ML19322C044
| ML19322C044 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/1979 |
| From: | Dieckamp H, Thiesing J, Wilson R BECHTEL GROUP, INC., GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912280477 | |
| Download: ML19322C044 (102) | |
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HEARINGS 3 \\ @ 3 y~2 QEC r-l Before The
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR REGULATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PtfBLIC WORKS l
UNITED STATES SENATE I
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THREE MILE ISLAND CLEANUP WASHINGTON, D.C.
November 8, 1979 MILTON REPORTING,INC.
8/[icss/NErpeedred (Notary Putnic: D.C.. Virginia Maryland 1801 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W., SUITE #301 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20000 8333000 7912280 h77
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cgNIE NIS PAGE IElll5ENI,QF:
3 MR. HERMAN DIECKAMP, President of General Public Utilities, and GPU Service 4
Corporation, Acting President of Metropolitan Edison Company MR. JAMES W. THIESING, Project Manager, 6
Bechtel Corporation I
MR. RICHARD WILSON, Acting Director for Recovery, General Public Utilities i
8 Service Corporation 9
MR. HAROLD DENTON, Director, Office of o
y Nuclear Reactor Rkgulation, NRC MR. RICHARD VOLLMER, Assistar t Director for 0
g Systems and Projects, Office of Nuclear Il ag Reactor Regulation, NRC 9l c*
12
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-R MAYOR ALBERT WOHLSEN, Lancaster, Pennsylvania a;
Zg MS. JUDITH JOHNSRUD, Environmental Coalition
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$3 on Nuclear Power
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15 MR. BRUCE SMITH, Chairman of the Board of l
E Newberry, Pennsylvania Township 67 l 16 Z
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E 18 19 20 21 22 l
23 24 L
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ROGER /Pam 1
HEARINGS ON I
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THREE MILE ISLAND CLEANUP i
I 3
4 THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1979 5
United States Senate, Subcommittee on Nuclear 6
7 Regulation of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 8
9 Washington, D.
C.
I OW Q
10 The Subcommittee met at 9:30 a.m.,
in Room 4200, Dirksen m
0 11 Senate Office Building, Hon. Gary Hart (Chairman of the a
O 12 Subcommittee) presiding.
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.E 13 Present: Senators Randolph, Hart, Stafford and Simpson.
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20 6
p5 14 Senator Hart.
Hearing wiLL come to order.
mu Oz aE ui Today's hearing, and the one that we wilL hold tomorrow, W4 m
16 constitute the first Congressional review of the cleanup and Z
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1:7 recovery operations now underway at the site of the Three i
E la Mili-Ir. Land nuclear accident.
19 These are, in my view, extremely important hearings.
i 20 Coping with the radioactive debris of the accident is at least 21 as important to the future development andregulationofnuctek 22 power as the cause and the events of the accident itself.
23 More important, actions now being planned and taken at Three 24 Mile Island involve major health and safety questions.
25 Although the situation inside the reactor of the. damaged plant
t 2
I is now stable, each step to be taken in the decontamination a ne 2
dismantling operation wilL involve major health hazards that 3
have to be fully anticipated.
4 It is extremely disturbing, therefore, to learn from the 5
Subcommittee's investigative staff, in a memorandum being 6
released today, that "more than seven months have elapsed 7
since the day of the accident, but there is stilL no overall 8
plan for recovery."
Our preliminary findings indicate that 9
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission appears to be withholding g
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10 guidelines f or such a plan until the utility makes its proposal e
0 11 while the utility position is that such a plan cannot be am DE ag 12 developed until specific regulatory guidelines are provided by Ek 13 the NRC.
So we now seem to find ourselves in a situation wher(
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Zo hf 14 the NRC and Metropolitan Edison are each waiting for the other o
15 to make the first move.
Meanwhile, cleanup at Three Mile z
I'6 Island proceeds on a step-by-step basis without an overalL pla(
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d 17 This is a situation not likely to generate a high degree of I
18 public confidence, nor perhaps good results either.
We wiLL 19 want to explore the problem closely during these hearings.
20 Recovery from the TMI accident, according to the 21 investigation staff, presents " challenges and uncertainties 22 that are unprecendented in the commercial nuclear industry."
23 Recovery costs, including the cost of repla cement power, is 24 estimated to be as high as $1.8 billion.
The entire operation 25 wilL take at least four years and require more than one mitLiol
3 l
I man-hours.
Unique tools and procedures wiLL have to be employed for removing, transporting, storing and disposing of 2
3 unprecendented quantities of nuclear waste materials, includin(
4 to ten million gallons of radioactive fluids and the highly up 5
radioactive core intself.
6 Clearly, recovery from a nuclear accident is a new factor 7
in the nuclear power equation.
The outcome of the recovery 8
operation is by no means certain in technical, legal, social 9
financial terms.
We have a long road to travel before the or 0W y
10 plant can be returned to a safe condition.
It is crucial that a
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industry and government representatives work as cooperatively II Os y$
as possible and not allow themselves to be overtaken by events.:
12
-R 13 We cannot afford suprises with a severely damaged 900 megawatt dl zo 55 34 reactor on our hands.
o 15 We wiLL be hearing today f rom the principal industry and z
16 NRC technical experts who are responsible for recovery opeation' Z
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at the TMI site.
We also wilL be hearing from state and local i d
17 I
18 officials and private citizens regarding their concerns about I9 how Ihe cleanup and recovery operations are proceeding.
I 20 I am interested in Learning how the utility and the NRC 21 are dealing with the more immediate problems of decontaminating l 22 water from the auxiliary building and of removing radioactive l
l 23 gas from the containment building as a first step toward gainin 24 entry and eventual access to the core.
I am also interested ia 25 Learning the degree to which the surrounding community is being
4 kept informed of operations at the TMI site and the degree of 2
confidence that members of the community have in the safety of 3
these operations.
Finally, we wiLL Look into the question of Long-range 5
planning and coordination to ensure that alL potential problems 6
are fully anticipated and safely acted upon.
In large measure,;
7 the degree of confidence that Americans have in nuclear power i
8 wilL be contingent upon the success of these operations.
Nucle l 9
0 power must be deemed to be safe in all respects, including W
Q 10 from an accident.
The health effects of the TMI recovery z
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accident, to our knowledge, have been minimal.
But she acciden og 12 wiLL not be over until the Last pound and pint of debris is j{
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safety disposed of.
The major issue before us today is whether!
13 32 I4
$3 cleanup and recovery can be achieved swiftly, economically, o5 gi 15 and, above alL, safely.
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16 Senator Simpson.
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d I7 Senator Simpson.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I I
18 Look forward, too, with keen interest in our hearings today on recovery operations at the Three Mile Island site.
20 Most of the Subcommittee's previous efforts, as weLL as 21 those of the other investigations have appropriately, I think, 22 been principally focused on the accident itself.
Of course, 23 today's hearing provides us an opportunity for hopefully a 24 clearer understanding of the present situation at the site in l
25 terms of both the existing risks and uncertainties and the
5 1
status of planning and preparedness for dealing with this 2
unprecedented cleanup operation.
Clearly, there are technical 3
problems that must be addressed to ensure continued stability 1
of the Three Mi Le Island plant and to proceed with the vari'ous l 5
steps in restoring the site to use.
6 Our investigation has disclosed that as time passes, j
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certain equipment now being relyed upon to cool the reactor i
and to contain the radioactive waste has become more susceptibl{
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to failure and, Mr. Chairman, I'LL be interested in hearing frok W
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our witnesses concerning the seriousness of these present 0
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problems and the extent to which they require decisions on o
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$g subsequent cleanup actions within the near future.
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I'm especially interested in hearing of the status of zo h
N efforts by both the general public utilities and the NRC to oz 15 ptan the recovery process.
Here, our investigation discloses tr 16 y
that many technical challenges remain, including the removal
-a-d II of the radioactive atmosphere in the containment, I
i 18 decontamination of water in the containment and decontamination; of the containment itself, storage, transportation of disposal 20 ut t h e-radioactive waste uerierated during cleanup, and.remov.it i 21 of the damaged core.
It seems to me, that these unique 22 technical challenges demand a very careful and comprehensive 1
23 planning effort to assure that the necessary work is done i
24 properly, within the time period that's required, and with 25 minimal risks to the health and safety of the surrounding
6 I
communities and the werkers at the site.
Mr. Chairman, in that i
2 regard, I'm concerned that adequate progress may not be taking :
3 place in the planning efforts of the utility and the NRC on l
4 these recovery operations.
i 5
The utility seems to be taking the position that final 6
plans cannot be made until the NRC's regulatory r eq ui rement s 7
a re in place.
While the NRC staff has prepared just such a 8
set of regulatory requirements, the Commission has not as yet 9
o acted upon them.
I should be interested to hear the views of WF 10 our witnesses on the need for a comprehensive plan for cleanup j g
o by the utility and for a definitive set of regulatory g:
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$n requirements for cleanup by the NRC at the outset of the recoveq e
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activity as weLL as views of those witnesses on whether adequatq EE N
$3 progress is now being made.
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15 Recovery process, I think, presents management challeng i
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of major proportion of both the NRC and the utility and, I thin F
I we should assure ourselves that both are prepared to meet it 38 fully and efficiently.
Mr. Chairman, another challenge presented, certainly both 20 to the NRC and the utility is the need to establish or at least 21 to reestablish public confidence and understanding in their 22 recovery programs.
The Kemeny Commission has weLL documented 23 the psychological trauma occasioned by the accident as felt by 24 the members of the surrounding communities.
It is essential 25 then that the recovery program not become a new source of l
7 1
continued public anxiety.
As I see it, two essential i ngredienG 2
in avoiding further public anxiety would be the avoiding of 3
i further crisis or major situations in favor of a planned 4
step-by-step, approach to recovery, and assuring the full public 5
review, comment, and acceptance by the public of those recovery 6
plans in advance.
7
'I should like to hear from our witnesses, including those 8
who reside in the vicinity of the plant, as to what efforts are6 0
now underway to accomplish those objectives and how those WF 10 j
efforts have been.
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1 I
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our 0;
12 witnesses on the valid financial questions surrounding the z
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13 m a recovery problem, including the cost of these activities and za P5 14 mu the ability of the utility to meet those costs.
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Thank you very much.
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Senator Hart.
Thank you Senator Simpson, Senator Stafforg 17 i
Senator Stafford.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have no i
g 18 statement.
I'm here as a very interested member of the CommittC 19 to hear what the witnesses have to say.
20 Senator Hart.
Pleased to have you here, particularly as 21 rankinq minority member of the full Committoc.
22 We have two panels th'is morning, first a technical panel 23 and that wiLL be composed of five individuals representing the 24 utility as welL as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
25 Gentlemen, wiLL you come forward; Mr. Herman Dieckamp, l
l l
8 1
President of General Public Utilities and General Public 2
Utilities Service Corporation, Acting President of Metropolitan 3
Edison; Mr. Richard Wilson, Acting Director for Recovery, Gener Public Utilities Corporation; Mr. James Thiesing, Project Manag 5
i of Bechtel Corporation; Harold Denton, Director of the Office 6
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the NRC; Mr. Richard VoLLmee.
7 Assistant Director for Systems and Projects Office of Nuclear 8
Reactor Regulation of the NRC.
o The rules of the Committee, gentlemen, of course, this W
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is an invastigation that we have undertaken, is to swear in our O
witnesses.
With that understanding, if you would aLL stand to '
12 be sworn.
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The testimony you are about to give before this Committee a:
Id do you cach swear and affirm that the testimony witL be the
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15 truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
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Mr. Dieckamp.
I do.
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d II Mr. Wilson.
I do.
I 18 Mr. Thiesing.
I do.
Mr. Denton.
I do.
20 Mr. VoLLmer.
I do.
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21 Senator Hart.
Mr. Dieckamp, staff informs me that you ha, l
22 an opening statement on beh'alf of GPU and Met-Ed and if you wou 23 be prepared to present that at the present time, we would 24 appreciate it if you could keep that to ten minutes or so, if i
25 possible.
9 1
TESTIMONY OF HERMAN DIECKAMP, PRESIDENT l
2 0F GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES, AND GPU SERVICE 3
CORPORATION, ACTING PRESIDENT OF METROPOLITAN 4
EDISON COMPANY; RICHARD WILSON, ACTING.
5 DIRECTOR FOR RECOVERY, GENERAL PUBLI'C 6
UTILITIES SERVICE CORPORATION; JAMES W.
l 7
THIESING, PROJECT MANAGER, BECHTEL CORPORATION; 8
HAROLD DENTON, DIRECTOR, 0FFICE OF NUCLEAR i
9 REACTOR REGULATION, NRC; AND RICHARD V0LLMER, w
y 10 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR SYSTEMS AND PROJECTS, i
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11 0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, NRC z$
Oug 12 MR. Dieckamp.
Senator Hart, since that is submitted, I k
13 think perhaps in the interest of time, we might make this as gj Zo
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14 brief as possible, if not waive the enti re thing.
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15 Senator Hart.
The text would appear in the record, if yo' s
16 would care to summarise the principal points, that would be 2
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17 acceptable.
I 18 Mr. Dieckamp.
Okay.
I think the main thing to point 19 out is that we are faced with a significant quantity of 20 radioactive materials stored at Three Mile Island site, and 21 that these are stored in a way that is less reliable than woul6 22 have been the case had the plant been operating, and we think 23 that it's important that we proceed deliberately to; first, 24 confine those. materials or immobilize. them; and, secondly, to 25 completely remove them from the site.
l l
10 Senator Hart.
Excuse me, Mr. Dieckamp, would you pull that microphone --
3 Mr. Dieckamp.
We think it's important that these materil be immobilized first; and, secondly, completely removed from 5
the site and placed in storage or disposal f acilities 6
specifically designed and Licensed for that purpose.
We do 7
not feel that these materials present a specific immediate 8
threat to the local population, but we do think that prudence requires deliberate progress towards the reduction and ultimatq aW F
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elimination of potential vulnerability of the area to future O
U uncertainty, and we are convinced that the removal of these i
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materials from Three Mile Island is in the best interest of th 13 Zl-ci neighbors of the plant.
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I4 Shortly after the accident, we engaged -- I'm on the a r, I$
I3 bottom of page three -- we engaged the Bechtel Corporation to a
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study the entire program for entry in decontamination and 8
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restoration of the plant to surface.
In early July, Bechtel I
18 released its preliminary report which really covered just phasOl one, which is the decontamination portion.
The second phase 20 report, which would cover fuel removal, is due in about one 21 month, and we wiLL be continuing that study effort.
22 In terms of overaLL preliminary study, I would identify 23 the three major initial conclusions of that study:
- First, 24 although a decontamination effort of this magnitude is a major 25 undertaking, the technology and techniques are known and have 4
11 I
been previously demonstrated and can be safely accomplished.
2 Two, the Bechtel estimate of cost of decontamination and:
3 reactivation of Unit 2 is approximately $320 mitLion.
This 4
figure includes $80 miLLion for contingencies, but does not
(
5 include replacement of the fuel core.
At the time of the 6
accident, the investment in the. core was $35 mitLion, with 7
increased uranium prices, enrichment and fabrication costs, q
8 a new core would cost $60 to $85 miLLion.
9 Thirdly, absent extraordinary Legal, political, or W
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10 regulatory delays, which could also add to the cost, l
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11 decontamination and reactivation should take about four years.
am Oe ug 12 I understand that the Committee has a copy of the Bechtel k
13 reports.
Based upon this study, GPU is using an estimate of gl Zo j"}
14
$400 mitLion as the cost to decontaminate and recommission, andl 05 i
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15 restart schedule in Mid '83.
The company carried $300 mitLion a
16 in property damage insurance, which should be available to i
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l'7 offset these costs.
None of the foregoing numbers, includes I
l 18 the cost of replacement power.
We must emphasize that the cost) 19 and schedule of recovery of TMI-2 must remain uncertain until 20 entry and decontamination efforts can provide an experience bas 21 for any reestimate and until the regulatory and public 22 acceptance environment has stabilized.
23 But, the cleanup is more than a technical matter.
It 24 involves activiti es which have been perceived by - Local public 25 as imposing an unknown hazard.
The accident has made some-
12 I
segments of the public so conscious and fearful of radiation 2
that there's a great tendency to accept nothing.
Federal 3
regulations and plant technical specs are in place, governing 4
the handling, transportation and discharge of radioactive 5
materials.
These regulations are the result of extensive 6
review and study, and alL relevant data and health effects.
7 They have been in place f or a long time.
We are obligated, and 8
our employees and management are committed to the full 9
implementation of, and to the compliance of these regulations.
I OW y
10 Beyond that, the incentives for cleanup the residuals a
O II of the accident, recovery effort constitutes an important amOE og 12 opportunity to add to the nation's nuclear experience.
13 dl Discussions have been underway for some time with the DOE, NRC,;
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14 and EPRI.
We would urge the nation take full advantage of this ai$l 15 opportunity for Learning and that such learning not be Limited a
16 Z
by the ability of our company or our customers to endure the O>
d I7 costs.
Thank you.
I 18 Senator Hart.
Thank you, Mr. Dieckamp.
19 (Prepared statement of Mr. Dieckamp follows.)
20 l
21 22 23 24 25
13 1
Senator Hart.
Mr. Denton, do you have any opening 2
comments for the NRC?
3 Mr. Denton.
Yes, I would like to make a few comments.
4 l
Of the three issues before the Subcommittee today, it's true i
5 that our focus has been on safety of the continuing operations.
6 We probably could have moved swiftly and we have paid not a tot!
7 of attention economically, perhaps, but right after the acciden 8
when -- I think was in June -- we established a task f orce O
devoted to TMI recovery operations headed by Mr. Vollmer, on y
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my left.
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g We assigned about 29 individuals to that group, and it'sj 0
12 z2 had first call on our resources since that time.
So, aLL the E
13 jg operations that have gone on at the site since the accident P"
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have been reviewed and approved by the NRC.
The plan for ar 15 y*
eventual.ecovery has been the subject of a lot of informal 16 z
dini.u.;ionc between the staff and the Licensee, and I think u
17
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it's time to formalize those discussions.
18 A meeting has been planned this afternoon to discuss the 19 options for removing the krypton from the containment.
I think 20 though I agree with the Committee that it's time to get a forma 21 plan in front of the applicant before it's time for us to set 22 forth what our requirements wiLL be, I think our efforts during!
23 I
the summer wiLL focus more on the EPICOR operation and the impa' 24 of those.
i 25 l
With regard to the need to keep the public informed in th 1
O
14 I
area, we in the State did agree with this objective some time 2
ago and initiated a series of bi-weekly meetings in various 3
communities around the plant in which we, the' State, and the 4
utility discuss our activities in a public f orum.-
5 That kind of concludes my opening remarks.
6 Senator Hart.
Thank you very much, Mr. Denton.
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7 Chairman Randolph.
d 8
Senator Randolph.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
I wiLL ask 9
the privilege of placing my statement in its entirety in the l
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10 record and to just speak very, very briefly.
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II Senator Hart.
Without objection.
amDE ag 12 Senator Randolph.
I believe, Mr. Chairman and members of; E$
13 the Subcommittee, that the conclusion is inescapable, the i
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14 post-accident experience of Three Mile Island wiLL have profoun y}
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g 15 ef.fects on the nuclear industry and on utilities generally.
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16 A number of pending regulatory and j udicial proceedings 2
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17 wilL tend to shape this experience.
The primary concern of I
18 this inquiry in the-Subcommittee, and I believe I share the 19 thinking of other members, but I would rather not have them fee 20 that I'm joining them with me, but the primary concern of our 21 own inquiry into the post-accident phase must be always to asse 22 the performance of the Nuctear Regulatory Commission.
That's 23 the Subcommittee's job.
24 We are Nuclear Regulatory Subcommittee, is that right, 25 Mr. Chairman.
That was the beginning of the Committee itself.
l
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15 1
And so, as the performance of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in this period is being tested, and I think.we must assure that 3
the Commission possesses the powers and the procedures necessar) to protect the public health and saf ety.
5 I think it's essential that public sentiment certainly 6
be carefully considered, very, very carefully weighed.
The 7
citizens of the areas surrounding Three Mile Island have 8
experienced a trauma.
Other citizens have been spared at least 9
a as of this date.
In addition, both the letter and the spirit W
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of federal environmental Law must be complied with.
The many O
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and varied environmental implications for recovery should 05 12
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I thank you.
Zo h5 I4 Senator Hart.
Thank you Senator Randolph.
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15 (Prepared statement of Senator Jennings Randolph folLows.
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18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i
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Senator Hart.
Gentlemen, thank you for your presence her today.
Let me begin by directing a question to Mr. Wilson, who 3
I understand is the principal responsible of ficial for this 4
operation.
5 Mr. Wilson, has Met-Ed or GPU approved a comprehensive 6
detailed plan to clean up Unit 2 that deals with at least the 7
following four factors:
8 Clean up the radioactive water; removing the krypton 85 o
gas in the containment building; removing the nuclear core; andl 9
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shipment and storage of the water gas in core.
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Mr. Wilson.
The actual planning on aLL of these subjectsi DE 12
$g was initialsy started, I believe, in approximately Mid April 13 d$
o,r Later part of April, with the engagement of the Bechtel 2O h$
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Corporation to study independently of the activities currently a6 y[
15 going on on site the issues of the eventual cleanup of the a
16 j
plant as restoration to service.
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II Approximately in early part of July, the first phase of I
18 the Bechtel report was issued, which dealt with the U
decontamination of the plant.
20 A second phase of the Bechtet study, which deals with 21 the removal of the fuel and the disposal of the fuel f rom the 22 reactor core, is due to be' issued in approximately_three to 23 four weeks.
24 The third part of the Bechtel study, which deals with 25 recommission of the plant, wiLL follow sometime in' the future.
l
17 1
Of necessity, the technical data which Bechtet had to wor (
with in developing those claims was extremel.-/ Limited.
The 3
plans, therefore, represent in our opinion a very conservative approach to what the problem is on the site.
5 We know, for example, that the contamination and the 6
radiation levels inside the containment building that Bechtel 7
used initially are probably about two orders of magnitude highe 8
than we believe they e xi s t today.
For these reasons, the scope l 9
c of the technical data that was available in that point in time,;
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Bechtel is now in the process, as we move forward and gather a
additional technical information, of recycling or reviewing thei g!
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decontamination technical plan.
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That review and that recycling wiLL be available Zo h
approximately as early as the first of the year.
With regard Id ag
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15 to the specific cleanup of the material on the site, there is a:
6 j
a plan in effect for the processing and cleanup of water on F
d I7 the site.
There are really two kinds of water that we talk I
8 about on the site. ~ Water which predominantly is contained in tankage or systems in the auxiliary buildings outside of the 20 principal containment building for the reactor.
This water is l characterized by levels of activity from a few, to 50, 60, or 7l 21 22 microcuries per milliliter.
23 The system in place, called EPICOR-2, that system was 24 authorized to begin processing of water approximately two weeks; 25 To date, we have processed, or as of Monday of this week,!
ago.
l
18 I
we'd processed about 19,000 gallons out of the approximately 2
375 or 400,000 gallons of water, which we characterized by the 3
activity Levels which I mentioned.
4 The performance of EPICOR-2 to date has been as measured 5
by decontamination factors, which are the removal of radioactiv 6
material from the water, and we only have measurements at this l
7 point in time of cesium.
Cesium is the principal contaminant. !
8 The decontamination factors are about two orders of magnitude 9
better titan the design basis of the system.
We expect to be l
a W
y 10 able to continue to process with this system and are putting i
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11 in place on the site additional storage tankage for the clean am05 ag 12 water.
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~ngl The higher-activity water, which is characterized by that[
13 zo 14 which is in containment or in the reactor system itself, there' O
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@5 15 a -- an additional demineralizer or ion exchange type system i
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16 beirg engineered and developed to handle that water.
We call l
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17 that the submerged demineralizer system.
It's expected to be 18 available and in operation further on in 1980.
That system wil.
l9 in a very similar manne.r, process the water from containment.
20 We are being assisted on that system by experts from the 21 Svannah River Installation, Oakridge National Laboratories, a.i d 22 by Allied Gulf, who has expertise on their environmental 23 facility.
24 Senator Hart.
Mr. Wilson, I think we're most concerned i
25 about the core and also the procedure of the rLans that you hav l
19 I
being presented f or app;
- ial to the NRC.
You've stated several 2
times that the Bechtel Corporation had done part of the plans 3
and is going to complete the next part.
First of all, does 4
that represent, I guess the GPU or Met-Ed comprehensive plan 5
for cleaning this plant up, and if so, do you intend to submit 6
it as such to the NRC for approval?
If not, what do you intend:
7 to do with regard to that?
8 Mr. Wilson.
It represents the basis for a final ultimate; 9
plan for decontamination, becuase I indicated the technical OW Q
10 data suggests that modifications should be made in that plan.
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11 For example, a part of the plan as originally conceived a
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O ag 12 by the Bechtet used the containment building spray system as a E$
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13 means of remote decontamination inside containment prior to Zo 14 entry.
The current data which has been gathered on activity a5
@I 15 Levels suggest that's not required, so in the process of a
16 interating those types of things, the basic concept of tee plan:
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17 in terms of sequence of events and the types of activities that 2
18 have to be carried out, in fact, does represent our current 19 plan.
20 Senator Hart.
Then has it been submitted to the NRC?
21 Mr. Wilson.
It has been made available to the NRC.
I'm 22 not sure it has been submitted as such, directly requesting 23 approval per se.
24 Senator Hart.
When do you anticipate doing that?
25 Mr. Wilson.
I would hope to do'that after the current l
L l
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20 I
iteration, currently underway by Bechtet.
2 Senator Hart.
With regard to the core, I think we would 3
be interested in knowing what the situation is.
Our informatio 4
is that nearly 8 minutes after the accident, it's stilL giving 5
off about 450,000 watts of decay heat.
To the laymen, I'm told 6
heat from about 4,500, hundred-watt Lightbulbs in a smalL 7
confined room.
How Long wiLL the core continue to give off thi; 8
much heat and are you satisfied of the stability of the present:
9 method of cooling the core?
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10 Mr. Wilson.
The core wiLL continue to give off heat in m
O 11 some degree for an indefinite period of time, but as time goes eai og 12 on, the magnitude of heat wiLL continually decrease, early next:
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13 year the power production of the core should be down to somethij za P3 14 between 300 and 350 kilowatts, and by the end of 1980, wiLL be a!
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t 16 So, there is a constant decrease in power.
Right now, za l'7 we are extracting heat from the reactor core by a dependence I
l 18 on natural circulation within the primary system to the steam 19 generators, which are a normal part of the primary system.
We ;
20 then boil water on the secondary side of the steam generator, 21 take that boiled water steam to the normal condenser system 22 and condensa the water.
Eventually, at some point in time,in 23 the recovery operation, when it's necessary to secure access l
24 to the core, natural circulation wiLL not function; therefore, 25 we are preparing a system which we..-- mini decay-heat system, i
l
I 21 1
mini being a description of the physical size and heat removal 2
capacity of the system -- which wiLL place the core back into 3
a very nominal force cooling mode. That system is currently 4
being installed, and sometime after the first of the year, we 5
wiLL anticipate switching the cooling Load from current situatt 6
to that situation, that wi LL be the mode of cooling until such 7
time as the head is removed and the fuel extracted.
8 Senator Hart.
WelL, under the current procedures, is 9
there any possibility in your judgment for accidental fuel W
y 10 melting beyond that which has already occurred, and, if there e
11 were, what would be the consequences of that?
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12 Kr. Wilson.
I don't believe the current heat production ZS E
13 in the core, there':s any credible set of circumstances which gza P"
14 would Lead to melting of the core.
It's not sufficient heat.
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15 Senator Hart.
Mr. Denton, do you concur in that judgmen0 m
16 Mr. Denton.
At these very low heat levels, there's no Z
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17 possibility that there would be a core melt through the reactoc I
18 vessel in the sense.that the so-called " China Syndrome" occurec 19 I'm not quite so sanguine about whether or not lost aLL water 20 and no air flowed through the core, whether or not temperatureG 21 might not approach melting somewhere in the fuel rods themselvc 22 but I'm not concerned about core meltdown in this sense of 23 reaching the Level of containment because of it.
24 Senator Hart.
But there could be further damage to the 25 fuel?
L
l 22 1
Mr. Denton.
But this is possibLy a complete loss of l
2 cooling, there are certain backup systems that could be brought' 3
into service if the present system were to malf unction, so i
l 4
I have no concern about the safety of the core today.
l 5
But, maybe Mr. VoLLmer, who is working day-to-day would j
6 Like to elaborate.
7 Senator Hart.
Mr. Vollmer.
8 Mr. VolLaer.
I think what Mr. Denton says is correct.
9 Most of the products in the core that have high volitiLity have 3W Q
10 already been released from the system or have decayed away.
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11 So even if a smaLL portion of the core were to obtain high 2,
Oe ag 12 temperatures, it would not pose the usual threat to the public g*
13 health and safety.
It would be basically solid fision products; za P"
14 which, if released from the core, would Likely condense the
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15 primary system or containment and not pose an outside threat.
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16 Senator Hart.
One final question from me to both you O
JI l'7 Mr. VolLeer and Mr. Wilson.
As I understand it, the water Leve I
18 in the core in the containment is rising slowly in the process 19 of keeping the core cool.
Can that slowly rising water knock 20 out or render inoperative any key valves or other mechanisms 21 for controlling or monitoring the core?
22 Mr. Vollmer.
WeLL, we have been keeping careful track 23 of the water Level in the reactor building.
It's currently at 24 a Level approximately two feet below the nearest valve or piece 25 of equipment that we would like to keep in an operatable state i
I
23 1
for a long period of time, that is the decayed heat removal 2
system valves.
Now the leakage rate of about 500 gallons per 3
day, and I believe it's actualLy Lower than that now, we would 4
project approximately a foot or se rise in six months.
About 5
two inches or so a month.
6 So, the rapidity of the rise is pretty slow, and we have 7
fairly good knowledge of each electrical component or each 8
compenent that might be jeopardized by the water Level as we 9
g along,and I don't see anything in the near term, say within 0W y
10 a year that would have any influence on the safety of operation m
O 11 In addition, since a foot only represents about 70,000 a
m!
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I4 if it did pose a threat, 70,000 gallons is not a very Large
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15 inventory when you consider the capacity of the auxiliary z
16 building.
It's about 400,000 gallons, once it's cleaned out by z
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17 the EPICOR system.
I 18 So, I think we do.
19 Senator Hart.
Your answer is no to the question of wheth 1
20 valves or other instruments can be knocked out?
21 Mr. VolLaer.
If-water was raised, yes, equipment could 22 be knocked out.
As I said, I think we have a considerable amot 23 of margin.
If we were approaching the point in which a valve i
24 could be knocked out, as we already did with one of the decay 25 removal valves, that valve could be opened and therefore, we
3 24 1
woutd have access to the system to the open valve.
We would 2
rather leave i t closed to provide additional assurance of full l 3
containment isolation, but the valve could be open in the event 4
it needed to be.
5 Senator Hart.
Senator Randolph.
I 6
Senator Randolph.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
7 I have asked for this opportunity, and I appreciate you, Mr.
8 Chairman and Senator Simpson, allowing me to just make.a 9
comment and ask a question.
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10 First, may I note the presence of Chairman Joseph Hendrie m
11 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission here today.
He sits as e
0 12 an observer, I'm sure, but I think it's very wholesome -- I l
Z Ana 13 think he indicates his concern by being here personally today g
zN i
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15 You, Mr. Wilson, have mentioned the EPICOR-2 system.
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m 16 think that I wilL ask, Mr. Chairman, to place a letter in the Z
O 1:7 record in its entirety which arrived yesterday, addressed to me E
18 and it comes from a wife and husband, Alice and George Herman.
19 They're citizens of the area of Three Mile Island.
I read a 20 part of their letter:
i 21 "We're concerned about the health hazards relating tothh 22 cleanup operations.
The EPICOR-2 system used to begin treating 23 the radioactive water, cre ?fiter some, but not aLL -
" they 24 have underscored those three words -
"of the radioactive 25 particles from the water.
Radioactivity cannot -
" and they j
l
25 I
underscore that again -
"be filtered from the water.
They hav(
2 treated some of the water with the system and are storing it 3
with the hope that they wiLL be able to dump it in the 4
Susquehanna River in the future."
And then the letter goes on 5
with favorable whims and unthinkable situations.
They end this 6
paragraph:
"We have had enough radiation already."
7 Now, would you comment on such a letter.
8 Mr. Wilson.
It's true that the EPICOR system, being ion 9
exchange system, does not basically affect the tritium levels g
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10 in the water, it only af f ects the ion-type material in the water a
O 11 The water is being stored.
We are not now, or do we have aaOE og 12 immediate plans to discharge that water.
In fact, they are k
13 under a probation from the NRC to not do so.
g=a z
14 There are options of treating that water other than
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15 discharge into the River, although I would note that discharge z
16 could take place technically at concentrations weLL under z
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d 17 current EPA drinking water standards.
But the wa.ter can be Z
18 solidified into concrete, it can be treated in other ways, such 19 that it does not become a material which is added to the River.
20 Senator Randolph.
Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Thank you, 21 Mr. Chairman.
22 (Letter referred to by Senator Randolph follows.)
23 COMMITTEE INSERT 24 25 t
26 1
Senator Hart.
Senator Simpson.
2 Senator Simpson.
Mr. Wilson, do you see any 3
institutional barriers to the efficient and effective cleanup 4
of the f acility, if so, what are those barriers?
5 Mr. Wilson.
I think I would characterize the cleanup 6
operations, part of the cleanup operations at the site into th' 7
two categori es of basically technical problems and technical 8
issues and institutional issues. The institutional issues that 9
I think are very important for the cleanup of the material at OW y
10 the site are one, stability of the regulatory process; secondt' z
k 11 a thorough and complete understanding by the local population,
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12 surrounding the plant, the Local political bodies and other
$a 13 political bodies in the State and in the country, as to what g
zP" 14 the situation is and what has to be done there; and a third 0
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15 issue, obviously, is the ability to finance that effort.
m 16 Senator Simpson.
What about the public perception of Z
0 17 the recovery process f rom the general conflict of nuclear I
18 versus non-nuclear?
19 Mr. Wilson.
I personally believe that's an issue which I.
20 would hope would not come to bare in terms of the cleanup of 21 the plant.
That issue might come into focus and be part of 22 the discussion on whether that plant is put back into service 23 or is not put back into service, but from my point of view, 24 technically, it's to everyones best interest to effect the 25 cleanup and the decontamination and the pulling together and l
27 1
adequate and safe disposal of radioactivity currently on that 2
site.
3 Senator Simpson.
Do the risks to the public and to the 4
workers, to their health and safety, increase if these cleanus 5
activities are delayed?
6 Mr. Wilson.
It's my opinion that if there are unusual 7
or extremely prolonged delays, I might characterize that as 8
years in terms of the steps that have to be taken place, it 9
would be my judgment that that would not be in the best w
y 10 interest of everyone concerned from a health and safety point l z
k 11 of view.
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12 Senator Simpson.
How many truck shipments of radioactivo 5$
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13 waste wi LL ultimately perhaps be required to remove the whole,
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14 of the material from the site?
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15 Mr. Wilson.
I don't think we have the total number of m
16 that, because to some degree it depends what form it wilL Z
0 17 eventually be removed from the site, but certainly wilL amount I
18 to be in the many, many hundreds of shipments.
19 Senator Simpson.
Harold Denton, if I might follow up on 20 what Senator Hart was asking.
Somehing I'm interested in, too l
i 21 but I would pursue a bit.
What is the risk of recriticality o 22 the boron in the cooling waters not being contained?
23 Mr. Denton.
The reactor is kept subcritical by a high 24 amount of boron in the cooling system.
This is an issue we 25 were concern'ed about very early on.
I have no concern about O
28 1
recriticality at the current boron Levels.
2 Let me ask Mr. Vollmer to elaborate on what the levels 3
are.
Recriticality, if it occurred, the core could conceivabt) 4 begin generating power again.
5 Senator Simpson.
That's the issue I'm addressing.
What 6
is the possible consequence of recriticality in connection witt 7
the boron flow, useage and content?
8 Mr. Vollmer.
WeLL, Senator Simpson, I think we don't 9
feel that the recriticality could happen, as Mr. Denton g
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10 indicated, with the current boron concentrations.
If we a
O 11 wanted to postulate that the boron could be depleted from the t a
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13 sort could occur, then I would suggest the option would be to fl Zo((
14 charge the core with a high boron concentration using one of o!
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15 the available decay removal system pumps or the high pressure m
16 injection.
These pumps we have felt should be kept off.
i 2
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17 I think the Licensee also feels that way,.since the I
i 18 accident, because of their high flow.
Again, we would concur l l
19 with current boron concentration, even if control rods were 20 not present and even if the core was configured in a most j
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21 reactive way, but not chance of criticality would occur.
22 Senator Simpson.
What would be the possible wayEin which l
23 the boron might be Lost, what is the most 24 Mr. Vollmer.
WeLL, there is the possibility of boron 25 precipitation, which usually occurs on the holder portions of l
r l
1 i
29 I
the surfaces in the primary system of the core environment 2
being the hotest part of the primary system.
It's not likely 3
that it could occur there.
4 In addition, soluability of boron that is needed to 5
sustain the core set critical is significantly Lower than the 6
temperature, or significantly Lower than the amount which tha9 7
temperature of water can sustain in solution.
In other wordsc 8
for the temperatures that we're talking about in the boron 9
a concentrations, they represent a situation that would not be W
y 10 expected to precipitate out the boron.
It should be expected a
O II to stay in the solution.
g!
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A couple of other questions.
Is there dl any nuclear waste storage or disposal facility that hasagreed 13 Zo 5$
Id to accept the various nuclear wastes which have been or wiLL 05 d[
15 be generated from this cleanup operation and recovery, and I
a 16 Z
what efforts are underway by the NRC to make sure that there O
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I7 wiLL be adequate storage and disposal f acilities for those Z
18 wastes, and how significant is that problem?
l 19 Mr. Denton.
Senator, that's an institutional barrier th 20 I wanted to add to Mr. Wilson's list.
Some of the waste wilL 21 be high-level waste, as opposed to low-level waste.
And I'm 22 sure you're aware there's considerable difficulty in the 23 country today with disposal of low-level waste.
It's not 24 clear to me that the depositories for high-Level waste wiLL b 25 available in the time f rame of cleanup, and it may become i
i i
e
30 1
necessary that some of these wastes be stored on site tilL 2
that issue is resolved.
3 Senator Simpson.
What measures has the NRC adopted either 4
on its own or in conjunction with State government or the 5
utility to assure that the local population around the area 6
i s f ulLy informed and consulted and participates in the full 7
spectrum of knowledge as to what is going on in that facility 8
near'them?
9 Mr. Denton.
Let me mention a few areas we've tried and Ow y
10 then I'lL Let anyone else add their own.
We're acutely aware z
O 11 of the need to keep the local citizens and governments informe@
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ag 12 We are stilL in the progress of acqui ring an office building O.
E$m 13 in Middletown and our intent would be to hold most of our g,
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14 meetings with the licensees and others in f acilities where the as a!
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15 public could observe and participate.
m 16 I mentioned the bi-weekly press meetings with the State Z
O 17 and utili ty that are publicly attended.
We are continually I
18 searching for ways to be sure that the public can observe and 19 judge for themselves the adequacy of our actions there.
20 Mr. VolLmer.
I would like to add to that.
I think it wa(
21 mentioned before that we have had a series of by-weekly meetint 22 which the state acts as the moderator and the Met-Edison has 23 been giving the public press and Local of ficials the planning 24 operations for the next few weeks or months to apprise 25 everybody of what is going on.
31 1
Also, I think myself and my staff have taken advantage 2
of many opportunities to participate in public meetings, town 3
meetings, and even smalL groups, to answer people's questions i
4 and to try to understand their concerns and to factor thos into!
5 our regulatory considerations.
l 6
Mr. Dieckamp.
Senator, I would like to add that we 7
certainly recognize that there's a great need to inform the 8
publi c and in the process, to hopefully regain some public 9
confidence in the operation of what's going on there.
The OW y
10 briefings that have been underway.now on this bi-weekly basis a
11 held in Harrisburg, I think, have been very useful.
They've e
12 covered EPICOR in detail and several other subjects.
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.E 13 I would also like to mention that at the time that the l
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14 Bechtel report was issued in early July, we immediately held S
OaE 15 a press conference that included public officials and members wa m
16 of the press and had made both volumes of the Bechtet study 2
O 17 available,and I think I would estimate that as of today, we hav 2
18 probably distributed somewhere in the range of 100 to 150 19 copies of that report in the hope that it would indeed give 20 peopl$ some insight into the kinds of activities that we're 21 going to have to undertake and what the time scale would be.
22 Senstor Simpson.
It would seem'to me that from what some 23 of the comments, and certainly from my reading, that the i
24 Sechtel report might be outdated even at the present time, 25 even though it's very helpful, assuredly, but what are your I
32 t
i I
thoughts on that?
2 Mr. Dieckamp.
WeLL, I think chat's essentially true, 3
and I thought about injecting some views to Senator Hart's 4
earlier question about the formalness of that plan.
i 5
I think it's important to understand that that plan has 6
a preliminary plan, that plan is going to be a dynamic plan 7
because there are many elements of that plant that can only be 8
refined as we progress and gain more detailed information 9
so that we can firm up succeeding steps.
W Q
10 I think also, relative to the formality of that plan a
k 11 that's being submitted to the NRC for approval, I think one m
0 12 needs to think in terms of an overalL plan which sort of Lays ka 13 forth the principal activities in their time scale, but then g
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14 also think that as we approach each major segment of that plan,:
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15 there wilL be a need for considerable expansion of the Level a
16 of detail in the plan and, in my mind, it's at that level Z
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17 where the real meaningful kind of approvals take place.
I 18 I don't mean to suggest by that that we are ceLuctant 19 about setting forth the plan, but I think the meaningful part 20 of the approval comes when we get down to the real specifics, 21 what are we going to do, how are we going to do it, and what's 22 the impact on the publi c, what are the alternatives.
23 Senator Simpson.
I think one of the most interesting 24 sentences in that report was this Language:
It says, " Findings; 25 could be-much different from these conditions assumed at this
-4 a
l 33 1
time and could result in Lower or higher costs and/or shorter 2
or longer schedule than shown."
That certainly gives a free 3
range of action to say the least.
4 Mr. Dieckamp.
WeLL, I'm sure that's an taiportant caveat 5
in there.
I'm not sure how many times any of us experience 6
oppo rtuni ti e s for greatly reduced cost.
But some of the things 7
that have been going on recently at the site have been directed 8
- . this very issue of providing a better base point or a better 9
characterization.
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10 For example, the water samples that have been withdrawn W
m 2
11 from the containment building have been for' that purpose, to a!
12 verify the conditions of that water so that we'lL have better O:
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13 information. One of the next steps that wiLL be taken and one Oa P"
14 of the things where activities are pointing towards now,is to Zo au i
gain visual access to the containment building. Some people OZ g,
15 16 have said what are you going to see? We're hoping that we don't z
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17 see anything that's far different than what we thought we
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1 18 should see, but on the other hand, we feel that it's es we go along to provide verification of the 19 important assumptions as we move forward.
20 Senator Simpson.
I read with interest that you're going 23 to find something I think described as "flocculent and green" 22 when you see it.
I want to see that myself.
23 i
I have some other written questions, Mr. Chairman, and f
24 I'lL submit those for the record.
Thank you.
25 l
2 34 I
Senator Hart.
Thank you Senator Simpson.
Mr. Dieckamp, j
2 Let me'see if I can accurately interpret your answer.
3 You do not forsee a time when a comprehensive cleanup 4
plan wilL be submitted to the NRC for approval, but rather, 5
there wiLL be sort of, to use your word, dynamic, peacemeal 6
submissions for peacemeal approval of various elements of 7
that.
Is that correct?
8 Mr. Dieckamp.
WelL, I say that' only in this sense that 9
at any point along the way, we wilL have a plan availa.ble.
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Q 10 That plan wiLL reflect our best knowledge at that time.
If a
O 11 it's felt meaningful or important to approve that plan at its aaog ag 12 various stages of progression, we from tne point of view of the:
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13 company, have no problem with that whatsoever.
I do suspect d*g as Id that people would be concerned about whether approval of a y}
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15 plan which lacked considerable detail might be construed as a m
16 blank check and would be undesirable.
But we wilL, I think, Z
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17 see a dynami c progression of this plan.
2 18 Senator Hart.
To what degree is the absence of detail, 19 the problem of just not having enough time,and to what degree 20 is the problem of not having the guidelines from the' NRC, as 21 I indicated in my opening remarks? It seems to us a chicken
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I 22 and egg problem here.
I'm trying to pin it down.
You don't 23 want to be Locked into specific procedures that new facts may 24 prove to outdate.
On the other hand, the NRC can't approve 25 the set of procedures until they're submitted to them.
35 1
You're talking about making something available.
I'm 2
trying to find cut whether you feel you have to submit a 3
plan or a date certain, and if you do, that you need NRC 4
guidelines to pin down what it is you're supposed to submit.
5 I want to find out from Mr. Denton whether he feels he is 6
obligated to provide you some guidelines and if so, when he is 7
going to do that.
It's all too vague right now is, I guess, 8
what I'm saying.
9 Mr. Dieckamp.
For our own needs or any other needs, there!
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'10 has to be a plan, I think we recognized that early on when we z!
11 initiated Bechtet study just a couple of weeks after the mDE og 12 accident.
I think certainly, the plan today probably lacks E$
8 13 most from the amount of time and efforts that we have been gza P"
14 able to put into it.
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15 It's my understanding right now the work towards the m
16 second phase portion of it, namely the core removal, i t 's being l Z
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17 pursued at a level of about 60 men within the Bechtel Z
l 18 organization in addition to whatever people we have applied to 19 it.
20 Now, with respect to the question of criteria, we have 21 been preceding on the assumption that the existing regulations 22 whether they are Appendix I or whether they are the specific 23 in place technical specifications of the plant, are the 24 criteria that would pertain.
25 I was surprised to note the comment in your opening i
36 1
statement that the company had expressed concern about the 2
absence of criteria.
I'm sure we have expressed concern about 3
the need for criteria and the need for them to be stable, so 4
that the plan has a good basis.
But I know of no aspect of our 5
effort or our relationship with the NRC that is today hung up 6
because of a Alphonse/Gaston question abaut the criteria.
7 Now, on the question of --
8 Senator Hart.
Excuse me, I'm told by the staff, Mr.
9 Wilson has told our staff that he's been wa ting criteria or W
y 10 guidelines, now, I just want to find out what's going on here.
m 0
11 Mr. Dieckamp.
WeLL, let's ask Mr. Wilson.
mDE ag 12 Mr. Wilson.
I had a discussion with your staff, I think ka 13 the latter part of October, and the gist or the thrust of that gz2 PE 14 discussion was realLy basically the one of stability of aw Ub
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15 regulatory guidelines, not the fact that they do or do not t
16 exist.
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17 Senator Hart.
That they might be changed?
I 18 Mr. Wilson.
That they might be changed.
We're looking 19 for a long-term plan for the restoration of that plant.
For 20 example, fuel removat might be a year and a half or more in 21 the future.
Many, many things have to take place prior to 22 actually moving fuel and it's necessary that the stability of 23 the regulatory guidelines be in place suct. that we can make 24 those plans, and when it comes time to execute, we don't have 25 a different environment.
I
~.
37 I
Senator Hart.
Is it your understanding that the NRC is 2
in the process of upg radi ng or changing its criteria or 3
guidelines?
4 Mr. Wilson.
I think the NRC could answer that better 5
than I can.
6 Senator Hart.
But you have some reason for insecurity on 7
this issue.
8 Mr. Wilson.
I have some reason for concern because of the' 9
very large commitment of planning and resources which wilL Q
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10 result in actions substantially in the future.
i m
11 Mr. Dieckamp.
Senator, if I could suggest, it may not m
O 12 necesrarily just be a matter of the NRC.
I-you look, for a4
.e 13 example, at the question of water release from the plant.
If Oa Zo p"
14 we were to be able to proceed on the basis of existing au O*
aE 15 regulations and specifications, one would be able to proceed WL E
16 to discharge some of the water which was contaiminated in the z
O 17 accident after having been processed.
But the whole process, 5
18 institutional process, has,in effect, frustrated that.
19 So, I think one of our concerns indeed is how confident 20 can we be that in a set of criteria or regulations not only wiLL be there as the basis for our planning and design effort, 21 22 but wilL, in turn, be supported and allowed to function when 23 it comes time to do something.
24 Senator Hz.t.
Mr. VolLaer.
25 Mr. Vollmer.
Yes, I want to mention Senator Hart, that at
38 I
a meeting in Hershey, which was attended by the pubLic and 2
Local officials, on May 16, I stated at that time that we 3
would require the Licensee to meet the environmental i
4 regulations for the release of gaseous and Liquid effluence 3
from the cleanup and decontamination phases of the accident.
6 These releases would, are those that are atLowed under the 7
technical specifications and under Appendix I, Part 50 for 8
a normal operating plant.
l 9
I think at that time, we felt that even in the accident aW y
10 situation, that the technology permitted us to restrict release 2
0 II g
to this level.
I think as Mr. Dieckamp has just mentioned DE I2 y$
however, that there may be some question in the -- there is
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some question in the minds of the citizenry as to whether or 2 2 I4
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not these type of releases are adequate even though they would ai 15 be atLowed for a normalLy operating plant.
i m
16 Senator Hart.
Let me see if I can summarize the Z
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I7 situation.
I'm afraid we're about it looks to us anyway I
18 almost like an impasse, and telL me if this is an accurate I9 or inaccurate statement of the case:
20 There are rules and regulations for the operation of 21 reactors under normal conditions that permit,on some occasions, 22 releases of gas and water.
We have had an accident.
The 23 operating 'utili ty is trying to figure out how to clean up that 24 accident, and some of the attempted cleanup involves the 25 releases of gas and water.
The NRC, however, has now said tha8
39 I
you can't release gas and water under certain conditions, and 2
is trying to figure out how to clean up the plant, but doesn't 3
know how many other changes the NRC is going to make in its d
normal operating procedures, rules, and regulations that might 5
prevent it from cleaning up the accident.
6 Is that a fair assessment of where we stand, Mr. Denton?
7 Mr. Denton.
That's a fairly accurate characterization.
8 I guess I'd say a little bit differently is a goal -- I thought 9
we had made great technological strides when we found that we g
W Q
10 were able to get the releases from this plant folLowing the m
O 11 accident within those of established normal operating plants.
l amDE ag 12 Then we were being sued by several communities not to permit Z~Ana 13 releases that would otherwise be acceptable within..-- if the g
Zo hf 14 plant had never had an accident.
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15 So, we decided as a matter of policy to look further to a
16 see if there was technology available which would f urther Z
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d l'7 reduce the impact of releases on the environment.
So I think I
18 the only area which the guidance is perhaps a little unclear 19 to the utility and it's -- would have been the subject of 20 today's meeting, is to what extent should we attempt or should 21 we require the utility to do better in cleaning up releases 22 from this accident than our regulations governing normal 23 operation would requi re, and we wanted to delay the release 24 of the krypton from the containment or water from the plant 25 until alternatives could be explored and environmental l
l
{
I
40 1
assessments could be prepared to reatLy be sure that we have 2
Looked hard at the technology that might further reduce 3
whatever the public impact would be of release of this gas.
4 And that, I agree with the utility, is an area that we 5
have not come down on and he has done studies, for example, 6
of the present kind of various approaches to removing the 7
krypton from the containment.
Once we attain this report, 8
evaluate it, we wiLL, I hope, come promptly to a decision of 9
what standards wilL be in that area.
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i y
10 But I think they are the only two areas in which the 2
i 0
11 standards are --
l EDE I
og 12 Senator Hart.
- WeLL, one factor I did Leave out is pubLic Z A i
gy
'13 opinion, I meant to calculate that in.
There's concern in the 1 z2 P3 14 area, obviously, we'LL hear about that shortly.
About those mu Oj
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15 releases that might not be there if there hadn't been an m
16 accident.
And, now, people are sensitized so you're trying to z
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17 do better with your normal standards, and that's causing the I
18 ut i li ty to be uncertain as to what you are going to permit them 19 to do, and you're uncertain because of the pressure of publi c 20 opinion.
21 Mr. Denton.
And the absence of some technical information 22 where we have required the utility to perform studies of varioe 23 ways to do better, and if those studies that we need to 24 understand before coming to a final decision --
25 Senator Hart.
WelL, if we got this auch trouble in t
41 I
handling gaseous and wastewater, what in the world are we 2
going to do when we get to the damaged and highly radioactive 3
core material.
When that time comes, isn't that really geing 4
to be a headache, and what can be done about the transporting or removing that highly radioactive core material?
5 6
Mr. Denton.
I think they wilL present some very 7
interesting technical questions.
In what form the waste, these 8
high-level wastes, should be solidified.
How should this re a t L; 9
high-level waste be contained, and, you really, in order to gw I
y 10 make the proper decision, you need to know the ultimate a
O 11 disposal of those wastes, what type of environment are they azat ag 12 expected to be in over thei r lifetime, in order to put them s
13 in the proper f orm to begin with.
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14 That's the area that I mentioned that's not clear.
Where og
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15 those wastes may ultimately reside in the U. S.
So, I'm sure a
16 those wastes will be solidified, they'lL no doubt be held on z
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d 17 site until some, until the country comes to grips with how to I
18 dispose of wastes that are in these categories.
19 Senator Hart.
How Long can they be held on the site, and l
20 what do you expect public reaction for'that to be?
21 Mr. Denton.
I think the local publi c reaction would be 22 against holding them at the site.
It's somewhat a natural, 23 just to the situation with spent fuel.
There are approximatelg 24 15,000 spent fuel centers in this country being held in fuel 25 storage pools because of a lack or no depository for those
42 1
fission products anywhere else.
i 2
Mr. Dieckamp.
Senator, can I comment that indeed the 1
question of public attitude or public acceptance is a critical 3
l one.
But, I also think that in order to assist in that public d
acceptance issue, it's important that we sort of determine the 5
6 appropriateness of the regulations and the criteria that we're l using and then of fi cia LLy come in and stand up and be counted 7
8 or be heard, so that the public has someone to look to as their!
9 s'ource of confidence that these regulations are appropriate oW H
10 y
and indeed, wiLL protect their health and safety.
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Senator Hart.
Senator Stafford,'do you h3ve a question?
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Not at this time, Chairman.
${.
m 13 c;
Senator Hart.
Senator Simpson.
32
$3 Senator Simpson.
Mr. Di eckamp, the President of the I4 l
af Kemeny Commission indicated the cleanup of the operation might '
$[
15 z
16 figure, including power replacement costs, of course, j
run to a F
d I7 would amount to as much perhaps as $1.8 bi t Lion.
What are 2
18 the present assets of Met-Edi son?
Mr. Dieckamp.
The total assets of Met-Edison, I'm just I9 sort of speaking roughly now, l'LL check, about a bitLion 20 21 dollars.
Now, I might point out a couple of things, the bulk 22 of the replacement power costs or a significant fraction are 23 being paid currently by customers, we're instituting a
24 proceeding now to further bring that into register and we're 25 hopeful that that can occur even though it has not yet occurre
43 I
The other comment that I would make is that I have not 2
been able to see enough information yet to be able to 3
understand fully the basis of the present Commission's 4
statement.
5 Senator Simpson.
If the cleanup should run to a figure 6
of $1.8 billion, can Met-Ed afford it?
7 Mr. Dieckamp.
WeLL, again, I think it's important to 8
segregate that accident cost number into itu components.
The 9
replacement power portion is the biggest one.
And I think I w
y 10 can say very directly that Met-Ed cannot afford to pay, to a
k 11 provide power to its customers and not be compensated for zog ua 12 that power.
So that's just something that I think has to occue m
13 When you look at the cleanup portion of the estimate, if g_
za P"
14 you use the $400 mitLion that we're using, or even if you use zw 08
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15 the number that the Kemeny Commission suggests as a high, whick z
16 I think is on the order of $500 million, then I would point Z
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17 out that there is 5300 mit Lion of property damage insurance I
18 which should be available to offset that cost.
We would expec9 19 that further treatment of those costs in terms of_ rate making 20 or recovery is something that can be dealt with by the State 21 utility commissions.
22 We would also hope that as we go forward, the opportunitis 23 for learning in this situation, the opportunities for, in 24 effect, expanding our base of nuclear technology, wiLL provide 25 a reasonable basis for some fairly significant participation e
44 I
by the government, and perhaps, by the utility industry itsetf.
2 For example, in this area of the core, that we speak of, I
3 certainly the damaged core, the fuel, the structure, the l
4 materials, constitute almost an invaluable base point to use 5
for validating the kind of analytical models that are used to 6
assess severe reactor accidents.
l 7
So I think it's important that we arrive at a situation 8
to make sure that we, indeed, are able to gain access to that 9
inf rmati n an tilize it for the benefit of the program.
Ow y
10 Senator Simpson.
Thank you.
In that statement, I sense a
k 11 a desire that the Federal Government participate because we havei e:
aag 12 come upon something that is so fascinating to the entire world Z An Q
13 to assess. What is your feeling about that?
gza P"
14 Mr. Dieckamp.
WeLL, again, when you look at the kinds of aw 0
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15 things that the accident has left us with, there are indeed a
16 significant opportunities for learning there.
You start right l
Z 0
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5 18 Lot of experience.
And a lot of the knowledge relative to the i
19 health physics or radiation protection challenges, and the waste:
20 disposal problems and the like.
21 You move on then to some of the major components of the 22 system, the instruments, the electrical components, some of the 23 materials, they've been exposed to extreme environmental 24 conditions of heat, steam and radiation, and their behavior, or 25 their ability to withstand those environments can be critical
45 1
information to our future design of plants or assessment of 2
plants and, again, I think the core is a very valuable data 3
point that we should not Lose.
4 Senator Simpson.
Harold, Mr. Denton, what plan has been 5
made by the NRC to assure that there are sufficient trained 6
operating personnel at this facility enabling it to continue to t
7 be maintained properly in a safe manner regardless of what might; 8
happen? Too,the problems with regard to financial distress of 9
Met-Edison or any possible decisions by the State Public g
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10 Utilities Commission which is bringing the Show Cause Order at m
0 11 this time.
And, I guess, the second part of that, does the NRC' z
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13 public, operate the plant as required?
Where are we with that za PU 14 situation?
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15 Mr. Denton.
The advice I get from counsel is that even a
16 in the event of bankruptcy of the company, the responsibility Z
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5 18 Lie with whatever entity would reconstitute.
So, it's our 19 understanding in event of failure of GPU, there would stilL be 20 some organization who would have a responsibility for generatin(
21 power and meeting federal standard.
22 We intended to focus on the managerial and technical 23 confidence of the utility people as it is presently constituted l
24 We have, f or example, Blue Ribbon Panel of health physicists at 25 the site this week doing their plans and organization f or ent ry l l
i
46 1
into the containment and open reactor vessel.
We've also 2
surveyed their management organization to establish the depth 3
of their technical confidence and that of their contractors, 4
we've obtained from the Board of Business to help us in this 5
evaluation.
But, I think it's fair to say that we are proceedinq 6
on the basis that we wilL not have to actually take possession 7
of the unit and maintain it with NRC personnel, even in the 8
direst of physical problems.
9 Senator Simpson.
I think one of the concerns with me is OW y
10 the issue of the fact that the planning is going on, but it E
k 11 doesn't seem to have a coordination that I would hope we would E m 05 12 have had by now with regard to Met-Edison doing pl'anning, the z:
13 NRC doing planning, and then coming up against whatever it is, g
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14 even terminology, such as " institutional barriers," which is ac 02 15 now a new word of art apparently in our efforts. I'LL have to gl a
16 find out exactly what interpretation.I'lL put on that.
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17 Meaning, I guess, " rock-headed" agency or Congress doing
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18 what we want to do perhaps.
But this concerns me that there is 19 no coordination planning goes on.
The question coming as to 20 whether to live under the existing regulations, nothing we 21 knowing we need new regulations, tho utility knowing that if 22 there are new regulations, it's going to take them a long time 23 to figure out how to interpret them themselves, on we'go.
24 Mr. Denton.
I agree with you Senator.
I think we can 25 bring this to a much better focus and lay out for the public
f 47 I
inspection general plans so that everyone can understand what 2
are the steps and stilL provide flexibility for adjusting and t
3 modifying the plan as new knowledge is gained.
4 I agree we need to move ahead in that direction.
5 Senator Simpson.
WelL, you have displayed throughout the 6
incident, a very great and uncommon degree of common sense and r
7 I think that that's what keeps us in this process, we get back 8
into technique and technology and dribble and we don't deal 9
with the issue that the people want to know; what's going to go g
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10 on?
z O
II We ought to start feeding it to them so they can get theirl a
z:
0ug 12 fears under control, because that's what we're dealing with.
3An 13 Everything here, and the reason we're paralyzed in America, with(
dl I:
14 this issue is simply fear.
So, we just deal with it, let peoplej y}
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15 know.
They handle that pretty welL, they do that in their-Lives!
m 16 every day.
They can do this very nicely if they have aLL the Z
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d 17 data.
I 18 Mr. Dieckamp.
Let me just add from the point of view of 19 the company, we would welcome any kind of'a mechanism that 20 would somehow break down some of those barriers to easy 21 communications and that would let us work with the NRC or any 22 other entity,more effectively employ the total resources that 23 a re available to do the job.
Because I think the job demands 24 the best.
25 Senator Hart.
Mr. Denton, follow up immediately on a l
48 1
question about what would happen in the event of bankruptcy or 2
some forfeiture of control by the utility.
The Law on the 3
matter from the Atomic Energy Act states as foLLows:
4 "Upon revocation of the li c en s e," p re s uma b ly which woutd 5
occur at the time of bankruptcy or maybe it wouldn't, but let's!
6 assume it di d, 't h e Commission may immediately retake possessioni 7
of alL special nuclear material held by the Licensee.
In case 8
it is found by the Commission to be of extreme importance to 9
national defense and security, or to the health and safety of g
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10 the public, the Commission may recapture any special nuclear a
0 11 material held by the Licensee or may enter upon and operate zOE og 12 the facility prior to any of the procedures provided under the g*
13 Administrative Procedures Act, and then use compensation."
za PE 14 The question here is, assuming the possibility of aw o!
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15 bankruptcy or forfeiture by the operating utility, and the e
16 operation of that section of the Law, do you believe that the Z
O FJ 17 NRC and its staff is capable and competent to run this plant 2
18 through the recovery phase?
19 Mr. Denton.
I think the answer is yes, if we were able 20 to hire the present force of workers at the plant who are the 21 ones who are trained in the details of the plant operation.
22 I do think the NRC operation could assume a managerial, I
23 technical direction of the plant, but this is only an assumptig i
24 that many of the employees of the plant who are skilled in 25 operating individual pieces of equipment could be transferred e
49 1
and somehow paid by the NRC.
We don't have the operational 2
capability to replace those individual employees that are 3
actualLy manning the equipment today.
4 And to do that, would require a massive rearrangement 5
of our own priorities and assistance from other government 6
agencies.
7 Senator Hart.
How many people were you talking about, 8
several dozen?
9 Mr. Denton.
No, I'm talking about the case where we W
y 10 would replace everyone that's presently employed by GPU.
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11
Senator Hart.
But if you, in effect, hired the GPU m
0 12 employees, how many are you talking about, roughly?
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13 Mr. Vollner.
Several dozen.
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14 Mr. Dieckamp.
WeLL, Senator the total population on thel rs
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15 site now of GPU employees and contractor personnet runs 12 to a
16 13 hundred sort of range.
The normal complement for TMI-2 Z
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17 alone would have been on the order of 250 people on site and I
18 then beyond that, some other technical support people.
19 Mr. Denton.
To just be clear, I think we do have the 20 staff capable of replacing tne managerial components, but not 21 of the 1,200.
22 Senator Hart.
Day-to-day operations.
Now, Mr. Dieckamps 23 correctly or incorrectly, there has been discussion in the 24 prest about the possibility of a Met-Edison bankruptcy.
If 25 that were to happen, wiLL GPU commit its resources to ensuring
.l-....-
50 1
'that the Three Mile Island Number 2 Unit is completely cleaned 2
up?
3 Mr. Dieckamp.
Senator, I'm not sure that I know how to 4
answer that question, because there are so many dimensions 5
to it, and so many uncertainties that it certainly impacts on 6
the outcome of whatever we were able to do.
We clearly at this 7
point, are doing everything that we know how to make the 8
resources available to manage the situation at Three Mile 9
Island.
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10 -
Since the accident, let me just give,you a feeling for j
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i 11 the magnitude of the things that have occurred there.
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12 ImmediateLy after the accident, the manning on the site
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$nna 13 reached a level of 1 order of 3,000 people, and it's now down gza P"
14 to about 1,200 Level.
The interval expenditures to date, aw 0$
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15 since the accident, have been about $100 mi. Lion.
The normal a
16 operating maintenance costs for TMI-2 alone, would have been 2
O>
d 17 Seethe range of $15 to $20 million.
l I
18 We have drawn on atL of our resources in terms of 19 financial capability and bank credit in order to make sure 20 that those financial resources were there.
I do have to say 21 that as jne go forward, it wilL be important that there be 22 recovery, reasonably rapid recovery of the insurance coverage 23 for the damages to the plant, and secondly, that the Public 24 Utiltity-Commission recognize the cost on the sufficient and I
25 current basis that we do not run into a cash shortage problem.
i
51 I
Senator Hart.
In round numbers, Mr. Dieckamp, what are 2
the assets of GPU?
3 Mr. Dieckamp.
The total assets of GPU are in round 4
numbers, four and a half to five billion dollars.
Now, keeping.
5 in mind those assets are alL plant and equipment and those 6
assets are not in the form of paid-off mortgages, they're in 7
the form of moretgages, Long-term financial instruments.
8 Bonds, preferred stock, and common equity.
So, even though we 9
have those assets, and those assets largely represent also OW y
10 continuing ob Li ga ti ons.
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11 Senator Hart.
They're not easily to make Liquid?
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That's right.
We might find somebody to Z A
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13 convert them to cash.
And if we did, the first thing we would i Zo
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I4 have to do would be to pay off the investors who made the money:
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15 availab Le to build those facilities.
m 16 Senator Hart.
WiLL there come a time when you wilL have Z
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17 to come up with a yes or no answer to the question that I asked' I
18 about the commitment of GPU to the survival of Met-Ed?
l 19 Mr. Dieckamp.
WeLL, I think the first piece of that 20 relates almost totally to the manner in which the Public Utilit!
i 21 Commission handle the problem and their perception of what is 22 fair and proper.
23 I migh t point out that if we just look at Met-Edisan, 24 despite these problems, and if one takes into account the 25 request for fuel costs recovery, Met-Edison's rates wilL stilL
52 I
be about 4th lowest in the State of Pennsylvania.
So, on the 2
one hand, we would not appear to be in the situation of oushing 3
beyond some reasonable bounds on the cost for the energy that 4
we are supplying to our customers, but I think the place where 5
we encounter problems is if the Commission think that this 6
problem can be handled by very simple application of their 7
perception of regulatory procedures and precedents and do not 8
wish to think in terms of how do we jointly manage the problem, 9
of risks in an enterprise of this sort.
OW y
10 Senator Hart.'
Senator Stafford.
2 O
11
/ Senator Stafford.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On that a
E e D.
ug 12 point, Mr. Dieckamp, it seems to me the Commission has already Z;
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fl crossed the Rubicon as far as recovery of costs are concerned, 13 2o 14 because I think I am looking at the PUC order dated June 15,
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15 folLowing a pubLic meeting on June 15 and the commission says l 2
f 16 that Commission is of the view that none of the cost of Z
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d 17 responding to the accident, including repair, disposal of 2
18 waste, and decontamination are recoverable from rate payers.
19 Has that not resolved the matter and does that not 20 indicate that Metropolitan Edison wiLL not be able to recover 21 those costs?
22 Mr. Di ec ka mp.
Again, that speaks just to the cost of th(
23 plant refurbishment that recognizes, I think also in.that orde 24 that there is $300 miLLion of insurance available to of f set 25 those costs.
If we were faced only with differentials between l
F 53 I
the cost of refurbishment and insurance, the problem would be 2
clearly manageable.
3 The big problem relates to the cost of replacement power.,
4 And, I think, you wilL notice also in that order it says that l
5 the customers should be no worse off and no batter off than had 6
this accident not occurred, and indeed, the basis for the rates!
t 7
that were put into effect for Met-Ed put the Met-Ed customers, t
8 at that time, in the position where they were paying no more l
9 than had the plant never been built.
ow y
10 Now, the additional increment that we require now, zo II relates to the fact that the public hearing SLB process for g:
aag 12 THI-1's return to service can be expected to stretch its return E$
13 from a previously assumed 1/1/1980 to somewhere, let's say d";
Zo h$
I4 in the late fall and winter of 1980, and it's that increment
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15 and additional cost due to that delay that is forcing us to ask 16 for additional relief for Met-Edison.
2o i
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I7 Again, even with that in palce, assuming that there was I
18 in place, Met-Ed's customers are fourth lowest in the State in 19 terms of cost of electricity.
20 Senator Stafford.
Let me ask you this:
I understand 21 that Met-Edison is a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Public 22 Utilities, which you're the President?
23 Mr. Dieckamp.
That's right.
24 Senator Stafford.
What would be the impact on GPU of a 25 j
bankruptcy of Metropolitan Edison?
l l
i
54 I
Mr. Dieckamp.
Again, that's an extremely complicated 2
question, and I would respectfully wish to not attempt to answe 3
that question, because it involves so many complex Legal 4
questions that, frankly, I'm not abLe to answer it in a simple 5
meaningful way.
6 Senator Stafford.
WeLL, Let me just express my personal 7
opinion then that it would appear to this Senator that 8
Metropolitan Edison could be cut of f and allowed to go bankrupt:
9 and that might likely be what GPU would do if it appeared to OW y
10 GPU that it's existence was otherwise prejudiced by the a
O 11 bankruptcy of Metropolitan Edison.
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u; 12 Mr. Dieckamp.
WeLL, let me go so far as to say this.
Wo; ka 13 do not, have not to this date, and I guess we don't see the gz2 l}
14 situation where we perceive to have bankruptcy of Met-Ed to be o
l 15 in the best interest of GPU.
Let me also point out that when m
16 we speak of that plant and the obligations for the health and Z
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l'7 safety of the pubLic and the necessary stewardship of the pland I
18 we're not speaking of just Met-Edison.
Met-Edison's only 50 19 percent owner of that plant.
Our other tow subsidiaries, 20 Pennsylvania Electric Company and Jersey Central Power and 21 Light own 25 percent of that plant.
22 Let me go on to say that while I don't feel capable of l
l 23 discussing bankruptcy in great detail, I j ust want to assure 24 you that we have been giving it considerable study so as to 25 understand what the ramifications are, or at least to attempt
55 I
to understand what the ramifications are.
2 Senator Stafford.
Nothing that's been said this morning 3
that I've had an opportunity to hear discussed in connection d
with recommissioning of the TMI-2.
The possibility I saw 5
suggested in the press recently that you might be considering 6
going to a coal-fired system there instead of nuclear.
I onty 7
bring that up to ask you if the ramifications expensewise woul@
8 be greater or lesser than those you prcject to recommission thG 9
plant as a nuclear plant?
g W
Q 10 Mr. Dieckamp.
The plan that results or is imbeded in thG m
0 11 Bechtel Study moving forward, is on the basis of recommission a
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12 TMI-2 as a nuclear plant.
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13 Let me add further then, that if we Look internally to za
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14 that plan, the first piece of it, namely that of cleaning up ci
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15 the plant, be respected with request to recommissionirig, has a a
16 cost associated with it of at least $200 mitLion out of that Z
0 F
d 17 ectimated 5320 million f or the total cleanup aspect, costs.
l I
18 So that is there irrespective of the return to service.
19 Now, with respect to the study of alternatives to 20 returning it as a nuclear plant, we have felt that as we moved; 21 downstream and got to the point after cleanup, where that 22 decision had to be made, we felt that it was going to be j
23 important for us to have good solid detailed studies that had,;
24 indeed, evaluated the options.
And so, we have been looking at!
i l
25 an option that would convert the plant to coal firing.
)
I I
56 1
I think that the thing to keep in mind is that once 2
having cleaned up the radioactive residuals of the accident,
'3 I think it's probably true that the incremental cost to get thg; 4
next 900 megawatts of power is probably less if one reconvertsj 5
or maintains it as a nuclear plant.
If one wants to convert it!
i 6
to a coal plant, you are faced with a bigger capital investmenti 7
you're faced with a problem of trying to preserve some fractio 8
of the vessel, namely the turbine gener% tors, the switch gear, 9
the transmission, a number of the auxiliaries, the free water W
Q 10 system, the heat rejection system, the Like.
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11 However, those components are alL far from optimum for E.
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og 12 a coal fi red station.
The turbine, for example,'would produce Z An g",
13 about 30 percent efficiency whereas the modern coal fire plant, Zo PE 14 is in the 35 to 40 percent efficiency.
This means that in aw 0$
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15 order to make an effective coal plant, one has to put high j
m 16 pressure turbines in front of the coal pressures nuclear Z
OFJ 17 turbine.
It becomes possibly a very compt'ex wieldy I
18 configureation, and perhaps, not a very porductive plan.
19 We are also looking at the environmental constraints, thq 20 capacity of that Local air basin to handle coal firing, and in) 21 addition, there are the problems of handling ash and scrubber 22 sludge because certain hazards of the scrubber and things of 23 that sort, but again, our feeling has been that when it comes 24 time to make that decision, we wilL need to e armed with or 25 have available the best possible study that truly reveals the
57 1
different options and their merits.
2 Senator Hart.
Mr. Dieckamp.
Just another way of 3
cleaning up one matter relating to the consumer rate base, 4
rate-payer matter, if I can read, it's a rather complicated I
5 equation, if I can reconstruct your statement, you said:
"Even[
6 if the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission granted the rate 7
increase to accommodate the cost of cleanup, the increased l
8 cost to the consumer would not be any greater than if the plant; 9
had not been built."
Is that an accurate restatement of what OW y
10 you said?
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11 Mr. Dieckamp.
No.
I made that in reference to the m!
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Again, the Z An 13 cleanup component is not t
g *a zP" 14 Senator Hart.
P.eplacement powe r, t h er.,
if the aw 0
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15 Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission granted the rate E
l 16 increase that you've requested to accommodate the cost of Z
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17 replacement power, the cost, the increased cost to consumers I
l 18 would be no greater than if the plant had not been built?
19 Mr. Dieckamp.
That's correct, because what is simply
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20 happening is the customer is being supplied with purchase power, 21 on what we call interchange power from within the power pool 22 and that is energy that is available at certain cost Levels ane 23 that, in turn, is passed on directly to the customer with no 24 markups on the part of the company, no adders of any sort.
i 25 So, as a result, you're in a configuration of cost which;
58 l
I is exactly what it would have been had the plant never been 2
built.
3 Senator Hart.
That's part of the equation I want to i
4 pursue, because I think you got a rate increase to build the l
5 plant.
l 6
Mr. Dieckamp.
We were on the threshold of a rate 7
increase, to recognize the fixed cost in the plant.
That was 8
denied at the same time that the June 15 order was entered to 9
recognize the fuel cost.
aW y
10 I think it's important to note that with respect to our m
O 11 Pennsylvania customers, they have not contributed one penny a
6 a$
0ag 12 towards the direct construction cost of the plant'or the fixed !
l Z4na 13 charges associated with the construction of that plant.
Prior g
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14 to placing the plant into service, alL of those fixed charges o!
$[
15 were capitalized to be recovered through rates into the f uture,;
a 16 and those rates have not been put into place.
2 O>
d I'7 What is simply the effect at this point is that across I
18 the three' GPU subsidiaries that own this plant, their 19 stockholders, GPU stockholders are now absorbing costs, roughlyj 20
$10 million a month, and those costs are made up of the fixed 21 charges on the bonds, the preferred dividents, operating and 22 maintenance cost, depreciation, and the absence of any return
(
23 on their equity investment.
24 So, as of right now, the GPU stockholder is carrying the 25 full burden of that $800 million vessel, with no contribution i
59 I
whatsoever today from any rate payer in either Pennsylvania 2
or New Jersey.
3 Senator Hart.
Now, on the issue, Mr. Vollmer, of 4
confidence of citizens in the area.
The Mayor of Lancaster i
5 in his prepared testimony, which we'LL shortly receive, speaks 6
of credibility gap and crisis of confidence, phrases that have 7
worked their way weLL into the public dialogue in the Last few 8
years.
And that credibility gap and crisis of confidence, he 9
says in his City, is the cause of what he calls inaccuracies, g
/
- W y
10 inconsistencies, and misinformation supplied by Met-Ed, and e
O 11 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
m 0ag 12 He specifically cites the NRC Commission that this i
Z Ana 13 Subcommittee was mistaken, I think that was the NRC's position g
2E i
P" 14 when we disclosed that storage capacity was running out for aw 0$
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15 contaminated water in the auxiliary building.
Only to have a
1 16 the NRC reverse its position and to urge the startup of the Z
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l'7 EPICOR-2 water treatment system precisely because of inadequate I
i 18 storage capacity.
19 Now, you are identified by the Mayor as the one who 20 changed this position from ample storage to inadequate storage, 21 what is your explanation for that?
22 Mr. VolLaer.
WeLL, I think that for some time when we 23 were pursuing the assessment for the use of EPICOR, assessing 24 its adequacy, we were concerned about the lack of storage 25 facility in the auxiliary building, and always at that time,
60 I
we had recognized that additional capacity, if need be, was 2
available by transf erring these radioactive wastes over into 3
the Unit 2 auxiliary building, or Unit 1 building.
I think tG 4
without going back and looking at the specifics of what was 5
said, I think that we felt it important for the general publie 6
health and safety,and particularly to reduce exposures to 7
operating personnel, that the radioactive maste generated by 8
the accident be confined in the minimum amount of Locations i
9 and that it be solidified and put on resins and immobilized, g
w Q
10 as far as an activity point of view, as quickly as possible.
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11 So there was always available that contingency for aaOEjg transferring the waste Unit 1.
Ithinkthatwasrecognizedaf 12
-:a 13 all times.
Again, I think the overriding concern was that in<
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14 the best interest of the operators, best interest of potentiaQ 05 g[
15 s pi l L s, that it be confined to Unit 2 and not be transferred m
16 to Unit 1.
z OF d
I'7 Senator Hart.
WelL, just to nail the issue down, whethq Z
18 there was a shortage of capacity or not, we issued our, I don 19 think we issued a statement, I think we made an inquiry of thd 20 NRC as to whether or not there was, in fact, a shortage of 21 storage capacity, based on information supplied to us by the 22 NRC, which in turn was supplied to the NRC by Met-Ed.
You, or 23 someone in the NRC then made a statement that our impression 24 that there was a shortage was a mistake.
25 So, if there was a mistake, it was either on the part oi
61 I
NRC people we talked to, or the information they were getting ;
2 from Met-Ed.
What is the situation?
3 Mr. VoLLmer, We L L, I beli eve, in our first letter from
(
4 the Commission to you, I think we described the roughly 40 da 5
of available capacity that was left in the Unit 2 facility 6
itself, but I think that letter also recognized the fact that t
7 if need be, if the EPICOR process could not be started, that 8
those waters would eventually have to go to Unit 1.
And so, 9
at that time, I think we felt that yes, there was 40 days or (
aW y
10 capacity left for storage of contaminated water in Unit 2, bu -
2 Oa 11 if that runs out, the alternative was either processed throug%
zOE ug 12 EPICOR or start transferring water to Unit 1.
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Senator Hart.
How did you verify the Met-Ed data, 40 m
34 day capacity?
y}
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IS Mr. VolLaer.
WeLL, our people at the site have, as Mr.
m 16 Denton indicated, we have 15 ro 20 people on the site, includt z
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d 17 around-the-clock coverage, we have verified and have been 2
18 involved in alL of'the radwaste operations,and to the best of,
19 i
our ability, certainly verified that the tanks, those major 20 tanks were indeed full and indeed based on the rate that we 21 were accumulating wastes at the site, roughly 40 days of I
22 additional accumulation would run out of tankage.
l 23 Senator Hart.
You're satisfied, based on your own 24 independent assessment that there was a genuine enough storagq i
25 capacity problem to necessitate the useage of the EPICOR systd
62 1
Mr. Vollmer.
Yes, sir, I'm convinced of that.
I'm 2
convinced that the shortage was indeed there, in Unit 2, and the alternatives between use of EPICOR and Unit 1 were the 4
only viable ones.
5 Senator Hart.
So, back to the cresent question.
Was 6
the Subcommittee correct or incorrect in its concern?
7 Mr. Vollmer.
My belief that the Subcommittee was correc.
8 in its concern that space was running out in the Unit 2 compl(
9 o
and that the best interest of operator exposure and potential W
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for spills would not be served by transferring into Unit 1 O
g t a n k'a g e.
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Senator Hart.
You have stated, others have stated therc n
13 d}
is an effort to publicize and make public the deliberations
(
Zo-h step-by-step in the cleanup activities.
Are there any other O
g 15 efforts under way to improve the credibility of Ferk the z
I' j
government and the utility with the people of I.ancaster and 37 other nearby residents besides lust these pubt"c and press 18 meetings?
I9 Mr. Dieckamp.
Senatee, I think the kincs of things thas 20 we are doing are trying to make as many of our-people and our 21 senior peppte as available as possible to appatar before the 22 public and not just caref0LLy selected audien:es, but also 23 to meet direct'ly with some of the local grours who are direct (
24 in opposition to 'the plant and its future operation.
We have.
25 felt very strongly that the most important thing that we coulG x
63 I
do would be to let these people, these organizations, see our 2
management individuals directly and gain a personal and direce 3
impression of their confidence and their dedication to doing d
the job right.
5 I think we have to admit though, that's a slow process, 6
there are a lot of people that we have to get to on that kind 7
of a basis.
We certainly had very high Level of activity in i
8 the Visitors Center just adjacent to the plant.
I think over 9
the summer and the fall, the attendance through the Visitors oW Q
10 center ran in the neighborhood of 20,000 people.
But I think-m II its a Long haul and a process to try to regain that confidenc OE 12 y$
We do think that with these aspects of the bi-weekly 13 dl briefings, in Harrisburg to identify what we are doing, discuc Zo h[
14 what we're doing, are a key part of that.
For example, the
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15 day after the Kemeny Commission report, Mr. Koons, the ChairmC z
16 of GPU, myself, Mr. Arnold, our senior man at the site, made Z
QF d
37 ourseLves available aLL Wednesday morning.
First for a briefi 1
18 and question-and-answer session with Local and state officiaLE 19 and immediately following that, for a press briefing.
20 Again, it's been our feeling that we need to make 21 ourselves available and address the issue.
22 Senator Hart.
Mr. Wilson, one final question on health 23 physics.
How many workers wiLL receive maximum atLowable dosc 24 of radiation during the cleanup and recovery of Three Mile 25 Island and where do you believe these workers to come from?
l n
64 I
Mr. Wilson.
We don't yet have a total estimate of what 2
we might expect of what I would characterize as a total 3
man-rated dose of the recovery operation.
I would expect we t
would anticipate there would be no workers in the absence of '
5 any incident that would receive what's called a maximum 6
allowable dose.
l 7
Workers wiLL come from many places.
Let me describe, 8
for example, what we're doing in the decontamination of the 9
c auxiliary building right now, where workers are in place and w
y 10 in performing the decontamination efforts.
The very Large a
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bulk of those workers are volunteers from elsewhere within th' OE I2
}{
GPU system, they're Linesmen, truck drivers, a LL kinds of i
n 13 ci {
people.
They have volunteered to work in the environment the Zo h$
Id Well over 90 percent, and they volunteered for a two-week per
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15 of time -- then they go back to their normal duties for a whi!
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weLL over 90 percent of those people have volunteered to come!
16 o
F
- f I7 back to the site.
18 In aLL cacos, except one, where one person wac not wil L, I?
to come back, it was for personal reasons, rather than concer 20 about the radioactive environment that they're in, so workersi 21 wiLL come from the GPU system, workers wiLL come from organiz 22 Labor, other groups of th'at nature.
23 I'm confident that while the management of that dose to 24 that total worker population is one of the substantial 23 technical and management tasks on the site, I believe it can
65 1
managed and managed weLL within the current guidelines.
2 Senator Hart.
WelL, I hope there are procedures, for 3
example, to accommodate peop,Le who have worked in other nucted 4
facilities and come there and receive any kind of exposure ati 5
alL, some central registry or some other facility so that thej 6
total accumulation can sort of follow the worker, if that's 7
a problem.
8 Mr. Dieckamp.
Our plants do have in place, Senator,
]
9 that kind of a mechanism for keeping track not only of the doOl y
10 received at our plant, but also the doses received on other a
0 11 sites for roving workers.
Our procedures of this date have z
O 12 not included keeping track of medical or other contact.
Z~An 8
13 Let me also say that there can be no question of what gza P"
14 the radiation protection of the personnel, radiological, aw a5 gg 15 health physics, whatever you want to call it, is a c ri ti ca l e
16 matter.
We are having difficulties getting up to the full z
0 17 Level and speed that this job is going to require.
I think 2
18 that's certainly part of the background for the Blue Ribbon 19 Committee that the NRC has on the site right now.
There's no 20 question in our mind of what we have to put in place the 21 necessary controls, and in the meantime, I think we are just 22 going to have to control the Level of activity to be within 23 whatever capacity the organization can handle.
24 Mr. Vollmer.
Senator Hart, I might mention that as farj 25 as the NRC staff that is at the site full-time, a major i
I
66 I
fraction of those are expert in health physics areas, it's 2
an area that we're watching very closely also in trying to 3
provide the Licensee with whatever assistance we can in meeting 4
the objectives and keeping those goals.
~
5 As far as the occupational exposures are concerned, I 6
would like to point out that the achievement of a quarterly 7
maximum dose does not necessarily represent a deficiency in 8
operation because often, the person who is best trained for 9
an operation wilL accomplish much more efficiently than sending aW y
10 a number of people through to do not so efficient a job, and z
Oa 11 we look toward a minimizing the total exposure by the use of aoI a;
12 the maximum extent of the most trained and most proficient E$
13
- people, fl Zo((
14 So, in many cases, one might need to have a worker achieg
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15 his maximum quarterly dose, but in so doing, minimize the tota; E
16 exposure to a group of workers.
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17 Senator Hart.
Achieve, I'm puzzled by your use of the I
18 word achieve a dose.
19 Mr. VoLLmer.
WeLL, I think the basis of our regulationsc 20' the basis of what we look for is trying to assure that whatevec 21 dose is received, it's as low as possible for the operation 22 being perf ormed, all measures are taken to reduce that dose.
23 In certain circumstances, a good example which is taking reactG 24 cooling system samples early in the accident, it was necessary 25 to have workers take that with full knowledge that they would
67 reach doses that were close to their quarterly maximum, yet 2
the operation needed to be done.
i i
Senator Hart.
I was just commenting on the use of the 4
term.
I would have thought suffer or something like that wout' 5
have been better than achieve.
6 Mr. VoLLmer.
I think suffer would be better.
7 Senator Hart.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your l
8 participation here today.
We appreciate your testimony.
It's; 9
o been extremely helpful.
W H
10 j
Our next panel of witnesses include Mayor Albert Wohlsen!
0 II i
Jr., Mayor of Lancaster, Pennsylvania; Miss Judith Johnsrud, OE I2 f
Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power; Bruce' Smith, Chairma n
13 d$
of the Board of Newberry, Pennsylvania, Township.
Zo 4
STATEMENTS OF MAYOR ALBERT WOHLSEN,
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15 LANCASTER PENNSYLVANIA; JUDITH JOHNSRUD,'
a 6
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ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION ON NUCLEAR POWER; H
I d
I7 AND BRUCE SMITH, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF I
NEWBERRY, PENNSYLVANIA TOWNSHIP Senator Hart.
These are investigative hearings.
The 20 rutos of the Committee provide for sworn testimony, so if the 21 three of you would stand and be sworn.
22 The testimony you are about to give before this Committe 23 do you each swear and affirm that the testimony wiLL be the 24 truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
25 Mayor Wohlsen.
I do.
68 I
Ms. Judith Johnsrud.
I do.
2 Mr. Bruce Smith.
I do.
3 Senator Hart.
Be seated.
4 Mayor Wohlsen, we'LL start with you, I understand you 5
have a prepared statement.
In the interest of time, and to th 6
degree possibLe that you could summarize the salient points of 7
that, the Committee would appreciate.
8 Mayor Wohlsen.
Senator Hart, Senator Simpson, I would i
9 Like to read what I consider appropriate paragraphs from my l
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10 prepared statement that you have received.
So I'LL do that m
O 1
11 immediately.
m OE i
12 gg On February 17, 1979, I was appointed interim Mayor of
-N 13 fl the City of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, by the City Council to Zo((
14 serve the balance of the unexpired term of my predecessor who,
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15 was appointed to a cabinet position with Governor Richard z
Z 16 Thornburg.
Our City charter provides for a strong Mayor form O
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17 of government.
My background has been in the Lancaster bcsino I
18 community as president of the area's largest construction 19 company.
I have not had previous involvement with politi cal 20 Life and my term in office wiLL expire in January, 1980, as I 11 did not seek to become a candidate f or election to the of fice 22 of Mayor.
23 The city has about 60,000 residents with a county 24 population of 445,000.
Based on the testimony given th,s 25 morning, I presume I'm the head of an institutional barrier.
l
69 I
Before I proceed further, I do vant to emphasize that I do not, 2
oppose commercial nuclear power.
I realize there has never 3
been an accident Like the one at Three Mile Island, and becaus!
4 of the uniqueness of this accident, government and utility 5
officials were understandably treading on new ground and facin' 6
problems never before faced.
7 For this reason, I want it to be understood that my i
8 criticisms are Leveled in a constructive sense; so that, if 9
such an accident should ever happen again, the mistakes wiLL aW y
10 not be repeated.
E i
0 II The City of Lancaster's concern and involvement with a
a:
i 0ag 12 events at Three Mile Island began as we Learned'through the ne 13 media of the existence of a potentialLy serious problem at the]
dl zo i
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14 site.
Because of Lancaster's proximity to Three Mile Is land, l
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i 15 4 distance of approximately 23 miles, it was apparent from E
16 the outset that the rapidly changing events that took place Za i
Fy 17 in the days immediately fotLowing March 22 could have a I
18 substantial and direct effect upon our community.
j I
19 Few people can appreciate the scope and extent andconco!
I I
20 by this accident.
Unaware of the inherent dangersofnuclearj l
21 power, this threat was invisible and people were upset.
j 22 Since Lancaster City provides a municipal water service,l i
23 a service f or approximately 110,000 customers,cityofficialsl 24 recognized the need to assure the integrity of our water suppl l 25 The Susquehanna River is the principal source of supply for tk
73 I
city.
We draw and treat some 8 million gallons daily from a 2
point 8 miles downstream from Three Mile Island.
We had to 3
assure that the envi ronmental impact of the cleanup would be r
d carefully evaluated for the area generally, and with particula 5
awareness to concern for the City of Lancaster's water source.:
6 Because decisions were being made with no opportunity 7
for Lancaster's participation, the City decided to file suit 8
against the NRC in the United States District Court for the 9
District of Columbia to compel compliance with the National f
o W
y 10 Environmental Policy Act.
2 O
II g
I firmly believe that the only reason the water is not OE 12 yg being discharged into the Susquehanna today is in view of the
-a 13 d[
suit that we have entered.
It seems clear that the public, zn h5 Id those residents in the area directly af f ected by this nuclear aj
$i 15 accident, the national public, and even the nuclear industry, m
16 wilL be served by a careful environmental impact statement.
z O>
d 17 Caution dictates a broader view of atL issues and technologies!
2 18 involved in the cleanup operations necessitated by the Three 19 Mile Island accident.
Any further problems at Three Mile 20 Island not only jeopardize the Lives and health of the public, 21 but also cloud the country's energy future.
22 The public must be fully involved and informed so that 23 it can be confident that reactor accidents are openly and 24 proscarly analyzed and resolved.
25 Some scientists claim that there are serious long-term i
I
l i
3 71 I
hazards in the discharge of contaminated water to the 2
Susquehanna River while others maintain that this discharge wS 3
present no significant risk.
Since the scientific community 4
is split on this issue, it is the City's position that the l
5 burden of proving that discharge would be safe must rest with 6
Met-Ed and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
7 The City's position is not one of total opposition to 8
nuclear power.
It is our belief that this country must contiG 9
to address and assess it's energy problems, including nuclearc OW Q
10 as expeditiously as possible, but we also must recognize that z
O 11 whatever decisions are made wilL have far reaching effects.
a m$
Oug 12 Whatever Lessons may be learned from Three Mile Island must sa 13 be given full consideration in future planning forthenucleah g
zn
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14 power industry.
U
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15 Restoring public confidence in nuclear power and our z
16 governmental ability to safer control, both in Lancaster Coun -
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17 and elsewhere, wiLL require more effort in the future than ha I
18 been demonstrated by Met-Ed and the NRC in the past.
19 My firm opinion that environmental impact assessments as 20 environmental impact statements should be performed by 21 consulting firms independent of Met-Ed and the Nuclear 22 Regulatory Commission.
Additionally, there should be 23 monitoring and on-site inspections by outside firms.
There 24 must be a thorough and considered review of existing f
25 regulations and standards, radioactive discharge standards
72 I
for Three Mile Island established bef ore the accident should 2
not necessarily apply to Three Mile Island after the accidentc 3
Because of the large releases of radioactivity and 4
severe psychological stress inflicted on the people in the 5
area, the only way to help those who Live near Three Mile 6
Is Land is to make Three Mile Island's discharge standards 7
more restrictive.
This is appropriate under NRC's own 8
regulations which require that, "As low as reasonably t
9 achievable" standards taken into account economic and g
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10 psycholdgical considerations.
m O
11 The Federal Government must have a community network a
a$
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j ug 12 capable of delivering the local governments information that zg i
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g a 13 they have to plan effectively for the safety and welfare of Zo 1
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14 t hei r communities.
0 ;,
y1 15 In conclusion, I think it is imperative that NRC be m
16 capable of quickly delivering accurate information to local Z
O H
d 17 governments in areas af f ected by nuclear operations.
18 Additionally, the NRC must concentrate on pubLic safety and l
19 not operate as a promoter of nuclear power in partnership 20 with the utilities.
21 The Lancaster community continues to be concerned by thc 22 Met-Ed and NRC approach of designing and developing systems 23 first and then evalyating their environmental impact.
Since I
24 an approach precludes an objective, environmental or saf ety 25 review, if the citizens of Lancaster cannot rely on the trust i
1
73 I
of NRC to protect our water supply, then, who can we turn to?
2 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I 3
Senator Hart.
Mayor Wohlsen, thank you very much for 4
taking your time to come down.
We'LL have some questions.
5 (Prepared statement of Mayor Wohlsen follows.)
6 7
8 9
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16 Z
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18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 l
74 I
Senator Hart.
I want to ask Chairman Smith if he wilL l
2 give us his statement.
3 Mr. Smith.
Thank you Senator.
4 First of a LL, I would like to make a slight correction, 5
I'm Chairman of Newberry Township, Board of Supervisors, 6
which is in York County, Pennsylvania.
7 March 28, 1979 changed my Life and my attitude toward l
8 nuclear power.
Until that day, I gave very Little thought 9
toward the nuclear power plant that had been built just two OW y
10 miles from my home.
Why should I worry?
The United States a
Oa 11 Gove.rnment was involved in the Licensing process and nuclear a$
Oag 12 power is f ootproof, f ail-saf e, and perf ect.
We'even boated on!
ka 13 the Susquehanna River, water-skied past the cooling towers, anc g
Zo((
14 proudly took guests on an admiral's tour which always ended Og gI 15 with a close-up look at modern-Ame ri ca 's ma rvel, Three Mile m
16 Island.
I would invariably compare the cooling towers to the Z
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17 pyramids.
I 18 I must point out at this time that I am a high school 19 English teacher, I have been teaching for 22 years; I served 20 two years in the Army; I am happily married and the father of 21 two wonderf ul girls who are 14 and 11 years old.
I became 22 involved in local government when I became dissatisfied with 23 the job being done by my local government officials.
I then 24 became involved in anti-Three Mile Island activity when I 25 observed first-hand what the accident did to my community.
l l
l l
~
75 I
First, a brief geography Lesson about my community.
It 2
is a second-class township located in the northern section of 3
York County.
It is the largest municipality within the five 4
mile radius of Three Mile Island, on the west shore of the 5
Newberry Township cora le t e ly surrounds 6
Goldsboro; in fact, all roads into Goldsboro must pass through 7
Newberry Township.
We have 8,500 residents, more than 31 squa-8 miles of Land, more than 114 miles of roads, and one single, 9
a solitary civil defense siren.
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10 Of course, we alL know that the entire municipality cann m
O II g
possibly hear that one civil defense siren.
Of course, we all OE 12 y$
know that the civil defense evacuation plan f ailed miserably 1
-2 13 dl during the crisis on March 30.
That's the reason that York j
Zo t
h $ ' Id County created this brand new evacuation plan which was O$
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15 published af ter the accident at Three Mile Island.
The fatal a
16 flaw in the new evacuation plan is the initial reliance on thei z
O i
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I7 civil defense siren in which the pubLic has no faith.
same I
18 I Live just two miles from the siren, yet I didn't always hear l I9 it.
It depends which way the wind is blowing.
In that 20 regard, the siren is like radiation; it depends which way the 21 wind is blowing.,
22 During the proposed' clean-up activities, which may pose 23 some additional danger for residents living close to Three 24 Mile Island, the public must be reassured that there is a M
viable, improved, evacuation plan.
Local Leaders should have i
e
76 I
input; Local residents' fears should be atlayed.
Long-range 2
proposals should be prepared so that Long-range preventitives 3
may be planned.
More than seven months have passed and j
4 Newberry Township stilL has only one civil def ense siren f or 5
31 square miles.
Our community cannot afford to purchase, 6
install, and maintain additional sirens even if the danger 7
Level were to increase as a result of the clean-up activities 8
on Three Mile Island.
i 9
A long-range step-by-step plan could better prepa.ed thel 0w y
10 community as weLL as the community leaders with the problems s
Oa 11 and dangers to be confronted with the clean-up process.
ma" ag 12 Met-Ed's present piecemeal approach is driving Newberry k
13 Township residents batty.
I personally attended the news g{
Zo l[
14 conf erence when Met-Ed announced their desire to release
@g a
i 15 krypton into the atmosphere.
Met-Ed of ficials seemed mysti fid a
16 when local citizens protested; after atL the krypton only had' zo l
H d
17 half-Life of the more than ten years.
It was little Z
18 consolation to the people of Central Pennsylvania to know thae 19 Met-Ed was going to select the days when the wind direction 20 and velocity were best for release of the krypton.
Lost 21 confidence is Like Lost virginity; it is impossible to regainq 22 The American people. Lost confidence in nuclear power 23 because of the accident at Three Mile Island.
As an example 24 of how much confidence and faith have been Lost in Newberry 25 Township, I submit to this panel a copy of a study whi ch was O
77 I
incorporated in the Kemeny Commission report.
This was a 2
study which was completed in September, at least one month prior to the release of the Kemeny Commission report.
This j
was a telephone survey within the township, done by township i
5 residents.
Only 13 percent of the persons surveyed thought i
6 the report would be complete; only 25 percent thought the 7
report would be truthful; only 30 percent thought the report i
8 would be factual.
The reason that the survey was taken was i
9 tc learn of community interest in a health monitoring program g
W ThreeMild y
10 for the municipality as a result of the accident at a
E 11 Isla'nd.
Eighty-three percent of those surveyed indicated thah a
0 12 health. monitoring was a worthwhile project.
Ia 13 Significantly, regardless of Presidential Commission gza P"
14 findings, 85 percent want more study done on the effects to zw ai gi 15 their health.
Another significant indication of the present l z
16 thinking in the community is that the Health Committee of the z
O h
17 township which undertook the telephone survey,is applying for I
18 private funding to complete the study.
Distrust of the fundic 19 by the Federal Government for nuclear power has resulted in LC 20 of faith in the Federal Government because of the conflict of 21 interest.
22 The bottom Line of 'the thought that I want to leave wit 23 you today is that I am an average citizen fighting to correct.
24 a wrong that has been committed.
I am so conservative that I' 25 supported Barry Goldwater in 1964; I am so idealistic that I l
(
l l
78 I
extolled Spiro Agnew's attacks on the press; and now I am so 2
angry about Three Mile Island that I have become one of the 3
Leaders in the movement to close TMI forever, as a nuclear 4
plant.
5 Why?
ALL of my reasons are psychological, and they 6
relate to the residents of my community and what they have 7
already gone through.
And that's only half of the picture 8
because aLL of the residents who Live near Three Mile Island 9
realize that we are now the control group for nuclear power aW y
10 accidents.
As you know, the word control group is the socialL a
O Il g
acceptable way of saying we are guinea pigs.
Just yeasterday CE ag 12 afternoon, I met with three women from the Pennsylvania d*
13 Department of Health, who wiLL be starting a special survey g
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14 in December on a smaLL select group from communities surroundi Oj
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15 Three Mile Island.
m 16 z
On November 1st, another control group began its study 0F d
17 on three segments within Newberry Township; plant workers, I
18 mental health patients, and mothers of young children.
This 19 study wiLL compare our group to a similar group near a nuclear 20 facility that did not experience an accident.
Again, this is 21 a state study.
The plan is to compare attitudes on March 28th 22 to what they are now.
23 In addition, numerous telephone surveys have been 24 conducted by various organizations.
The State of Pennsylvania 25 also has conducted an in-depth population control study which
/1..
Q 79 1
was completed this summer.
It is my job as an elected officia and the leader of my community to urge that citizens cooperate:
3 with everyone conducting Legitimate, necessary surveys in an effort to Learn
'om the March 28th accident.
The inherent 5
robLem is similar to that of a hypochondriac who learns of 6
too many potential diseases.
It becomes a psychological 7
problem which depresses the interviewer and the interviewee.
8 I have even heard of accounts where both were crying during an 9
o interview.
The psychological impact of the accident at Three w
F 10 g
Mile Island is immeasurable, but it is there, in many homes.
O II g
Senator Hart.
Thank you for a very fine statement, DE I2 Mr. Smith.
13 d$
Miss Johnsrud, if it would be possible, if you could Zo h
I#
summarize, in the interest of getting some questions in.
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l t-is w1 Ms. Johnsrud.
I have to summarize.
I have a Lengthy a
16 j
statement for you and I do hope that you and the staff wilL ha F
I7 f
an opportunity to examine the specific points.
Senator Hart.
We wi L L indeed, and the entire statement wiLL appear in the record.
P 20 Ms. Johnsrud.
There are attachments that were delivered.
21 to the staff persons.
I hope they are before you.
22 Senator Hart.
Yes,'they'lL be entered into the record 23 also.
24 ds. Johnsrud.
Thank you.
My name is Judith H. Johnsrud 25 I am Co-Director of the Environmental Coalition on Nuclear I
80 I
Power (ECNP), a non-profit public-interest organization of 2
individuals and citizen groups throughout Pennsylvania and 3
adjoining states, founded in 1970, composed of citizen groups 4
and individuals who are very acuh concerned about nuclear 5
energy and its expansion.
6 I had hoped that our Legal representative, Dr. Chauncey 7
Kepford, who is a radiation chemist, could be with us today.
8 However, as I'm sure you know, Met-Edison, Three Mile Island 9
Unit 1 reopening hearings are getting underway in Harrisburg aw y
10 today and we are intervenors in that proceeding to attempt 2
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to k.eep Unit 1 closed as welL as having participated since 197 OE 12 y$
as the sole public interest intervenors in the Licensing
-2 I3 dl proceedings f or Three Mile Island Unit 2.
Zo![
14 I would like to be able to point out to you some of the
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15 ways in which that proceeding compiled a record that we believ z
16 z
might welL form the basis for criminal charges against certain O
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I7 officials of the. company with respect to testimony that we now I
18 believe cannot have been true at the time.
39 I would, however, point out that the License proceedings 20 for TMI-2 are incomplete.
We go back to hearing on two major 21 issues in February of 1980.. Issues that should have been 22 resolved bef ore the License had ever been issued and indeed, h 23 those issues been handled, one of them being radon-222 from 24 uranium mi tL tailings, a problem you're welL aquainted with, j
25 had those issues been resolved prior to the granting of a l
81 I
License, as should be proper, we believe the accident might 2
never have taken place.
3 I would respectfully urge that at some later date you 4
try to make an opportunity to hear Dr. Kepford in his 5
discussion of social and technical problems relating to the 6
.estart of either Unit 1 or 2.
I have' attempted to address a
7 in this statement, that was very hastily prepared, which I 8
apo'.ogize, some six issues which I wiLL skim over quickly.
9 Naturally, the ongoing nature of the accident; aspects g
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10 of the regulatory posture of the NRC since the accident; third z
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13 recovery for Unit 2;' fifth and sixth, the attitudes that we g
Zo
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14 as a public interest organization devoted to education in
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I 15 P.ennsylvania, publi c servi ce among the residents, and what E
16 I find very troubling, potential for sabotage in the event z
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l'7 that either Unit is permitted to go back on Line.
I 18 First, with respect to the accident stilL being in 19 pru!ress:
I find that outside the immediate area of 20 Pennsylvania, there is very Little understanding that problemE 21 remain with gaseous releases, krypton, with stiLL accumulating 22 radioactive water within containment and elswhere in the systC 23 With the problem that lies ahead once the water and gas probLC 24 can be solved, if indeed they can, namely the problem of 25 controlling radioactive dust, in the process of cleaning up tR e
82 I
interior of the containment building, and'the reactor system 2
itself.
3 Here, in particular, we are much disturbed by the 4
potential for the release of s'tontium cesium 137 contaminantsj 5
which we believe could have a very substantial impact onthe!
6 agricultural Lands of Southern Pennsylvania.
And, finally, 7
among those ongoing problems, is the concern expressed among 8
citizens of the possibilities for damage to Unit 1, which, in.
9 turn, might affect Unit 2 during the cleanup or conversely, j
aW 10 further accident conditions at Unit 2 that might require the l z
Oa 11 use,of TMI-1 f acilities particularly, for the storage of 2
i 0m c
12 materials in an emergency situation.
E;$
13 dj However, I f eel the public has not understood the ongoiq Zo((
14 nature of this accident, and I would Like to suggest several
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i 15 reasons for this to you.
Gr pages three and four; first, m
16 is the impression that has teen given by virtually all of fici(
z 0>
d I'7 sources and the utility that only minimal doses of radiation I
18 were actuaLLy received by the public, despite what we believe!
l 19 certain evidence that suggests the contrary.
20 Secondly, there has been a distressing Lack of I
21 availability of reliable inf ormation f rom of ficial sources.
22 We have heard today about the closing down and now, perhaps, 23 the reopening of public information f acility in the Harrisburf 24 Middletown area.
Citizens have f ound very uncooperative 25 attitudes on the part of the regional public relations office i
l l
i 83 of the NRC, and, very disturbing to us are the facts that the]
I 2
NRC staff and Met-Edison Company ceased,following the accident!
3 to provide virtually any information to Dr. Kepford and me as 4
the Legal intervenors and stiLL incomplete Licensing proceedin' 5
for that plant, despite repeated requests for data, for 6
documents, for briefings, we have received virtually nothing 7
from the NRC o r-the utility.
8 And, finally, as perhaps you are aware, in recent months' 9
and weeks, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has attempted to oW Q
10 restrict public access to documents, issuances of the Commissi a
O 11 even.. notices of meetings and availability of documents, throug, aaai ag 12 the installation of the Publication Sales Program and the zg l
13 restriction of these documents to the public, documents where dl zo((
14 a commercial charge of 10 cents a page was Levied, a charge
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15 which perhaps the utilities can pass through to their customer m
16 but we citizens simply cannot afford.
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17 And, finally, I would point out to you in particular, I
18 those documents and the appendicies that relate to the efforts 19 of the NRC to restrict inf ormation, it's especially troubling r
20 that this appears to be Lessons Learned from the Three Mile 21 Island accident.
22 I would like to skip now-to a f ew instances of the natur 23 of the regulatory posture in addition to this information 24 cutoff.
We find it especially disturbing, as I think they 25 apply to the Livelihood of the care and regulation of the
84 1
cleanup proceedings that we f eet would be appropriate.
2 First; just within the last.few days, the NRC has 3
announced changes in its procedures with respect to generic 1
4 proceedings, such as to restrict the participation of ci ti zen i
5 and in particular, to essentially destroy the potential for i
1 6
meaningful discovery in such proceedings.
The intent appears 7
to be to reopen proceedings on radioactive waste management 8
in order, so far as we can ascertain from the notice of I
9 hearing, to remove the entire question of the disposition of j g
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10 spent fuel in a reactor from the License proceedings.
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11 Now, in Pennsylvania, we're faced with the possibility a
mOE og 12 that the Public Utility Commission intends to cut off Met-Edi z;
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13 Company as an operating utility in the State.
We wonder what za((
14 provisions are being made by the Regulatory Commission for thq i
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15 ganagement of spent fuel that hasn't already accumulated at a
16 that site, and in which aight do so in the future.
What z
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17 analyses, f or example, have been conducted on the integrity o$
I 18 the spent fuel storage of TMI-1 relative to cleanup operation 19 at Unit 2.
I 20 Secondly, with respect to regulatory posture, I would 21 point to the handling that the NRC is now using for the Class 22 accident such as was declared at Unit 2.
The Class 9, of 23 course, is-that accident vaguely defined as exceeding the 24 capacity of safety systems, and yet, when the issue was raise 25 by our organization at the Three Mile Island Unit 1 proceedin l
l A.
o.
85 I
where it obviously, a similar Class 9 disaster could impact 2
heavily on the TMI-2 cleanup, we were told by the NRC staff 3
that there was nothing to Litigate in that the events, the 4
sequence of events that we might propose had not taken place,;
5 and therefore, would be considered only hypothetical and 6
speculative and not to be considered in the Licensing 7
proceeding.
I 8
It appears to us that nothing, in fact, again, has been 9
Learned about the need for careful examination of atL potentio g
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10 accidents at the nuclear reactor despite the severity of Threo a
Oa 11 Mile. Island.
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0ag 12 I would like to skip now to the health effects.
For E$
13 here, I think in parti cular, we have a problem that relates d$
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14 intimately to the future cleanup activities.
We have alL bees
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15 assured in the population dose assessment report back in May a
16 10, that there would be only one or two or possibly up to ten z
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d l'7 cancer deaths.
I would draw your attention to the two graphs I
18 that accompany, are appended directly to this statement, 19 Lettered A and B, folLowing the notes.
On these graphs, whics 20 are taken from the NRC's data, in the ad hoc report, May 10, 21 we lind a plotting of the sectors, I'm sorry, of the dosimetep 22 readings of the NRC by sector for the week following the 23 accident, March 31, onward.
And these are compared with the 24 curved Line on the graph that shows the dose model that was 25 used by the NRC and HEW and other agencies to predict that ont Q
9 86 I
one or two cancer deaths would be experienced at that distanco 2
to 50 miles from reactor.
If you'lL note, please, on grapd up 3
B.
The plot for the sector to the northwest of the plant, whi 4
is indeed the area including Harrisburg, shows that although 5
there was an initial drop of dose, between two miles and 6
approximately s'ix miles from the plant, where the two dosimeto 7
were located, that at eight miles and especialLy at ten miles 8
from the reactor, the dose had actualLy risen higher thatn it 9
was close to the plant.
g W
Q 10 Now, this piece of information when taken in conjunctica m
0 11 with the NRC's admission of the release of some 13 mitLion am05 og 12 curies of radioactive xenon gas in the first days of the E$
13 da accident plus some 14 or 15 curies of Iodine 131, indicate to zn[]
14 us that there is indeed a potentiality that the doses actualLF
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15 received were far higher than the nuclear industry and the a
16 regulators have Lead us to believe.
z
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l'7 In particular, we have the evidence of uncertainty 2
18 that is shown in the testimony of EPA officials back in June, 19 namely testimony that states that the thermoluminescent 20 dosimeters, the ground Level monitors that were in place at 21 the plant were not designed t'o pick up the Lulk of the bata 22 radiation that was omitted and secondly, the very disturbing 23 testimony of one Albert Gibson of the NRC staff who when asked l
l 24 in late June by Commissioner Gilinsky if the staff radiation 25 monitor was off scale, replied that it was.
And, in response l
87 1
to Commissioner GiLinsky's next comment, "So we don't reatLy 2
know what went up there," Mr. Gibson replied, indeed, "That is 3
correct."
4 This gives us then to understand that nobody really does 5
know what the doses received were.
Ou. concern for the I
6 residents of central Pennsylvania at this stage and for the 7
years in the future during the cleanup activities, is that 8
there wilL be f urther errors, there wiLL be unanticipated 9
releases of radiation and the consequence wiLL cumulative g
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10 doses above and beyond what has already been received.
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11 You wiLL note --
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12 Senator Hart.
Excuse me, if you can summarize, it wouls Eh g!
13 be very helpful.
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14 Ms. Johnsrud.
Let me turn to my final point then.
I
@g 15 think we can classify the attitudes of groups of people in a
16 Pennsylvania, some are apathetic, some are furious, some are Z
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17 not sleeping at night, some are calling us at atL hours of tho I
18 night every time there is a siren or a, any incident at alL 19 at Three Mile Island itself.
There is a sense of deep pervasi 20 uneasiness among.the citizens.
21 As we have examined, I would ask you to turn here to pae 22 17 and 18 at the bottom, as we have examined the response of 23 the citizenry to the ongoing nature of the accident, and when 24 we've considered the likelihood of the restart of Unit 1 withi 1
25
.a year's time, we must say that we see a very real possibility
P 87-A 1
that there may emerge some quietly angered Pennsylvania or 2
Pennsylvanians, people who have not been so identified as 3
nuclear opponents, who wilL out of their frustration and theie 4
anger, manage in some way to cause damage to that reactor.
5 Damage that may,in fact, result in the release of radioactivity 6
in substantial cuantities.
And I would call your attention tG 7
the illustration that's based on our own experience some four 8
years ago when an ex-Green Barret came up t.o Dr. Kepford and 9
me and said, wiLL you people draw an X on a reactor designed w
7 10 f or me, I can get a hold of a missle, I'm not going to have 2
0 11 them, building a nuclear reactor near my home, m
0 12 I am deeply concerned about the potential for that kind Ia 13 of response.
I'm also concerned in another political realm g
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15 surveillance, distruction of civil Liberties as the other forq z
16 of expressed opposition may begin to'take place in the anea o9 Z
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17 TMI-1 and 2, namely civil disobedience.
I 18 We feel that there is a continuing state of very deep r
19 distress among the citizens of Pennsylvania.
That wilL be 20 ameliorated only with the assurances that TMI-2 wiLL never be 21 put back on Line and indeed, I would surmise that the vast bus 22 of the residents from our. State would like to see TMI-1 cut o9 23 as weLL.
24 Thank you for your attention and I'd be glad to answer 25 questions.
(Prepared statement of Ms. Judith H. Johnsrud follows.)
f
88 I
Senator Hart.
Thank you Dr. Johnsrud.
Thank you all 2
for your statement..
I personally believe that the statements amon 3
offered here this t.orning by the elected officials may be 4
the most important that this Subcommittee has received since 5
I have had the privilege of chairing it.
I believe end have 6
repeatedly stated, that when asked about the future of nuclear 7
power,that it's directly related to the confidence of the 8
American people in that source of power, and particularly, in 9
its safety, therefore, you, as not only representatives of you OW i
y 10 communities, but I think a cross section representatives, if i
e i
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2 i
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13 Mr. Smith, is a Little more categorical, he says in his Zo((
14 first sentence, March 28, 1979, changed my Life, and my, at
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15 that time, attitudes towards nuclear power.
That is a very a
l.6 important statement, particularly to the degree that it's Z
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d 17 reflective broadly to citizens in this country.
I 18 Mayor Wohlsen is somewhat less categorical, but he 19 renders some very, very serious charges.
The days of Late 20 March and early April were the most ag oni zing and frustrating ;
21 that I have ever experienced, not just as Mayor, but I presume 22 as a citizen of the country, and then you go on particularly, 23 Mayor, to comment on the absence of information and the, l
24 perhaps the misinformation.
l 25 Mayor, Let me ask you, is there any particular reason l
89 I
why you have not been as traumatized in this respect as 2
Mr. Smith?
3 Mayor Wohlsen.
Could be because of the, our location as relates to the Island.
And, of course,wedidfocusinonthel 4
5 water.
Are you referring Senator to during the period i
i 6
immediately following the accident?
7 Senator Hart.
I'm referring to your statements which 1
8 seem to be related both to that as weLL as more recently.
9 Mayor Wohlsen.
Yes.
We were very much concerned aW Q
10 immediately following the accident because at that point in a
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time, there was an indication that they were considering an OE 12 y$
evacuation in a radius of 20 miles and, of course, Lancaster
-2 di 13 being within 22, 23 miles, City Government and the citizens z8 h$
Id were extremely upset and could have developede that I would a5$i 15 have been called upon to order an evacuation of our City.
m 16 That's when I refer to the most agonizing period of my Z
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d I7 time.
We felt in Lancaster that because of the source of our I
18 water, and the protection of the integrity of the water, that I9 we should focus our view on that.
We feel that the overaLL 20 result of the cleanup concerns not only the City of Lancaster,l 21 but also the surrounding towns and also our State Government, 22 and we feel that maybe the Leadership as to the response to 23 what's happening at Three Mile Island should come from the 24 State Level or by county Level.
I might add that it's my 25 personal view that Leadership has not been forthcoming.
a 9
l 90 1
Senator Hart.
How would you characterize, if you can, 2
the attitudes of the people of your community generally, 3
towards nuclear power af ter the accident?
i Ibelievk 4
Mayor Wohlsen.
Our people are very concerned.
5 I can say that of the mail that's been received in my office, 6
relating to one single incident, this far outnumbers any mail i
7 received on a single issue, I would presume, of any Mayor who,
i 8
ever served in that capacity.
9 It wo6Ld be 99 and 9/10 percent in support of the City's:
g W
y 10 position on the discharge of the water into the Susquehanna a
k 11 and many of the others.
The vast majority of the Letters are :
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DE ug 12 very concerned and I would say relatively anti-nuclear energy.l ka 13 Senator Hart.
Would you say that that reflects in any g
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14 appreciable degree a shift in opinion generally?
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15 Mayor Wohlsen.
I could not say that there's been a m
16 shift in opinion since, in the period after the accident.
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17 Senator Hart.
Mr. Smith, what is the distance between I
18 the plant and your house?
19 Mr. Smith.
Approximately two miles.
20 Senator Hart.
Is there any direct correlation, in your 21 opinion, between the proximity of one's residence and the degr(
22 of concern?
l 23 Mr. Smith.
Absolutely.
I've found that the closer peopi 24 Live to Three Mile Island, the more they care and the more 25 anti-nuclear or anti-Three Mile Island they become.
The closei
91 I
you are, the greater the concern.
2 Senator Hart.
WelL, I would just make a comment and the 3
defer to Senator Simpson.
We are hearing increasingly in 4
the Congress these days about the criticisms of those who are 5
alleged to espouse the so-called risk-free society, and the I
6 over abundance of health and safety regulations, and the 7
so-called envi ronmentali st blocade of progress in economic 8
growth.
But I think that's a little too retractive and also 9
a little too simple.
It is an issue of confidence.
That's g
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10 why I think your testimony is so important here.
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0 11 For those of us who try to figure out a way and continud Eas ag 12 to continue a source of energy that some parts of this counted z;
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13 are vitally dependent upon, but at the same time, reduce the 2;o((
14 risk, I think it does not help for anyone in industry or aj
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15 anywhere else, to put down those Legitimate concerns.
And I e
Z 16 think you've stated them as welL as anybody I've heard about a
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17 risks, about danger, about public health, about publi c saf etyo Z
18 We ce alL going to have to work together, I don't think the s
19 polarization of these issues either way; alL anti-nuclear or 20 alL pro-nuclear are very, very helpful at alL.
21 This was a serious accident, and it ought to change the 22 way we think about things and I don't know, I guess just 23 Listening to your statements, particularly you Mr. Smith, reaG 24 makes me unhappy personally about those who put down or i
25 mischaracterize others-who they say are trying to create a
o 92 I
risk-free society, I don't think there is'such a thing, I don d 2
know of any responsible public of ficial in either political 3
party at any level that believes there is a ri sk-f ree society 4
or ever wiLL be; but progress I think has to be measured in 5
the degree to which we try to eliminate risks and hazards andi i
i 6
unsafe conditions and while that's never possible completely,'
7 it's stilL, I think, a worthwhile goal, and it seems to me if 8
w,e re ever going to have continuing nuclear industry in this 9
o country, particularly degree of risk in that industry, and W
y 10 it is different in kind.and degree from other kinds of risk, a
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Il and.alL of us are going to have to strive to make it as eOE i
ag 12 risk free as we can.
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Senator Simpson.
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14 Senator Simpson.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
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15 I,too, was very intrigued by testimony of alL three of a
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you.
I guess I make more continual references than anyone on OF i
d 17 the Committee to the American citizens who are "out there."
I 18 Perhaps, that's just because I've been most recently through 19 the electoral fi res.
I know they're out there.
And they're i 20 asking questions about regulations in their lives, health and i 21 safety, and those things.
And you represent the very importaf 22 at least partial cross section of the people in your communitd 23 and I appreciate your sharing those views.
24 I gather from you, Mr. Smith, that you must be in the 25 category that is know here as a Republican, is that correct? !
l
93 I
Mr. Smith.
You guessed.
~
2 Senator Simpson.
Formerly an endangered species, now, 3
I think in the area of repopulation.
We talk Like that, we actualLy use phrases Like batty t
5 and guinea pigs and we actually call institutional barriers 6
municipalities in my country.
(
7 I think that one of the things, and the Chairman I think; 8
has handled it, because he sets the tone of our investigation,:
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as Chairman, and I, hopefully, add some tonal quality to it w
y 10 as ranking minority member.
We've tried to stay away from m
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high drama in this situation.
Because there's so much of it i
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there.
And,sowetrytorestrainourcommentswhichcaneasil i
dl excite and overwhelm and arouse the public,so easy to do, justl I3 52 I4
$3 using the term core meltdown about once every ten minutes is j
us$i 15 anough to get everybody's j uices going in Americar
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So, I think that from that standpoint, I think you'lL 0F d
I7 want to be careful about inflammatory commentary.
It's not I
18 h elp f ul in my mind and I try to strike at it wherever I find 19 it on both sides.
I think that it's far removed from what 20 w,e re up to.
We're far removed from drama and hysteria.
21 WeLL, I have a couple of questions.
I think you have 22 discussed some of the Local public reaction.
I think that 23 you're definition of that Local public reaction would dif f er 74 as to each of you.
But back to the issue of plain old recovee l
l 25 What are the people saying, Mr. Smith, I'm asking you and theq l
l i
l l
l
94 o
1 ask each of you to respond, what are the people saying about 2
simple question, I wonder what they're going to do with that 3
place out there?
Would you answer that, please?
4 Mr. Smith.
That's a very difficult question to answer.
5 IsLL try.
One of the things that it relates to Senator Hart's 6
observation is that because the Harrisburg and York areas are 7
very, very close to Three Mile Island, there are articles almo 8
on a daily basis about the activities at Three Mile Island.
9 And people are very, very much abreast, if they want tobe,onl 0
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Q 10 what's occurring.
I know there are problems relating to E
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The problem a:
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13 they have meetings during the day, not daily, but when they gl 2o((
14 have the announcement, but I'm a school teacher, they have the a5 g[
15 in the daytime, I can't get to them, so I have to do the same z
16 thing that occurred during the crisis, I have to watch Z
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I'7 television and read the newspaper to find out what they said, I
18 and, I guess, the bottom Line of what most people say is due 19 to their unique experience, they don't quite believe everythinq 20 that they're told.
21 And it's back to what you said, mentioning the word core 22 meltdown.
That was bandied about quite a bit during the 23 crisis.
You heard also two different thin.s
,n television. So 24 the people don't know what to believe, and they're told that 25 everything is being done safely and within the guidelines and acceptable Limits.
Even the word acceptable limits becomes
~-
95 I
Laughable when you've been through what people in Central 2
Pennsylvania feel that they've been through.
t 3
Senator Simpson.
Could you comment just briefly.
4 Ms. Johnsrud.
I think that there is a very strong i
S denial syndrome among many of the residents of the area.
Theyl 6
don't want to have to think about the ongoing nature of the
{
7 accident.
They're trying to restore some assemblance of sanit; 8
to their own Lives.
There certainly seems to be no sense of j
9 genuine stand Locally as to what Met-Ed does intend to do withl 0w y
10 cleanup, we've been given virtually no information about it, m
Oa 11 desp.ite that report.
m oe I
ag 12 There is, I think, however, an increasing understanding I Z A n
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13 that transcends the Logicalness of the accident.
Namely, that!
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14 there are some problems of j ustice involved.
The accident has]
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15 taken place in Central Pennsylvania, people want the hazardousj Z
16 material out of there.
But where is it to go?
Who deserves 0F d
17 to get it?
By what routes and who takes the risks there?
2 18 I think that in that respect, the understanding of the 19 total system of. production shot through with imperfections, 20 has expanded immeasurably among people of Central Pennsylvania 1 21 No, we don't know what Met-Ed intends to do, I hope you people 22 wilL be able to find out.
23 Senator Simpson.
Mayor, what were your thoughts on that 24 general and tough question?
25 Mayor Wohlsen.
Number one; the people in our community i
4
96
~
1 say keep the waste water out of the Susquehanna, that's number:
2 one; but we also recognize that the reactor must be cleaned up/
3 It would seem to us that it's appropriate that rather than pla 4
for the cleanup and the analysis of how to be accomplished tha 5
this should be put on the basis of a full-scale study, rather 6
than on a piecemeal, as suggested early this morning.
7 We would suggest that the water not be discharged into 8
the Susquehanna, that a complete study is prepared with total 9
cleanup f the reactor in conjunction with that, and an oW y
10 environmental impact statement, be prepared and that outside m
0 11 and_ private engineering and inspections and testing Laboratoric z$
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ag 12 be involved, maybe with Met-Ed, through the NRC, for their g*
13 input.
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14 I would like to take the opportunity this morning to raif G$
15 the banner for private enterprise, however, it would seem to a
16 me that the demonstration of Met-Ed makes that a little z
O l'7 difficult for me, but I would like to say to you, sir, that I
18 I believe the private sector can be called in to provide backu0 19 and good input into this issue.
20 Ms. Johnsrud.
I have one point, Senator.
21 Senator Simpson.
Yes.
22 Ms. Johnsrud.
I think that it would help immeasurably 23 if there were a far fuller independently operated and widely 24 publicized monitoring system f or both potential gases and wate(
25 releases and ultimately, solids as welL.
People want to know
I
.4 34 97 I
just as they want to know the temperature before they walk out.
2 of the house, they would like to know what's happening with 3
radiation levels.
4 Senator Simpson.
I think that you've touched on atL the; 5
things that we have grappled with since March 28, credibility, 6
public confidence, knowledge, furnishing information to the 7
American citizen so they can make their determination, the 8
private sector, it's responsibility, and certainly, one thing 9
that we'LL be forever with, wiLL be the safety of these aW y
10 f acilities is either there, or invested capital wi LL not come z
Oa 11 to them.
It's that simple.
moE 12 gg So, they are most interested, and that's the way the
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system should work, private enterprise is most interested in l[
14 safety, wiLL be increasingly so, or they'lL never get anybody l
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15 to cough up any chips to go along with them.
a 16 So, thank you so much.
I have further question, I'lL Z
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17 submit in writing, you have been very patient alL of you, and I
18 your testimony has been very helpful.
Thank you for taking 19 the time.
~
20 And the hearing is concluded.
21 (Whereupon at 12:25 the hearing was adjourned, to 22 reconvene at 9:30 a.m.
on' November'9, 1979.)
23 1
24 25 l
.