth such as sand bags, 2N steel pipe, some pumps and generators.
These are the 3
only resources that are actually physically in the hands i
4 of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
5 j
We coordinate, during periods of declared emergencies, i
61 i
whether it be state or federal, the application of all i
7 resources of the state government towards that disaster.
8' Does that address the --
9 O
Somewhat.
I guess I was keying more on the 10 words " direction" and " coordination" as separate words in 11 l l
the plan.
12 Who is in charge of a multicounty emergency response?
13 Who says, Jump?
14 A
Following a presidential-declared disaster, the 15 governor has the authority to appoint a state coordinating 16 i
officer.
Under our law, the director of the Pennsylvania 17 Emergency Management Agency is, by law, the state l
18 coordinating officer.
The duties of the state coordinating
~
19 officer are spelled out in the federal legislation as well
(
20 as those of the federal coordinating officer.
t 21 And under the strict interpretation of the law, the 22 federal coordinating officer has the full authority to t
23 commit all of the resources of the federal government, and 24 i w. u n. n.,,,ine, the state coordinating officer has the authority to commit 25 all of the resources of state government.
i
25 1
How, in many disasters in whi-P a declaration of 21 disaster is not made either by the state or by federal 3 i government, the application of resources and the contrel and 4
I direction are more on a cooperative undertaking.
But in I
5c times of declared disaster, I feel that I exercise the 6'
authority that the governor would give to me at that time.
7!
l The governor remains ultimately responsible for the health, 8
safety, and well-being of the citizens of the Commonwealth.
9 At the time of a disaster, any policy guidance or direction 10 coming through the governor to me as the state coordinating 11 l
officer, and at that point, I could direct and compel, 12 to the degree of the authority given to me, the response 13 of the stnte.
14 l
Q Let me see if I can describe it, and then we will proceed.
The council has authority to direct in the 16 case of a declared emergency, and you feel that in that i
17 situation, the council or the governor would designate you 18 as the acting agent for directing these activities?
19 A
By law, I am appointed as the state coordinating
(
20 officer.
I am also +'e adviser to the lieutenant governor i
21 on emergency matters.
Now, it seems reasonable, it 22 has in the past been the policy of previous governors that 23 during an emergency, either the governor or the lieutenant 24 Aa+~,sn.omn.%,
governor go to the scene and remain there for a day or tuo.
25 After a day or two, normally, they go en with the business 8
l
26 1
of government and leave myself there as the continuity with 2;
d myself giving daily or hourly reports to the governor and 3
the lieutenant governor on the progress that is being made.
4i j
Q Was a disaster emergency, as defined by public law, ever proclaimed by the governor with regard to TMI?
6; A
No.
7!
O Did the lack of such action affect, in any 8
substantial way, the operational responsibilities assigned 9
to PEMA and to others by state law?
10 A
I would say, no, except to the degree that we were, 11 that when an emergency is declared by the governor or by 12 the president, there are certain federal fundings that are 13 made available and state fundings that are made available.
14 And recognizing that there was no iaclared disaster, that 15 the extraordinary expenses that we were incurring in overtime 16 and so forth, we were, or I personally was eminently aware
'7 that I would probably be required to eat these expenses 18 further down the road.
19 And I acted very cautiously in the incurring of any
(
20 l expenses.
And that would have been the only limitation 21 that I felt in this instant.
22 Q
Would this have been a substantial impairment 23 of response, the fiscal !wareness?
24 sce.Feoerst Copo,ters, Inc.
A Being a relatively small agency, such as we are, 25 with 75 percent of our total budget going for salaries, 15
- a. 1 1
1h h
percent of it going for fixed costs such as rentals, a
2 l!
3, communications, it's ongoing, and having something in the
..I J
neighborhood of two or three percent of our budget available 1
4 to us for flexibility, if you will, this is always a concern i
Sl i
of mine.
And particularly, it is a concern when you start 1
i 6
reaching the end of tne fiscal year, which we were rapidly 7
approaching.
8' l
But as far as the overtime and the expenses that we did 9
incur, I know of nothing that I failed to do because of 10 cost, although I was very cautious of those costs.
i 11 Q
Are you aware of the Dauphin County Emergency 12 Preparedness Plan, dated April 6, 1979, signed by Kevin Molloy 13 and John Minnich M-i-n-n-i-c-h?
14 A
Yes, I an aware of that plan.
15 Q
Was this plan and or other county plans reviewed, 16 commented on, or concurred in by PE:1A and coordinated 17 between counties by PEMA?
18 To some degree, during the preparation of the A
19 plan following the Friday, 29th of March, I had representation k
20 in each of the six risk counties.
And I had assistance 21 from two additional personnel in four of the counties that 22 were loaned to me by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.
23 I also sent representatives of the state government, 24 Department of Health, Department of State Police, and the l
Ace Federal Reconen, Inc.
25 Department of Transportation, to the counties during that l
d
29 weekend -- Friday, Staurday, and Sunday -- to insure that u
2i the plans were coordinated.
]
,~
Now, this was before the plans were reduced to writing.
I 4
This was in the planning development phase.
i Si i
Q To carry that one step further though, the plan i
6 that is now in writing, was that concurred in by PEMA?
7 A
No, that plan has not been approved by PEMA.
8I l
O Do you know, based on review, whether it is 9l' consistent with the state plan and other county plans?
10 A
I know of no major problem areas except --
11 and I'm not sure if that one has been resolved -- the use 12 of the 11/15 bypass.
However, we are in the present 13 stage of issuing our own state plan which is a draft update 14 of Annex E which clarifies these route assignments.
j 15 i
0 Who in your organization was responsible fo.
16 working with the county plans, updating and perhaps the 17 review of the Dauphin County plan that I mentioned before?
18 A
Well, I had two people down at Dauphin County 19 from my own office during the TMI incident.
I had a k
20 Ben Towsey T-o-w-s-e-y and a Jack Glouner, who were there, 21 not reviewing the plan, but carrying the state guidance to the 22 counties for the development of the plan and rolling up 23 their sleeves and pitching in to assist the county in the 24 development of a 20-mile evacuation plan.
Am FWwC Roomn. ix, As far as a formal review as required under our law, no f
4
,o.
c il 1 '1 hl such formal review has been conducted as of this time.
And 2 l!
]
the reason for that is that our guidance to the counties, 1
3 1 as disseninated through our Annex E, is inadequate.
I 4
O Did someone in your organication coordinate the 5l.
overall update of county plans?
Was this an operational I
6 assignment A
Going on at the present time?
8!
O At the time of TMI, the first week, say, the 9
first few days to a week of TMI?
10 A
Yes.
I asked my person in charge of the i
i 11 ;
l crisis relocation planning to be my coordinating agent 12 l to assist the affected counties in their planning sequence.
13 Q
Who was this?
14 A
Charles Crowe C-r-o-w-e.
And he's continuing with 15 this mission at the present time.
16 Q
In your opinion, do you view a plan such as 17 that Dauphin County plan as being an ad hoc plan applicable 18 to the circumstances that existed at TMI, or do you 19 consider it to be the kind of plan, detailed plan that Ik 20 has a continuing function in emergency planning?
Is it 21 a living document?
22 A
No.
I do not consider that any of the plans 23 developed in the haste of the moment of the TMI incident 24 would meet my requirements for the plan that I conceive.
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 But at the same time, I have had enough experience within
ll ji 30 i
1i the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in treating with other i
Il 2 h kinds of disasters to recognize that the details of a plan I
3 ll do not necessarily represent the actions that the counties i
I and municipalities take at the time of a disaster.
The 4
l l
P anning has a very important place in getting people to l
5 I i
6 think of the problems and trying to resolve issues of the 7
problems, but when it comes down to the actual disaster, 8
that the county commissioners and elected officials roll 9
up their sleeves and do the job.
10 0
It appears that some form of what you might 11 call a command center was established in the governor's 12 office during TMI.
Are you aware of this, or is 13 this how you would describe it?
14 A
Well, I don't know that I would describe it 15 as a command center.
But certainly, the governor assumed 16 his full obligation as the single authority for 17 the TMI incident and exercised his powers from his office; 18 that is correct.
19 Q
What was -- who were the principal advisers to the ik 20 governor during this time of crisis?
21 A
Harold Denton and Lieutenant Governor Scranton.
t 22 Q
Are you aware of any other groups that were asked 23 by the governor or his immediate advisers to assess the 24 adequacy of state or local emergency plans and or the W.Fw..a Reporters. Inc.
25 actual state for emergency readiness?
31 i
e l
A The lieutenant governor asked the federal represen-9
'f tative, Bob Adamcik, to independently view the county plans 3i l
and to provide him an assessment of the adequacy of those 4i l
plans.
I also understand, indirectly, that the governor 51 established an ad hoc committee, headed by Mr. Wilburn, 6l Secretary Wilburn, to review some aspect of emergency 7!
planning; but I am uncertain as to exactly what that 8
mission was.
9 Q
Dr. Wilburn didn't work with you directly?
10 A
I met Mr. Wilburn about noon on Saturday, the 31st 11 of March, and he had been in the office for a couple hours 12 l before I arrived in the office and had been talking to my 13
. deputy.
At that time, I did not understand that he was 14 making any kind of an assessment.
A day or two later, 15 just outside the governor's office, Dr. Wilburn and 16 a John Pearce from the lieutenant governor's office, and 17 l the governor's plans -- I'm not certain of the exact title, 18 l but the person in charge of his planning office, state 19 planning; I can't think of his name, asked me to stop by ik 20 an office there.
And I spent approximately 15 or 20 minutes with them 22 describing how the counties would utilize the school buses.
23 And at that time, I became aware that there was such an 24 ad hoc Committee making some review of something, but I Au-FMmI Recrun, W.
25
\\
am uncertain even today as to what their mission might have l
32 1
,reen.
j 2 !,
t Q
Are you aware of any recommended changes or cerments 3;.
or something by any of the other groups that were taking a i
4 concurrent look at emergency plans?
5i A
No.
6!
O Did Mr. Adamcik, to your knowledge, mane any 7l:
suggested changes or discuss emergency planning with you 8
personally?
9 A
No.
It is my understanding that Mr. Adamcik 10 relied on John McConnell, from the Defense Civil Preparedness 11 Agency, to visit some of the counties and to review the 12 adequacy of those plans.
And it is my understanding that 13 their report to the lieutenant governor was generally that 14 they considered the plans adequate.
15 Q
This is a review of the, you might say, a pragmatic 16 review of an operational readiness rather than a 17 paper review of plans?
18 A
That's correct, because there was very little 19 in writing at the time they were conducting these reviews.
Ik 20 0
Are you aware that the White House was also asked 21 to revic the status or adequacy of emergency plans?
22 i A
Through the Kemeny Commission?
l 23 Q
No, the White House?
24 A
No, I am not aware of that.
Ace Feder:J Rooorters, Inc.
25 0
Who was your principal official contact in the
33 i
i 1!
governor's office during this week's period?
2 I
A The governor.
3i t
Q There are a number of meetings that took place 4
after about Friday, March 30th.
Denton was in town, briefed the governor quite frequently.
There were scheduled 6i i
governor's news conferences and, I guess, meetings with i
7 the lieutenant governor and a large number of meetings of 8
this nature.
Were you or a representative of PEMA, your 9
staff, present at most or all of these types of meetings?
10 A
On Friday, yes; on Saturday, yes; on Sunday, yes; 11 either myself or my deputy was present each time Denton 12 4
reported to the governor.
The following week sometime, 13 i
I stopped going to the meetings or sending any t
14 representation to the meetings.
15 4
0-Were you also present then at the subsequent 16 press briefings held by the governor?
This is after the 17 governor's meetings on Friday, Saturday, Sunday?
18 A
I did en Friday and Saturday, but it got to be 19 too time-consuming.
And usually, then after the Xg 20 Denton/ governor meeting, I would bug out and return to my 21 office.
22 Q
L' :re you present in a meeting at the governor's 23 i
office on Sunday, April 1st, at roughly 4:00 or 4:30 in l
24 Am#_,e namnm. ine.
the afternoon, where there was a briefing that included 25 Adamcik regarding an evacuation radius of potassium iodide i
e 34 l,
I, 1 !l and the general preparedness?
2""
A Yes.
3' i
O And was this the meeting that the governor asked i
4; Mr. Adamcik to take a look at the existing status of the l'
5' plans and preparedness?
6:
1 A
No.
He had been asked prior to this time.
7!
O In emergency preparedness, how much does PE.'1A 1
8 rely on the national guard?
9l A
My own philosophy, that.we r ~ - on the national 10 }
guard only as a supplemental organization, that we are 11 very cautious in plans relating to the national guard, 12 because we recognize that the national guard is not always 13 going to be available.
14 O
Who then would you principally rely upon to 15 provide the necessary response services?
16 A
We rely upon, or course, the volunteer organizations, 17 the fire departments, ambulance departments, police 18 departments, the state police, and any other resource 19 available to us.
And the national guard then are ih 20 supplemental to all else or to these.
And when these 21 resources can no longer do the job, then we have provisions 22 for a national guard.
23 Q
There apparently were newspaper stories or at 24 least a story implying that the guard might not be ordered Ace.Feder:J Reporters, Inc.
25 into areas of dangerous levels of radiation and statements I
, =,
11 that the guard did not have suitable low-level dosimeters.
I 2'
Therefore, guardsmen might decide not to go into questionable 1
3i or, perhaps, dangerous areas.
4 A
We had no plans for sending anybody into areas of 5
i high-level radiation.
As far as dosimeters were concerned, i
6 i we had adequate dosimeters.
We had 7,500 available to us 7
which we requested from DCPA on Friday and were delivered 8
on Friday.
We did not issue all of these out.
We had 9
plans to -- some were issued to the guard in storage but 10 not actually to the individual guardsman.
11 O
When vou say you would not send people into 12 high levels of radiation, would you be more specific as 13 to what you mean by high level of radiation?
A Well, I'm using the term that you used.
You 15 brought it up first.
If it is such a high level that we i
16 must evacuate people from that area, then once the people 17 i
are evacuated, I certainly wouldn't send a security force 18 into that area that is receiving a high level of
- c 19 radiation.
Now, I base the recommendations or I 20 o
receive my recommendations as far as what is a safe level and what isn't a safe level on the advice given to me by 22 our Bureau of Radiation Protection, based on the incident 23 at the time.
24 Any plans of ours to establish a security line outside
. Aa. F.o.r.: n on.,,, inc.
25 the evacuated area would cert 2nly.be far enough from the area I
9 i
36 l
1, j
to be in what we would hope to be.a low level of radiation.
2 jj O
Well, speaking less of a security force than I s
31' was the force necessary to evacuate, and the thrust of the 1
4 question was, what levels of radiation would you anticipate 5l that emergency response forces would go in and assist the 6 !
j evacuation as opposed to deciding to stay out and let 7t I
the people fend for themselves?
8 A
None of our plans, either at the county level or i
9 at the state level, charge the national guard with the 10 i
actual conduct of the evacuation.
This is the responsibility 11 of county and local government.
The Pennsylvania State j
12 Police and the Pennsylvania National Guard have a supporting i
13 role to assist, by means of transportation, helicopte-14 I
and ground means, trucks, to evacuate any of the people that 15 the local government cannot take care of.
16 So our plan does not provide that at the time of an 17 incident we send thousands of policemen or national guard i
18 down into the arsa to execute the evacuation.
The evacuation 19 is executed by local government.
And where the local 20 o
government needs help, then we would dispatch national guard 21 or state police to augment the local government efforts.
22 0
In the case of the plans developed specifically.for 23 the TMI accident, what reliance was being placed on the 24 l Am t a n.a.,w s,inc.
national guard?
25 A
We had arranged that the national guard would have j
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one battalion in support of each of five counties and a 0
2 '!
4 backup battalion prepared to assist each of the five ccunties, 3
with Cumberland and Perry County being handled by one 4 i l
battalion.
Perry County has a very small segment in it.
Si But the actual warning of the citizens and the initial i
6!
evacuations were still a responsibility of county and 7!
I local government.
The national guard, for the most part, 81 would be used in its security role and by providing j
9l l
transportation to assist in the evacuation.
10 0
What guideline or criteria exists that would say 11 radiation levels have exceeded this amount in terms of 12 hour-per-hour; therefore, guardsmen or state police even 13 l will not go into that area and assist the locala in their 14 evacuation?
15 '
A Well, except for the five roentgens per hour 16 th*'. is listed in our appendix to Annex E, that is the 17 only guidance that we have.
We are dependent entirely 18 upon the Bureau of Radiation Protection guidance to us 19,
I at the time as to whether it is safe to go into the area or uould not be safe to go into the area.
21 l
l O
Would you anticipate that this guidance would be 22 i
similar for a fixed facility emergency compared to atomic 23 warfare?
24
' Ace A o n. con.n, ine.
A I don't believe I understand the relationship.
25 Q
Well, I would anticipate, in the case of a i
m
38 i
i 1l nonfixed facility accident or occurrence, that these same 2'
guardsmen or state police would be called upon to perforr.
4 3i some kind of emergency function and would be operating 4
under some guideline with regard to exposure.
S A
Well, under an enemy-attack scenario, we have no i
6 guardsmen.
The guardsmen have a federal mission, and our 7
plans would not provide for the utilization of the guardsmen 8
unless there are guardsmen or federal troops that might be 9'
I assigned to the state.
But for the most part, these people 10 would have an independent role of support, but they would i
11 be under the direction and authority of the -- I don't 12 recall the name of the, what the federal government calls 13 the commander designated to command all reserve national 14 guard, federalized guard forces in the Commonwealth of 15 Pennsylvania -- but they would be under the direct authority 16 of the second army commander at Fort Meade, Maryland.
17 That's an enemy-attack scenario.
18 Of course, the Pennsylvania State Police, however, would O
be available to us as forces to be used.
20 Q
What would be your guidance to the Pennsylvania 21 State Police in a situation like that as far as life-saving 22 or emergency response doses that they should be willing to 23 8
accept?
24 A
Well, I don't think that we -- I would not olan, Aa r.Wml Reconen, Inc.
25 from my level, to put out a set standard.
I think that if
i 39 1
there were an area, say, near the fixed nuclear site that 3 'l
'd had not been evacuated for any number of reasons, let's 3
take an island, Brunner Island, the word hadn't gotten to i
4!
Brunner Island, I think that at the time we could make an l
evaluation as to how long it would take emergency forces 6'
to go in, a helicopter rush in in a matter of minutes, 1
7i I
this would give me no concern regardless of what the radiation 8'
level might be.
t 9
It was my understanding that the article that you made 10 reference to was the suggestion that once se had evacuated 11 the area that we were going to send in the national guardsmen 12 and have the national guardsmen post every street corner and 13 actually secure that area.
Our scheme of things is that whatever area we evacuate, we assume that we have an adequate 15 safety cushion so that this ten-mile area or five-mile 16 area or whatever it is, that would be a restricted zone.
17 No one would be in that area accept for emergency personnel, 18 whether they be our forces or whether they be from the 19 telephone company or some other who were actually briefed, trained, equipped, and dressed to go into the area to make 21 the repair or do what needs to be done at the time and then 22 immediately brought out again; but that the guardsmen, the 23-state police and everybody would be outside of this restricted.
1 24 area.
Aereml Ramnen, Inc.
25 Q
I have two more questions here, and then we'll take i
1
i, 40 l
l' l
a break.
20 l
How much of your support -- this is people and ecuipmen 3.
I for evacuation out to ten miles and further out to 20 t
4 miles, would have had to be obtained through Adamcik and 5,
I the FDAA, other federal sources?
I 6-A I can't tell you how much of the total or what 7
percentage of the total, but we evaluated what we would 8
need in the risk area to conduct the evacuation.
And then I
9 I
we determined what we would need additionally in the 10 host area.
11 We then assigned all of the state resources available to 12 us against this, and we came up with an unmet need in the 13 way of ambulances, for example, of some 400.
We came up 14 with an unmet need of approximately 200' doctors and 200 15 nurses.
There were some other unmet needs that I am not 16 aware of or I can't recall at this particular time.
The 17 big one was really the ambulances, based on the number of 18 hospital patients that we had in the area, the number of 19 immobile personnel in our institutions.
20 And Adamcik or FDAA -- I guess they were FDAA at the time 21 1
-- identified for us-from whence these resources would come.
22 O
Who is responsible for the very sick or recently 23 i
operated-upon or patients that it would be very difficult 1
24 to move?
Who basically is responsible for their health and u.% n n.,,, %,
25 i
safety in this multicounty response?
l' 1
a
\\
i 41 1r h
A Well, the facility in which they reside or in which 2
they are located had the basic responsibility, and this 3
makes for a very tough decision for the governor to order 4
or compel an evacuation or even to issus an advisory for 5
an evacuation.
Because there, unfortunately, are many pecole 6
who are extremely ill, who maybe the movement may mean 7;
their death.
8 Q
So this would weigh heavily upon any decision to 9'
evacuate?
10 i
A Absolutely.
11 O
How about other factors that might weigh heavily 12 upon a decision to evacuate?
13 A
Well, there's, of course, the first decision is 14 that nobody wants to evacuate, period.
And this is 15 always a decision that is not entered into lightly.
I 16 think there were, in the TMI incident, there were a number 17 of unknowns -- particulary, as to if an evacuation were to la be executed, really how far, what was the distance we're 19 talking about; whether we're talking about a five-mile, 20 ten-mile, or 20-mile.
And of course, the further out you 21 i
)
go, is that the extent or is it going to go to 30 and now 3
22 to 40 and perhaps 50.
23 r
The question of the unknown as to how long will these I
24 Aew,; neoo,ms, inc.
people have to remain out of the area.
I think these l
25 kinds -- and do we have the resources and can we do it in a
42 1
timely manner.
When schools are in session, we don't 2l; have the buses immediately available to us because the 3.
l buses' first priority would be to move the school children.
4 We depend quite heavily on volunteer forces.
Are those 5l l
volunteer forces, particularly those within the risk area, 6l are they going to be available to us, or are they going to 7
have to pick up their families and get them outside of 8
the area.
So I think when you start talking about whether you 10 should or shouldn't evacuate, you've got to make --
11
'4 unfortunately, in these kinds of cases -- a sort of a snap 12 decision.
But at the same time, you have to analyze the 13 problem and determine that do we, in fact, have the 14 adequacy of resources with which to successfully conduct the 15 operation.
le l
If you can't, maybe it's better that you just not i
17 evacuate and have the people take cover or what else you 18 i
can.
19
,l Iiow, as the waters come up in a flash flood, nobody 20 questions it.
They can see the water rise; they know they i
i 21 better get up the hill or they are going to be drowned.
22 Similarly, in a hazardous materials spill, although you may not see the gases escaping, you can at least see the incident 24 A e o m n oorws. w.
itself; you can see that the rail cars are turned over or T
- 25 you can see that the two trucks have come together.
And
'O l
43 1
1 although you may not see the gases, you can visuali:e that, 2 bl q
Hey, here's a problem.
So you can move out and move out I
3-relatively smartly.
I 4i l
In the TMI kind of a thing where you don't see the radiation, you neither can feel it nor touch it, sense it 6 !
by any other means, there is a different kind of reaction 7
on the part of the general public.
8 Q
Getting back to the resource problem, is it a 9
true statement that you needed little or no outside help 10 i
for a five-mile evacuation from the standpoint of federal 11 help?
12 A
Correct.
13 0
What was the extent of federal assistance 14 provided to your office -- sort of a chronology?
15 A
Initially, DCPA provided me eight personnel, 16 who had some planning experience, which I assigned two i
each to four counties.
They followed this up by providing 18 me six CDNARS, radios to hook together my six risk counties 19
\\
a.i my headquarters.
They provided me 19 people, one for each of the host areas or support areas, to review the host area plans and to provide the host areas any assistance that i
22 they needed.
23 All of these people were briefed at my headquarters and l
24 then sent out to the host areas to take a loch at how the l
. Ace-esdorJ Reporte,s, Inc, 25 host area was set up and to provide any advice and assistance
l 44 li
[
to the host area that they could and then to report back into 2 3 our headquarrers.
I 3'
" hat was the direct support that was provided to us.
I 4
Of course, Adamcik had, I can't recall now how many S
federal agencies, but from the post office department to 6
the IRS reeresentives who were available to us and with 7l 6
l whom we met at 11:00 o' clock every morning.
I 8
had a representative attend these Adamcik meetings.
And 9
each of the federal agencies gave a report to Adamcik on 10 their preparedness to support the state if we should be 11 required.
And that, in turn, got back to me.
i 12 i
Q You had mentioned previously that there is a direct 13 teletype to each county?
14 A
Yes.
l Q
And now you mentioned there is some sort of a 16 signal system set up, I assume that's a radio?
17 A
Yes, the CDNARS, Civil Defense National Regional i
18 something, I'm not sure of the exact title.
19 Q
So that was two methods of communications with 20 the county that -- this radio system was established when?
21 A
I had a hot line.
Q You had a hot line_to.._each. county?_
i A
At the time of the_ incident, I had commercial i
24 AmiWed Rwomn. h:.
telephone, and I had the teletypewriter.
By Saturday morning,_I had a hot line.
By Saturday night or Sunday 9
ll 45 l
1 1
morning, I had a CDMARS radio.
b 2l Q
This teletype, can you send out simultaneous i
3.
j messages to each county, or does each one require a
'I separate message?
If you wanted to send out evaucate 5
messages to six counties, would that take six discrete 6'
operations or one simultaneous?
l A
one simultaneous, or I could send it to all i
Si i
67 counties simultaneousiv, or I can designate the counties 9l I want it to go to.
10 i O
These federal resources that were supplied, under il l whose direction were thev?
Did thev then come under vour 12 l i
direction after being supplied, or did they still receive i
13 I their orders from Adamcik, or who?
14 A
They were provided at my request.
They were 15 indirectly under my operational control, except that 16 John McConnell, they were directly responsible to 17 John McConnell.
And John McConnell to me for their perform-18 ance.
19 Now, McConnell set up a small staff in my office as a sort 20 of liason with me and to coordinate the movement these 21 people and their initial briefings and their debriefings.
22 My people briefed them.
Their people, DCPA conducted their 23 debrief, along with my people.
24 O
Did that prove to be an effective way to control and' Am t wwC Rgo,wes, tN.
25 to disseminate information and interact in a communicative e
46 1
sort of way?
Was it operationally good?
2 ll A
Very good; although I had confidence in the 1
o 3 9 counties, particularly, I'm talking about the host counties, 4
what would have been the support counties and their ability 5
to do it.
I was at that time devoting so much attention to 6l the 20-mile evacuation plan, that these extra pair of i
7; eyes and the knowledge that somebody had been on the scene e
and that the county management coordinators had gotten their i
9l staffs together and that the county commissioners were 10 together and they were, in fact, prepared to take care 11 l of whether it was 40,000 or 60,000 people, was extremely 1
12 1 helpful to me.
13 Q
How many people did evacuate?
Do you have any 14 good numbers on this?
Has there been any survey made?
15 A
The best records that we have been able to fathom, 16 somewhere between 80,000 and 100,000.
However, the figure 17 that I'm basing this on is primarily an Elizabethtown 18 College survey that was conducted during the first week 19 by knocking on doors.
However, it did not differentiate 20 between those people who actually left and those people a
21 who leave every weekend to go to the Poconos.
22 So how many of those people that this is their normal 23 weekend movement and how many evacuated just because of I
24 Three Mile Island, I think that's suspect.
j w Fu.,eu naamn. Inc.
25 Q
So you're sole source of this 80,000 to 120,000 is i
i a
l 47 i
t 1j n.
a survey made by a college on a weekend?
2 'l
[
A Well, it is validated by the Elizabethtown State 3
l College that started the survey on Sunday, immediately 4 i l
following the incident, and continued it through the i
5 f
following Sunday.
I had a similar report from two or three 6
of my county civil defense directors on their estimates, 7!
and the Elizabethtown State College survey verified the 8,
i oral reports that I received from my personnel.
9:
However, on Friday following the incident, I had the 10 Pennsylvania State Police conduct a survey of all major 11 l
routes leading in and out of this general area, and they 12 l l
reported no abnormal traffic patterns except an absence 13 of vehicles at the shopping centers.
14 0
On which day was this?
15 A
This was Friday following the release.
16 Q
The 30th?
17 A
Yes.
18 MR. ERNST:
I would like to recess for a few
~
19 minutes.
20 (Recess.)
21 BY tiR. ERNST:
~22 Q
According to an NRC telephone log on April 1st,
)
23 you stated that you would need a four-hour advance notice 24 mFun.1moomn,=.
for evacuation since the national guard and state police i
25 were on a white alert, which apparently was a four-hour l
l 1
1
4S I
If alert status.
Considering the alert status, how long would ni'y it have taken for a controlled evacuation to begin?
3i A
The 30th, Friday, the 30th of March, we 4
4I were in a position at that time, in a ready alert, to have 1
5 executed a controlled evacuation with very little lead time, 6'
because all of our forces had been put into a ready condition.
7l I'm not speaking here of national guard and state police, 8
because at this time, they were not involved in our, not into j
i 9l j
our response mechanism.
The controlled evacuation did not
(.
10 ;
hinge on them.
I 11 >
On Monday when the schools str.rted going back into session 12 li and the national guard went back to work and the national i
13 guard and the state police at this time have designated 14 i
traffic control points, it would have taken longer.
i 15 i l
Mow, I had been attempting to secure from Bob Adamcik and 16 the NRC the kind of a scenario that they visualized 17 could occur and asking them for the lead times associated i
18 with these scenarios.
I'm still waiting for that.
i
-19 I think that on Monday, my forces certainly -- speaking 20 here of the -- see I think what you've got to recognize is 21 in Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, fireman, ambulance personnel I
were either in the fire houses or the ambulance houses.
23 The county staff were in full operation, and many of these l
24 were volunteers.
But on Sunday evening and Monday, the Am4mes mammm. ine.
25 atmosphere as a whole began to change where there was not that!
49 i
1 immediate response capability.
So our time is necessarily, 2p l
advance lead time is necessarily greater.
3i i
I do not recall using the ter= four hours as a lead i
4:
time.
5' i
O I gather then you think that within the first three 6
or four days or at least once, people became sensitized to 7
the problem that your response could have been to start an 8l evac 2ation, could have been almost immediately.
But then i
9i Sunday night and thereafter, it would have taken longer.
10 So I guess the question still is, about how long do you 11 think it would have taken before one could have started 12 a controlled evacuation, starting Sunday night or I
13 Monday or Tuesday?
14 A
Well, whether you want to call it controlled or 15 uncontrolled -- and I think this is a very fine line --
16 once you put out the word that you're going to execute an evacuation, people are going to start evacuating immediately.
18 Now, all of our traffic analyses indicated that it would take 19 a minimum of three hours for all vehicular traffic, private 20 vehicle traffic, to have cleared the outer rim of the 21 five-mile area.
And it would have required seven hours to 22 have cleared the rim or the outer radius of a ten-mile area.
i 23 And it would have required ten hours to have cleared the 24 20-mile area.
Am-Fooeral Reporters, Inc.
25 i
Now, this is merely based on our knowlefge of the number of i
i l
50 t
e i
11 registered vehicles that are in their particular communities.
i 2 ll i
j And based on our best traffic analyses of the routes. that 3
we would have both the major routes and the fieder routes P
4I leading out of these areas, these times that I gave did no 5
i include the time to evacuate hospitals, institutions, and
}
other human cane f acilities.
And I still don't know how 6'
I
/
7:
l long it wand take to evacuate a hospital, for example.
i 8
So much depends on what is the availability of ambulances 9
and ambulance crews and doctors and nurses that may have i
10 l to accompany certain patients.
11 '
My estimate is that if we were to blow the siren today and the word got out over the EBS system or some other 13 fashion that we needed to evacuate that there would be 14 some evacuation started within a matter of minutes.
I 15 0
This is the second time you've mentioned the 16 simulation of traffic.
Could you give me a thumbnail 17 description of the process of how one simulates the traffic 18 flow?
l 19 A
Ue determined the density of population within 20 each of these areas.
We determined that an average family, 21 we would have three personnel per vehicle.
We assumed that 22 the vehicles would travel in a control 'd evacuation at an 23 average speed of 30 miles per hour.
And based on this 24 s
kind of an assessment, how long it would take from the 4,,,,,,g n, n,,,
25 furtherest point within the center for these vehicles i
31 1,i traveling at this density through a given point and 2i arrived then at approximately three hours.
I 3
j On one side of it, it might be two hours.
On another 4
side; two hours and fifteen minutes.
But the longest time 5
l it would have taken, which would have been the Staelton-61 l
Highspire area coming in this general direction up on the 7
turnpike, was the longest one which required three hours.
8, Q
So typically then might the three people per car, 9
30 miles an hour for safety's consideration and conversatism, 10 three car lengths apart per car, and then how long does it 11 take to get the people out?
12 A
Well, the traffic control group in PennDot has 13 the formula for the number of vehicles per mile, and they l
14 '
very rapidly extrapolate that out.
15 Q
This wasn't a computer kind of calculation or i
16 a road bottleneck kind of a calculation?
It didn't 17 take a situation like that in mind, just assumed that j
18 everybody --
19 i
A Well, it assumed that all of the routes were open 20 It did not provide for a major accident where traffic 21 was held up for 30 minutes, yes.
O In his testimony to the President's Commission, 23 which I believe you were present also, Mr. Molloy 24 4 5% non.n, inc, stated that his estimate would be that in good weather, he i
25 would need six hours to complete an evacuation.
And the g.ss"#
'***e%
g_y-*==eemq,y#**
I
o l
l 32 l
i 1 lj i
assumption -- in my mind, anyway, in listening to the 2 ll 4
testimonf -- is that this is from the time completely 3i i
unprepared, like.on Wednesday _ morning, from the time of (r
4i l
notification to the time an evacuation would be completed.
e.
~
Do you have any judgments on the time to complete a i
I 6
five-mile evacuation from TMI starting from essentially 7
scratch?
BI A
I think his judgment is probably -- he would have 9
the larger number of people of the three counties involved.
10 I would generally go along with something in that area.
O I believe I read in the record -- I must confess, 12 !
l I forget the source exactly -- but somewhere that five of 13 !
the six surrounding counties had dedicated phone lines to 14 i'
PEMA insta] led by Sunday.
This appears te differ slightly 15 with, I think you had said by Saturday all six were installed.'
16 A
It is my ber. recollection that they were all in by 17 1 Saturday.
Perry or Lebanon counties, which were two of 18 the exterior counties that had a very small play, it is 19 po.esible that theirs did not get in until Sunday, but I would have to check with my communications officer.
21 O
It's not necessarily an inconsistent bit of i
22 '
information, because all ours said was by Sunday which i
23 could be consiscunt with your statement.
24 How long did it take to recognize the need for dedicated Am.Feaeral Reporters, Inc.
25 lines, and how long did it take once the need was
53 1l sstablished to physically install them?
h 2 l!
4 A
Well, it didn't take long af ter the public 3i announcement when all of our commere!'1 wire lines began i
4i experiencing about a 30-minute hiatus, to know that we needed them.
We asked for them almost immediately thereafter.
6' The first one was in within four hours, and the others as
~
7 racidly thereafter as possible.
i 8
Q But the order for all six was placed at the same 9'I time essentially?
A No.
The order for four of them was placed 11 at that time, because at that time we still were talking i
12 about four counties at ten miles.
And so this leads me ro believe that perhaps someone who said, maybe on Sunday 4
for the other two counties or for other counties, might 15 be right.
I am not certain when we added those other two 16 counties to the dedicated system.
17 Bell Telephone System here in Harrisburg has a provision that each time we have an emergency the y send 19 a representative to our EOC and he functions out of our EOC.
20 And when we have a need or a requirement, our requirement 1
21
. takes priority over all others.
So they can react very 22 l
rapidly.
Also the fact that we have 100 extra pairs of i
line in our EOC facilitates any such arrangement.
l 24 O
It is our understanding that this dedicated line
%.g 25 was removed from Lebanon County about three weeks later.
I 54 i
i i
l' Were they also removed from the other counties?
2 s
A We put in the stop order at approximately the
~
same time for all six of them.
s Q
Why would they be removed?
5' A.
Well, it's economy, the cost.
6f Q
What is the cost, do you know?
7l A
I don't know.
8' O
During the response there were a number of 9'
j instances where physical lack of communications --
10 >
l since I guess walkie-talkies had to be provided to BRP for 11 l even office communications and, of course, these lines had I
12 l to be inctalled to the counties and several other problems t
were commtnications-oriented.
Is PEMA responsible for 14 all communications, all physical communications in an 15 emergency response, or does each bureau or department have 16 a basic responsibility to identify a problem and then 1
17 either solve it themselves or talk to PEMA about 4**
18 A
Well, basically, they have a responsibility 19 to identify any shortfalls and to notify the office of 20 telecommunications and have the office of telecommunications 21 take care of the problem for them.
We in PEMA do 22 maintain approximately 100 mobile or portable radios.
We 23 did loan out to the federal agencies and to other state 24 agencies 84 or 85 of these portables during the incident.
Aa.w a n
,,n, %.
25 I think we've got them all back now.
i l
I i
i l
t
55 1l 2
How was your coordination function hampered by 2j not having a person either on or with your staff that was 3l' knowledgeable about radiation matters?
And I'm speaking 4
now of fixed facility radiation matters.
A Well, it was very seriously hampered because i
6 i
all of the training exercises that we conduct, the Bureau 7
of Rad Protection has always been co-located with us in 8
our simulation exercises.
And all of our plans were based 9
upon having somebody immediately available to us who would 10 be aware of the technical problems at the facility or ut. der 11 l
nuclear attack conc'.itions that would be immadiately available i
12 '
to advise us and make recommendations to us.
13 The absence of someone such as in this case really j
I meant we were flying blind quite a bi' of the time.
15 O
When did you recognize that you were flying 16 blind from a radiological operational standpoint, and what 17 actions were taken to try and alleviate the situation?
18 A
Well, almost immediately, I would say by 19 Friday, prior to that time there was no problem in maintaining 20 telephone communications with the Bureau of Rad Protection 21 and kept informed.
Sometime Friday, I directed my operations officer to start putting out an hourly situation 23 I
report to my counties.
And sometime Friday night, in i
24 Am4Wy3 Rgomn, W.
reviewing those, I was struck by the occurrence of no change, 25 no change, no change, no change running through those I
i
56 1.
[
hourly reports which surfaced to me that ws weren't 2 ;!
l providing the counties a hell of a lor of information.
I 3>
So I called the Bureau of Rad Protection to get an update,
- l and the only person I could get was a person that was in f5i their lab and actually knew very little about what was going 61 i
on at Three Mile Island except for the number of samples 7
that were coming in.
I spoke to Tom or Maggie about 8
this,,and they told me that they were committed with 9l personnel down at the island, were maintaining liason 10 with the Department of Energy down at the Capital City 11 Airport and that they just absolutely had nobody that 12 they could provide to us.
However, they would provide 13 us, on an hourly basis, information that we could pass i
la on to our counties.
15 However, the situation did not improve.
16 Q
Did you send a representative of PEMA over to 17 their office to try and facilitate communications?
18 A
No.
19 0
Who controls roads?
Who can designate one-20 way traf fic for local, state, and federal, turnpike roads?
21 Who has-the power to block roads and order one-way traffic, 22 i
things of this nature?
23 A
The Department of Transportation is the state 24 i
AceJweral Reporwes, Inc.
agency.
However, it does not control the turnpike; you l
25 mentioned the turnpike.
t
57 1
Q Yes.
t 2 j!
A The turnpike is a separate entity.
Although we 3
had close daily contact with Mr. Wilson of the turnpike, l
4 j and he assured us of their support and that they were willing 5
to do anything we wanted done.
And when we indicated that i
6l we wanted at least three lanes of the turnpike heading i
7' east and three lanes of the turnpike headed west, one-way 8
traffic, they were agreeable to us.
I 9
The Department of Transportation was also willing and 10 assisted us in designating those major routes and assigning 11 them to the counties for their evacuations based on 12 three-lane traffic, on three lanes going in one direction or 13 four-lane traffic routes.
14 Q
I guess what triggered this particular question j
15 is I recollect a sequence of events where I think somebody l
16 from your office -- I don't know whether it was Mr. Lanison i
17 or who -- called up Mr. Malloy and asked that 441 be 18 closed.
And then Molloy called the state police and the 19 state police said no, based on their information, it didn't 20 need to be closed.
We're sort of concerned wondering 21 who actually does or does not control roads.
It sounds I
22 like the Department of Transportation wasn't even in on that 23 particular change.
24 A
Yes.
Well, this was a request given to Mr. Lamison A=Jwea nmorwrs ix.
25 by plant personnel at TMI.
They requested that 441, whatever -
l
58 1
1 number it was in the fac'lity of the plant be closed.
2 d I don't believe that Lamison called the county and told them 3i i
to close it.
I think he was calling to verify, is it i
4!
closed or what is jour assessment, does it need to be 5l l
closed.
I 6
I have heard, in testimony, Kevin Molloy make a similar 7
statement that he made a decision that it didn't need to 8
be closed, so he didn't close it or didn't have it closed.
9l Q
Do you have any function regarding the criteria 10 for taking various protective actions such as take cover, 11 evacuation, use of potassium iodide, food interdiction, 12 j things of that nature?
I understand that BRP is responsible i
13 l for making a technical evaluation about whether to 14
. recommend certain actions, but then assuming they recommend i
a certain action, what function does PEMA play in carrying 16 that out?
1 17 Let's take, for example, the food interdiction or taking 18 the cows off the pasture.
I gather that could impact either 19 i
Department of Health or Department of Agriculture.
Does PEMA have any role to play in that kind of an interchange?
i 2.
i A
We have a responsibility and it is so cited in 22 our current plan, current draft plan which is to replace l
23 i
Annex E, that DER continues to be the lead agency.
And they i
24 will insure the coordination between health and Department of 25 Agriculture in preplanning for this and the use of the
l 59 l
1!
l county agents for the education of the farmers and the 3.,
public in this area.
3li Our primary role would be one of dissemination based on i
4 the recommendations and advice from the Bureau of Rad 51 l
Protection, to disseminate it to the counties for 6;
j implementation.
7 O
But basically for essentially all of your protec-8 tive action, orders or recommendations, BRP in 9 I combination sometimes, I guess, with agriculture and 10 Department of Health, would be the responsible agencies for 11 making that kind of recommendation?
12 A
Correct.
t 13 Q.
On March 28th, about midafternoon, I guess, l
14 i
2:00 to 3:00 p.m.
time frame, the governor requested 15 Mr. Miller and Herbein to come to his offices and brief le him -- or I guess it was the lieutenant governor who 17 requested that they come to his office to brief hin regarding 18 the status of the plant.
Were you or your representative, 19 either one present at that meeting?
20 A
No.
I had met with the lieutenant governor 21 and the governor just prior to that.
22 Q
I think the basic subject of this meeting was the l
23 steam releases and status of the plant, things of that l
24 Aw+
ad Cwodm, W:.
nature.
j 25 A
No, I was not present at that meeting.
e
l!
60 i
j lf Q
Are you aware of the meeting?
Do you know who I
7 '!
might have been there?
A No, I do not.
3 I
Q Do you know who in your organization, on Friday 4
5l morni.ng, called Carl Abraham regarding the 1200 mr per hour I
6l reading and requested advice about evacuaticn' A
Who is Carl Abraham?
7l Q
He is in the regional office --
8 8
MR. HERR:
NRC regional office, public information, 9
10 NRC Region 1.
i 11 THE WITNESS:
The answer is, no, I am unaware of i
12 any call going out of my office to NRC.
Calls coming in 13 from NRC, but I have no recollection about any of our ja people calling NRC at that time.
15 BY MR. ERNST:
16 0
Were you aware that Met Ed made two phone calls 37 to PEMA regarding the 1200 mr per hour reading?
A Yes.
jg 19 Q
One was from Floyd to Kuehn?
A Yes.
20 I
21 Q
And do you know who made and received the other i
i call?
22 t
A The other call was received by Jim Cassidy 23 i
24 C-a-s-s-i-d-y.
.And the calls were received simultaneously.
. Aca-rederW Reconen, Inc.
25 Who the party was on the other end from TMI, I do not know.
61 i
1 Q
On the morning of March 30th, there were several
,e'I counties that cere called rather promptly regarding the i
3i possibility of an evacuation.
As I recall, Dauphin County I
41 was called and I think by yourself and an indication made 4
5l.
that there may be an order of minutes or a short time frame 6
in order to evacuate.
Do you know which counties were i
~
7 called and who called them, general time frame, what 8
information was given to the other five, the other however 9
many counties were involved at that t.ime?
10 A
At about 9:30, I called at least Dauphin, Lancaster,!
11 and York.
Now, it is my recollection that I spoke personally 12 to Kevin Molloy in Dauphin County, but that the 13 emergency management coordinators at Lancaster and York I
Id were not immediately available and I spoke to my own 15 representative that I had there in there EOC and related I
16 i to them, the information basically was that I had 17 recommended to the governor a five-mile evacuation and that I felt, based upon the information then available, that 19 there was about a 90 percent chance that we would probably 20 conduct at sometime that day a precautionary evacuation.
21 0
To your knowledge, was this information also 22 transmitted to other counties by other people in your staff, 23 I
or was it just those thz n counties?
i 4
24 A
Just these three counties, because, again, remember
= %.pe n n.,,,,ne, 25 that suddenly at this same time, a fourth county becomes C
52 I
I!
involved which would have been Cumberland County.
But 2.
we're still talking abcut ten miles.
I'm talking about 3
five miles.
I had no intentions at that time of recommending nor did I recommend a ten-mile evar:uation.
<*j Although that was the advice from NRC.
t 6I We had no plans for a ten-mile evacuation.
We did have 7
plans for a five-mile evacuation.
8 Q
Did you personally recommend evacuation to the 9
governor based on your own analysis and judgment regarsing 10 the need for evacuation, or did you make a recommendation 11 to the governor which was based essentially on Collins' f
12 phone call.
13 A
It vas based on two.
It was based on Collins's I#
telephone call to me and it was based on lack of any 15 information from Bureau of Rad Protection.
And I qualified 16 my recommendation to the governor that I had not yet I7 heard from Bureau of Rad Protection upon whom I depend 38 for my recommendation.
But that with essentially what 19 I had in the hand then, that there was a 1200 millirem 20 release going on and that the source had not been determined t
21 and it was a continuing emission, that it would be prudent on 22 our part to conduct a five-mile precautionary evacuation.
23 Q
Does that mean that your recommendation to the 24 governor was based on your evaluation of the information
. Am+WwW Roomn, W.
25 you had at hand, you were personally recommending to the 2
l
I 63 l
i 1;
governor, as an officer of the state, to evacuate?
I 2 I f,
A I think there were -- whether they should have been 36 i
considered in my own evaluation to the degree that I did 4
consider them -- but one, the call from at least identifed 5
l to me as Floyd; I have no personal knowledge that it was 1
61 Flovd.
It was a very highly emotional kind of report t
i 7 j indicating that Three Mile Island was getting ready to 8l evacuate itself, all noncritical personnel, that it had its i
I 9!
own buses standing by for this evacuation, strongly 10 recommending to us that we get prepared for an immediate 11 I
I evacuation.
12 i
Then Collins's call to me that said or verified the i
13 information that I had already receive ~d from Three Mile 14 Island, extending this distance now to ten miles.
And i
15 then his subsequent call to me, five or ten minutes later, 16 i
telling me that he wanted me to understand that this was 17 not only his recommendation but that this was also the 18 recommendation -- and I have testified that he said 19 commissioners', but after hearing him testify, I suspect that he is more accurate in saying that it has the support 21 of the senior staff members of my agency.
22 So I had the call from Three Mile Island.
I had the 23 call from Collins, and then backed up immediately by another 24 call letting me know the seriousness with which NRC was 4 pe,a n
.,,, w, 25 treating the incident.
And I had not yet had a report
64 jl back -- and this was over a half an hour from the time that i
I we had submitted the information -- from the Bureau of 2,
I i
3 P.ad Protection, a report from them saying, Hey, there's norhing to it.
4 5
0 At noon on March 30th, PEMA sent a telegram to 6
all affected counties lifting the stay-indoors advisory.
l l
7 1 However, also at about noon, the governor held a press 8
conference at which time he said the advisory remained in effect.
At the 10:00 p.m. news conference on Friday, 9
10 the governor lifted this advisory effective at midnight.
11 What was the basis for PEMA, in essence, lifting the j
12 advisory with this telegram at noon?
13 A
I think there is something in error there.
Just ja lefore 10:00, noon on the 30th of March, the governor 15 issued an advisory for all personnel within the five-mile 16 arst or within the ten-mile area to remain undercover until 17 noon.
At about 11:50 that morning or perhaps a few 18 minutes before that, my deputy, who I had sent to the 19 governor's office, called me and told me the governor was 20 going to make a press release at 12:00 noon lifting the l
21 advisory on the take-cover and reintroducing an advisory 22 that all pregnant women and preschool-age children be evacuated from the five-mile area.
So this is what we 23 24 put out on our teletypewriter a little before the jovernor i
Ace-Fees noo,ws am:.
i 25 made the announcement that he was, in fact, lifting the
65 1
a advisory.
2 The governor did lift that advisory at 12:00 noon, not 3;
i 12:00 midnight, 12:00 noon, for people to stay under cover.
I 4I Q
During various meetings with the governor or 5
l contacts with the governor's office -- and this is sort of 6!
i a temporal kind of question, I guess -- what did you 7
report on the state of readiness and preparations for 8
varicus evacuation scenarios?
What was your bottom line 9
to the governor as time went on?
10 i
A From the first meeting I had with the governor 11 e
on Wednesday noon, following a press conference with the 12 lieutenant governor, I reported to the governor that we 13 were prepared to execute a five-mile evacuation or to have 14 the personnel take cover.
I continued, in all of my 15 meetings with the governor -- I met with him again that 16 night and gave him a map of our evacuation plan for the 17 five-mile area.
i 18 The only change, as I recall, that I alluded to at that 19 time that under the present weather conditions, that we, 20 PEMA, were no longer contemplating a quadrant kind of an 21 evacuation; that the unstability, lack of stability of the 22 weather conditions, that any precautionary evacuation, that 23 we better do it on a 360, 360 degrees.
24 a..p
,3 n,,,,, w.
I continued to assure the governor and the lieutenant 25 governor that we were prepared to execute the five-mile
66 1
evacuation.
I. told the governor en Friday morning, E
2l-based upon the recommendation of NRC, that we were not in 3
a posture to execute a ten-mile evacuation and that unless I
d!
there was an overriding reason to extend the range to ten i
l miles, I would not recommend it.
I would recommend that we c
l 6!
stick with the five-mile avacuation and have people within l
7 five to ten remain undercover.
8 Sometime on Saturday, I talked to all of my county 9
personnel by Saturday night, and at that time I was 10 assuring the governor that we could execute a 20-mile Il evacuation.
12 On Sunday, I brought all of my county emergency management 13 coordinators into the office, and we again went over the t
I#
plan and the guidance that we had provided.
And all of 15 them were assuring me that we could execute a 20-mile 16 evacuation.
I7 MR. CHIN:
May I show Colonel Hendarson a 18 document, Exhibit 3, with the title "NRC Procedures for 19 Decision to Recommend Evacuation."
It is a seven-page 20 document.
21 (Henderson Exhibit No. 3 identified.)
i 22 BY MR. ERNST:
23 0
When were you first aware that this NRC document 24 existed which was given.to the governor bv Chairman Hendrie i
- A= Feo.rw n.oonen. anc.
25 on Sunday, this document which analyzed possible future I
i i
67 i
1 1 accident scenarios, consequences, evacuation distances, and 2N 1
lead times?
I 3l A
On or about the 21st of June, 1979.
i 4l 0
Is that the time that you got a copy, or were just Sl' made aware?
6!
A This was the first time that I was aware that such 7
a document existed.
In a meeting with Mr. Gerusky, on or 8l about the 21st of June, I again made reference to a I
9 request that I had made to --
10 THE WITNESS:
Off the record a second.
11 (Discussion off the record.)
12 THE WITNESS:
I made a request on Saturday or 13 Sunday, the 31st of March or the 1st of April, of Boyce 14 Grier, that we vitally needed a scenario of potential incidents that could occur and the time elements as affected 16 evacuation for that kind of a scenario.
17 I had also made requests to the Bureau of Rad Protection 18 and to whom I am uncertain at this time.
19 At this meeting on the 21st of, on or about the 21st of June, Mr. Gerusky asked me if I was aware that NRC had 21 i
published such a document.
And he consequently promised 22 to send me a copy.
Some two days later, perhaps the 23rd 23 of Ju'ne, and this is not my copy so the stamp on the back 24
%.,.,,n _,,,,,
shows the exact date it arrived in my emergency operations 25 center, but it was on or about the 23rd of June that I I
i 1
6C 1
saw this document for the first time.
- i BY MR. ERNST:
3 0
To your knowledge, did anyone on your staff receive 4
such a document?
5 A
Mo one on my staff received such a document.
I have l
6:
made inquiry.
i 7
Q Have you examined this document --
A I have.
g 9
Q
-- since June?
10 A
I have.
11 Q
Do you find the document to be difficult or 12 reasonably easy to understand?
13 A
It is.
14 Q
Which.
15 A
It is very easy to understand, and it would i
16 have provided me the kind of information that I could 17 have put out to my county civil defense directors, the 18 kind of information we were all needing as far as our 19 state of readiness to execute any kind of protective actions.
20 Q
What was your line of communications with NRC; 21 principally, to whom did you communicate within the NRC 22 organization on a rather routine basis?
23 A
No one.
Our line of communications is primarily 24 with our Bureau of Rad Protection who, in turn, is in ec.A,.i neoonen, inc.
25 communication with the plant and with NRC.
69 l
1' Now, I had infret"ent telephone calls from personne 24f at the operations center in Bethesda, Maryland, several 3,
different people.
And on an occasion or two during the j
s incident, I may have called them.
But it was primarily Si i
someone from the operations office of Bethesda, Maryland i
6' calling me asking for information regarding how long it 7
would take us to evacuate.
8 I forget some of the other questions that would have 9
come up at that time.
I 10 !
O Would there have been any value to have more 11 routine communications with NRC or, perhaps, even to have 1
12 an NRC person assigned to your office?
13 A
Under the circumstances of Three Mile Island 14 where we did not have an individual from Bureau of Rad 15 Protection, yes, it would have been helpful.
But if we 16 had had the Bureau of Rad Protection co-located with us 17 as all of our scenarios in the pcst had planned, we would 18 not have needed NRC.
They would have made those 19 contacts for us.
0 I would like to go back to a line of questioning 21 earlier this morning.
You had mentioned that you or your 22 staff attended most, if not all of the governor'r meetings 23 and press conferences, certainly through Sunday or Monday 24 or that kind of a time frame.
But I recall personally, 4..
.i man.n. inc.
25 either in our conversations in Harrisburg several months
70 l
l' ago when I came up with Hal Gaut, or maybe it was in your 2,
testimony previously, that there was a communications
~
problem.
That some of the times, you did not know when the 1
4l l
governor was making a press release or what was being 5
contained in it and had relied to some extent on listening 6!
to the radio or something to keep up -- or maybe I'm confused in my own mind.
I would like to straighten it 8
out in my own mind.
9 A
Well, I think you answered it -- through Sunday, 10 approximately, I was present at, I believe, almost every time 11 Denton met with the governor or any other representatives 12 except you pointed out the ones that I was unaware of, the 13 couple individuals meeting with the lieutenant governor.
4 14 After Sunday, I was unaware when such meetings were being 15 held and was not always aware of the times of the press 16 conferences.
And the information to me became somewhat 17 difficult to obtain.
i 18 Q
But through Sunday, you were fully aware of 19 not only when the press conferences were being held, but also 20 what the governor was going to say?
21 A
Correct.
There was a -- starting on perhaps 22 Saturday, the governor's office was becoming very crowded 23 with straphangers and with personnel that were there when 24 the governor entertained Mr. Denton.
At the first meeting am.. -.ra n==n.n,im.
on Saturday night with Mr. Denton, there was an effort made by 1
Tl 1
the governor to move a lot of people out of the office.
3 il
'i However, I was asked to remain, and I was invited to come 1
3' back on Sunday for subsequent meetings.
I suspect that j
4' the governor was using the lieutenant governor as my point 5
of contact for subsequent meetings and, therefore, did not 6l feel that I was needed to attend these subsequent meetings i
7 with Mr. Denton.
8l 0
It also seems to me that I recall that the counties 96 were complaining or upset that they did not get information 10 through the normal chain of communications and had to, 11 in essence, rely on radio and television broadcasts of i
12 thd governor's press conferences.
A This is correct.
Most of our counties were very 14 upset that we were not providing them what they considered to be requisite information concerning what was going on 16 down at TMI, that they were having to rely upon the news 17 media for incidents that were occurring or possibilities 18 that might occur.
~
19 Q
PEMA, however, was fully informed of the Denton 20 briefings and what the governor was going to say.
Why 21 couldn't PEMA have established those normal communications 22 simultaneously with the governor's briefing?
23 A
Well, we were through Sunday, and we did a fairly 24 good job through Sunday.
We were under the same, operating Ace M Rm,ws, Inc, 25 under the same difficulties that many other state' agencies
i 72 1
were operating under.
2 Friday and Saturday, particularly, we just had thousands 3}'
i and thousands of calls ccming into the 20C where it was t
4I taking an inordinate amount of my operational people's 5
I time to answer news media inquiries and public inquiries.
6 j
On about Sunday, the governor established a rumor 7
control center; and starting with that, very quickly, 8 !
many of the calls that were coming into our office were i
9 diverted to the rumor control center.
As a consequence, 10 my people began having a little more time.
But we 11 recognized that there was a communications deficiency.
12 We addressed this to the governor's press office to try and 13 resolve the problem.
I discussed it with the lieutenant 14 i
governor.
The lieutenant governor assured me that we 15 would be informed of any information we needed to know.
16 Q
Could you briefly describe the training that your 17 office gives to themselves internally and also to the other state offices an~ perhaps the county and local 19 coordinators with regard to emergency response?
Or if l
1 20 l
you have such a document that describes the training that 21 we could have, there may be a simpler way for us to 6
22 understand it.
23 i
A I'll have a member of my staff who may be coming 24 over later in the day bring a copy of the type of a
- 4 +.o.a n n.,,, inc.
25 training schedule that we outlined for the year over to you.
}
l
73 1
But basically, we conduct a two-day training conference 21!
y each cuarter in each of our three areas.
The training is i
3i in-depth on a topic of interest at the time.
Over the past, I
4' flash flooding has been a very serious problem within the 5.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
We've given an inordinate 8
i 6'
amount of time to flash flooding.
7 We have in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, several 8
hundred unsafe dams, and we have given training in t'2 9
preparation of plans for down-dam safety.
10 Chemical spills have been a serious problem throughout 11 the nation, and one of our conferences was a two-day 12 conference on chemical spills and the response mechanisms 13 and how counties should be prepared.
14 We give training conferences on the training of 15 mass care managers, and just a whole host of subjects on 16 a quarterly basis.
Now, we do it twice in each area.
17 Our areas split the Commonwealth from north and south, 18 and the eastern area, central area, and the western area.
19 In order to insure maximum attendance, we select the 1
20 I location in southwestern Pennsylvania for those ten counties 21 in that area We might put that conference on on a i
22 Monday and Tuesday, and then we move.p to the northwestern 23 counties for Thursday and Friday or sometimes it's a 24 A m-r w wal R o o m n, W.
subsequent week.
25 We conduct an annual three-day seminar with all of our
74 im h
county emergency management coordinators, and we just concluded 2 lIJ one yesterday, Monday through Wednesday.
In those seminars, 3
we cover a host of subjects very briefly, with the view that 1
i 4i the on-site training, well, the area-type training that j
we conduct will be a more in-depth treatment.
I 6
At the same time, we publish bulletins and memoranda 7
on subjects that we consider to be of interest to the 8
emergency management community on a continuing basis, and 9
update those on a regular, at least annually.
10 We maintain a film library of over 1200 prints of 11 some 110 to 115 subjects in our business which we loan out 12 on a regular basis and is seen by over 600,000 - 700,000 13 people annually.
14 Additionally, other kinds of information, perhaps not in 15
-- well, additionally, the Defense Civil Preparedness 16 Agency conducts certain training for us.
We then have l
special training that we conduct such as radio monitor 18 training.
This is both by home-study course and by eight 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> of classroom instruction.
We train the radio monitor instructors, train people in each county who are
'l
^
capable of providing instruction to other people in the 22 county on radio instruments.
23 I think generally that's --
24 O
This training is to the county people and your
- Ace +sooral Roonen, Inc, i
people; as I understand, you don't provide training to the
(
75 1[
l local coordinators.
That is a county responsibility?
2 lI n
Correct.
t 3;
O Does Met Ed provide any training exercises or a
training courses or whatever to state or local emergency o
response people?
6 i
A No.
I 7
Q Have they ever performed any tests of plans or I
8 things of that nature?
9 A
Their annual communications checks which usua21y come more often than annually.
11 i
Q And you have participated in those?
12 A
We participate in those.
i Q
Before March 28th, were you aware of any 14 problem in the emergency response area in whatever relations 15 you might have had with TMI?
I realize, I guess most of 16 the centact was with BRP.
I'm not aware of how much 17 ccrmenication PEMA may have had with Met Ed.
f 18 A
Mot any real problems.
We meet on about an annual 19 4
basis with the Pennsylvania Electric Association which has representation from the various power industries.
While Unit 2 was being built or just prior to its being completed, 22 Met Ed did invite me down or TMI personnel invited me 23 down, and I did tour the facilities.
They took care of 24 4
us for a day there.
A..pe,nowwn,w, 25 We have had meetings with their folks in our office, my I
76 1
people, when Met Ed were involved in the public hearings 2'
f during the licensing process.
But there was no other formal 3i kind of arrangements between PEMA and Met Ed.
4 Q
So your people did testify at the licensing Se hearings on the adequacy of the state plan?
6!
A Yes.
7 O
And testified that in their view, the state plan 8
at that time was~ adequate?
A Yes.
10 Q
Have you identified with regard to the state 11 plan that would seem to indicate that maybe your 12 judgment should be revised, that the state plan at that time 13 was not adequate? -
14 l
A Well, if I understand what I have been told in 15 the past, that for Three Mile Island, we were required 16 to have a protective action plan out to a range -- which had 17 been identified to us as a low-population zone -- of 3,000 18 meters.
I think our plan was adequate.
It was adequate 19 up to the five miles, barely.
20 For ten mile or twenty mile, no, our plan is not 21 adequate no.- did it ever address that.
I have a conflict 22 with myself at the present time whether we need a separate 23 fixed nuclear site plan rather than including that as an 24 Aa.5-es n==n m ix.
annex in our operation plan.
I am uncertain at the present 25 time.
I am moving down the line as if the plan can be an 4
77 1
annex.
a 2 li Our plan does not provide to either the counties or the 1
3 support counties -- and this was an area that we really 4
didn' t give much thought to, the host areas, our support counties.
At the time, we conceived each county taking 6 I care, as far as mass care facilities, of its own people.
i 7
Now, rhis certainly is a shortfall.
In our administrative directive 720.1 where we assign 9
responsibilities to all state agencies having emergency 10 responsibilities, their responsibilities are all-encompassing 11 and treat disasters as a single subject.
They do not i
12 spell out, except in the case of DER and perhaps in the case 13 of health, the word " radiological" or " radiation" I don't 14 believe is used.
15 We've, for example, given the Department of Transportation 16 an overall mission of being prepared to assign highways 17 to -- and I'm using this only as an example, this is not 18 the one I'm trying to think of -- but it's not specifically 19 slated towards a fixed nuclear facility, perhaps which is 20 in error.
i 21 i
A couple of years ago, I sat down with my plans officer, j
22 and we went down a listing of eight plans that would take 23 care of most of the emergencies with which were concerned 24 and the activities of that plans office.
And the eighth w.m n-3, w.
25 i
priority item that I assigned was the preparation for plans l
I
7s I
for fixed nuclear sites.
2j d
Now, that priority is no longer current.
This has --
i' 3
I I won't say it has the first priority, but it is pretty 1
4' close up to the top at the present time.
But there was a general feeling, not only with myself and my staff, but
=
6' certainly throughout the community that nuclear power 7l plants were ccrpletely safe and that really preparing any kind 8
of a plan was merely a paper exercise to meet the requirements 9
of NRC during the licensing process.
And very little 10 attention was given to what meat might be in the plan.
11 This is not true on our flash flood plans, because we 12 recognize that we have flash floods on a regular basis 13 in Pennsylvania, and more attention is given to that.
14 Our chemical spills, more attention is given to that, more 15 detail.
So that kind of detail was completely lacking on 16 our fixed nuclear site emergency response plan.
17 O
Should the NRC approve state plans before 18 licensing a plant?
19 A
I think somebody should, whether it's NRC or not.
20 I have mixed emotions about,a regulatory agency, as I 21 understand NRC to be.
In reading, certainly in reading the 22 principal 70 checklist items that NRC has come out with, 23 i
I think they are pretty broad and general which leads me 24 a.>
.c o.omn, w.
to believe, rightly or wrongly, I don't know, that I don't 25 believe that NRC, as I understand and know the people that I
79 1
know from NRC, really have an appreciation of time / distance 2l factors and problems associated at local government levels I
3i i
for evacuations.
4 I personally think that DCPA or FEMA probably have a S
better understanding and appreciation and that there might 6
be some duplication in this area.
i 7l 0
Should states be required to have a state-approved plan or some federally-approved plan before licensing?
A It couldn't hurt.
Again, I'm certain that --
or for my money, a plan is merely a piece of paper.
In 11 many counties within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania --
12 and I suspect this is true throughout the United States --
13 states draft a plan and send it to the counties for la guidance as far as making their own plans for any kind 15 i
or an emergency.
16 It's not unusual for us here in the Commonwealth of 17 i
Pennsylvania to prepare a plan which we call " Lincoln i
18 County" because there is no Lincoln County in the Commonwealth' 19 of Pennsylvania.
We write a. full-blown plan for a down-dam 20 i
safety evacuation.
It is not unusual to get back from one 21 of our counties a copy of their plan, signed by their 22 county commissioners, and to see Lincoln County still in 23 i
the plan.
24 So a plan that is prepared by a plans office or a single 4..>,
, non.n, o r,c.
25 entity within that agency, unless there are also requirements
30 1
that the plan be tested and that the plan be regularly
'f exercised, it's not worth the paper it's written on.
1 3
You can take, if you would like, Met Ed or the other 4
nuclear power plants would prchably provide us a professional 5l planner or two and we could send them around to our 6!
counties, and they could write up the most beautiful plan 7
that would meet every one of the NRC criteria.
But when 8
it came to the day of execution, there wouldn't be an i
9i elected official or very few people in the emergency 10 management organization have any idea of what's inside the 11 plan.
I 12 So I think they should have a plan, but the plan should 13 be a plan that everybody is involved in, that's going to 14 participate in it are required to participate in the planning,!
15 that the local police departments, local fire deparements, 16 local medical services, the chamber of commerce or whoever 17 else has a part to play in that plan, Red Cross and so forth, 18 should be required to provide their input into that plan.
19 And then that plan should be reviewed at subsequent headquarters and exercised on a regular basis.
21 Q
I have a personal observation I would like for 22 you to comment on.
In the past, NRC clearly did not 23 I
require an approved state plan to issue a license, with the 24 udgment that the state was the one responsible for Acs MW Mosenen, Inc.
25 protection of the health and safety of its citizenry off-site
i i
81 I
i 1 ll and perhaps should not be a federal function, at least for p
2'!
the NRC.
Now there is scme talk about requiring a I
3-state-approved plan.
4 And yet what I read in the state plan as it exists and 5
j hear you testify that the responsibility and authority for i
6:
emergency response starts with the local level and works i
7 upward, what would be your observation as to the usefulness, 8
in the protection of health and safety of the public, of i
9 a state-approved plan, if indeed, one has to co down to 10 the local level to assure that they are ready to do somethine?
11 s
i A
It could or could not be worthless.
I could N\\
12 i
i prepare you the most beautiful state plan that I assure 13 you NRC would approve, but if that plan isn't disseminated
\\
~
14 g
and the subordinate county and local municipal plans x,
prepared that dovetail and take the guidance in the state
-/1 15 16 I
plan, you still don't have anything.
It's the local
{,
17
\\
government and the county government that are going to ii 18 have the capability to execute any evacuation, if evacuation /
19 were necessary.
O Did you routinely have communications with 21 Met Ed during the TMI emergency response?
And if not, should 22 you have had more, would that have been helpful?
23 A
Not under our procedures.
One of the areas that 24 I omitted earlier, we have a dedicated NAWAS line to Met w.
,,, n n.,,,inc, 25 i
Ed.
This telephone was never used once.
The telephone is i
i i
h
62 1
in their operations, in the control site at Met Ed.
2 '!
dow, we had no reason for calling, because we're entirely i
3i i
dependent upon the Bureau of Rad Protection.
Now, the only I
4:
I reason that NAWAS line was put in there, at Met Ed's expense 1
St
-- about 530 or S60 a month -- and how we were able to l
6!
j justify it through the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency 71 was that in times of emergency, Bureau of Rad Protection 8
functioned out of our emergency operations center.
l 9
0 So you would anticipate that there would be a 10 use for that line under the current thinking?
11 A
Well, under the previous thinking and under the 12 current thinking, but under the actual practice of OMI, no.
13 Q
We were sent, on August 2nd, I guess you signed 14 I'
to Miss Jill Geiger, a document which advertises the 15 PEMA log which is a typewritten, about an inch-thick 16 document.
It's a typewritten chronology of PEMA actions.
i 17 I was wondering if you first recollect such a document, i
18 remember sending that document, what the nature of the 19 document was?
A It appears that my deputy sent it.
I see my 21 name is there, but he signed it.
I am aware of this document, 22 yes.
i 23 Q
Would you describe the origin of that log, upon 24 l w.p.., non n,,,,,,
what is it based, and the thrt.. of the question is, is it 25 l
an exact copy of a handwritten log or perhaps are the times
f 33 1
correct, but the typed description of the call and
+
I 2i i
everything perhaps expanded from existing notes.;
or 3i might it be just a concensus or recollection of events, I
4 not really based on substantive or handwritten notes taken 5
f at the time of calls?
6 A
Under our emergency operations center procedures, i
7!
every action desk in PEMA -- that's my own otaff plus all of the state agencies -- are provided mimeographed forms 9
which are message receipt and transmittal forms.
Each 10 telephone call and each radio message or other oral 11 message being relayed is supposed to be reduced to writing 12 at the time of the event.
13 These message forms are then sent to a typist who we call our journal clerk, our law clerk, action log clerk.
15 That person takes these messages and puts them in a i
16 sequential order, time sequential order.
At the conclusion j
17 i
of each day, that person types them on this action log 18 and shows the actions that were taken on that particular g
19 message which the originator has blocks to fill in.
20 I believe that the time sequence shown are relatively 21 accurately, recognizing that in an organization such as 22 l
ours, some people use the wall clock, others use their 23 wristwatches, some people, when they make out the messace i
24 in haste, may forget to put the time down and come back and A=4 --.i n.,,, i m:.
+
25 reconstitute the time -- so for other than minor changes.
i
t 84 1
i Now, the log, once the log is typed, it is sent to ny operations officer, Dick Lamison.
What we want the log 3i to show is merely a cryptic statement of the problem or of Al the call.
For the most part, our message backup, which we 5
maintain in a handwritten page taken down by the originator, 6
provides us the backup.
o 7
Now, in order to keep this log relatively brief, 8
i Mr. Lamison will frequently, on the first draft, knock j
9 out a lot of the goobledigook or will insert, from the 10 original message, something to make the statement a little 11 more meaningful.
12 So from that asoect, this has been policed from the 13 original log.
But for the most part, we do have backup a 14 message form of one fashion or another.
l 15 O
Then this log would accurately and adecuately 16 reflect the events -- within the inaccuracies of time that 17 you have mentioned -- and your agency's response?
18 A
To the best of my knowledge, yes.
l g
19 MR. ERNST:
That is the end of my list of 20 questions.
You have testified many times before, and you have, 21 had some lessons learned, I think, in the President's 22 Commission in which you went on record.
23 On reflection, do you have anything else you rauld like i
24 Ac. +..e m.oonen. ine.
to add to everything that's gone before or anything that 25 might help us in our inquiry at this time?
f j
25 iII l
THE WITNESS:
No, I don't believe there is anything 2
that I car contribute to what has already been said.
3'!
.NLR. ERNST:
Outstanding questions?
4 MR. EERR:
I've got one small question.
You 5
mentioned on Friday morning, you talked to Kevin Molloy I6i about the pending order to evacuate that you thought was 7
coming and that you talked to your representatives in 8
Lancaster and York Counties.
Could you identify who i
9 from PEMA you spoke to in Lancaster and York Counties that 10 morning?
11 THE WITUESS:
I'm only guessing, but I surmise i
12 1 that it probably was Bob Stimmel in York County, and 13 Bob Hetz in Lancaster.
l 14 MR. HERR:
Thank you.
15 MR. CHIN:
I have no questions.
l 16 MR. ERNST:
In conclusion, let me say that 17 this is an ongoing investigation, and although I have 18 e
concluded the questions that I had for you today, it is o
19 possible we might need to ask you some residual questions 20 at some later time.
We will, however, make every effort l
21 to avoid having to do so.
22 I will now recess this deposition rather than terminate 23 it, and wish to thank you very much for your time and 24.
Reporters. Inc. '
efforts sp?nt in being with us today.
Ace Fooer
.25 THE WITNESS:
You're quite welcome.
I
CP. 71S6 36 l
9/20/79 3;
I (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m.,
the taking of the 2 I.i deposition was concluded.)
3I I
i 4
Oran K.
Henderson S
6' 7
8 9l 10 11
~
l I
i 12 i 13 14 15 16 17 18 0
19 l
20 I I
21 22 s
s 23 1
24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 i
i e
1
g>R RICg UNITED STATES g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y ) )s, g
WAwlNGToN, D. C. 205t5 3QY j
September 4,1979 5
In Reply Refer to:
- i
,?
NTFTM 790904-05 d,
Col. Oran K. Henderson, Director Pa. Emergency Management Agency Room B-151 Transportation & Safety Bldg.
0 P. O. Box 3321 Harrisburg, Pa.
17105
Dear Col. Henderson:
I am writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for September 20, 1979 at 9:00 a.m.,
in a meeting room at the Holiday Inn Town motel, 2nd and Chestnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pa.
Please bring with you a copy of your resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precurso,r events including any which you have reason to believe may not be in official NRC files, diary or personal working file.
The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
This Group is being directed independently of the NRC by the law firm of Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Ingeiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to At the identify major problem areas and to make recommendations for change.
conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the deposi-tion is voluntary and there will be no ef fect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you. However, the Special Inquiry has been s
given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place. Any person deposed may rave an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at the deposition as his representative.
You should rea.ize that while we will try to respect any requests for confiden-tiality in conntition with the publication of our report, we can make no guar-Names oi witnesses and the information they provide may eventually antees.
inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's become public, investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem A
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2 appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Informa-tion Act. Moreover, other departments and agencies of government may request access to this information pursuant to tha.. Privacy Act of 1974.
The information may also be made available in whole or in part to committees or subcommittees of
. the U.S. Congress.
If you have testified previously with respect to the Three Mile Island accident, it would be useful if you could review any transcripts c,f your previous state-ment (s) prior to the deposition.
d Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
,sht),A.-4 ci Mitchell Rogovin, Director NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group O
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LIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ORAN K. HENDERSON The Colonel uho was born on August 25, 1920, is a native of
' Indianapolis, Indiana.
Colonel Henderson enlisted in the Indiana National Guard in April 1939. His initial assignrent was as a machine gunner with Corpany n, 151st Infantry Regiment. His active duty began when his unit was called into Federal service on January 17, 1941. Af ter completing Infantry School OCS in early January 1943, he was connissioned a Second Lieutenant.
o Af ter receiving his commission, Colonel Henderson was assigned first to Camp Roberts, California, and then to For'. ?.ewis, Washington, At Fort Lewis, he served with the 71st Inf antry Regirent as Rifle Platoon Leader, Battalion Personnel Of ficer, and Battalion Training Officer. When his unit was deployed to the European Theater of Operations in August 1944, he was assigned as a Rific Platoon Leader. He was seriously wounded in action on November 13, 1944, and was returned to duty in a lindted status in February 1945. Upon his request, he was reassigned to the 71st Infantry Regiment as Weapons Platoon Leader until his unit was returned to the United States in August 1945 to prepare for deployment to the Pacific.
In September 1945, the Colonel was assigned as Regimental Adjutant and continued in that capacity until his unit was inactivated in December 1945.
In January 1946, he was assigned to Headquarters, Second U.S. Army, Merphis, Tennessee, as Post Exchange Officer. He was separated from the service in Septecher 1946 in the grade of Captain and awarded a 60 percent disability due to wounds received in action.
At Colonel Henderson's request, he returned to active duty on October 31, 1946. He served initially as Supply Officer and Billeting Of ficer with Headquarters, Secend U.S. Arcy, at Fort Meade, Maryland. From March 1947 to June 1950, he was assigned as Aide-de-Camp to the Deputy and Army Commander.
From July 1950 through January 1951, he attended the Associate Advanced Course Infantry School and the Airborne School. The Colonel served f rom February 1951 through July 1952 in Korea as Ccemanding Officer, Company C, 38th Infantry Regiment, as Regimental Adjutant and as Aide-de-Camp to General James Van Fleet.
When the Colonel returned to the United States in July 1952, he was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division where he was a Battalion Executive Officer, later an Executive Officer of the (C3) Training Section, and subse-quently, as Battalion Commander..During this assignment, he attended the Ascociate Course, Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
He left the 82nd Airborne Division in July 1955 for assignment with the lith Airborne Division. When the lith was assigned to Germany, his assignments were Battalion Executive Officer, Battalion Com=ander, Regimental Training Officer, and Commander of Troop C,17th Cavalry. He was Troop Commander of the 17th Cavalry in Lebanon during the period June 1958 through October 1958.
Colonel Oran K. llenderson Colonel !!cndersen graduated from the Armed Forces Staf f College in June 1959. lie was then assigned to the Office of the Chief, Research and Development, in the Pentagon.
In January 1962, he participated in the Boot Strap Program and received his degree f rom the University of Maryland in June 1962. From August 1962 through July 1963, he was a student at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. While attending the War College, he participated in the Master's Degree Completion Progran with George Washington University.
When Colonel Henderson graduated f rom the Naval Callege, he was o
assigned to the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietn*, for duty with the Joint Research and Test Activity. He completed his Vietnam tour in July 1964.
In August 1964, he was assigned as Brigade Executive Officer, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Ile was promoted to Colonel in early November 1965 and was then reassigned to the Training Office, Headquarters, U.S. Army racific.
On July 1,1966, the Colonel was assigned as Commanding Officer, lith Infantry Brigate Schofield Barracks.
The Brigade was sent to Vietnan in December 1967. lie served repeatedly in assignments as Commander and Deputy Commander of the lith Infantry until October 3, 1966.
During this Vietnam tour he uas wounded.
He then returned to Schofield Barracks for assignment to the (G3)
Training Office of Headquarters, U.S. Army Hawaii. From July 1969 to June 1971, he served with the faculty of the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia.
Fror June 1971 until February 1973, the Colonel served at First U.S. Army Headquarters, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training.
During this assignment, the Colonel was tried and acquitted of charges growing out of tha My Lai inci-dent.
In February 1973, he assumed Command Fort Indiantown Cap and remained in this capacity until his retirement on 1 August 1974 Colonel Henderson's awards and decorations include the third award of the Combat Infantry Badge, five Silver Stars, five Brons:e Stars (two for valor), four Purple Hearts, the Legion of Merit, w/ 1 OLC, Jeint Services Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal (with Cluster),
Pa. Distinguished Service Medal, Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry, and the Vietnamese Medal of Merit (Knight Fifth Class), and numerous service awards.
In early September 1974, Colonel Henderson was appointed Deputy Director for the Pennsylvania Bicentennial Commission. He contitiaed in this position until appointed Director, State Council of Civil Defense on 19 August 1976.
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t rm f(RC PR0CEDURES FOR DECISIO!! TO RECOM'4EllD EVACUATION liho Decides 1.
Combination of consequences and times require imediate initiation of evacuation:
Senior flRC Official on site recomends to Governor.
.o 2.
Unplanned event with substantial risk takes place or is iminent l
or situation judged excessively risky but there is time for con-f t
sultation.
Senior NRC Official notifies Governor and HRC HQ.
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Chaircan makes recomendation to Governor after consulting l
with Comissioners if poss?ble.
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Planned event' involving significant additional risk.
Chairnan and Co.nnissioners nukes recomandation.
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I-EXPECTED PLArtT REl. EASE IlhidilllG EVACUAT10ff EVEliT
, RESP 0ftSE All0 TlHE TIME SCEMARIO
- 1. l.oss of vital Restore function withir flo significant Possible pre-function or un-I hour change
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planned leaks.
cautionary evac 2 ml; sta,i inside 5 ml Switch to Alternate Small leak less possible pre-i Examples Function involving than 1 gal / hour
, cautionary
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Primary Coolant in Reactor Coolant Auxiliary Butiding evac 2 mit Pump Trip; stay inside.
5 mi Loss of offsite
'Large leak 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Evac 2 miles power; 50 gal / min
" Stay Inside Loss of feed-S miles water; Serious possibility of failure to restore ~ a a
Depressuriza tion vita; function to go en RilR-See 2 Leak in Auxi-cr@
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These tables incl >de a number of assurrptions about yctivity a"'
pg weather, chosen realis tically4 in in actual release, the r
? ~T.g rate and weather ihould be evaluated as they are at the tirne,.ml the decision base 1 on those vi, lues.
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6 EXPECTED PLAlti REl.EA$E.
IIAntilllG EVACUAT10ti EVEllT RESP').*15 E NIU Tl!E TEE 5CEliN110
- 2. Sequence lead-lbintain Containment 0,esign r,ntain-4 hour Precautionary, ing to Core Integrity (likely) with ment Leon Rate,
Hel t Containment Cooling Evac 2 mi all r
around and 5
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mi, 90* sector stay inside 10 mi j
.I Containment expected to Significant 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Evac 5 mi all Breach release of core (time for con-around and 10
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fission products tainmen,t failure) mile, 90" sector, stay
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- 3. liydrogen flame Mixture in flammable Precautionary I
or explosion range 2 mi (?) 4 6 '-
possible inside j
reactor vessel.
Explosion; major damage Core Nelt See 2 i
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Evac 5 mi all ;
- 4. Evacuate or Lose Loss of Control Treat Control Room like nujor release around and 10 1
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stay inside gE 15 miles
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RESP 0tlSE litT. CiSE AND TIME tlAnfiiiiG EVACUAT!0tl Hanuever Probability of losing Tlg Planned JtEfjC vital function Timing of maneuver can be set Precau tionary provide as.to evacustion 2
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much niles stay time as necessary inside 5 miles Seereleasesundek PLUS loss of vital iSee outcor'nes function hnder loss of vital function.
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Action Guidelines
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- a. ' Hotify evacuation authorities two hours in advar.ce (if possible)
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to standby for a possible evacuation.
b.
Projected doses of 1 ree whole body or 5 rems thyroid. stay 4
inside.
c.
Projected doses of 5 rems whole body or 25 rens thyroid mandatory
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evacu'ation of all persons!
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Assums general warning already that some form of evacuation clay become necessary.
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Lig ;ther The table is based on a realistic prediction of the weather for the next few days, based on the April 1 forecast which would resuit-in high doses at a given distance. At the approach to decision time for evacuation, the T.
appropriate meterological condition will be factored into the dose estimates to determine the evacuation time, sectors, and distances for the evacuation.
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NRC is predicting the dispersion characteristics of the region for the currently measured meteorology as the incident pbgresses.
Rain could lead
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to higher local radioactivity levels.
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Heat Generation i
The reactor core is now quite cool compared to the conventional design-basis calculations.
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The reactor is new, so no fuel has more than 3 months equivalent operation, compared to 1-2 years average for other plants.
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The neutron chain re' action has been shut down for over 4 days, j
It should also be noted that the concrete basemat of this plant is i 4 J
unusually thick.
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"'T. ids 450 min. Core begins to n it u s/f.
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is 2500 psia
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Ticie=210 min Reactor vessel fails, containment pressure goes to 25 psia
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GTide=216 min 11ydrogen burns, co'ntainment. pressure goes to 67 psia
-licM Steam explosion possibility'.- minor consequence 1
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- Us.COHTAIMENT SURVIVES (Failure assdm'edr.130 psia) ~
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- Tih.6 days-Major problem - handle hydrbgen, oxygen - maintain contain-T#,
cent integrity r:
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CAUTION:
- T.eep sprays. running
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- Keep water many feet rolten debris
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- WITHOUT RECO'-SILLERS Hycrogen : continues to' build up
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BASEMT SURVIVES
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Conclusion:
This event should not'. produce major releases n
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- Sprays ~and Coolers Failed Before Flow Stops ci=0 to Time =210 miri.' Sane as Event 1 containment pressure is '25 psia l
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". containment fails due to steam (mostly) overpressure -
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' about 135 psia
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Conclusion:
This event leads' to major releases.
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