ML19320C016

Advises of Procedural Inadequacy Re Radiography of Unauthorized Explosive Matl on 800626.Caused by Inadequacy in Applying Administrative or Procedural Controls.Separate Cover Sheet Indicating Approved Matls Will Be Issued

ML19320C016
Person / Time
Site:	Oregon State University
Issue date:	07/11/1980
From:	Wang C Oregon State University, CORVALLIS, OR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
NUDOCS 8007150649
Download: ML19320C016 (4)

Text

a a i r 3 Radiation Center E".

University CmaHis. Oregen 97331 m:n n mt J

July 11, 1980 U.S. fluclear Regulatory Commission Region V Office of Inspection and Enforcement 1990 fl. California Blvd.

Walnut Creek Plaza, Suite 202 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Reference : Docket flo. 50-243, License fio. R-106 Gentlemen :

On June 26, 1980, an inadequacy occurred in one of our administrative procedures. This was discovered on July 2,1980, and reported to your office by telephone on July 3,1980. This telephone report was to inform you of the occurrence and to clarify the exact nature of the event as it related to our Technical Specifications.

This written report, as required 'oy Part 6.7.C.4 of our Technical Specifications, provides more details of the occurrence and outlines the corrective action we have taken which should prevent a situation of this type from happening in the future.

Occurrence On June 26, 1980, an experimentor was performing neutron radiography using the beam from beam port #1 under our existing, approved reactor ex-periment B-24 (General fleutron Radiography). The experimentor was taking neutren radiographs of a variety of objects for demonstration and training of a new research assistant. The experimentor radiographed, among other things, a 30.06 rifle cartridge and a 16 gauge shotgun shell. The approved experiment did not allow the radiography of any explosive material, and therefore, the experimentor violated this stipulation of the experiment.

This violation was discovered on July 2,1980, when the experiment was being reviewed by the experimentor and the operations staff. This occur-rence was reported to your office by telephone on July 3,1980. The occurrence indicates an observed inadequacy in the implementation of ad-ministrative or procedural controls (in this case, an approved reactor experiment), and as such, a 30-day written report is required by Part 6.7.C.4 of our Technical Specifications.

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USNRC July 11,1980 Background Information and Safety Implications The experimentor involved is our most experienced neutron radio-grapher. He has performed. countless neutron radiographs, conducted funded research in this area, and directed several graduate student's theses in this field. Most of his radiography, however, has been performed using the beam port #3 radiography facility under approved experiment B-21. Experiment B-21 and our Technical Specifications do-allow the radiography of explosives in quantities up to 0.014 lbs.

equivalent of TNT using this facility.

The two objects in question, the 30.06 cartridge and the shotgun shell, c;uh have bsen radiographed legally using beam port 53 facility under Expe'iment B-21. The experimentor mistakenly assumed that the same limit' on explosive material applied to Experiment B-24 for the beam port

1. 1 facility, and he failed to verify these limits in Experiment B-24 before radiography was performed.

This error was not detected by the operations staff at the time the irradiation request was approved for the June 26 radiography. The reason for this was that the experimentor's irradiation request did not

' provide a complete list of all the objects to be radiographed.

The safety implications of this incident are virtually nonexistent.

For the purposes of a safety analysis calculation it was assumed that the maximum ouantity of explosive was 0.014 lbs. of TNT equivalent. This is the accent licensed for beam port #3, and it exceeds the actuai araant radiographed in beam port #1 in this incident. The following sequence of events is visualized as the maximum accident:

A small arms cartridge is placed in the beam (exterior to the reactor and beam port) to be radiographed. It is not contained inside a rifle barrel and therefore it would normally be in a vertical position pointing directly upwards. It should be emphasized that this pcsition is not in any beam port or reactor experimental facility, is outside of the primary reactor shield, and is approximately 12 feet from the reactor reflector.

If the cadridge should somehow fall into the horizontal position and then semehow fire, it could be discharged toward the beam port of the reactor. However, when small arms cartridges are fired outside of a barrel, the velocity of the projectile is very low, and it could not in fact penetrate the k" aluminum plate which is permanently across the beam port as part of the reactor water tank.

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USNRC- July 11,1980 The construction of the neutron collicating fixtures in beam port #1 make the possibility of a projectile reach-ing the end of the beam port very small. The collimator consists of a lb" diameter opening approximately 12 feet from the radiography position. The collimator consists of

. lead eight inches long. Thus, to reach the end of the beam port the projectile would have to pass directly through the collimator hole. The probability of doing this is less than 3 x 10-5 Furthermore, if the cartridge were to fall over it would fall to a position about six inches below the bottom of the beam tube. This would place the cartridge below a direct line to the collimator opening.

In addition to the " aluminum reactor water tank, there are three other aluminum plates between the reactor core and the radiography position. These are, in order from the outside, a h" shim between the beam port and the reflector, a %" outside liner on the reflector, and a k" inside liner for the reflector. Thus, the total thickness of aluminum between the reactor core and the radiography position is ik".

Normally, cartridges are not radiographed in a free standing position. Rather they are taped to the imaging cassette. In the case reported here the cartridges were

'i firmly taped to the cassette perpendicular to the beam line and could not discharge toward the beam port.

Thus, following these procedures will result in no damage to the reactor due to neutron radiography of small arms car-tridges (not exceeding 0.014 lbs. of TNT equivalent) using the beam external to beam port #1. .

Corrective Action The Reactor Operations Committee (ROC) met on July 3,1980, to

-discuss and review this incident. The following cor; active actions were approved by the ROC:

1. A separate cover sheet will be prepared for irradiation requests indicating that no explosives, special nuclear material, or other hazardous items can be irradiated without special approval, and further' indicating that all ~ items to be irradiated must be listed on the irrad-iation request. A separate signature block for experi-mentors will also be provided on the cover sheet.

2. The Reactor Administrator will issue a memo to all TF. IGA users calling their attention to the importance of accurate submission of irradiation requests, adherence to the specified information in IR's, limitations on materials which can be irradiated, and other related topics .

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USNRC July 11,1980

3. A review of existing reactor experiments for inclusion of appropriate prohibition statements will be made.

These actions should guarantee that:

(a) the experimentor is aware of the limitations of each experiment and/or experimental facility, (b) the operations staff can adequately verify all materials to be irradiated prior to each irradiation, (c) the experimentor will not irradiate materials which have not been previously approved, and (d) each experiment will be subject to the same, basic uniform set of limitations as delineated in the Technical Specifications, with a few exceptions as noted in each individual experiment.

If you have any questions or desire any further information about this occurrence, please contact us.

Sincerely,

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C.H. Wang Reactor Administrator Director CHW/mks cc: USNRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.

USNRC, Document Management Branch, Washington, D.C.

Oregon Department of Energy J.C. Ringle, Assistant Reactor Administrator, OSU A.G. Johnson, Senior Health Physicist, OSU T.V. Anderson, Reactor Supervisor, OSU

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