ML19320C518

Transcript of Commission 800608 Closed Discussion Re Testimony to Be Given 800611 in Washington,Dc.Pp 1-53

ML19320C518
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/08/1980
From:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:
References
REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8007170315
Download: ML19320C518 (55)

Text

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UNITED STATES o

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g

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July 3, 1980 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY COMMISSION DETERMINATION REGARDING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT OF:

Transcript of Testimony to be Given June 11, 1979 June 8, 1979 Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.108(c), the Commission has determined that the attached portions of the subject transcript should be released to the public.

The remaining portions of the transcript are being withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 9.104 as noted below:

Page/Line thru Page/Line Exemption 7/21 7/21 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 26/16 26/21 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (7) 26/24 27/3 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (7) 27/4 27/22 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (4) 30/15 37/25 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 43/17 43/17 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 43/23 43/23 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 44/13 44/13 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 46/21 46/23 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 52/6 52/6 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 2n -

Samuel J.

hilk Se retary of th Commission THis DOCUMENT CONTAINS POOR QUAUTY PAGES 8 0 0 717 03/f a

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s

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IN THE MATTER OF:

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CLOSED MEETING DISCUSSION OF TESTIMONY TO BE GIVEN JUNE 11, 1979 I

Place -Washington, D.

C.

Date. Friday, 8 June 1979 Pages 1-53

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.MELTZER UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CRS327 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r~.

v Closed Meeting DISCUSSION OF TESTIMONY TO BE GIVEN JUNE 11, 1979 Chairman's Conference Room lith Floor 1717 H Street NW Washington, D.C.

Hearing in the above matter was convened at 3:20 p.m., JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chai man, presiding.

PRESENT:

JOSEPH M.

HENDRIE, CHAIRMAN VICTOR GILINSKY, COMMISSIONER JOHN AHEARNE, COMMISSIONER Messrs. Gossick, Dircks, Burnett, Shapar, Case, Pasedag, Davis, Howard, Mu4-len, McComick, Malsch,

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_P _R O._ _C _E E.D _I N G.S il COMMISSIONEF.GILINSKY:

The Chairman said to go ahead without him.

Who'is in charge, Lee?

MR. 'OSSICK:

We just came down with the idea G

that it might be well to gc over the questions, particularly the letter from Chairman Udall, and some rather condensed answers that the staff has put together, and be available to questions and discussions.

Anything that might be helpful to you Monday morning.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

You don't have any testimony?

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MR. DIRCKS:

We might point out, we'/e put these books -- we've got two things, actually, we have prepared.

The short proposed paragraph typed answers to the questions that Chairman Udall raised, we did put together this briefing book which should have been delivered to your offices by new, because I took it down at noontine, and the driver gave it to the secretary at ncentime.

MR. BURNETT:

But just in case they didn' t, we brought scme ext.ra copies.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Do you want to just run through these and give cral answers?

Because the alternative would be for us to simolv all read cuietiv, and there would be nothing to transcribe.

1--2 jwb 3

Why this is a closed :aeeting escapes =e.

COMMISSICNER AHEARNE:

Don': we have to take a vote of some kind?

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Not if there's just the two of us.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Until the time it becomes three.

COlGISSIONER GILINSKY:

The only reason that a transcriber would be here is in case another Co=missioner would want te know what took place here, but that won't be ready before the hearing, anyway.

So I guess there's no reason to be *..ranscribed.

(

(D:.scuss.lon orf the record. )

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Why don't you lay out the bases specifying the level of threat in simple English.

MR. DIRCKS:

Okay, the level of threat is basically -

CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I will pretend to be.

Mr. Weaver, and John can be whoever he wants to be.

(Laughter. )

MR. DIRCKS:

The threat lev.el is basically

' '3 developed by reviewing ongoing studies and reports that have been pl=

ed, plus a

" ose that we've cc==issicned, and we've given some examples of sc=e of these that we

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ha';e ccH ssioned and ha'.'e ongoing.

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In addition to these, we have a whole series of studies that have been done, and Sally nullen has a very comprehensive list, in case someone asks us.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What in fact are the threat levels that apply to -- Are we talking about reactors and fuel cycle facilities?

MR. DIRCKS:

It's going to be both.

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Why don' 'you tell us whether it's the same -- what they are, whether they're the same for both.

MR. DIRCKS:

Well, currently they' re the same.

I guess we don't talk-in numbers, do we?

We talk about a

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determined --

MR. BURNETT:

Several people --

MR. DIRCKS:

One inside.

New the upgrade rule --

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

How do you describe these several people, briefly?

MR. SURNETT:

Well, as you know, just talking between us, it's three and one.

That is the current threat.

COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

Three cu:siders and one inside?

MR. BURNETT:

Yes, sir.

That is the current threat at bcch reactors and fuel cycle --

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Lat ne understand, when

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5 1-4 jwb you say it is three and one, but we describe it as "several"?

MR. BURNETT:

"Several."

CO.W SSIONER GILINSKY:

The reason for describine it that way is not to be sufficiently precise -Jun someone can take advantage of that information?

MR. DIRCKS:- That number is classified.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay.

But in fact when you apply a te= plate to these facilities, that template is basically th:2e persons?

MR. BURNETT:

That's how we review it.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

That's the standard to which you hold them, or that's hcw you prepare ycur criteria?

MR. SURNETT:

That's the summarization.

We also sau=e he's dedicated, well trained, the rest of it.

CC:MISSIONER GILINSKY:

I understand.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Just a question.

The number three, the :. umber one are classified on what grounds?

MR. SURNETT:

It would be because it establishes the threat and the adversary would then know your system is designed --

COMMISSIONER AREARNE:

I would like to knew -- I understand why you'd like to keep it away from it.

I would just like to know technically the grounds.

4 6

1-5 jwb MR. DIRCKS:

I guess that's the number you're prepared to defend.. against.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Is it national security information?

Is it proprietary information?

MR. SEAPAR:

It's got to be national security information.

MR. BURNETT:

3ay Brady is the one that applied that.

He has consistently maintained --

MR. SHAPAR:

It's classified, isn't it?

MR. THOMSON:

3 On the safeguard classification

guide, an threat number which is published in our our regulations is nod classified.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Is that number published in our regulation?

MR. THOMSON':~.'

It's published in the Guide, and published in 73-55.

MR. BURNETT:

There was a time, Bill, sometime ago, that i.t did get published.

Then later it got eliminated.

COMMISSIONER AEIARNE:

Someone ran all over the country cutting it out.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I've never understood it.

101. CASE:

I don't know any legal basis for classi:ying 10.

COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

Howard, do you know anything?

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HR. SEAPAR:

It's got to be detrimental tc the S

national security if it's classified.

There 's no other basis under which it would be classified.

MR, DIRCKS:

We just have to go en the basis of national security.

MR. SHAPAR:

It's a factual question.

It's either classified new, or it's not.

MS. MULLEN:

When the Task Safeguard was meeting this issue arose.

I submitted our justification for threat levels to the Office on 2*aurity and was informed that a ecmbination of study information that led to our dec,ision to define the threat level at a specified threat, plus the threat level information, was a classified confidential piece of data, NSI.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, it would have to be -- the classified part would have to be that it is as lcw as three and one.

If the number were very much higher, you wouldn't. worry about it.

MR. DIRCKS:

I guess it serves as a basis fcr our setting up recuirements of the facilities.

MR. SURNETT:

And never had this i

l problem.

It never got into publication anc has remained i

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c., a s s 1 _c l e c.

(Chairman Hendrie arrived at 3:30 p.m.

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

We never have gotten

8 1-7 jwb past the first question.

CHAIF.AN HENDRIE:

I see.

Was a transcript being taken?

CObaiISSICNE.R GILINSKY:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Okay, I guess we now have to vote, since there are several of us, we have to now vote to hold a meeting on short notice.

Those in favor?

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Aye.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Aye.

CHAIRMAN EENDRII:

So ordered to close it under Exemption 9.

CCMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Which is?

CHAI3 MAN HENDR*E:

Frustration of an agency action.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Aye.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Aye.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

So ordered.

MR. DIRCES:

Question one, we have mentioned that we submitted some draf t answers to the questions that Chairman Udall sent down.

We also mentioned dat we had this notebook prepared.

We got en question one:

What's the basis to setting the threa agains whicP we require (feguards to be taken?

We generally talked about scme studies that we

l-8 jwb 9

have done, plus a review of any outstanding material in the technical literature.

And then we started talking about what's the i

actual threat level.

Anymore on question one?

(No response.)

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Do we have any information that would say we have known of a group that would have wanted ta sabotage a plant -- seriously wanted to sabotage a plant?

MR. BURNETT:

No, sir.

All the data we have evaluated we classify as analogous..

MR. DIRCKS:

I think we've had one or two cases 4

that somebody wanted to --

MR. MC CCRMICK:

One individual.

The guy out in Washin g, Trojan, said he had the dynamite and wanted to blow it to entil.he saw how big it was, and then changed J

his mind.

He claimed it was a group, but the Bureau and Secret Service looked into it and he had no connections with a group.

I COMMISSIONER AREARNE:

Why did he want to do it?

MR. MC CORMICK:

He claimed he was being paid by a group, but he had no --

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Wouldn't your answer be that, while y:n already had one successf ul attempt at sabo: age?

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l-9 jwb 10 MR. DIRCES :

Where?

3 COEiISSIONER AHEARNE:

The Idaho reactor, in the United States.

3 MR. SHAPAR:

You mean the SL-l?

COMMISSIONER A*iEARNE:

Wouldn't that be clearly an example?

MR. SHAPAR:

I was a counsel on the investigating board.

That's not -- there was lots of speculation.

MR. BURIETT :

A man killed himself --

MR. SHAPAR:

-- speculation about fooling around with other people's~ wives, and that kind of thing, but no. conclusion at all that it was sabotage.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Bob, what is the current 15-second characterization of a threat level?

What are we using cur ently?

MR. DI E S:

The current threat level is --

MR. CASE:

73-55, attack by several persens with the following att-ibutes, well trained, military training, dedicated individuals, two inside assistants, attempts to participate either in a passive or an active role, (Inaudible.)

single weapons, et cetera.

COMMISSIONER AHEA2NE:

And that applies both to

-fuel; cycle and -- (Inaudible. ) -- reactors.

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MR. CASE:

They'11 have to speak to their facilities.

Reactors, yes.

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The appl _sii. aill aldra 1.

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That was laid ou MS. MULLEN:

(Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

It was used for the comprehensive evaluation?

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That's right, rima ily, evaluation gg was the th,reat level just described.

CFAIRv.Jd HENDRIE:

Do we have a reactor page?

MR. BURNETT:

Yes, the blue tab in the back.

MR. DIRCES:

And the annual report says that it's the same for both.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Now does it say the bases part of the question -- where did we actually come up with the three and one?

MR. 3URNETT:

It's a judgment of the data, Mr. Commissioner.

The data does not fall out and say the threat is anything.

All you can do is look at it.

It gives you the historical -- as I say, analogous information.

And in fact there are some incidents that go quite high in numbers.

There are others that are icwer.

Sc we established a prudent level.

COMMISSIONER A*dEARNE :

Sun the threat level then is more an assessment by analogy to groups that have attempted s

to sabotage other things, as oppcsed to an assessment of what kind of a group would be required to cause significan: hazard

• *l-11. j wb Di out of cne of these facilities?

MR. BURNETT:

Yes, sir.

We started *Eith what

,s we think the threat is --

MR. CASE:

And more specifically, for reacecr tirte the threat level itself as set by the Conraission did not come up from the staff, it came from the Commission

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down.

COMMISSICNER AEEARNE:

The Ocnunission --

MR. CASE:

Commissicn orders.

MR. BURNETT:

That is one very clear point.

COMMISSIONER AHEARIiE:

Do you recall the grounds the,Cerrtission used at th.at coint?

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I beg you pardon?

MR. CASE:

What it is saying in Reactor Rule 73.55, the threat level was specified by the Commission, as distinguished from being recommended by the staff, and in particular the addition of the insider as part.cf the threat level was directed by the Cordssion.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I thought we modified whatever was propcsed?

MR. CASE:

We came up with the three.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

I see, so it was just the one.

The three number was established.

MR. CASI:

But the one is very significant.

COM.ISSIINER AEEAR:iE:

I guess I would have no M

1-12 jwb 13 problem with the one.

It was the three I was questioning.

All right..

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

The thought there was the fuel cycle -- the reactor, as I remember, they had three.

COMMISSIONER PEEARNE:

I see.

At that time, the intention was to upgrade t.)e fuel cycle?

MR. DIRCKS:

The intention still is.

It's in the upgrade rule.

CCMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

I realize that.

(Laughter.)

MR. DIRCKS:

The upgrade rule started in

'76.

the 'pgrade rule passed.

e-1 It's just another attempt to get u

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?sh 1 MR. DIRCES:

Shall we go to Question 2?

-y CHAIRMAN HE'iDRII:

Yes, by all means.

MR. DIRCKS:

.The bases for determining whether safeguards are adequate for levels of assurance -- I guess we might talk first about fuel cycle.

Ed seemed rather jealous of the reactor.

MR. CASE:

No.

MR. DIRCKS:

The fuel cycle, we basically take the threat level, get the licensees to provide us with a safeguards plan, carry out the comprehensive evaluations and see if the plan will actually defend against the

. threat level, lock the plan into shape, and then I&E picks it up and does a regular inspection against that agreed upon item.

Ed?

MR. CASE:

The only distinction I'd make here

<,pvu is that we have a detailed regulation 73J5 which specifies in some detail the kind of requirements licensees must have in addition to the threat level that you measure against the threat level.

So ours is more.following regulation and then evaluating the plan against the regulation to determine that they satisfy the threat level.

Your upgrade rule will provide your detailed rules that new'you don't have yet.

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kV cch 2 MR. DIRCKS:

The uoerade rule additional has some Qp>1)

A other rec irements.

MR. BURNETT:

After the upgrade rule, the only remaining difference, Bill, will be to perform vulnerability assessments where reactors does not.

C0ff.ISSIONER AEEARNE:

Do we do any kind of evaluation o'f the adequacy by means of attempting to defeat the security plans?"

MR. DIRCKS:

That's in the comprehensive evaluation.

That's precisely what we do.

We have four means of testing.

We have a physical security team.

We have the external assault team, material conrrol and

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accounting, diversion --

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

External assault team?

Does that mean you actually attempt to assault the plant?

MR. DIRCK3: No.

What they do is try to -- we don't storm the fences, but they do attempt to analyze th facility from the outside.

MR. BURNET'":

Covertly also.

MR. DIRCKS:

If they determine an adversary wanted to get in theresj how would he get in?

This is the area where we do a= ploy all these -- (inaudible).

MR. CASE:

Normally, we do not do that.

We review their plans by visiting the site, approve their plans, and then rely on I&E's inspecticn, usual inspection h

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16 rah 3 like safety inspection.

Whether the plan is being implemented properly by the. licensee and to report any deficiencies in the plan back to licensing -- we then modify the plan if there's something that we really didn't realize when we originally

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approved it.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Bill, when you vere talking about the four elements of'~the adequacy estimate, is that I&E?

MR. DIRCKS:

That's a combination of NMSS and I&E, and uring the outside services of the Army.

MR. BURNETT:

And a representative of the region.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Onward.

MR. DIRCKS:

I guess the levels of assurance is one that you may want to take a look at.

That's one where we have had some debate on that issue.

The way we 1cok at it is -- and I guess, let me put this in my own words.

The way we look at it, if the evaluation that we do manages to ring a perfect score, that is a facility that makes high assurance.

If the team discovers areas where there are some improvemenrs needed Sp but none of which would result in our rating that thing u s tbe needing i. mediate remedial action, 'M we ' d gi te the cp plant either a good or adequate rating and lay car a

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system of upgrad4s on it.

17 gsh 4 COIC1TSS.IONER AHEARNE:

Adequate er fair?

MR. SURNETT:

Good, fair, or inadequate, which is poor.

MR. DIRCK5: We call it fair.

I think what we're talking about in taking another look at that, we're talking about high and conditional, inadequate. Conditional means you put the thing on probation.

COMMISSIONER AREARNE:

But at the moment you have four categories:

High, good, fair, and inadequate.

MR. DIRCKS:

Right.

MR. CASE:

Reactors, we don't have any categories.

MR. DIRCKS:

You might mention that last --

MR. CASE:

I would strike -- they tell me that 's a qu@

from the. annual repdrt.

MR. BURNETT:

That's a quote from the commission pape>

that forwarded up the annual report.

MR. CASE:

It is not in the annual report?

MR. BURNETT: That's correct.

It's not in the annual report as such.

It is in the commission paper.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

You don't use the term --

MR. CASE:

We don't use labels.

COMMISSIONER AREARNE:

It's either adequate or inadequate.

Is that right?

MR. CASE:

You may need some corrective action.

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'1 You require them to do scmething within scme specified

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.gsh 5 period of time to allow them to continue operation.

But we

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don't put a label on it that it's conditional.

MR. DIRCKS:

But if it's less than high, it dcesn'.t necessarily mean it's inadequata, I guess.

MR. CASE:

That's right.

The regulations require high.

What this means is that it wculd be less than the regulation and still let the facility operate.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Have either of you ever closed a facility because of inadequate evaluation?

MR. BURNETT: We have required extra precautions.

I don't think it could be said that we have closed.

MR. CASE:

We haven't.

MR. DIRCZS:

We've never closed it because the statement is in the 11 evaluations we've done, we have never found a plan --

MR. SHAPAR:

Have some voluntarily gone out of business because they couldn' t meet our standards?

MR. BURNETT: Some might say yes to that.

MR. SHAPAR:

Kerr-Mc._'ee ?

MR. BURNETT:

Apolic.

I cannct validate that.

MR. CASE-Shutting down a f acility is not, in either case, adequate solution to the problem.

MR. AHEARNE:

I understand that.

MR. DIRCIS:

I think you might find interesting --

, m.

I'll get 'his cut -- we have what we call licensing action by

19 gch 6-facility. I think as a result of the reviews comprehensive m

evaluations on the fuel cycle facilities, we hav.e laid on these extra requirements that result in -- (inaudible).

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MR. BURNETT:

Now in the area.:of,XC&A having to do with ids, we have requested that facilities shut down voluntarily to perform reviews or inventories.

But we did not put out an order to close them down.

We did strongly suggest it and they volunteered it.

COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

That was en inventory difference question.

MR. BURNETT:

Yes, sir.

It was not a physical security question.

There-is one case, however, in the cas5 of Erwin about two years ago where a deficiency was found on the guard force, which demanded immediate attention.

And the team left Washington and made a review and it was very clear that if we didn' t get -- we, the NRC -- did not get corrective actions, we were going

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.to take strong measures.

And I&E led that team down there.

MR. DAVIS:

I believe some years before that there was an order to Erwin -- (inaudible).

MR. SURNETT:

But that's the closest I know of, j

Mr. Commissioner, for physical security problems.

MR. DIRCKS:

Question 3 I think I basically covered in our little exchange here about how we determine Y

20 esh 7 safeguards adegracy; we go through the bcsiness of establishing a plan,.doing evaluations against the plan.

MR. SEA?AR:

This might generate another question that invariably, comes up in hearings like this, and that is how does our level of safeguards compare with that of DOE and/or DOD.

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That question always comes up.

What's the answer now?

MR. DI2CES:

The answer now, in the absence of the upgrade rule, physical security, they're better than we are.

Material control and accounting, we 're better than they are.

MR. SEAPAR:

That's unchanged, then, for at least two or three years..

MR. DI2CES:

And it won't change until we get the upgrade rule passed.

MR. CASE:

If somebody asks me the reactor, reactor sabotage, I would have to say I don' t know.

MR. DIRCKS:. We've got no equivalent.

MR.- CASE:

I don't know in that area.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

They have reactors.

MR. CASE:

I know they have reactors.

(Discussien between Commissioner Ahearne d

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Mr. Dircks inaudible.)

MR. CASE:

Sun I think the answer is every case

21 sh.8 where they have a reactor -- I think. neu chay also have special nuclear material.

And that's the thing.that drives the protection rather than reactor sabotage.

MR. DIRCKS: Question 4, the statement of commission's level of confidence of bomb-size quantities of nuclear pm explosion materials, have not been diverted Ac facilities AEC

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(ree' regulated by the NRC or its predecessor organizations at NRC.

1 Now the answer t5 that question can basically be taken out of the commission -- out of the paper we.

sent demr--to 4he commissien,"7 9 34 5, and that's still before

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you and still subject to your individual conclusions on that point.

This is essentially.what the staff put together.

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-:-3 mto 1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Of course, what you have written here is a considerable compression of what's in that.

MR. DIRCKS:

Yes.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

So I wouldn't want to conclude, if I say that looks fine, I'm saying fine to the paper.

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HR. DIRCKS:

No, no.

But thau's where we're coming in.

Question 5, the lessons learned about the Rumanian shipment.

I think we have listed some of the lessons there.

John, this is the lessons learned, Cuestion 5, the lessons learned from the Rumanian snipment.

You may want i

to expound on that one a bit more.

MR. HOWARD:

We made several recommendations on the paper that is before the Commission, and among the reco=menda-tions on lessons learned, what we intended to do is development qp of a seal procedure, a seal,efinventory technicue, which has been completad; that we would also issue specific procedures 1

i for unusual events, where it was possible in the general j

procedure, and we tried to develop local procedures where it

-u s has been couldn' t be included in that general proced"~

done.

We've had a number of meetings with the staff, the safeguards staff, to bring to their attent on the imper:ance of these unusual tvre of circumstances that occurred and the

.m:0 2 23 responsibility for assuring that they contact the staf f duty officer out at headquarters or in the region if they run into a situation that could cause undue attentien or problems.

CHAIR'4AN HENDRIZ:

Tell me again, those efforts to develcp a better way of putting the seals on and protecting them, did that work,,out?

MR. HOWARD:

No, sir, that hasn't ful2;( worked out.

The seals we ordered are somewhat larger than the original type seal.

We do have a requirement that they use a collar and sleeve on the wiresg, as. they put them togeth' r,- and;then e

squee::e them together quite tightly.

But as far as protecting the, seal itself, no, sir, we haven't anything on that.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Didn't they route the ship-ments up through Canada, or do they still go through New York?

MR. DI2CKS:

The subsequent shipments went through Canada.

CCM1ISSIONER GILINSKY:

So what you learned is not to have another check.

Are they checked in Canada?-

MR. SLTIETT:

No, sir, they' re not. checked again unT.il they arrive --

MR MC CORMICK:

They're checked in Rumania, and there wen.

..o prehlems with any other.

All eight other ship-ments went withour. any problem.

COMMISSIGNER GILINSKY:

We couldn't ship them through :iew York?

-15 3 24 MR. MC CORD 7CR:

The health commission in New York decided.they were g.oing. to fine. General Atomic 'for moving it through New York.

MR. BURNETT:

In fact, they did fine them. 5250.00.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Do you have a better list of all the actions that have been taken than what you just described?

MR. EOWARD:

Yes sir.

I can provide you ene.

I

~

don' t have one with me.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Isn ' t there scme bulletin or something that we' ve got?

MR. HOWARD:

Our intention was -- (Inaudible).

We can provide you with a complete rundown.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Fine.

MR. ONG:

Could I suggest something, a question?

Just the last sentence is that -- do you think it might be better co say "have been adecuate in protecting against,"

rather than " effective in preventing"?

It almost sounds like it couldn' t happen, and the overall system doesn' t prevent in any way.

It protects more physical security, some controls --

MR. DIRCKS:

What did you say, Cookie?

MR. ONG:

Ea're been adequate in protecting casks.

We have been s ruggling with that sentence.

MR. SUENETT:

What do ycu see as the difference between-these two worfs ?

. ' ~

• 25

~

MR. CNG:

Most of the paper goes in, and we don' t know what happened er net.

" Preventing" almost'sounfs like, gee, you kept it from happening.

MR. DIRCIS:

Sun wait.

" Adequate and effective,"

it really doesn' t - I don' t get the shade of meaning.

MR. CNG:

Not so much that one, but the next word, "praventimq," nade "prc tecting. "

The three elements of safe-guards and -

~

MR. BURNETT:

We're not talking about accounting here; we'.~. talking about a combination.

MR. CNG:

That's what I mean.

MR. DIRCIS:

I'm not wedded to those Words.

I don't care.

MR. CNG:

Just' consider it.

MR. DIRC35:

It's down here, anyway, if you want to say it either way.

CCMM15SICNER AEIARNE:

As far as the shipments from Rumania, all of them wenn up to Canada.

Have they 'ceen cc.'.-

pleted ncw?

MPJ. MC CCAMICK:

There were nine altogether.

The dh*

.m The other eicht first en were the one that had orchlems.

ge went threngh Canada.

You see, the health department fined General Atomic.

CCMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

And all of those, what we

.cssentiaEy did was --

a 15 26 MR. MC CORMICK:

Check them with General Atomic, check them when they get to the airport in Les Angeles, check them the same as we did in Kennedy.

Once they got off in Los Angeles, they were out of our control.

They went to Canada, to Switzerland, and from Switzerland on.

MR. EURNETT:

It was Rotterdam.

MR. MC CORMICK:

Some went to Switzerland, some went' to Rotterdam.

But they al arrived safely.

l MR.,DIRCKS:

Item 6.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Cn the question on Surry, it says " Involved nuclear cnly, therefore no threat. "

Is there any possibili.ty they could have damaged the fuel in such a way that it would not.have been noticed until it was being put into the reactor and run up, which then could have caused damage?

MR. PASEDAG:

1 MR. CASE:

I think it's true that the investigations, both by the F3I and I&E, are still going on.

So these are more tentative or preliminary lessons learned rather than final.

....,, e g

MR. PASIDAG:

Yes.

MR. CASI:

And one of the lessons learned is we have to be quite a bit =cre specific in our rsquirements, at least

o 7

.8 our review guidelines.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It may be that'we just have to be to'ughe r.

,s MR. CASE:

We haven't decided what the penalty should be in this case.

5o maybe that is one answer.

COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

Maybe it does not make sense for us to write a Napoleonic ' ode for legal action.

Sun will that stop the management?

. think we' ve get to deal'with that.

~

MR. SHAPAR:

Is it clear it's a violation at all?

MR. CASE:

It's not a violation,._ They were authorized by the station manager.

He had signed his name to the list of the 600 and scme people.

COMMISSIONER AHIARNE:

But in some way it dces

~

indicate also, I guess, a lack of now we're being able to convince the management th'ey ought to be more sericus about that.

d>ust can't let.oeoc. le COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

We through all these activities.

MR. CASE:

As I say, I&E hasn't concluded their inves tigation, nor, as I say, have they decided what penalty, if any, should be taken.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It may not be a penalty; it

.qay be a severe letter.

COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

To whcm wculd the severe letter go?

.S ' 8 29 MR. CASE:

But this may well come out, and I think it probably will be said just this way.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Well, then, I think the follow-on question would then be:

What is the -- has the NRC's attitude been toward these plans?

How hard a review have we given them of their plans?

How hard have we reviewed or how tightly have we reviewed how they do implement them?

MR. CASE:

We 've just been required to meet _ghese requirements in the last six months.

We're now looking at how they are dealing with I&E, and this is something we'.re finding out.

In this particular area, they' re not doing that well.

We'

e. goinc to do something about it.

We've got the survey going to find out how bad the situation is.

We're going to tighten up the words, at least.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

We never found the person --

MR. PASEDAG:

The FBI has not finished their investi-ga tion.

So far they have no suspects.

I might point out, the plan was in effect for a litult over a month when this incident occurred.

.CCMMISSICNER AHEARNE:

The controlled access plan?

MR..PASEDAG:

Yes.

I: was the new security plan, with a much higher level of security than what existed before; had just been implemented.

COMMISSICNER AHEARNE:

But that, in a way, that's even. more disturbing, because if it had jus been im lemented

m.sc 9 30 to have controlled access, that's the time that you would at least have thcught that they would have been most concerned about having the control.

MR. PASEDAG:

It seems to not work that well with some of our licensees.

We have to beat on them for a while before they get the message.

~

MR. COMBS:

The Subcommittee intends to hold hearings

~

on Thursday en the subject of reactor safeguards, requested Mr. Denten, Mr. Stello and Dr. Mattsen attend these hearings.

MR. CASE:

I read that to be TMI-type sabotage, by the cast of characters they suggested.

But I may be wrong.

They suggested Denton, Stello and Mattson.

MR. COMBS:

They normally move onto a variety of subjects -- (Inaudible).

MR. DIRCKS:

COM'IISSIONER AREARNE :

-+, m 10.

31 1

MR. DIRCKS:

COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

J MR. DIRCKS:

COMMISSIONER AHEJdLNE:

9.4 3

4 MR. DIRCKS:

MR. BURNETT:

t t

.. p.

4

-s2 1

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

i MR. DIRCKS:

k l

G UPMAN EINDRII:

6 i

MR. BURNETT:

4 i

MR. DIRCKS:

~~ ~

MR. BURNETT:

f

.-. m--

r.

r

7.-C 11 32

> +

COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

s.

MR. BURNETT:

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

MR. DIRCKS:

COMMISSIONER GIL NSKY:

)

MR. DIRCKS:

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

f MR. DIRCKS:

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

i MR. BURNETT:

E r

o w-c.

nw,-

e

p 33

- e '.12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

MR. DIRCKS:

CO.'SIISSIONER GILINSKY:

MR. DIRCKS:

MR. BURNETT:

1 3

MR. DIRCKS:

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

f MR. DIRCKS:

I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

MR.,DIRCKS:

CCM:'.ISSIONER GILINSXY :

te r

+

r

~. ~. 0 13 34 MR. DIRCKS:

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

MR. BURNETT:

COMF1ISSIONER GILINSKY:

MR. BURNETT:

O

27' 35 i

,. ish 1 2G. BUR'ETT :

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

MR. EURIGT":

COMMISSIDMER AEEARNE:

CCMMISSIONZR GILINSKY:

MR. BURNE"T:

COMMISSICtER AEZA?2E:

MR. BURNETT:

_s 1

36 gCh 2 MR. DIRCKS:

MR. BURNETT:

COMMISSIONER GILINS:01:

!!R. DIRCKS:

~

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

MR. BURNETT:

37 gsh 3-MR. PASEDAG:

k MR. BURNETT:

i MR. PASEDAGY-f I

f t

I MR. BURNETT:

I t

MR. PASEDAG:

MR. BURNETT:

1 i

MR. DIRCKS:

U 1

f 1

MR. BURNETT:

I-COMMISSIONER AREARNE:

MR. BURNETT:

CCMMISSIONER AED.RNE:

y..

, ~-

38

- psh 4 MR. DIRCKS:

Then they have matarial control and accounting.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

(Inaudible).

MR. DIRCKS:

Question 7 is the usual question we get on th'e derived benefits from the safeguards research program.

I guess I have been asked that question twice in hearings and the answer is we're getting some benefits out 9

<pu of it.

And the primary x we 're looking at h, is the material control and accounting research areas and Ee

.think it's essential and it's providing some very valuable input into the saterial control and accounting upgrade 4

y/XN

~

gm We have listed other V,'jects down there.

We've ccm minicated threat capability project.

q w'1 Walt)is 5andia ur-der research?

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

~

MR. PASEDAG:

Yes, sir.

(Inaudible.)

COMMISSIONER A "ARNE:

Which cne was that~under?

MR. C2SE :

The question asked in terms of what have you already used --

MR. DIRCES:

Derived benefits frem.

MR. SCRNETT:

Fast tense -- derived.

MR. CASE:

The One chat Walt 'has is acre future potential, l

coy _CSSINE7 17BNE :

You mean safeguards netwcrks i

(,

analysis progran is past.

39

?sh 5 MR. BURNETT:

No, we're just starting to use it.

I thipk what Walt is trying to say is they have high hopes for something, but they haven't used i: yet, as opposed to the ones that were listed here by research.

Neither m

Walt --

COMMISSIONER ASEARNE:

These are all completed?

MR. BURNETT:

This was created by research.

They are getting some use out of it.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

But these are ccmple_ted

. tasks?

MR. DIRCES:

Scme of them are not.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

If they're not ccmpleted tasks, I don't understand --

'\\.

MR. BURNETT:

In some cases, scme have produced a product already, even though the task is not --

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Fine.

All I'm pointing out is the character of this answer -- scme of them are future reference.

And I thoucht that NRR had related that as a future-oriented program in Sandia.

MR. CASE:

The question is the extent to which CY NRC has er:Lved.

COMMISSIONER AI~_d.RNE:

I know the question.

I'm talking about the answers.

MR. CASE:

Eut I think what they're saying in the answer, even though some of these things are still going en,

,l

40 g2h 6 they have already derived some benefits.

MR. SCENETr:

But I think'.there's something else that should be said.

If you look at Item 6, whichl.is spent fuel vunlerability program, this is an advanced one.

So it :nay he correct that you might wanu to put yours in.

COMMISSICE AHEARNE: Could I ask the question in a different way?

Can we answer just the question that M

was asked -- as of right now which of these programs erd a product which is now being used.

MR. 3URNETT:

All right.

No. 3 is definitely being used.

Number 1 is not really being used yet.

Number 2 is not really being used yet. Number 4 is a study that is still going on.

Number 5, I have made partial use of.

And number 6 has not been used.

So if we boil it down to that COMMISSIC5ER AHEARNE In other words, if we answer the question thau we asked --

MR. BURN E :

You get 3 and 5.

Research might not agree with those, you know, just quick looks that I made.

MR. DIRCr,:

This was research's answer.

MR. BURNE: Secause I can cnly talk about the ones that I have used.

- that was done, COMMISSIC5ER ;*".?SE:

The study the Sandia studies _ hat were done - the reporu '-75,

'77.was q

• 3h 7 that recoarch?

11R PASEDAG:

I believe it was.

COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

It was research'in the sense of research.

Now didn't that lead to a number of changes s

in upgrading?

MR. PASEDAG:

It provided many of the bases, the data base for.73f5.

COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

I would think that that would be a very major part of the answer.

MR. PASEDAG'.:

I think that that should be in there.

CHAIPMAN HENDRIE:

What's this?

MR. PASEDAG: The sabotage vulnerability study for reactor that Sandia did. starting in

'75.

And there

(

were a couple of follow-on reports through '77.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Which were incorporated in that

• Ep5, very definitely.

'3et ^-

MR. CASE:

These were clearly talking to the licensees as potential.

COMMISSICNER AFJ.ARNE:

And they're in our regulation.

MR. CASE:

There are a couple more.

We believe they have done some research on explosions en -- (Ihaudible. )

-c reactors that might be helpful to us in deciding what to do in sabotage deted"i'on matters.

3 They are also in e>:plosion en pcwer reacecrs, they pointed out in locarions that we have used. specifying

42

'.ph 8 vital arcas.

Is that right, Waltor?

.E4 MR. PA5EDAG:

Yes.

43 (D ~

hy O

e

• • CR'5327 Ma jwb 15 MR. CASE:

The problem with a dollar value, though, we can't compare with the dollar value previously expended and 1:teing expended on research, and that's the point-I think to be made.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

It's hard to tell.

MR. DIRCKS:

We've covered the questions the committee raised.

There might be another question, for example our favorite plant, Erwin, Tennessee, what's going on down there.

And we prepared a brief history of what's going on down there, one page.

We can send that out and just give the history of events from 1976 on to q,m today, about the various MUF s they've had, and the various o

\\

actions we've taken to try to cope with their problems.

MR. SHAPAR:

Anether question I suppose:

Are j

they new prcWHg high protection, or adequate protection i

j in action?

A j

j MR. BURNETT:

They are presently, by the last'ul d d e rc. J_.m niuc, reinspection.

c' T**Tl A

i COEISSIONER AHEARNE:

Didn't a notice come out recently on Erwin?

MR. BURNETT:

Yes, I think I&E just sent one about three weeks ago on the results of the reinspection of Erwin, which stated that it was

, but there was yet one remaining thing to be done.

CCMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Vic, wasn't there a h

m.

44 5-2 jwb recent one?

CO:GIISSIONER GILINSKY:

They just exc'eeded their MUF limits.

g COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

Todar they have jus:

exceeded their MUF limits.

MR. BURNETT:

The last two consecutive reporting periods, they have gone over.

COMMISSIONER AREARNE:

This is now the third.

MR. BURNETT:

Yes, sir.

MR. HOWARD:

(Inaudible.)

COMMISSIONER AFEARNE:

How do you answer the question?

You could say that they have -- they were still rated

, but yet they are centinuing to go over?

MR. BURNETT:

There are<more aspects than just material control and accounting.

The physical security down there, its integrity is not in question.

So, yes, the MUF_ has just recently gone over again, and we've had pr a history of continuing MUF orchlen at that facility.

% 4r u

COMMISSIONER AHEAFNE:

Are we any closer to raaching a resolution as to why there has been a --

MR. BURNETT:

No, sir.

We have had teams on board.

We have had consissioned studies.

They have cor:missioned studies, which are recuired by license

',cs n cO5L

-. comis o -en.

If you look at this presentation, you will

]

{u,,,

see back in '76 they were having a two to three kilogram

~

45 5-3 jwb m a W'That concern 4 c')

s m

.s.

per reporting pericd that always 4eet.

j 4

cw

,does a great deal.

So we stimulated their efforts to W

ccme up with a new system.

They did so in August of

'77.

They instituted ancther system.

This newer system changed me from a continual negative MUF MR. DIRCKS :

Changed "Erwin," not "you."

MR. BURNETT:

I'm sorrf, changed frca plus to minus on alternating cycles, and they pursued that mode --

COMMISSIONER AWuNE:

In other words, they had balanced books.

'MR.

BURNETT:

-- fqr abcut six or seven reporting periods, and we exhibited a great deal of dislike en that method.

And so we have recently forced them to go into a new method, a third approach which has kind of effectively put us back to square one, if you look at the data.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Are we taking it easy on them because they're supplying material --

MR. BURNETT:

No, sir.

We're act taking it easy at all.

I&E has extensive manpcwer down dere locking.

gw I have studied the heck out of them.

The recen-@ action l

is really a tightening cf de procedures.

If they exceed a certain number, they have to close down and to look for that stuff, and they cannot star; again until they have authority from NRC.

That is much more San ancth=r other

5-4-jwb 46

(,

facili' hers".

We have tightened it up.

g COMMISSIONER GILINSR'?:

What is this "exeeding the LEMUF "?

4 MR. BURNETT:

The current regulations at other i

facilities, thev can exceed LEMUF but thev have to do a f

certain check.

They have to make studies on why, and provide that data to us.

That is true an all facilities.

It's -not just unique to this facility.

In addition, on this facility we have actually got what might be referred to -- in f act it is, a close-down criteria on that facility.

We do not have such a requirement in any other facility.

A COMMISSIONER AEIARNE:

But we also have a more relaxed reinventory.

MR. BURNETT:

No, sir.

There is nothing more relaxed at that facility.

The inspectors can contradict me at any mcment, but there is nothing less at that facility.

We are holding their nose to the grindwheel, so to speak.

COMMISSIONER AEEAR'!E:

This third excess, how much was it?

MR. HOWARD:

l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

So it's less tthan the amount requiring reinventory?

MR. HOWARD:

Yes.

47 5-5 jwb Now the region has started to set up a task force.

There is some new systems that they have been a

c,7.4 discussing on the treatment of liquid,4ffluents, and there seems to be some question in the region's mind. as to whether they have actually taken a good inventory or not.

And they are now moving in a cc/.e to get down there get fe'cm. there to require them to get the systems (g

-to operations -- (inaudible).

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Now under this whcle history you have-going back to ' 76, has there been any question in any of the NMSS or I&E people's minds that there might have been material being diverted?

MR. HOWARD:

I've never heard that expressed.

MR. BURNETT:

As the Commissioner knows, there was a large MUF back in the la*.e '60s which was never explained, and then later there was a f ailure in a physi-P q

cal security 3 caution wid a two-man rule down at una:

0 facility which was desit with quickly.

COMMISSIONER GILINSK'?:

There was also a time in, I think late '75, when we got concerned about what was going on there.

In fact, we sent a planeload of people 4

i down.

1 MR. SURNETT:

That was tne one --

I MR. MC CCRMICK:

'76.

I remember it well, because I was en the airplane.

a-o 3wo 48 CO!O1ISSIGNER GILINSKY:

Early '76?

MP., MC CORMICK:

Yes.

January

'76.

COIG1ISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay.

And that had a s

great deal to do with the. upgrading of safeguards -- you know, upgrading existing facilities.

Before that, the fccus was very much en getting ready for some vast new plctonium industry, and all of a sudden people realized d

that thlngs were pretty bad in existing facilities.

And just at that time, our Safeguards people started going around reviewing the various facili, ties.

Sun I don'.t knew whether a decision to do that came before or after, bat-in any case, that incider.t --

CONSSICNER A*-iETJNE:

Was a real trigger.

COMMISSIONER Q.NSKY:

-- had a lot to do in catting ever'Jbody's attention.

L Mause we realized that the material accounting system down there was con letel da#icien: - claH4 g that a great deal of material was 4

g=ing into the river, that in fact was going in, and this was the reason why --

MR. MC CDPRICK:

And why they had the MUT_

<.Wf level.

CCESSICNER GILINSKY:

And which was the reason why the backs showed them accumulating material.

And the am::unt that was actually unacccunted for in a sense is just unclear.

One doesn't knew how much in

3 49 5-7 -jwb E

fact did go into the river.

We made some estimates after' that, bii: it was clear, you know, the bookkeeping before that was practically worthless.

And there were some suggestions at that time that there may be some -- there may have been some improper keeping' of the books, but none of this seems to have been borne out by the examination.

COMMISSIONER AREARNE:

So as far as all of the 1

inspection reviews have concluded, it's either a problem with the process itself, or sloppy management?

MR. HOWARD:

I don': think I have ever heard it expressed as " sloppy management."

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

We11, that's what I thought --

a COMMISSIONER GILINSRY:

'Vell --

MR. HOWARD:

You mean recent?

COMMISSIONER AFEARNE:

No, I mean in prior --

I mean, if yo" duc't keep the books, that's -- you know.

MR. DAVIS:

Well, I think the hockkeeping problem, as I recall it, is that they were using a "less than" value in a waste stream.

And as the state of _he art of instre.entation progressed, they did not increase their On..sitivity in the waste strean, as I recall it.

COMMISSIONER GILINSRY:

Ihere were some limits set by EPA or scmeone that they could dump into w-

50

'g_g jwb into their pool -- in this case, I suppose, into the river, if the waste streas contained less than one part per something -- one part per million per some amount of water, and then they had a little test.

If it showed "less tnan,"

they would dump it.

Now it may have been -- and what they put on their books is not limiting value.

COE1ISSIONER AHEARNE:

So it could have been a lot less.

COE1ISSICNER GILINSKY:

It could have been anywhere between ::ero and that number.

And the amount -- the uncertainty the.e was over 100 kilegrams a year.

That is to say, between ::ert, and that number, and obviously the snd #5 likely uncertainty is considerably less than that.

{0 J-r>1 3/

99

M 5327

'.ELT':ER -

51

.-6 mte 1 MR. DIRCRS:

There's no assurance they were meeting EPA standards.

MR. BURNETT:

But I would like to end it on a strong note, that the staff has spent a lot of time on this f acility.

Mr. Dircks has exhibited a strong interest in it since his arrival.

I have always been interested in it.

And I will go

~

one step further.

With the system that they have down there, I don' t knew that we will $ver get these numbers dcwn frcm the MC&A side to what you and I would like.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

By "the system," you mean the chemical system?

MR. BURNETT:

Yes, sir, the nature of the beast down there.

So we have to rely on a strong physical security program.

CCMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

How about Wood River?

MR. BURNETT:

I think they can operate within the precautionsted[have.

'C m

j COMMISSIONE?. AHE.GNE:

Well, in related areas of physical security, et cetera, there were prchlems with guard forces.

MR. DIRCRS:

Then there was this eroblem between

~

e,.J W M w.

by Montville and - 4 s'Innudible).

COMMISSIONER AEFJ.RNE:

Where do you stand en that?

MR. BURNETT:

We've cot them back us where they're

o.

22

- 1. _.,,.

supposed to be.

The trouble is, where there's any evaluation with any inspection, we get it that way and we 'Jalk of f-site, and unless management keeps a high attention to it it could slip.

And that's what happened.

The comprehensive evaluation reviewed it.

We found problems.

We bootstrapped them up to a level.

Then later it was determined -- I don' t remember. the exact month, but some months later they fell back down.

Inspection went back on the scene --

COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

Any penalty on them for i

falling back down?

MR. BURNETT:

You can answer.

MR. HOWARD:

Wood River right now -- (Inaudible).

MR. BURNETT:

You might add, it's been in process T

l 4

for --

MR. HOWARD:

Three Mile Island's kind of gotten in the way of the process.

MR. BURNETT:

As of the last reinspection, we have gotten Ehem back up.

Mr. Dircks instructed that I write a letter to them emphasizing the importance of good management.

~

We did that.

MR. DIRCKS:

I think, on that point, we do these comprehensive.evaluaticns.

In effect, we're almost going out i

like, putting it kindly, like a management consultan team.

We look at their procedures and they' re pretty good.

Sun the j

4.

4

. + n *;.o 3 53 management just dces not seem to pay enough attention to these

~

things.

CDFSiISSIONER A~iEARNE:

It's not clear that we have s

much pressure on them.

!G. DIBCKS:

No.

CO201ISSIONFJ. GILINSKY:

You're talking about Erwin?

MR. BC2NETT:

No, Wcod River.

By the vay, the MUF numbers associated with Erwin

<>r are classified still.. By law, we do not classify them except on a six-menrh basis..

The ones that we just put out would i

require this trarscript in those areas to be classified, and the discussions that followed.

k..

MR. SHAPAR:

You mean a National Security Council memorkndum.

MR. BETETT:

Yes, sir.

MR. DI2CK :

What's the cle.ssification?

MR. S N TT:

Confidential.

I have got to live by the rules.

' tm. DI2CKS:

You better mark it if we're living by the rules.

CHAI?mN EINCRI2:

Okay.

No discussion?

i (No response. )

--6 (Wnere:pon, at 4 : 3 5 p.m., the hearing was adjcurned.).

.