ML19320A430
| ML19320A430 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1977 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19320A425 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8005050433 | |
| Download: ML19320A430 (7) | |
Text
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800505o 93 UNITED STATES 0 '-
- 4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j.I j
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO._DPR-51 ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-313 INTRODUCTION Following a fire at the Orcuns Ferry Nuclear Station in l'crch 1975, e.
initiated an evaluation of thd need for improving the fire protectic:.
progrcas at all licensed nuclear power clants. As part of i.his conti: >-
ing evaluation, in February 1970 we published a report entit1 ?d "Reconmendations Rr lated to Browns Ferry Fire", l'UEG-0050. This rm.o.
reccrztended tMt ing ovecenti in t"9 ar.f as of fire preventien a'id fin control be r. pdc in nost e..istica f ccilities and that consideration be given to design fecture, that vaulo increase the at>ility of nuclear f acilities to s ithstana firos without tM 1r is of inportml fvcti: ;
To impleacnt the repert's recc!.mnnr.t!".ns..Fe 'AC initiatre a prem.','
for reevaluation et the fire protect.ico projrams at all licensed nuc1c; poser stations and for a conprehensive review of all new license applications.
He t1 ave issued new guidelines for fire protection prcgrams in nuclecr po..er plants. These guidelines reflect the recomendations in NU3%-06.'.
These guidelines are cnntained in the following documents:
" Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Anr. lysis Reports
'l for !!uclear Power Plants," PUREG-75/087, Section 9.5.1, " Fire Protection," liay 1976, which includes " Guidelines for Fire Protectiro
, for INchar Power Plants," (CTP APCS 3 9.5-1), riay 1,1976.
" Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants"( Appendi:
A to liTP APCSL 9.5-1), August 23, 1976. -
" Supplementary Guidance on Infor. ation Heeded for Fire Frotection Program Evaluction," Septe.iber 30, 1976.
"l'uclear Plant Fire Protection Frnctional ?esponsibilitio,,
Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance," Jene 14, M77.
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. In addition to the above guidelines and the subsequent action requested from all licensees, by letter dated October 21, 1976 we requested that Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L) submit technical specifications for presently - installed fire protection equipment at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1). AP&L responded, by letter dated November,19,1976, that a schedule for submittal of such specifications would be developed.
By letter dated December 2,1976 we provided sample proposed technical specifications. AP&L responded, by letter dated Dece:nber 9,1976, that their submittal for ANO-1 would be delayed until June 1,1977.
Subsequently, AP&L provided proposed technical specifications by letter dated June 16, 1977. Based on our review and consideration of the AP&L response and the responses of other licensees, we modified certain action statements and surveillance frequencies in order to provide more appropriate and consistent specifications. These specifications were i
forwarded to AP&L by letter dated June 24, 1977. This letter also requested that AP&L submit appropriately revised interim specifications.
By letter dated July 18, 1977, AP&L stated that their originally proposed specifications (June 16,1977) were generally consistent with the latest guidance and were therefore satisfactory. We have reviewed the AP&L' submittal and made several modifications to assure conformance with our requirements.
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l DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION The guidelines for technical specifications that we developed and sent to all licensees are based on assuring that the fire protection equip-ment currently installed for the protection of safety related areas of the plant is operable. This assurance is obtained by requiring periodic surveillance of the equipment and by requiring certain corrective actions to be taken if the limiting conditions for operation cannot be met.
These guidelines also include administrative features for the overall fire protection program such as interim fire brigade requirements, training, procedures, management review and periodic independent fire protection and loss prevention program inspections.
The equipment and components currently existing at this facility included in the scope of these Technical Specification requirements are fire detectors, the fire suppression systems, the hose stations, and piping and cabling penetration fire barriers. Operability of the fire detection instrumentation provides warning capability for the prompt detection of fires, to reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment by allowing rapid response of fire suppression equipment. In the event that the minimum coverage of fire detectors cannot be met, hourly fire patrols are required in the affected area until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to operability. The operability of the fire suppression system provides capability to confine and extinguish fires.
In the event that portions of the fire suppression system are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment. is required to be made available in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment is returned to service.
In the event that the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, a backup fire protection water system is required within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and a report to the NRC is required within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to provide for prompt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measures for adequate fire suppression capability. The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers provides protection to confine or retard fires from spreading to adjacent portions of the f acil i ty.
During periods of time when a fire barrier is not functional, a continuous fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected barrier to provide fire prevention methods and prompt detection and suppression in the event of a fire.
. We have reviewed the licensee's proposed interim Technical Speciff-cations against our requirements as implemented in the sample Technical Specifications. We have made some modifications to the specifications that were proposed by the licensee in order to make them conform to our requirements. One of the proposed specifications that we changed involves the minimum size of the on-site fire brigade.
In our previous sample Technical Specifications we did not identify the number of members on a fire brigade that we would find acceptable. We have now concluded that minimum number for a typical commercial nuclear power plant to be five (5).
The basis for this conclusion is presented in an attachment to this SER entitled " Staff Position Minimum Fire Brigade Shift Size."
4 In the report of the Special Review Group on the Browns Ferry Fire (NUREG-0050) dated February 1976, consideration of the safety of operation of all operating nuclear power plants pending the conpletion of our detailed fire protection evaluation was presented.
The following quotations from the report summarize the basis for our conclusion that the operation of the plants, until we complete our review, does not present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
"A probability assessment of public safety or risk in quantitative terms is given in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). As the result of the calculation based on the Browns Ferry fire, the study concludes that the potential for a significant release of radioactivity from such a fire is about 20% of that calculated from all other causes analyzed. This indicates that predicted potential accident risks from all causes were not greatly affected by consideration of the Browns Ferry fire.
This is one of the reasons that urgent action in regard to reducing risks due to potential fires is not required.
The study (WASH-1400) also points out that 'rather straight-forward measures, such as may already exist at other nuclear plants, can significantly reduce the likelihood of a potential core melt accident that might result from a large fire.'
The Review Group agrees.
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. " Fires occur rather frequently; however, fires involving f
equipment unavailability comparable to the Browns Ferry fire are quite infrequent (see Section 3.3 [of NUREG-0050]).
i The Review Group believes that steps already taken since March 1975 (see Section 3.3.2) have reduced this frequency signi ficantly.
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" Based on its review of the events transpiring before, during and after the Browns Ferry fire, the Review Group concludes that the probability of disruptive fires of the magnitude of the Browns Ferry event is small, and j
that there is no need to restrict operation of nuclear i
power plants for public safety. However, it is clear l
that much can and should be done to reduce even further
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the likelihood of disabling fires and to improve assurance 1
of rapid extinguishment of fires that occur. Consideration should be given also to features that would increase further the ability of nuclear facilities to withstand large fires without loss of important functions should such fires occur."
Subsequent to the Browns Ferry fire and prior to the Special Review Group's investigation, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement took steps with regard to fire protection. Special bulletins were sent
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to all licensees of operating power reactors on March 24, 1975, and April 3,1975, directing the imposition of certain controls over fire ignition sources, a review of procedures for controlling maintenance and modifications that might affect fire safety, a review of emergency procedures for alternate shutdown and cooling methods, and a review of flammability of materials used in floor and wall penetration seals.
Special inspections covering the installation of fire stops in electrical cables and in penetration seals were completed at all operating power reactors in April and May 1975. Inspection findings which reflected non-compliance with NRC requirements resulted in requiring corrective action by licensees. Follow-up inspections have confirmed that licensees are taking the required corrective actions and that administrative control procedures are in place.
. Since these inspection activities and the subsequent Special Review Group recommendations in the 1975 to 1976 time period, tnere has been no new information to alter the conclusions of the Special Review Group, and the ongoing fire protection program flowing from those conclusions is still adequate.
Therefore, we have found these specifications acceptable on an interim basis until such time that our overall review is complete, required equipment is installed and operable, and final specifications have been developed and issued.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION We have determined that the planned amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this planned amendment.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(i) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this planned amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Attachment:
Staff Position - Minimum Fire Brigade Shift Size Date:
November 28, 1977
m' Attachment Staff Posit..q Minimum _ Qre Grigade Shift Size INTRODUCTION Nucicar power plants depend en the response of an onsite fire brigade for d:fense against the effects of fire on plant safe shutdown capabilities.
In some areas, actions by the fire brigade are the
,only means of fire suppression.
In other areas, that are protected by correctly desinned autenatic detection and suppression systems, manual fire fighting efforts are used to extinguish:
(1) fires too small to actuate the automatic system; (2) well developed fires if the autenatic system fails to function; and (3) fires that are not completely controlled by the automatic system. Thus, an adequate fire brigade is essencial to fulfill the defense in depth requirements which protect safe shutdown systems fecm the effects of fires and their related combur. tion by-products.
DISCUSSION There are a number of factors that should be considered in establishing the minimum fire brigade shif t size. They include:
- 1) plant gecmetry and size;
- 2) quantity arid quality of detection and suppression systems;
- 3) fire fighting strategics for postulated fires;
- 4) fire brigade training;
- 5) fire brigado equipment; and
- 6) fire brigade' supplements by plant personnel and local fire department (s).
In all plants, the majority of postulated fires are in enclosed window-less structures.
In such areas, the working environment of the brigade created by the heat and smcLe buildup within the enclosure, will require the ute of self-contained brv. thing apparatus, smcke ventilation equipment, and a personnel replacement capability.
Certain functions must be performed for all fires, i.e., connand brigade actions, infonn plant management, fire suppression, ventilation control, provide extra equipment, and account for possible injuries. Until a site specific review can be completed, an interim minimum fire brigade size of five persons has been established. This brigade size should provide a minimum working number of personnel to deal with those postulated fires in a typical presently operating commercial nuclear power station.
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- If the brigade is composed of a smaller number of personnel, the fire attack may be stopped whenever new equip" tent is needed or a person is injured or fatigued. Ks note that in the career fire service, the minimum engine company manning considered to be effective for an initial attack on a fire is also five, including one officer and four team members.
It is assumed for the purposes of this position that brigade training and equipment is adequate and that a backup capability of trained individuals exist whether through plant personnel call back or from the local fire department.
' POSIT!0l!
1.
The minimum fire brigade shift size should be justified by an analysis
.of the plant specific factors stated above f.or the plant, after modifications are ccmplete.
2.
In the interim, the minimum fire brigade shift size shell be five persons. These persons shall be fully qualified to perform their assigned responsibility, and shall include:
One Sunervisor - This individual must bl.ve fire tactics training.
IIe UITi assume all command responsibilities for fighting the fire.
During plant emergencies, the brigade supervisor should not have other responsibilities that would detract from his full attention being devoted to the fire.
This supervisor should not be actively engaged in the fighting of the fire. His total function should be to survey the fire area, cenand the brigade, and keep the upper levels of plant management informed, luo Itose Men - A 1.5 inch fire hose being handled within a window-less enclosure would require two trained individuals.
The two team members are required to physically handle the active hose line and to protect each other while in the adverse environment of the fire.
Two Additional Toan Members - One of these individuals would be requirec 'o supply filled air cylinders to the fire fighting membere.. the brigade and the second to establish. smoke ventilation and aid in filling the air cylinder. These two individuals would also act as the first backup to the engaged team.
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