ML19319E006
| ML19319E006 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1970 |
| From: | Dodds R, Spencer G US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319D996 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-70-06, 50-312-70-6, NUDOCS 8003270724 | |
| Download: ML19319E006 (17) | |
Text
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O U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE REGION V Report of Inspection CO Report No. 50-312/70-6 Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco)
License No. CPPR-56 Category A Date of Inspection:
September 17-18, 1970 Date of Previous Inspection:
July 15-17,1970 Inspected by:
R. T. Dodds, Reactor Inspector CO:V (Principal Inspector)
W. D. Kelley, Reactor Inspector CO:II (Construction)
Compiled by:
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/d 'O!70 R. T. Dodds, Reactor Inspector Reviewed by:
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Gr S. Spencer Senior Reactor Inspector J
Proprietary Information:
None SCOPE Type of Facility:
Pressurized Water Reactor Power Level:
2452 Mwt Location:
Sacramento County, California OG 72 pg 8003270
. Type of Inspection:
Construction Inspection (Containment)
Scope of Inspection:
Review QA radiographs and welding of containment liner, observe concrete placement and review corrective action on previous CDN items.
SUMMARY
Construction Deficiencies - The spot radiographs taken of each welder's work on the containment liner as an aid to quality control did not conform to the requirements of Paragraph UW-51 of Section VIII of the ASME Code. A CDN will be sent to the licensee following review and concurrence by Compliance Headquarters.
(Appendix A)
Status of Previously Reported Problems - Satisfactory corrective ection has been taken by the licensee on the three deficiencies (weld electrode control, Cadweld splice test program and rebar spacing) identified during the previous inspection. The construction inspectors no longer report to the field engineers but rather have been centralized under a Chief Inspector who reports i
to the Project Manager instead of the Construction Superintendent.
(Sections C. and D.)
j Other Significant Items 1.
The overall project construction was estimated to be on schedule with 16.7% completion as of August 31, 1970. The vertical portion of the containment liner was completed in early August. Concrete for the reactor containment building exterior wall has been placed to elevation
+33.5 feet (60 vertical feet of wall). The first of the two 425-foot natural draft cooling towers has been completed.
(Section B.)
2.
Concrete plact ment was, in general, observed to be consistent with good construction practices. However, two items were noted that were contrary to the licensee's quality assurance procedures. They were improper labeling of a concrete transport truck and inspector sign-off
.l of an item on the preplacement report while the item was still being checked ra' L<r than after the checkout had been completed.
(Section E.)
3.
The quality of welding during the early stage of the containment vessel
' liner plate was poor, primarily because the flux coating on the weld electrodes was too dry. CB&I had to change suppliers to correct the problem. The defective welds and subsequent corrective action have been documented in nonconforming material reports.
(Appendix A)
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V Management Interview - The results of the inspection were discussed in two management interviews. The first was with Mr. Jackson (SMUD), Mr. Boyd (Bechtel) and Messrs. English, Gattis and Jamison of CB&I. The second meeting was held at the conclusion of the inspection with Messrs. Raasch, Jackson, Hilt'. McMahon, Stinchfield and Deming. Specific comments by the licensee regarcing items discussed were as follows:
1.
SMUD will review the quality of the spot radiographs used for quality control of ' welder performance during the construction of the liner and will act accordingly. Future radiographs will be made in accordance with the techniques required by UW-51.
2.
The quality of welding in the early stages of the liner construction was acknowledged to be poor and resulted in the rewelding of most of the early work. The principal cause was attributed to bad electrodes while i
some bad welds were related to the culling out of welders.
Mr. Jackson emphasized that management was fully cognizant of the problem which was r.ot corrected until they had changed electrode manufacturers. At that time the acceptance rate for welding jumped from 10% to 90%. He further pointed out that all deficiencies had been documented for review by management on nonconforming material reports.
3.
Mr. Jackson stated that the people involved with mislabeling the concrete i
transport truck had been reprimanded and he would not expect this to happen again.
4.
Mr. Deming stated that additional training sessions have been planned for all inspectors. They will be cautioned against sign-off until after j
a check or test has been completed, j
DETAILS A.
Persons Contacted The following persons were contceted during the inspection.
SMUD D. Raasch Project Engineer J. Jackson Quality Assurance Director J. Hiltz Resident Engineer
N Bechtel Corporation W. Stinchfield Project Manager V. McMahon Project Quality Assurance Engineer R. Cutter Manager, Civil Construction A. Erickson Supervisor Concrete Testing Laboratory H. Davis Reactor Building Inspector B. Boyd Senior Welding Engineer L. Stromberg Quality Assurance Engineer A. Cappelletti Welding Inspector L. Hatlock Inspector (Concrete Placement)
R. Deming Chief Inspector Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I)
E. English Manager, Welding and Quality Assurance R. Jamison Quality Assurance Supervisor (Welding)
D. Gattis Rancho Seco Project Manager B.
Status of Construction
('~'N Site construction was estimated to be on schedule with 16.7% completion
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as of August 31, 1970. The vertical portion of the containment liner was completed in early August with work on the dome scheduled to start in November.
Six lif ts (10 feet per lift) of the exterior concrete wall of the containment building have been completed. The first of the two 425-foot natural draft cooling towers has been completed.
C.
Project Administration Messrs. Jackson and McMahon discussed project administration for the mechanical and electrical equipment installation contract which has been awarded to Bechtel (Vernon, California office). SMUD QA Procedure No. I has been modified to reflect the separation of QA and project management from Bechtel Construction. Bechtel Corporation has been retained by SMUD as the engineering and construction manager. In this capacity, Bechtel will perform all QA activities specified by SMUD 's Quclity Assurance Director, Mr. J. Jackson. As the principal mechanical and electrical contractor, Bechtel will install the mechanical, electrical and instrumentation equipment and will perform all QA activities associated with this effort.
U The QA group is now almost totally divorced from construction, since these divisions independently report to the Vice President and Division Manager of Engineering and Construction. The field inspection group reports to the Rancho Seco Project Manager, W. E. Stinchfield, rather than the Rancho Seco Construction Superintendent, J. M. Vander Knyff. The Project Manager and the Construction Manager report independently to the Vernon Office Construction Manager, R. W. Ayersman. Contrary to Bechtel's normal job practice, the field inspectors for Rancho Seco now report to a Chief Inspector (Mr. Deming) rather than the field engineers.
Mr. McMahon felt that the separation of the inspectors from field engineers will permit the inspectors to be more objective and force them to document nonconformance to specifications which will then require an engineering evaluation by responsible individuals and appropriate levels of management.
D.
Previous 1v Reported Deficiencies Corrective action in response to deficiencies that were identified at the time of the last inspection was reviewed with Mr. Jackson. Records were examined and tours were made of the construction site to observe current practices.
1.
Weld Electrode Control O'
At the time of the last visit, about fifteen E6010 electrodes were observed to be stored in a heated oven, contrary to QA procedures.
The licensee felt, and the inspector observed, that there has been a substantial improvement in the area of weld electrode control as evidenced by the correction action from a previous CDN (Section D.l.
C0 Report No. 50-312/70-4). Therefore, the licensee contended that the observed violation of QA procedures was an isolated case which was followed up by CB&I locating the worker responsible and effecting his immediate termination of employment. Audits conducted by Bechtel and SMUD subsequent to the last inspection did not disclose any deficiencies in this area. The auditors found that CB&I was adhering to the corrective action policies promised as a result of the deficiencies that were identified during the May, 1970 inspection.
2.
Reinforcing Steel Splice Tests QA has prepared a formal inspection plan fer the testing of Cadweld rebar splices. The Bechtel field engineer provides the inspector with an inspection plan for each concrete lift containing Cadweld splices. The inspector completes a daily Cadweld inspection report that is used to transfer daily quantities to a master tally sheet for each rebar size and position of splice. The totals are reviewed v
( U and sister splices required in accordance with a schedule of one test splice per each third of a 100 production splices. According to Mr. Stromberg, the current Cadweld splice inspector as well as two backup inspectors have been trained to understand the Quality Control Instruction for Cadweld rebar splicing.
The inspector's review of Cadweld splice and sister splice records disclosed that the frequency of testing was not consistent with the schedule outlined in Appendix SC5.0 of the PSAR.
3.
Rebar Spacing Rebar spacing had previously been found to be in excess of specified requirements and although approved verbally by engineering, was undocumented.
Following the last inspection, the licensee innediately instituted an intensified program to identify all discrepancies from original design specifications and document them on drawings and nonconfor-mance reports. The QA records disclose that the nonconformance reports along with appropriate stress analysis reports were submitted to engineering for review and disposition made accordingly. In some cases, additional rebar had to be added. All of the accept
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or repair work was approved by the Engineering Review Board.
It appeared to the inspector during a tour around the liner, at which time numerous measurements were made, that all of the rebar had been properly spaced. Jackson stated that SMUD will review this matter further during the licensing phase if desired by DRL.
E.
Concrete Followup Observation of Work (Containment Building)
The inspector observed work connected with the testing and placement of concrete for the containment vessel walls as required by PI 4605.06. A substantial portion of the placement of lift B-11 (elevation 33.5 to 43.5 l
feet) was observed. Except for two questionable items, it appeared that the procedures being followed and work performance was consistent with C0's PI 4605.06 and Section 5.4 of the PSAR. Items of interest were as follows:
1.
Preplacement QC Inspections A preplacement checkoff list was used prior to the placement of concrete to assure that all concerned parties concurred with the proposed placement. It was observed that the Bechtel placement inspector had signed off on the tendon sheaths while one sheath was still being checked. In fact, the placement was held up pJ
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Mr. Davis stated that his inspectors were not in the habit of presigning checkoff sheets but that the tendon sheath involved was partially covered by the last lif t and had been checked at that time. Nevertheless, all parties agreed that it was not 3
prudent to sign off on an item until all checking had been completed.
2.
Slump. Strength and Entrainment Tests The sampling for slump, strength and air entrainment testing was observed. Only slump tests were made of the trucked concrete when it was discharged into the placement bucket. Slump, strength and air entrainment tests were made of concrete sampled as the batch wsA discharged into the transport truck. In accordance with Section 5.1.3.1 of the PSAR, truck sampling and testing practices were observed to be consistent with ASTM C-l '2 (sampling fresh concrete), ASTM C-31 (making test speciments), ASTM C-143 (slump tests), ASTM C-231 (air entrainment), and ASTM C-39 (method of test for compressive strength).
Mr. Erickson stated that they were still making comparison strength tests of batch plant sampling versus point of placement sampling for bucket concrete, belt conveyed concrete and pumped concrete.
The preliminary results of 28-day break tests of about four tests of each type of concrete has shown reasonable agreement with some variation between batch plant and point of placement samples.
However, all samples have exhibited strengths greater than the specified strength.
Mr. Erickson believed the reason for the noted discrepancies could be attributed to the handling of samples and trying to get them to the curing room as soon as possible.
Therefore, specially insulated boxes have been made which will be used to hold the samples for a day prior to transporting them to a curing room. At least 10 comparative samples have been planned for each method of placing concrete. Regardless of the results, Mr. Erickson will propose to management that comparative samples be made for pumped concrete at least weekly.
3.
Placement The placement of concrete appeared to be consistent with the inspector's understanding of good placemant practices. It was observed that horizontal surfaces were wetted and covered with one-quarter inch to one-half inch of mortar of the same cement-sand ratio as used in the concrete, immediately before the concrete was placed to ensure bonding of concrete between lifts (Section 5.4.4.1 of PSAR).
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Rebar Splices The making of rebar splices was observed during the previous inspection and was found to be satisfactory. The adequacy of the test sampling associated with the sister splice program was questioned at the time of the last inspection but has since been corrected to be consistent with the schedule in the PSAR (re: Section D.2. of this report).
5.
Delivery of Concrete Except for one item, the delivery of concrete from the batch plant to the transport truck to the bucket was observed to be consistent with the licensee's QC plan. A numbered placard is used to indicate the strength of concrete a truck will be hauling. It was observed that the placard showed "4" instead of "5" on one of the trucks when it arrived with a load of concrete.
Mr. Davis, Chief Reactor Building Inspector, spotted the discrepancy and Lanediately checked the driver's delivery ticket before allowing the concrete to be unloaded. The ticket showed that the proper mix had been delivered.
The inspector independently confirmed this by checking the batch plant tapes. When questioned, Mr. Erickson stated that the batch plant inspector was responsible to see that trucks were properly N
tagged prior to the delivery of any concrete. Apparently he had
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neglected to check this particular truck.
Mr. Erickson subsequently discussed this breakdown in QC with his inspector, the Leavell-Dravo job foreman and the truck driver.
6.
QC Inspections With the possible exception of the two previously discussed deviations, it appeared that the proper QC inspections were being made in accordance with the licensee's established QA program.
Bechtel QC inspectors were observed to be at the batch plant, truck delivery point and point of placement.
F.
Prestressed Concrete 1.
Tendon Sheaths The continuous checking of tendon sheaths for blockage during the placement of concrete was observed and appeared to be consistent with CO's PI 4705.06.a.2.
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Placement of Sheaths and Anchorages The placement c.f sheaths and anchorages was observed to be consistent with the inspector's understanding of PI 4705.06.a.1. Alignment of sheathing and anchorage plates was checked against the drawings by surveyors before the placement of concrete. It was coted during the July 1970 inspection that concrete placement was held up until sota tendon sheathing had been properly aligned.
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k Sacramento Municipal Utility District Rancho Seco Nuclear Generation Station Clay, California i
APPENDIX A Reactor Containment Liner Welding and Nondestructive Testing i
W. D. Kelley Reactor Inspector (Construction)
I C0 Report No. 50-312/70-6 4
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'N SCOPE An announced inspection was made on September 17, 1970, at the Rancho Seco 's containment liner fabricator and erector, Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CB&I), to audit the radiographs of the field welds. An announced inspection was made on September 18, 1970, at the Rancho Seco site to visually inspect the field welds of the containment liner.
SUMMARY
An audit of approximately 50 radiographs of fiel'1 welding selected at random from the knuckle section up revealed that the density of the weld varied greater than the minus 157, plus 30% of the density through the penetrameter as specified in paragraph UW-51.
The density in the weld area in some cases was less than the 1.3 specified in paragraph UW-51.
The containment liner had been welded from both aides and the penetrameter sized for plate thickness plus two reinforcements thickness as allowed by the paragraph UW-51(a);
however, a shim for only one reinforcement thickness was used. Because the radiographs did not meet the applicable sections of the code, they were not evaluated by the (CO:II) inspector for flaws.
(See Section D.)
The visual inspection of the containment welds at Rancho Seco confirmed that in the welding of the -inch plate to the one-inch plate the weld bead had overrun the weld groove and up on the scarfed edge of the one-inch plate as 4
revealed in the radiographs.
(See Section D.)
The welding of containment liner in the lower section was poor in appearance indicating considerable trouble in maintaining quality welds.
(See Section E.)
DETAILS A.
Persons Ccatacted Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD)
J. Jackson Quality Assurance Director Bechtel Corporation (Bechtel) - Rancho Seco Nuclear Generation Station B. L. Boyd Senior Welding Engineer A. Cappellette Welding Inspector Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CB&I), Fremont, California E. T. English Division Manager Welding and QA R. Jamison QA Supervisor D. Gattis Project Manager
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NDT Requirements An announced inspection was made on September 17, 1970, to the SMUD Rancho Seco Nuclear Generation Station containment liner fabricator and erector, CB&I, Fremont, California, to audit construction weld radiographs.
All radiographs for this contract are stored at their Fremont plant.
dection 5.5.1.1.c. of the PSAR requires that 2% of each weldor's wcrk shall be spot radiographed on a random basis as an aid to quality control.
The criterion for radiographic techniques is specified to be in accordance with paragraph UW-51 of Section VIII of the ASME Code. However, the contract with CB&I requires in Section 7B.ll that 10% of the containment liner welds of materials less than three-fourths inch in thickness be spot radiographed in accordance with paragraph UW-52 of Section VIII. All plate greater than three-fourths inch in thickness and all penetrations are required to be fabricated, inspected and tested in accordance with Section III, subsection B, of the ASME Code for material. The 1968 Edition of the ASNE Code plus the summer addenda are the applicable documents for the contract.
During the welding of the knuckle, cone, and second course of plate spot radiography revealed an abnormally high porosity. SMUD issued through Bechtel a Configuration Change Document Change No. 24-M12 dated March 19, 1970, i
gsg (see Exhibit A) which changes the radiographic acceptance criteria from j
paragraph UW-52 to UW-51 with the exception that the maximum allowable length of slag inclusion was reduced from 0.25 inch to 0.125 inch.
C.
NDT Technicians The erection of the containment liner was done by boilermakers from Local No. 6, San Francisco, ?alifornia, which does not require the nondestructive tests be performed by boilermakers. The lines of supervision of the NDT l
technicians are shown on the attached CB&I Quality Assurance Organization Chart.
(See Exhibit B.)
The project radiographer has been examined and certified to Level I radiographer per SNT-TC-1A by CB&I and is under the direct supervision of the project foreman; however, the project welding and QA supervisor who interprets the radiographs has been examined and certified to Level II and reports to the construction welding and QA manager at Fremont.
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Jamison, who is the project welding and QA supervisor, is also qualified to Level II for magnetic particle inspection and liquid penetrant examination.
He stated that he has been doing NDT for CB&I since 1952, 4
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Radiogra phs The records of radiographs are kept on containment rollout drawings.
The (CO:II) inspector selected radiographs at random starting at the bottom knuckle section and continuing upward. CB&I was able to retrieve the radiographs from their storage in less than 30 minutes. During the audit of the radiographs it was apparent that the density requirements of paragraph UW-51(c)(3) were not met.
The inspector was informed that at the start of the erection a densito-meter was not onsite for the CB&I or Bechtel inspectors. A Kodak Model 1 densitometer was made available to the (CO:II) inspector which was the same densitometer used onsite during the later part of the erection. Density measurements were taken on a radiograph by the (CO:II) inspector and Jamison was asked to take density measurements at the same spots and their readings were in agreement.
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Some of the density readings through the weld area of the radiographs were less than the 1.3 on the H&D scale for single film viewing as required l
by paragraph UW-51(a)(3). Some readings were as low as 0.9.
These low readings were marked on the film separation paper by the Bechtel inspector of the radiographs taken after the densitometer was received onsite. An example of the low density of radiographs taken before the densitometer was (N!
received onsite is the fifth repair on knuckle weld R-44 on which the uensity reading through the penetrameter was 1.4 and through the weld 0.9 and 1.0.
l An example of the low density measurements through the weld (recorded by the i
Bechtel inspector and verified by the CO:II inspector) was the vertical weld between plates 25B and 25C which required 100% radiography where readings of 0.9 and 1.0 were recorded.
The wide variations in density reading of the radiographs of plates of equal thickness is due to the uneven grinding of the weld reinforcement.
In some areas of the welds, -einforcement on both sides of the weld was flush, while in other areas the reinforcement on both sides has been ground to the maximum allowed by paragraph UW-51(a) of the Code. The radiographer used only one penetrameter which had been shimmed for only one weld reinforcement which resulted in a variation in the density greater than the minus 15% to plus 30%
allowed by paragraph UW-51(c)(3) of the code. The low density reading of the radiographs of welds of plates of different 'hicknesses was in the area where the weld reinforcement had been washed up on the scarfed edge of the thicker plate. The spot radiographs were taken by X-ray generators which emphasized the variation in weld thickness by a greater variation in density of the radiographs than would have been given with Ir-192.
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Welding CB&I stated that the welding specifications for welding rod were written so that only Hobart Brother welding rod could meet them. CB&I bought Hobart E6010 electrode for the erection welding and, during the welding of the knuckle section and cone section, excessive porosity was revealed in spot radiography. Porosity is not a basis for rejection of welds in paragraph W-52 of Section VIII of the code. SMUD was not willing to accept radiographs with the large amounts of porosity and required a contract change. Bechtel issued a Configuration Change Document-Change No. 24-M12 dated March 19, 1970, changing the acceptance criteria for radiographic acceptance of welcs from paragraph W-52 to paragraph W-51 except the maximum acceptable length of slag inclusion was reduced from 0.25 inch to 0.125 inch.
An investigation of the source of porosity by CB&I revealed the Hobart E6010 electrodes as received from the manufacturer had flux that did not contain the proper moisture content. CB&I was then permitted by SMUD to switch to Lincoln Electric Company E6010 electrodes and the excessive porosity was eliminated. A decision was made to remove electrodes and reveld using Lincoln electrodes. This was accomplished by arc air gouging out the weld from one side to a depth greater than T/2, rewelding using Lincoln E6010 electrodes in accordance with the approved welding procedure, are air gouging the remaining half of the weld from the opposite side, rewelding with Lincoln E6010 electrodes, and radiograph in accordance with paragraph W-52 but svaluating the radiographs in accordance with paragraph W-51 as modified by Bechtel Configuration Change Document-Change No. 24-M12.
The appearance of the field welding readily revealed that considerable rework had been done and that the erector had trouble getting good weldors during the early stages of construction. The boilermaker weldors are members of Local No. 6, San Francisco, which does not permit a company to bring in 507. of its work force as permitted by the National Transit Local of the boilermakers. CB&I verified that they had considerable trouble in qualifying veldors in accordance with Section IX of the ASME Code, and once qualified,
keeping the quality of the welding up to the requirements of Section VIII, paragraphs W-28 through W-38.
The Bechtel welding inspector who evaluated the radiographs was Mr. A.
Cappelletti who was with Bechtel at FP&L Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 at the time the containment was erected by GATX Corporation and should have been knowledgeable in the requirements for welding and nondestructive testing of reactor containment liners.
s.
s, m RaivCHO Lv PROJECT CONFIGURATION CHANGE DOCUMENT
's CHANGE NO. 34-!:12 Reference Contract: di.1 Date: March 19, 1970 Change Requested by: Charles Berk Date: March 19, 1970 Change Prepared by: Charles Berk $
Description of Chan,+:
With regard to Section 7B.11, paragraph I.1.b, the criteria for radiographic acceptance of welds is changed from paragraph W-52,Section VIII of the ASME Code, to Paragraph W-51, except 'that maximum acceptable length of slag inclusion will not exceed 0.125 inches, whereas the code allows.250 inches.
Reason for Change:
To increase the level of quality of the welding thereby providing more assurance that leakage of the containment liner will not occur.
Remarks:
Approval Signatures:
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Date:
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JR xect Ud\\D i ew O-I3 7 0 Sechtel Vernon
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EXHIBIT A
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R. M. Phelps Operations Manager Fremont i
Project' lManaaer
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QA Manager Fremont Fremont I
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,~N DIVISICII 0F CC?f?T,TU'CE MONT2LY REPORT. EPTEEER 1970 d-3/k Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco) - An insnection was conducted on September 17-10 to (1) review radiceraphs and weld-ing of the centainment vessel liner, (2) observe concrete placement, and (3) review corrective acticn regarding deficiencies observed dur-ing the July 1970 inspection (August Menthly Recort). Previously reported deficiencies have been satisfactorily resolved. New de-ficiencies relating to spot radiograchs en the containment ldner and the placement of concrete were noted.
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