ML19319D672
| ML19319D672 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1970 |
| From: | Ross D US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003180707 | |
| Download: ML19319D672 (3) | |
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na lV June 4, 1970 s
. Richard C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for PWR's, Division of Reactor Licensing S
TIIRU: ' Charles G. Long, Chief, PWR-2, Division of Reactor Licensing k
PRE-FSAR MEETING WI11I FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION ON CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 (DOCKET NO. 50-302)-
We met with J. T. Rogers and W. O. May of Florida Power Corporation and Roy Snapp,. Legal consultant,on May 27, 1970 to discuss changes in regu-latory practices since ene September 1968 issuance of the Crystal River CP.. The items' covered and positions expressed were these listed in the meeting notice,'Long to Morris, dated May 25, 1970.
Attending for DRL were R. C. DeYoung, C. Long, D. Mui 3r, A. Schwencer, and D. Ross The items discussed were:
1.
Hydrocen Purging We said_that scue sort of hydrogen control would be required and gave them a copy-of the M111stene-2 ACRS letter for further guidanca.
FPC said they have only 880# aluninum in the containmenr.
2.
- Reactor Vessel Cavity Desien We asked for an analysis of a big-break (14.1 f t ) in the vessel cavity.
FPC said that Gilbert Associates had already dona this analysis and that the informattien would be in the FSAR.
3.
Turbine Misslics We.saidJ hat-in light of Westinghouse's revised turbine missile analysis, t
FPC should reevaluate its design.
Rogers said that FPC had already started this effort, and _is in the process of obtaining further information on missile energy for use by the,A/E, Cilbert Associates.
'Appare,ntly the turbine over-speed controls will be improved; also FPC has already taken the emergency feedwater pump suction away from the-hot-well, to separate tanks.
4.
Industrial Security We / notified FPC of ~a need for some information on industrial security to
-include:
access control, equipment status monitoring, personnel selec-tion, and plantfdesign and arrangement.
3 5.
. Fuel Storaye We infor=ed FPC of our revised criteria for a fuel handling accident
. (208 ' broken rods, vs 56 ~at CP).
We also. discussed the need for_ showing the fuel cask zone-in the fuel pool; and the consequences of a cask drop.
FPClsaid they had already performed this analysis and that the cask
. zone could survive.a drop.
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June 4, 1970 6.
Strong Motion Seismograph We advised FPC, and they agreed, to provide one seisc.ograph.
They are not sure of the location at this time, but believe that the A/E has selected the base-slab center of rotation.
7.
Failure to Scram on Anticipated Transients We discussed the status of our efforts with B&W to date. We said that at this time we see some possible problems, that there are other transients that B,&W should look at, and that the ground-rules should be different.
Rogers thought that FPC should be a party to this effort, as the appli-cant may be able to make a significant contribution in their role as an experienced secam plant operator.
FFC will be given a lis t of the transients to be analyzed.
8.
Emergency Plan We gave FPC a copy of the recently-published 10 CFR 50 Appendi:: E (Federal Register ':otica s ! May 21, 1970), and a ccoy of the Guide for Em?rgency Planning.
9.
SEPA We said that FPC uculd receive a request for additional informatica in regard to the Environmental Act, but that we were not yet sure of the tieln; or dapth required.
- 10. LOCA Analysis We notified FPC that a more sophisticated code than FLASH-1 should be used in the blowdown analysis for the Crystal River FSAR.
- 11. Sensitized Stainless Steel We asked FPC to include in their FSAR.c description of the sensitized stain 1gss steel components and the related water chemistry control procedures.
- 12. Vibration Monitoring We indicated that Crystal River would need to provide some confirma-tory vibration monitoring for the plant life.
Troubles at Connecticut Yankee and Indian Point 1 were centioned.
FPC has a staff cember on extended duty at CY, and he should becc=e familiar with their problems.
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June 4, 1970.
- Y 13.114ak Detection-
- We said'that FPC should follow closely the developments in leak
= detection. sensitivities that are being required, and how FPC design provides'this' sensitivity.
4 14'. Structures We1 revealed'our current practice of; analysis of containment ptessure l'
E with :the ~ CONTEMPT code, and said that. there was a preferred margin of
'10%, predicted belcw : design.. We ' mentioned current thinking on smaller-than-telephone. pole tornado ~ missiles, such as piping.
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- 15. Instrumentation
-I We told FPC of our current dialogue with D&W (0conee-Midland) on
- pressurizer-high-level ins trumentation redundancy, and diverse trip requirements for: ECCS function.
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16.~ Miscellaneous
':FFC will evaluate their design against the 70GDC (of 1967) uniens something never is published in the next few months.
The FSAR will probably Lbc filed in. late 1970.
WI D. F. Ross i
- DISTRIBUTION:
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