ML19320D566
| ML19320D566 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/25/1980 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1692, NUDOCS 8007210534 | |
| Download: ML19320D566 (56) | |
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EXTREME EXTERNAL PHENOMENA
(
[6 LOS ANGELES, CA NOVEMBER 15-16, 1979 y '@
$ +S ACRS Subcommittee on Extreme External Phenomena held an open meeting on November 15-16, 1979 at the Best Western Airport Park Motel, Los Angeles, CA.
The purpose of this meeting was to con-tinue the Subcommittee review of matters related to the NRC spon-The Seismic Safety sored research on extreme external phenomena.
Margins Research Program (SSMRP) was of particular interest.
Notice of this meeting was published in the Federal Register on A copy of this notice is included as Attachment October 31, 1979.
The schedule A list o'f attendees is included as Attachment B.
A.
Selected portions of for the meeting is included as Attachment C.
the handouts are included as Attachment D.
A complete set of hand-No written statements of outs have been included in the ACRS files.
requests to give oral statements were received from members of the public.
Subcommittee chairman, The meeting was attended by Dr. D. Okrent, Dr. M. Carbon, Dr. J. C. Mark, and Mr. W. Mathis, Subcommittee mem-The ACRS bers; Dr. R. Savio and Dr. T. G. McCreless, ACRS Staff.
Dr. G. Thompson, Dr. S. Philbrick, Dr. S.
consultants present were.
Saunders, Dr. Z. Zudans, Dr. M. White, Dr. T. Pickel, Dr. M. Trifunac, cnd Dr. J. Maxwell.
The meeting was Dr. R. Savio was the Designated Federal Employee.
opened at 8:30 am on November 15 with a short executive session.
The open portion of the meeting on this day extended to 5:30 pm.
A closed session was held between 5:30 pm and 6:30 pm to discuss The subcommittee was matters pertaining to the FY 1981 budget.
reconvened at.0:30 am on November 16 and was adjourned at 6:00 on The discussions of November 16 were held entirely in that day.
open session.
8 0 0 7 21 g _S3y
t EP which would bc ES NTRODUCTION - L. SHAO, NRC-R f the presentations boratory and NRC personnel over Dr. Sheo summarized the soope o discussions S ven by.the Lawrence Livermore Lain addition, he indicat i
the next two days.with Dr. Newmark and Dr. Corna brief review of the st tus i
e the R
ress that had been made s n were schedule Mr. Richardson gave at Rehiew Group.
of the SSMRP program and the prog mittee.
E b tion had NRC lest met with the ACRS Subcomhnique for the SSMRP risk developed.
analysis program had beeni i ted and the that a computational tec been selected and that a systems work project had been in t a t had been ent trees for the Zion Planf fragility expe The load combinations subcontractor work on the evHe also noted that a panel o Group applied statistics Steeringtion mo f
l completed.
been formed and that they had anWork on the best e l
formed.
t goals for the short-term (nex started.
been d to some best estimate analyses an h
Mr. Richardson indicated that t e d
six months) were to perform to evaluate It was the project's intention identify and quantify the uncerta
- models, il structure inter 5ction response with the SSMRP process.
the state-of-the-art on soestAblish suitable s t5blish The projects also intends to es And to determine the Edequacy of t and to for the SSMRP eval $ation. noted that the project's re-the statistic $1 methods
$ny in$dequacy (if it exists) in t d
ing fragility ddt$.
Mr. Richar son d
sources for deEling with to the largest frdgility datE bases are limited.The project, however, wil d
may be initiated.
i data.
extent, on the use of exist ng ths) are to-est$blish s
- models, E
iori-dies,:5nd to estEblish rese rch pr The intermediEte goals (6-9 mon E
It also intended to developintermediate
~
to perform sensiti6ity stu h
e II work and to pro idently in use were dies.
ties based upon these stu program pl$n for the SSMRP Phasadequacy of the methods p recommendations on the
Ns0 15-16, 1979 9
,a 3
EEP Eppro$ch.
It wEs suggested that r5isedas[tothe5deqbdcyofthis i ties to the it would be better to establish bounds on the uncerta n 5blishing of different inputs into the system model prior to estO E
del and a higher systems model.
carried out in this fashion a better systems mo E t of the degree of confidence as to the adequacy of the tre tmen phenomena could be established.
(or lEck of Long term go$1s are to estimate the conservatismsents, to de0elop E
i conservatisms) in the seismic s fety requ remEnd to define qbdnti-5 improved seismic methodology As Appropri te, rall risks associated f
tatively the seismic contribution to the oveRecommend$tions for with the oper$ tion of nuclear reEctors.
l$ tory guides would E
chenges to the stAnddrd review pl n into reguUr. Richardson indic5ted be deheloped $s $ result of this progr$m.
i mic risk in Phase I 5
that it mAy be difficult to qb ntify the se s be associated because of the uncertainties which are expected toThe Subco h t the project's with the evaluation process.
program had been ongoing since July 1978 a r511 risks should be m5de EvdilEile $s soon as possible.
d h
rocess in Mr. Richardson noted th$t there were are s within t e p Edl difficulties.,
which the project expected to encounter unus d
il structure These were in the treatment of the seismic hazar, sodnd design /
inter $ction,structbrdfdamoening,fr5gility,The S i l system degr$d5 tion wobid, in 511 likelihood, present theIt wEs dddition errors.
difficblty in the eh$lu5 tion process.
h le of the by the Subcommittee that the study should address t e rod d
redctor operator End the interaction of a fety gr gr$de equipment.
P. D. SMITH.LLL SEISMIC SAFETY MARGINS RESEARCH PROGRAM He noted Mr. Smith summarized the scope of the SSMRP program.In Phase that the work was divided into three phases.
EEP' hich will be used to perform methodology, is to be developed wi hts into the seismic safety re-
~
d and esti-ssnsitivity studies to gain ins gSome sensitivity studies w l
1 quirements.will be made of the probability o f earthquake levels.
I It lity of radioactive releases over range ofor changes in the licensing mates I
is intended that some' recommendations In Phase II, the methodology process should result from Phase I.from Phase ervatism of the standard review' plan safety requiremen f a need for this is indicate ts.
oted to' develop improved methodology iThis improved method d to f conservatism and to refine the seism by the Phase I studies.
In Phase III, the improved methodology
. refine the estimates o tribution to reactor risk.
develop recommendations as to changes from Phase II will be,used to i istic safety requirements.
in the standard review plan determ n d to date has identified Mr. Smith indicated that the work performewhich the NR rvative The e conservatisms.
in some areas in h
and have produced estimates of some of t es60 synthetic response use of the Regulatory Guide 1.
i t ries, using one dimensional compared to the use of real-time h s oIt was concluded that the Regu cnd three dimensional analyses.
ould be conservative in an dy the tory Guide 160 said that spectrum w Mr. Smith stated th$t for model pl nt stuO.lgw overall sense.
10% increase in relia-probakilityofd$mageattheSSEofIncreasing t h
Other
.It was noted that only t e ting the reliEbility.
seismic event wEs considered in compu uch as the increased proba-bility.
i effects which might reduce reliabil ty s not inicuded.
bility of failure due to thermal cycling were RNREUTER, LLL SSMRP PROJECT 2-SEISMIC INPUT - D. L. BEify the earthqu
. The objective of Project 2 was to quantThe Zion site was used in at the Zion Nuclear Power Plant site.
Nav 15-16, 1979
-a-EEP.
The studies the Lawrence Livermore studies as a plant model.
linking earthquake hazard model/ studies were reviewed in this phase of.the work.
The major sources of uncertainty which were identified were the uncertainty in the knowledge of the local structure near the site, the incompleteness of the available data, l
and possible systematic differences which might exist when informa-t tion obtdined from studies of the western earthqudkes is Applied to l
earthquakes in the Eastern U. S.
The special treatment of the input would c$use uncertainties in the tre5tment of soil structure interE A survey of expert opinions will be used to help evaluate the The members on this panel are listed uncertainties in the process.
on page 1 of Attachment D.
A correlation describing the earthquake hazard at the site has been developed and a description of the method used is given on page 2 It is noted that the model intermixes data ob-of Attachment D.
tained from a few earthquakes from the tectonic region containing the Zion site, and correlations obtained from intermixing measure-ment made in the Western and Eastern United States.
In attempt to address these problems as well as the overAll relation-ship between the earthquake source parameters and ground motion, the The project will attempt to model the basic earthquake mechanics.
most ambitious of these models will account for dynamic and static and width of the rupture, the ruptbre stress drop, the length velocity, the depth of focus, and the structures surrounding the Site correction factors are obtained through SHAKE type break.
analysis, from data obtained from measurements at similar sites, from computer models, and from data obtained in the Enderground LLL is currently reviewing the results-of their nuclear tests.
expert opinion survey.
A sampling of the results is given on page 3 of Attachment D.
Nov 15-16, 1979
. ATIONAL PROCEDURE - G. WELLS, LLL fEP SSMRP PROJECT 7 - SYSTEMS ANALYSIS COMPUT dure used in their systems Mr. Wells described the computational proceThe procedure
/
cnclysis co'de (SEISIM). flexible computational procedure i
The tor seismic safety.
importance of the various contributions to reach are outlined on pa key elements to the comput$tional approac l
Attachment D.
analysis in seismic i
The treatment of the transfer function /dynam cthis computational pro i
was o major decision point in sett ng up(1) to use transfer fEnctions as Two methods were considered: lysis in SEISIM and (2) to use i
to SEISIM and to perform a dynam c ana dynamic analysis to SEISIM and not to perform any dis-response input Values and disadvantages to both approaches are The response approach was within SEISIM.
cussed on pages 5-10 of Attachment _D.
In making this decision, ach.
selected over the transfer function approbility of the response o great deal of weight was given to the capafu The overview of i
the SEISIM c51culational procedure ment D.
ODEL AND SENSITIVITY SSMRP PROJECT 7 - SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OUTPU itivity Andlysis ANALYSIS - L. GEORGE, LLL Mr. George discussed the output model and sensThe sensitivity of d
segments of the systems analysis proce ure. input parameters will be the vario$s accident sequences to t e f about the nominEl v51ves h
obtAined by perturbing the input valves oIt was noted that this in obtaining sensitivity relationship.5 basis for extrEpolation 5ery formed and thEt the techniqEe does not provide yond the r5nge in which the calcul tions per ensive.
The results process was somewhat time consuming an i
ities for the SSMRP Phase II work.
'~
HE RESPONSE COMPUTATIONS PROJECT 3-5 OVERVIEW OF T of the response hMRP i
s I
k JOHNSON, LLL o0erview of the ediculat onMr. Johnson noted l
w$s of the 3
SEISIM code.
an$1ysis l7.Jchnsongaveanwhich are input into the 511 dynamic edicu-I factors work performed to date,will be tredted in futureused to max a
that in the Non-linear behavior k
d will be major sources of uncer-Bincer type. Time history analysis has an masking it by the of the allows the inclusioncalculations rather than 1ctions.
This sxtent.
h tointy directed in t e which will use-of other methods.
cElculations d will perform Soil structure d time histories. response The programs being developeresponses from will be interaction, structural responEffective uncertdinty willsoil obtcin 5
The is responses v$riations in time histor e,onse, and subsystem c51culated.
por5 meters, structur 1 respApplied to the Zio liedble to random pplic$ tion and will be appcode wil bility methodology will be unique to this p$rticular aThe an$1ysis for the soil strucwill also have the of plants.
capa-o general class of using the CLASS 1-type and supporting soil in three,
The code cnd major structural response.
of bility of modeling the struc u il by horizontal IEyerswork compari-t res dimensions and representing the so It is expected that in this il struc-SSI, FLUSH, And non-linear soTh viscoelastic materials.will be mdde between C are the auxiliary sons sdfety injection, i
es analysis using these techn qu tures interaction l
steam and main water, residual heat remova,tAinment sp selected for i
feedwater, service componentcoolingw$ter, con feedwater systems.
M*
e
Noh 15-1T,1979 ~ -- ~
~8~
x s
EEP.
?
l l
l iS t
DEETlM i
SSMRP - PROJECT 6 - COMPONENT AND STRUCTURAL It. G. DONG, LLL Ur.Dongsummarizedthescopeoftheworkde51ingwithcomponent A work p1En is summarized on page 17 and structur$1 fragilities.The work is directed towards gEthering fragi of Attachment D.
Expert opinion data End andlyzing it in a systematic fEshion.
will be utilized to provide whet is expected to be a judgmental evaluation.
D.
the members of this panel are listed on page 18 of Attachment Some preliminary work has been done on the application of the Zion summ$ry of some of this work is given on pEges 19-25 An increEsed-dEt$ base of fragility relEted in-p1Ent.
A of Attachment D.
formation is being develope 6.
The NRC's data gathering system, literature seErches, militEry And foreign dEta banks, End inform tion obtained from participants in the expert opinion pool have been utilized.
i
~
~
N E 15-16, 1979.
,,y.
EEP Elso being En51yzed.
Earthqu5ke damage surveillance reports are 978 earthqudke, The event.s to be studied are the JEp$n, June 1thquake, the Santa B the San Fernando, February 9, 1971 earearthquake, the 27, 1964 earthquake, August 21, 1978 cnd the Managua, Nicaragua 1972 earthquake. pages 26-27 of Attach-I of information being reviewed are given on.
ment D.
ffort will be devoted to this
-About 10 percent of the SSMRP eThe resources of the to activity.
severely limit any experimental work.
able to evaluate i imum mittee that the LLL work should at the m nil $ble and to provide limits on base might be improved the body of information that is ava its usefulness and guidance to where the data by future work.
NEWMARK AND D. CORNELL PRESENTATICN BY THE SENIOR _ REVIEW GROUP -
ittee and gave Dr. Newmark and Dr. Cornell addressed the Subcomm SSMRP.,
their views on various aspects of the the adequacy of the degree that it was important that SSMRP address d the effectiveness or the of redundancy used in critical systems an He also h llenge.
opplication of the redundancy to the particular c awould have lation techniques and noted that in the SSMRP we l
which could be understood by utilizing ca cuwith by measurement and em others which could only be dealtDr. Newmark felt th h iques I
should be ex$ mined End replaced, when possible,I methods.
techniques.
high levels Dr. Newmark recommended qualification to sufficientlyDr.
to assure equipment integrity.
He also urged more search for weakness in the design procedure.
i iderations attention to the-design margins required by seism c cons d the considera-relative to-the normal operating loads and endorsed operator response tion of an earthquake beyond the' design basis anHe also u as the Japanese have done.
E i
is pr$c-situ testing End qualification End Idrge sc le test ng as tical.
. ~.
N:v 15-16, 197W
~~
EEP liehed thE; the SSMRP w$s making Dr. Cornell indicated that he beDr. Cornell beliehes th$t the Ebility is oecoming of increasing Eery sAtisf$ctory progress.
of the project to utilize expert opinion the correct approach.
ii importance and that the project is util z ngtion of the Phase I work i
He indicated that pressures for the red rec should be kept to $ minimum.
~
SING, LLL SUBJECTIVE INPUTS FOR THE SSMRP - R. MEN system $ tic selection k
Mr. Mensing summarized LLL's ef fort to ma e aThe 5pproach l of use of expert opinion.
The process appeared to place a good dea 28-30 of Attachment D.,
cmphasis on consensus and peer review.
TREES / FAULT TREE ANALYSIS SSMRP PROJECT 7 - SYSTEMS ANALYSIS EVENT development for the Zion G.E. CUMMINGS, LLL Mr. Cummings discussed the event / fault treeInitiat Y
d fdult trees the computa-The event and fault trees will be input toEvent tr 5n51ysis.
developed.
tional procedures in SEISM.
These event trees include pressureOn the bdsis pages 31-32 of Attachment D.
$nd ATWS transients.
the vessel rupture And a r$nge of LOCA,the systems dre judged to contribut of the prelimin5ry $ndlysi lant subjected to a seismic i
most to the overall risk from the Z on p C power system, service ovent were auxiliary feedwater, emergency Al system, containme 5
$nd the component w$ter systems, ECCS, residudl he t remova injection system, containment fan cooling system,The b$
Mr.
cooling water system.
pages 33 anu 34 of Attachment D. fault tre conclusions summarized or Cummings indic$ted thEt dependencies bet Bound-dant components failed d
ing studies (such as, assuming that re un fut$re.
h simultEneously) would be performed in t e l
\\,
i
Noh 15-16, 1979
. EEP SSMRP SOIL STRUCTURE INTERACTION
--J. JOHNSON. LLL f the progrEm wAs Hr. Johnson indicated that objective of this part ofree field motion to h
to develop transfer function relating to t e A
f the-Ert basendt End.in strEctEre response Utilizing the st te-o -
End Eld be Essessed.
The es-enElysis methods.
sEbstrEctEre and direct method 5pproaches wo$ms will be pert of b
t5blishment of benchm$rk End link p in test progrSens The effect of soil configuration and materials proper-
- this work.
End the effect of wdbe site model.
ties, the effect of strEctEre inter ctions, ddressed.
StEte-of-p$ss5ge End direction will be among the topics aU$riations of grob the-Art description of speciEl ctural response.
t used to assess the effect of wave passage on s ru 1
L SSMRP STRUCTURAL BUILDING RESPONSE - J. JOHNSON, LL l
is techniques
-hr. Johnson indicated that the state-of-the-art ana ysThe modeling of for major structural response is being reviewed.
Elu$ted and the structures and dynamic response methods will be evEnd an estimEtion sources of Encertainty will be identifiedThe work shoEld lead to recomme 2
E to be used their effects on the end prod ct.
dation-of appropriate techniques for modeling of str The effects of dampening in the Ph$se 1 work.
cwarded contracts for performing this work.
i aluation.
cnd impact between structures will be included in th s ev containment t
The Zion plant will~be used as the model and the reac orEilding in shell (prestressed concrete), the reactor b bine building complex (reinforced concrete), and the auxiliary-fuel-tur (reinforced concrete / steel fr$me) will be analyzed.
SENSITIVITY SSMRP MODELS FOR STRUCTURAL RESPONSE CO STUDIES - T. Y. LO. LLL d that the reactor Mr. Lo summarized the scope of this work and indicate b
bi building com-bEilding, the crib hoEse, End the EuxiliEry-f el-t rb neModeling co plex at the Zion plant would be used in this study.
x
Noh 15-16, 1979 EEP sitivity crations and structural sites would be evdlbated in f
E
/
cnhlysis.
E D.
structures'Ere gihen on pages 35-37 of Att chment
, d the lump-mass model will be used for the conta Ai Elysis a
i ent and auxiliary-models for the internal structure of the conta nm fuel-turbine building complex.
SSMRP - SUBSYSTEM RESPONSE - J. JOHNSON, LLL to develop
-Mr. Johnson indicated that the scope of this work wasa the main structu i
response input parameters for the equipment w tfrom the main structures.
which could be treated as being decoupled d
End desess-This work will incibde A rehiew of the existing metho sADAC And EnElysis.
m2nt of their Edeqbacy for Use in the SSMRP f the current NSC/QUQDREX have been awarded contracts fo st5te-of-the-Art.
LL.
The have been received and are currently being reviewed by Ld fragilit methodology will be applied to the Zion plant an h
response to cssigned to the subsystems which are consistent with t eThe pilo sEbsytems dre sbbjected.
,i t and the steam which these the main feedwater piping between the conta nmenf the pipe sbpport gener$ tor $nd will incibde a det$iled modeling o rt system.
system and will treat non-linear behavior of the suppo t tion level.
Fragility parameters will be allowed to vary with expec a IPING SYSTEMS,
SSMRP PROJECT 5 SUBSYSTEM RESPONSE - SAF feedwater,.ser-T. Y. CHUANG, LLL Mr. Chb 5ng indicated ch5t the Zion analysis auxiliary l nt compo-vice wEter, resided 1 heat remov$1, s$fety injection, coo a d
End nent wEter, containment spray. main steEm End m$in feedw ter, d
The sensi-Ye$ctor cool $nt piping h5d been selected for 5n lysis.
E EEludted.
tihity of the resbits to model And fragility inp t will be e
Nov 15-16, 1979
, $EP is For additional details, a complete transcript of the meeting oveilable in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Public Document 20555, or from
' Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.
Inc., 444 North Capitol Street, N. W.,
Ace Federal Report, Washington, D. C.
e
' " = ~ ' ' -, -,
I Federal Register / Vol. 44, No. 212 / Wr dnnday. Octtber 31.19~9 / Natir 9
)
members af the NRC St:ff.For the NUCLEAR REGULATORY reason just stated. a discussion would nents and discussions. Written COMMISSION not be possible if held in public session, nints m:y be submlited before or I have determined. therefore, that it la 2ch session.
Advisory Committee on Reactor necessary to close portions of this ditiin:!inftrmation conceming Safeguards, Subcommittee on neetina may be obtained through Extreme Externat Phenomena; Meeting meeting to present frustration of this aspect of the ACRS' statutory
,ommittee's Executive Director, Mr.
The ACRS Subcommittee on Extreme nsponsibilities.in accordance with W.Connolly, whose mailins bas is: Nstirnal Advisory External Phenomena wi!! hold a meeting Exemption 9;b) to the Government la the taittre en Oceans and Atmosphere, on November 15-10.197W at the Best Sunshme Act(552b(c)(9)(B. Westem Airport Park Hotel.600 Avenue Fu-ther information regarding topica
- Whitehaven Street NW.(Suite 438.
- Buildmg No. 2). Washington. D.C..
of Champions. Inslewood.CA to discuss to be discussed. whether the meeting the NRC sponsored General Reactor has been cancelled or rescheduled, the 6 The telephone number is (202) Safety Research Programs with the Chairman's ru!ms on requests for the Q18. emphasis on the Seismic Safety Margins opportunity to present oral statements t:d. Oct:ber 2s.lers, Research Program. Notice of this and the time allotted therefore can be l ' W Cosmot! meeting was publisl.ed October 18,1979 obtained by a prepaid telephone call to t (44 FR 60178). the Designated Federal Employee for >,jh oj"C' In accordance with the procedures this meeting. Dr. Richard P. Savio a outlit*.ed in the Federal Register on (telephone 202/634-3267) between 8:15 - October 1.1979 (44 FR 50403). oral or a.m. and 5:00 p.m., EST. wntten statements may be presented by Dated October 25,197s. members of the pub 3c. recordings will h0N AL COMM!SSION ON THEbe permitted cnly during those portions John C Hoyle. [ /ERNATIONAL YEAR OF THE of the meetmg when a transcript is being Adrisory Committee Management Officer. pLD,1979 kept, and quest: ens may be asked only,m m u m,,, 8 by members of the Subcommittee,its m,,,,,,, g a 9 consultants. and Staff. Persons desiring ntnati:nal Year of the Child 1979. the Designated Federal Employee as far Financial Protection Requirements and f National Commission on the to make oral statements should notify pMCv: in advance as practicable so that jndemnity Agreements;Datermination c* hon: Notice of meeting. appropriate arrengements can be made of Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence C Huamv:This notice announces the to allow the necessary time during the The Commission recently extended Nhe: ming meeting of the National l f ^", f fh$ o ee n T 6' } 'r antilthe conclusion ofbusiness each usjy 3 1 pe u n g { $.o endations to be includedin the Deted at Washington.D.C. thin 24th day of C. th doy. sport t) the President.This document is he Subcommittee may meet in October.1e7s. A l litended 13 totify the general public of Executive Session. with any ofits For the Commission. la opportunity to attend: e nsultants who may be present, to SamuelI. milk, explore and exchange their preliminary @Tss:N:vember 12-13.1979-opinions regardmg matters which should seentary of the coeuruss/on. 'I bas: Wingspread Conference be considered during the meeting and to y,o. m w, ,aen W I Center,Racine.Wiscensin. formulate a report and oo.c y,, Di pusman euromenation cowTacT: recommendations to the full Committee. pc es B.Mberts. Executive Officer,600 At the conclusion of the Executive IDocket No. 60-150
- Strest. N.W., Suite 505. Washington. Session the Subcommittee willhear p
presentations by and hold discussions Consu aP desuance of ,n, t D.C. 20471,(202) 37th2435. Sinco conference facilities are in great with representatives of the NRC Staff, ndment to Facility Operating desnand, we must know the number of and their consultants, pertinent to the toc general public who plan to attend in above topics. ne U.S. Nuclear Regulatory erder 13 cllocate adequate space for the The Subcommittee wi!! be considering Commission (the Commission)has Cc saeetmg.N tice of persons from the Portions of the budget and program of issued Amendment No.29 to Facility Ar* poner:1 public who plan to attend must the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Operating License No.DPR-4, issued to Uc se in wnting and be received by the Research.Since the NRC budget Consumers Power Company (the Executive Officer of the National Proposals are now part of the Ecensee).which revised Technical .g Commission (at the above address) by President's budget--not yet submitted to Specifications for operation of the Bil 'Co[- alose cfbusiness November 5,2sts. Congress--public disclosure of Rock Point Plant,(the facility) located in g, ' Such notice of intent to attend abould budgetary information is not permitted. Charlevoix County, Michigan.The o. loclude the address and telephone See OMB Circular *A-10.The ACRS. amendment la effective as ofits date'ef Ch member of the person. however,is required by Section 5 of the lict
- issuance, james B. Roberts, 1978 NRC Authorization Act to review he amendment modifies the gp,
, g,ey:f,e Ohr.Wwealm the NRC recesrch program and budget technical Specifications to incorporate a pg sheInt;rnacons/ YeareftheChiE and report the results of the review to procedure for reactor startup la the Cc; Congress. In order to perform this event ns utron source strength is below w' (g, mum, review,the ACRS must be able to that which provides the currently .t o% engage in frank discussion with S O I ATTACHMENT A
ATIENDEES LISI IRC Staff ACRS Mer:bers L. L. Beratan, OSD D. Okrent, Qicirman S. Brococci, OSD 'M. Carbon F. Schauer, DSS h [d J. C. Mark J. Knight, DSS W. Mathis G. Bachgi, RES C. P. Tan, DSS ACRS Staff R. Savio, Designated Federal Frployee
- f. Richardson T. G. McCreless Miscellaneous ACRS Consultants J. Malthan, Agbabian, Associates U. h sm S. S:rxxnan, J. H..Wiggins S. Philirick T. K. Hasselman, J. H. Wiggins S. Saunders Z. Zudans M. White T. Pickel M. Trifunac J. Maxwell Imrence Livernere labs D. Arthur C. K. 01ou J. J. Johnson G. L. Goudreau T. Y. la T. Y. Chuang B. Benda F. M. Gilman R. G. Dong G. E. Cunrings L. George J. Wells D. Bemreuter R. W. Mensing F. J. Tokarz R. J. Wasley ATTACHMENT B
' SCHEDULE FOR NOVEMBER 15-16, 1979 EXTREME EXTERNAL PHENOMENA SUBCOMMITTEE LOS ANGELES, CA THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1979 15 min Executive Session 15 min '8:30 - 8:45 Introduction - J. Richardson 30 min 8:45 - 9:00 Overview P. Smith I hour 9:00 - 9:30 NRC Goals, Short Term and Long Term 9:30 - 10:30 J. Richardson Relative Importance of the Various ContributionsI hour 10:30 - 11:30 to Seismic Gisk 30 min Project I, Plant / Site Selection - C. Chou 11:30 - 12:00 12:00 - 1:00 Lunch 14 hours Project II, Seismic Input - D. Bernreuter 1 hours 1:00 - 2:30 Project III, Scil Structure / Interaction 2:30 - 4:00, J. Johnson lh hours Project IV, Structural Boilding Response 4:00 - 5:30 T. Y. Lo I hours Status of GRSR Programs ((CLOSE0 SESSION, 5:30 - 7:00 Exemption 9) - L. Shao FRIDAY. NOVEMBER 16, 1979 30 min Executive Session 2 hours 8:30 - 9:00 Discussions with the Senior Review Group 14 hours 9:00 - 11:00-Project V, Subsystem Response - J. Johnson 11: 00 - 12:30 12:30 - 1:30 Lunch I hour Project VI-Fragility - R. Dong 24 hours 1:30 - 2:30 System Analysis - G. Cummings 30 min 2:30 - 5:00 Summary - P/ Smith & J. Richardson I hour 5:00 - 5:30 Follow-up from January SSMRP meeting and 5:30 - 6:30 concluding discussion with ACRS Subcommittee and ACRS Summary ATTACHMENT C
gular s ur nw g_n%v, C 6 .O 1 f ?. e e i i 4 5 1 e ( ) i l ATTACmENT D i s b ew *rr ><, m - .1
OUR FIRST PANEL DEALING WITH THE 0, VERALL HAZAR CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTE'RN US HAS THE FO PROFESSOR GILBERT A, BOLLINGER DR. EDWARD CHIBURIS DR MICHAEL A. CHINNERY PROFESSOR ROBERT B. HERRMANN 1 DR, RICHARD J. HOLT PROFESSOR OTTO NUTTLI PROFESSOR PAUL W. P0MER0Y PROFESSOR RONALD. STREET PROFESSOR MARC SBAR PROFESSOR NAFI TOKS0Z. h 9
TO DEVELOP A RELATION BETWEEN EARTHOUAKE MA DISTANCE WE FOUND FROM THE DATA FROM THE IN CENTRAL ILLINDIS: 0.4 - 0.005 r - 0.7 log r I -I = S' d 19.s Lia. 3 7e ?) y m AQ WE COMBINED THIS WITH A RELATION BETWEEN ACCELERATION, SITE INTENSITY AND DISTANCE BASED ON WESTERN 0.3 in r In a = 1.8 + 0.6 1 3 AND FROM NUTTLI'S WORK IN THF CENTRAL US - 3.s 41, 2 *b TO GET - 0.003 r - 0.5 in r in a = 0.009 + 1.15 mb MLNE E e =w
I [., l' Il00r. . / i 4 g.. ) i - g t \\ \\ t !cq/f'- / l f- 'p D l r//~ / c-i j,// f fI l/* / t. l/// ,!,b./ l. t l,'I / f i ,? \\ / .. 5/ [/ l' l' / i J \\ b lI;/ ' .y. ~ m t -\\ f \\ ? 6s h , '/ r 1 ,,/, 1 y ~uc ./, a t j W / I //. b I ~',/,t./ t ./ -/ c /i I l f . ///a', / 1 LEGEND / ' /' / / 3 O P / __________-5 - -11 i ~ l. - 7 0.1 -8 -9 ~........____....--------10 I .. s.a.u. 10. 0.01 ; ' ' ' ' '.1 -- 1 0 0.01 P RIOD . DAMPING = 5.0 O_ WMW p
M i' EE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE COMPUTATIONAL APPRb i 1 Non-seismic i
Response
'oad calculation Major Subsystem r Soil structural response r structure Se. m.es ic r . response mput intwaction I Component System l fragilities definition l Non-seismic ' SEISIM load l u I u Probability l Event / fault of release. Component r failure tr e analysis o r Initiating event prob } } l Other failure data i l i d ) A b ^ - - - - - ~ ' - 2 ~-
U INPUT TRANSFER FUNCTIONS Carry out dynamic analysis within overall computational procedure I Seismic Dynamic + Response input calculations a TF Response _ Component failure analysis Prob of release Ewent/ fault a a tree analysis + Failure prob Fragilities a Non-seismic S s em loads definition i ) ./ b
k 4 ^ [] INPUT RESPONSES l No dynamic analysis carried out within overall computational procedure 1 + Prob of release Component Event / fault tree analysis + Failure prob
Response
failure 1 analysis l i r l Non-seismic Fragilities System definition loads (may be i included in response calculation) I y
h 4 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS INPUT TO SEISIM _ g DYNAMIC ANALYSIS IN SEISIM Advantages e Tracking random and modeling uncertainties may be ea e Transfer functions can be developed in parallel l l e. Sensitivity studies may be simpler since all inputs and outputs are contained in SEISIM j 4 + 4 l i ,3 1
l l ,l 1 t e r ll en o t be f d es sr n t e o n r e t a m n e e s ci np ha ei l h jm p e T p. o a o cd r a e n st pf l in ) i s xt ye ny v e e n r s u e e n l d aq e lpio ne w o v M ta mp as t ei t I h o e c eml b a . S )d t u bou cs i I E 't o t s r n s dc c Sn s oo ao e el o r-p e t rba l c O (C a e s e uo i l e pe rb qt s ,l e T l r T M c a n mo e a een c r US u st ni vo I i tMil eap d ( s nI p bhs PI s e l N E nr iiS yp e S oe soI a yd r l I id y pE p al e uc t SN c nl a eS mb moi NI nh nsf nw m i i st a OS u an o T S rb co n o os n I f e I pe o n .it s t sy i C Y ey msemtd a yd i f nl N L sa a cl ias t n u ri U A nmn dn u a ymg u o r ao wP o s FN e tMdon r f i R o sr A g ri r a t oS of n eMMcmv I R a f f g dnfsI S EC e e I rth na mE eeu nS S st l I F M v rS vir aI o yi r rEf S FoLvoTSoMSw of e af N A da AN s RY D e e e i I TD ll l l
- l
\\ ll l\\l l1 R N O x M c r t f o n o i m.i e s r s p d ne n ob ie e e e tl i s l l l f b b p ai w o a a e l iu d u l e al n cs l t p va i al y av s cu t i s ee s ne f bb y or o l dd a dm t l l n n uu a ea e oo dr dla c ng M nr ww a o i ee se m pr IS pnis a x p s I ee e ME dglyh n ee S y r S ne aT d eo I r n bm i N e I EI do aM l l l SS emicI p d i OS oe mS m wn p I a I i t b l iE s ry s TY e orR vd eS r L el s o f t f f sR TA duf o d e u oo mdN UN bws n e e l n PA t o aio ia N nd l i C an ut t r t go eMot se I e ca el I .dI s S s pR M e s r rru oS SA g Mi pa E mRdE I l it s a a l I eic t Slyio N N '_ t cN nS ome r n a r I r O Y-v SaPtt a En af ai PD aooCoMfd d SEO A e e e RN Il \\llll ,\\ l i l l4{ ,i
x O q RESPONSES INPUT TO SEISIM NO DYNAMIC ANALYSIS IN SEISIM (Cont'd). g l Disadvantages e Handling of modeling uncertainty, except in fragilities and seismic input may be more difficult l e Correlation relationships and input data. identification are needed with response inputs e A number of response data sets will be needed to study i the effect of modeling and input variable uncertainties 1 o Calculations have to be carried out sequentially .~ ~ /o
l _g SEISIM OVERVIEW l ( Operation 4 -input > c ( Start ) i r Vector of response e Determine seismic statistics for each earthquake and non-seismic definition induced failure of structural elements and system [ Fragility functions [ components o e Determine occurrence / of initiating events / System failure log. /: ic e Determine states or failure probabilities of engineered safety features e Calculate radioactive / release probabilities / Logicaldescriptionof event sequences f Sensitivity analysis L. i t ( Stop )
7_ _, TYPICAL RESPONSE INPUT VECTOR E s Peak acceleration p ....f, Spectral shape parameter p Probability of occurrence $~ t ~ A Characters identifying properties 2 A or attributes of this particular 3 response vector Pr3 ~
- '2 Mean peak responses
~
- '3 a
l Org r2 Standard deviation of a peak response o, r u .2-- o
- 12
- 13 Correlation coefficients p,,
' T g s l 9 l D o A t 4 w-
COMPONENT / STRUCTURAL FAILURE 3 COMPUTATION AL OVERVIEW ) ( Start + Input peak seismic response levels 8 Y Input fragility functions for failures on structure and at system components k Compute structure failure probabilities Y Compute component failure probabilities seismic + operating loads k Compute component failure probabilities seismic + operating + i seismically induced non seismic loads Y (sutput structurd and component failurs probabilities j ( stop 1 8
ACCIDENT SEQUENCE COMPUTATION OVERVIEW g 7) F I Start L S Input structural system location and component failure probabilities Y Compute states or probabilities of initiating events V I Computs states or failure probabilities of engineered safety features j u Calculate accident sequence probabilities n r-Output probability of release histogram and accident sequence probabilities ( Stop )I \\+ 1 i
SIMPLIFIED ACCIDENT SEQUENCE COMP g. (PROBABILISTIC MODEL) ( Sun ji 4 Array of structural location and component failure probabilities h IE probability Compute IE point estimate for probability. Repeat for each seismic event all IEs in IE hierarchy. ~ } ESF failure probability Compute ESF failure point est,imates for probability. Repeat for each IE and se,ismic all ESFs given each IE event 4 Accident sequence pro-Calculate accident sequence bability po).it estimates for probabilities. Repeat for each IE and seismic event all IEs in IE hierarchy, h Generate histogram of release probability for each release category. Repeat for all IEs in IE hierarchy k ( Stop ) l5 e ,,...,_.,..,,,m,,,.--..,,,,,n-,._ e,....,,,-,,
SIMPLIFIED ACCIDENT SEQUENCE COMPUTATIO J @ BINARY MODEL) E7 "' 'id'*: J ( Stort ) lE = Initis'.ing event I ESF = Engineered asfoty festure Arrey of structural loeotion and component feiture probabilities '**'I Monte Carlo triels g _ [ Loestion failure probability Compute locumon siste and storej 7 poic' ' metes for each .oc event' Repest for alllocetions. l / s M Compute IE state and stors "lF" first failure sentinue "ELSE" go to repost for all IEs 5 / ESF component failure Compute seste of d probability point ESF somponent and store. Repest for ei! relevant / estimets for each seismic event
- components.
_/ t Generate occident sequence and store ~~ r I j lE failure probability j F Repest_l For est IEs / point estimets for and in IE hierartery seismic event' / Repest iFoe oli unnte Certo triels t Sum like escadert sequenos [ gg g N *
- '".P"" M probability point estimate 7
for each seismic event', t ^ ~ Generate histogram of 'Tha N nt estimates, con be encumulated in release probabilities for i each release category. hisw form to produm distributions of Repest for all (Es in foliare probability and conditional feifure IE hierarchy probabilities as functions of various g earth wake parameters (e.g., peak secolaretson). ( Stop } Ib
.l ,/f I b5 ( Ia !l l g j g' l l gjIl Il ll lll g!gi M r s fo t l t n i n t e v 9 ne s nn s 8 neom k o yi m e a ipot o e s yi m p t t peu k t pms T t v s t i l p v i rl c p a i io oa gc e i rl c v as v u l T gc e s r d I r eet ewr as o n Fdds o. rFddf a e s t_ a m. .r g t ,n u,,s s t i isy u w s t t a n u n a. A u ed g p nn y n f s v 7 o n oas s i u m o c k n ip,e s oytpmsmt y m s. c a t i r i I v a u t o s I T i i io I l t s ,r y c ec i i r cl r e o i ic t u S S s s egs r s V a eoyt y r le e@oQ Sfrdf s s g I ,3 d n n s o n a nt i o o n t s ie a s t t t n 6 nef e v i 5 a n a ir or o k i mlu u k nef a z p s s o, i a ml s,seom T eadu t ir v r a ri e c s u t f epe or T a d, n 'v o i r ' c ef e o Domt f t s ef ' e Domgoy'r S s n v K S A d e t T a n l 4 e o E n r g i dt t o yan mi v n N ino goh t T i i i pt r I a ot af N t, i Fip r n c . ai l F _ po V as ! l I i ]l ,o I O _E ill lll1 lll t ,leillil . u e S q t p t n e d h i_ i i T d n s n a a e* oi ,S u r o S u v ,n i ht ot v cdn'd ga S I 2 t cc en e nmS S d.t e b s j i = e, N V ia b .n .n u N t v Td s' 8 i ieP s e nigt H .r S u n ah O A' n*9 a e e ts C T -l CE n J d o i n t O s a 1 a e c s r i R d1 mti uf P T ntect u n os e r ytd i E Zs si H T_ ~ I' b ,l f ,lI! e l
WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A PANEL TO AS _g IN THE DETERMINATION OF FRAGILITIES Battelle Pacific Northwest Lab. Spencer H. Bush Engineering Decision Analysis Corp. Robert P. Kennedy Wyle Laboratories George D. Shipway Woodward-Clyde Consultants John D. Stevenson Failure Analysis Associates Jerrell M. Thomas Westinghouse Electric Corp. i Peter P. Zemanick i ) \\ f d
i PRELIMINARY FAILURE MODES FOR COMPONENTS g Governeng
- Sessaus Eise/shaps Primary
's' -- hv T Ai Generic Laceteen of feiaure failure fadwo st.widard method equipment anode seode seede l component in Function code or squalifecanon f. or subsystem plant NSSS criteria Cyiendrical assemWy of Crusheng of Bending of Core support g,,,,,,,,,, assemWy ASME sec. lia Analysis plus fuel rods and incemeens core conteenment Heat power for support.
- mt of fuel cenarel rods fuel pin yid -
control red structure drives festoners surrounded by spacers. i supports, fuel haalding soutes NSSS criterie l ami control red ior fuel and core support e L d anseheses control rods structure l Large, vertical, Nozale/ pipe Reactor coolant Contaamnant haenment ASME sec. ill Analyses cylindrical, weld in presence Vessel supports system vessels 'I heavy wag of flaw (RPV,SG and L a L I l ANSI B31.1 Continuous 3D Component Coolant g. N t t t Primary coolant g beam aT 7 ASME sec. til system pipeng Butt walds in ANSI 831.1 Continuous 3D Component presence o aws Largo diameter Containment. Coolant Analysis suppens
- tseaer, piping,8in, euxiliary and boundary Mmm and greater tuebine bide.
Fabricated Compeent Buu web h f intermediate Contamment Coolant Analysis branch supports (welded peesence of ANSI B31.1 Continuous 30 l diameter pepmg and auxiliary bound 8'Y ASME sec. til connections L to pipisiel .L flaws L 8'" 21/2 8 in. building Fabricated Component supporis (welded ANSI 831.1 Continuous 3D Socket welds
- branci, Small deemster Containment Coolant Analysis l
2 in* and auxinary boundary ASME sec. lit L connections L to piping ( h* ** y buskiing 4 Asw icable to Zim Preliminary Opinion on Fragility Parametess o Stress L Load s Acceleration a rw.amemment
g PRELIMINARY FAILURE MODES FOR COMPONE 1 ~i Tertiesy 1 s-- 3 Primary faihase Siae/ shape failwe sposte overning ' Seismic faduro M of G uahlication snede hi* Lecanon code or ag sneched espugument compemens g, - Function saanslerd natie,y er plases Es.ctrical Rack /busideng None Back sneuntad todisse Emergency DC e d Auxiliary L g hueldens power source IEEE 323 8"'8
- winessaneous j stesicadargers)
- i'*t' "i Transformers, Equipment TWm wW elays, breakws, was feelure None r
Emergency AC Analysis and e k. maman W h a e
- "I'*8 east racks et consolos L
A y,;ggery N ^'F syseesne ' IEEE 323 en ES and 344 Switch gear tiudding Hack f ailure tracW Mascellaneous None Primarily rack Failure of (local or at 88'**** *** snosot control
- "".ed electrical rack /buddung t
- sonters, Elect. control Analysis and elecincal Imtion interlm) matsument tacks, 3,, ggg"
""d gg equipment H and V and AC csh enstrumentation en a&d centsois, aus, for ESF systems IEEE 323 L relay cabmets, analW a Electrical breakw panels, Emtornal internal connection,sg, local Compact mapport g supports t instruments Test rigad AC-DC power E 323 NW Auxillary Miscellaneous I'"** buiadans conversion Lccal hPl*" AISC Beam-like steel anotion d supports L Amdyus structures L Allbulldmes 7,,,,g AlSC g,pp,,g j,;,g Cable trays cables Beun-like j,;,, g,g,. dg Analysis structuses y, Channel vital AISC wentilation and - with then walls dj . _L ; Containment, AISC d aundlery an coohne air Ducting turbine badgs l
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ELEVEN FAILURE MODES ARE IDENTIFIED FOR _[] THE TURBINE-AUXILI ARY BUILDING Failure of turbine building roef bracing system (element, gusset pla or bolt failure) - transfer of inertial loads to out of plane wall 1.
- 2. Yielding or buckling of columns between the turbine and auxiliar building -collapse of roof
- 3. Loss of the turbine building vertical braced frame systems (elem gusset plate, or bolt failure) - column bucking and collapse Column anchor bolt failure under combined shear and t 4.
loss of lateral load transfer capacity
- 5. Auxiliary building concrete slab roof diaphragm failure (shear fa of the slab or failure of shear transfer to collector beams)
- 6. Auxiliary building roof truss failure (shear failure of bolts, membe gusset plate failure)
Failure of composite wall between turbine and auxiliary building (failure of shear studs or crushing of concrete) - transfer of load 7. to braced frame
- 8. Auxiliary building shear wall failures (shear failure across a co joint, shear failure across a plastic hinge joint, flexural failure) transfer of load to braced frame
- 9. Auxiliary building vertical braced frame failure (shear failure of gusset plate failure, element frailure) -loss of lateral support eventual collapse Plastic hinge of roof girder - partial collapse of roof 10.
- 11. Out-of plane bending and collapse of one foot thick walls aro'u control room and oth, r critical equipment o.3 b
V 3. TWELVE FAILURE MODES ARE IDENTIFIED FOR THE E5 CONTAINMENT BUILDING ~ Shear and diagonal tension cracks in the containment vessel 1. Crushing and spalling of concrete in the vessel wall 2. Yielding and failure of the reinforcing steel and loss of prestress 3. Gross shear failure due to loss of dowel action and aggregate interloc 4. 5. Axial shear failure along buttress plates 6. Buckling of vessel wall Shear failure in the foundation slab due to uplift 7. l Failure of a tendon gallery wall and collapse of gallery 8. Shear failure of concrete internal structure anchor bolts at line i 9. f interface Shear failure of internal structure ring and shield walls I 10. Failure of the concrete structure enclosing the pressurizer 11. Failure resulting from impact of adjacent structures or equipment 12. O e G
NINE FAILURE MODES ARE IDENTIFIED FOR j THE INTAKE STRUCTURE (CRIB HOUSE) Longitudinal guide wall failure from shear failure, flexural failure, 1. or concrete crushing from out of plane response
- 2. Operating floor diaphragm failure from shear failure of slab initiating from cut outs or failure of shear transfer to walls
- 3. Service water pump enclosure failure from loss of roof diaphragm due to shear failure at roof-shear wall junction or initiating from cut-outs - flexural failure and collapse of out-of plane walls 4.
Failure of north and south shear walls -loss of lateral support - flexural failure and collapse of out-of-plane walls Failure of concrete walls at the intake end of the structure 5. to out of plane bending - partial flow blockage Failure of concrete strut in open area from combined axial 6. compression and biaxial bending -loss of north and south foundation walls from excess lateral soil pressure
- 7. Tensile, shear, or buckling failure of underground pipes due to relative motion of structure Failure of masonry block walls due to rigid body rocking 8.
and collapse
- 9. Collapse of roof top trolley frame due to lack of E-W Iateral bracing
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I B 9 RTS EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE SURVEILLANCE REPO I Empesionwa f I I i f 1 failure Comments (~ Fait us needes Mae ZPA pescent Telei eoneconapany d Sa Desages basss (lessiseld) Hack an insestace SCE subssensen 2PA and spect Sagndicant fa kne sic.(1) Event Component USC (0Ja. static) 0.36e UCSBI4) 7 ) San Fernando a DC pouser Ibetteries, Feb.9,1971 Significar.: Telephone ca. SCE Racks 7 senergers, etc.) 0.4g Racks, interface m m, g ggg USC Saunalacan b) Santa Basbara Substasson equipment , 0.350 el San Feenando UBC Racks. inteslace Subasatenes equipenent Sunices gear F eb.9.1971 -0 4a Racks,insesface USC Telei ione a SCE d b) Santa Beebesa._ 7 ,ognug,,,, 0.2Sg c) Mayagi Ken Oki 0 - 0.3Sv UCS8 basaldings H al San Form UBC _ Contsol centers 0 I ' O.4 g will mounsad (U*' X 18" x 24") -b) Santa Basbase Floor mounted Sevesel substation (36" x 18" x 24") -Several selays. tripping. Anchos s, r.u.ks fedusas _ Emergency deesel typesand ? etc. generators 0.15 to 0.4g modes -Anthe s. e acks Sevesat substatsons a) Sen Fwnendo 02g static - Sevesal sclays, tsquieng.' faeluses Substation s f,2s and ) J espapment
- lC-ki 0.259 88Hkl*5 b) Meyegi Keno
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APPROACH TAKEN BY THE SSMRP WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF JOINT WITH NRC, COMMITTEE FORMED TO GUIDE THE SSMRP IN USE OF ~ } 1. SUBJECTIVE INPUTS (SCSD RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SSMRP 3 e A (r USE THE SERVICES OF SEVERAL CONSULTANTS TO ASSIST 2, ELICITATION, EVALUATION, USE AND VALIDATION OF EXPERT OPINIONS 3. INVESTIGATE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ELICITING, EVALUATING, WEIGHTING, AGGREGATING, ETC. EXPERT OPINIONS l 4. ENCOURAGE FURTHER RESEARCH I 1 1 .a B
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STEERING COMMITTEE.ON SUBJECTIVE INPUTS FOR THE SSMRP MEMBERS: . R. MENSING, LLL, CHAIRMAN D. CHUNG, LLL, SECRETARY P. SMITH, LLL L. ABRAMSON, NRC R. BRAZEE, NRC J. BURNS, NRC B. VESELEY, NRC DR. T. FINE, CORNELL UNIVERSITY CONSULTANTS: DR. R. KEENEY, WOODWARD-CLYDE DR. P. MORRIS, APPLIED DECISION ANALYSIS DR. A. MURPHY, OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY D. RUBINSTEIN, NRC DR. D. VENEZIANO, M.I.T. k e g
.SOME CONCLUSIONS 1. USF OF EXPERT OPINIONS IS & COMPLEX ISSUE THERE DOES NOT SEEN TO BE ANYBEST' METHOD FOR ELICITING, EVALU 2. ETC. OF EXPERT OPINIONS. DIVERSITY OF OPINIONS SHOULD 3. CONSENSUS MAY NOT ALWAYS DE THE BEST. BE RETAINED. SMALL GROUP ELICITATIONS USUALLY REALIZE BETTER QUALITY 4. A STUDY OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE OUTPUTS TO THE METH 5. THE DIVERSITY OF OPINIONS BETWEEN EXPERTS IS IMPORTANT 6. RESEARCH ON THE TOPIC SHOULD CONTINUE 4 e e ~
l h l l l MINIMUM LIST OF EVENT TREE INITIATING EVENTS RECOMMENDED ll FOR SSMRP ANALYSIS OF ZION
- 1. Reactor vessel rupture (R)
- A vessel rupture large enough to negate the effectiveness of the ECCS systems required to prevent core melt
- 2. Largqp LOCA (A)
- Rupture of primary coolant piping equivalent to break of a single pipe whose diameter is > 6", i.e., a break of one or more primary system pipes whose total cross-sectional area is > 28.3 square inches
- 3. Medium LOCA (M)
- Rupture of primary coolant piping equivalent to the break of a single pipe whose diameter is < 6" but > 3" a
MINIMUM LIST OF EVENT TREE INITIATING EVENTS RECOMM J FOR SSMRP ANALYSIS OF ZION (Cont'd)
- 4. Small LOCA (S1)
- Rupture of primary coolant piping equivalent to the break of a single pipe whose diameter is <3" but > (~) 1.5"
- 5. Small-small LOCA (S2)
- Rupture of primary coolant piping equivalent to the break of a single pipe whose diameter is <(~) 1.5" but > 0.5"
- 6. Transient (T )
3 - A transient with PCS event is defined as any abnormal condition in the plant which (a) requires that the plant be shut down, (b) does not directly affect the operability of the PCS, and (c) does not qualify as a LOCA or t vessel rupture
- 7. Transient (T )
2 - A transient without PCS event is defined as any abnormal condition in the plant which (a) requires that the plant i,e shut down, (b) causes the PCS to become inoperative, and (c) does not qualify as a LOCA or vessel rupture i .,4 t
lY%) IDENTIFICATION OF ZION UNIT 1 SYSTEMS CONSID.ERED LIKE BE MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO PLANT RISK IN THE SSMRP AN ll!l (ORDER NOT IMPORTANT) 1. Auxiliary feedwater system Basis: a. A 40-foot section of the line from the secondary water (condensate storage tank appears vulnerable to failure of the turbine building. All AFWS pumps require emergency power to operate for extended time. Emergency AC power (diesel generator) system ' 2. Basis: a. The air start system on each diesel is not completely redundant. Two . tanks feed into one unsupported line. b.'There niay be a possibility of the swing diesel being locked-out due to a relay race situation under certain failure conditions
- c. A steam pipe tunnel is located in the vicinity of the diesel fuel tanks 4
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Nvs y IDENTIFICATION OF ZION UNIT 1 SYSTEMS CONSIDERED BE MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO PLANT RISK IN THE SSM g (ORDER NOT IMPORTANT) (Cont'd) 3. Component cooling water system Basis: a. Many manually operated valves in the system
- b. System is generally located in one place in the auxiliary building
- c. System heat exchangers are apparently bolted directly to the have no seismic restraints 4.
Service water system Basis: a. Common header for six service water pumps. Although the described as consisting of two headers with a crosstie, the crosstie i l apparently normally open. 5. Containment spray injection system Basis: a. All three supply lines to the sparger rings in the containment d located with in a 90 sector (approximately) of the containment 1 e -l e 4
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COUPLING BETWEEN NSSS AND INTERNAL STRUCTURE IS L4.;.r/ CONSIDERED BY MODELING THE NSSS WITH THE STRUCTURE ' M. U' ' - ~' Most likely NSSS Seismic Analysis Model SG G:;;el 95.- RCP. o . t: ' O .:;g'.!a":f!$f{TS p$ SG M N-O RCP S Mass point o- ~ 'h! N 5 Support point ~ COL g IM 'i ,j.: j $.f N f1 q O jr,: N j '.k gi ~ '[ COL W II 4 3."l'^.3.yg jT. a. CL l,l ~: il CL -.. : S 4' y, HL [M..f. '3.l f RPV SG HL
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