ML19320C432
| ML19320C432 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Buffalo |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Chon W NEW YORK, STATE UNIV. OF, BUFFALO, NY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007160827 | |
| Download: ML19320C432 (1) | |
Text
M neo UNITED STATES o,,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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S REGION I re 431 PARK AVENUC KING OF PRUS$4 A. PENNSYt.VANI A 19404 June 24, 1980 Docket No. 50-57 State University of New York at Buffalo Nuclear Science and Technology Facility ATTN:
Dr. W. Y. Chon Director 14214 Rotary Road Buffalo, New York 14214 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-14, " Radioactive Contaaination of Plant Demin-eralized Water System and Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel," is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, y e H. Grier Director Enclosures 1.
IE Circular No. 80-14 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Circulars CONTACT:
P. J. Knapp (215-337-5291) cc w/encls:
P. M. Orlosky, Operations Manager Dr. A. K. Bruce, Radiation Safety Officer Dr. A. W. Holt, Acting Dean, Division of Graduate and Professional Education 8007160827
ENCLOSURE 1 SSINS.: 6830 UNITED STATES Accession No.:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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005050074 9 hl" 'F 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.
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IE Circular No. 80-14 Date:
June 24, 1980 Page 1 of 2 RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION OF PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER SYSTEM AND RESULTANT INTERNAL CONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL This circular describes an event which occurred at a nuclear power facility; however, the generic implications may be applicable to research reactors, and fuel cycle facilities.
On March 17, 1980, a licensee informed the NRC resident ins)ector that portions of the plant demineralized water (DW) system were found to 3e radioactively contaminated.
A temporary hose used to add demineralized water to the spent fuel pool was the pathway for the cross-contamination.
After this fuel pool makeup was completed on March 14, the temporary DW line (still connected to the DW header) was inadvertently left submerged in the fuel pool.
Since the DW header pressure at the point of supply was relatively low (a DW booster pump had been secured), a siphoning action occurred, resulting in radioactive contamination of portions of the DW header.
On March 17, 1980, while )erforming routine secondary system chemical analyses, thelicenseediscoveredtlatthedemineralizedwatertapin_$hechemistrylab contained high levels of boron and had activity of 1.5 x 10 uCi/ml (mainly Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-58, Co-60 and Mn-54).
It was subsequently discovered that demineralized water from the chemist:, laboratory supply tap has been used to make five (5)(pots of coffee.23) individuals who had consumed this coffee were The remaining coffee was confiscated and the twenty-three counted.
All involved individuals showed no intake greater than an equivalent 0.01 MPC-HRS. Analysis performed by the licensee's radiation consultant, based on the maximum concentration of radioactivity found in the coffee, indicated that the resultant 50 year dose commitment to an individual drinking eight ounces of this coffee would be less than 1 millirem.
Further licensee investigation revealed that the non-radiological chemistry DW supply tap was the only DW supply point outside the Auxiliary Building controlled area.
Thir DW supply tap was tagged prohibiting human consumption to prevent a similar event in the future.
It is recommended that you review your facilities use of demineralized water 1
(DW) via temporary connections and give attention to the following:
j 1.
Provisions should be made to assure that radioactive materials are not inadvertently introduced into use of temporary connections. your facility's 00 system via the improper A temporary cros:, connection between contaminated systems and the DW system without adequate physical controls to prevent cross-contamination should be prohibited.
IE Circular No. 80-14 June 24, 1980 Page 2 of 2 2.
In addition to some physical means of preventing backflow into the DW system, appropriate administrative controls should be establisned to ensure that the DW supply valve is secured and temporary hosing is disconnected from the DW supply header after use.
3.
Use of plant-supplied DW for human consumption should be prohibited.
The potable water system should be the only authorized source of water for human consumption.
4.
Examine potable and demineralized water systems to determine if pathways exist allowing or having the potential to allow contamination of these systems including temporary connections whereby siphons cculd cause situations described above.
No written response to this Circular is reguired.
Your review of this matter i
to determine its applicability to your facility and any corrective and preven-i tive actions taken or planned, as appropriate, will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
Ifyoudesireadditionalinformationregardin this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRL Regional Office.g j
1
IE Circular No. 80-14 June 24, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject Date of Issued to No.
Issue 80-13 Grid Strap Damage in 5/28/80 All holders of a Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies Power Reactor Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP) 80-12 Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key 5/14/80 All holders of a May Fall Out of Place When Power Reactor Mounted Celow Horizontal Axis OL cr CP 80-11 hergency Diesel Generator 5/13/80 All holders of a Power twe Oil Cooler Failures Reactor OL or CP 80-10 Failure to Maintain 4/23/80 All holders of a Environmental Qualification Power Reactor of Equipment OL or CP 80-09 Problems With Plant Internal 4/28/80 All holders of a Power Communications Systems Reactor OL or CP 80-08 BWR Technical Specification 4/18/80 All holders of a Power Inconsistency - RPS Response Reactor OL for a General Time Electric BWR 80-07 Problems with HPCI Turbine 4/3/80 All holders of a Power Oil System Reactor OL or CP 80-06 Control and Accountability 4/14/80 Medical licensees in Systems for Implant Therapy Categories G and G1 Sources 80-05 Emergency Diesel-Generator 4/1/80 All holders of a Power Lubricating Oil Addition and Reactor OL or CP Onsite Supply 80-04 Securing of Threaded Locking 3/14/80 All holders of a Power Devices on Safety-Related Reactor OL or CP Equipment
, 80-03 Protection from Toxic Gas 3/6/80 All holders of a Hazards Power Reactor OL 80-02 Nuclear Power Plant Staff 2/1/80 All helders of a Work Hours Reactor OL, including rem arch and test reactors, or CP