ML19319D475

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Forwards Strain Gauge Predicted Readings for Reactor Bldg Dome Cap Instruments During Structural Integrity Test,As Discussed on 761026
ML19319D475
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/28/1976
From: Rodgers J
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To: Engle L
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8003170602
Download: ML19319D475 (4)


Text

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u.s. nucle AR Recut 4 Tony coa SioN cocxET NuurE3 A sonu 105 ap a, 50-302 NRC DISTRIBUTION con PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL TO: FROM: # "

Mr Engle Florida Pwr Corp h-28-76 OATE RECEIVED 10-30-76 NETTER ONOTORIZEO PAoP lNPUT FORM NUMBER CF COPIES RECEIVED foasciNAL )2f0NCLAS$1FIEO Ocopy 1 signed.

DESCRIPTION ENCLOSURE Ltr re conversation 10-26-76....trans the Charts indicating the predicted valuse following: for strain gauge readings during the SIT for those instruments placed in the cap of the dome.......

p0NOTKOIOG -

PLANT NAME: Crystal River #3 SAFETY .

FOR ACTION /INFORMATION ENVTRn 11-5-76 dif ASSICNED AD: \/ A s s a //-o '

ASSIGNED ADr BRANCH CHIEF: < + o l '2. _ BRANCH cMTETt PROJECT MANAGER: Fri 4 / PL PROJECT MANAGER!

LIC. ASST.: 1-1 7 ,/ # 0 /1 LIC. ASST.!

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INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION -

V REG R h SYSTEMS SAFETY I PLANT SYSTEMS SITE SAFETY &

NRC PDR HEINEMAN / TFnnscn ENVIRO ANALYSIS )

I & E (t) SCllR0EDER BENAROYA DENTON & MUT.T FR OELD <

/ LAINAS COSSICK & STAFF , ENGINEERING IPPOLITO ENVIRO TrC11.

MIPC f.MACCARRY KIRKWOOD FRNST m

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CASE KNIGHT _ BALLARD HANAUER / SIHWEIL ( y) OPERATING REACTORS SPANCIFR

_JAELESS PAWLICKI STELLO RTTE TFEM

__ PROJECT MANAGEMENT REACTOR SAFETY OPERATING TECH. CAMMILL B_qD ROSS EISENHiTr STEPP -

_ P_. COLLINS NOVAK SHA0 HUT MAN HOUSTON ROSZTOCZY BAER /

PETERSON CHECK BUTLER SITE ANALYSIS I MELTZ CRIMES VOLLMER HELTEMES AT & I BUNCH j SKOVii0LT SALTZMAN .T J OLLINS \

RUTBhhG KRrcFR EXTEHN AL DISTRIBUTION

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CONTROL NUMBER g LPDR: C , , A / fl% _ f-

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Q. NAT IAB: BROOK 1IAVEN_NAT IAB gIC: ._R,EG . VIE ULRIKSON_(ORNL) f}

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1 Ciceonusuaa.iai 8 () () 3 17 Og l

a REACTOR BUILDING DOME

. STRAIN PREDICTIONS ALL STRAINS ARE)(in/in (1 x 10-6 in/in)

THEORETICAL STRAIN GAGE AZIMUTH ' RADIUS INST. MEASUREMENT 12 psig 35 psig 45 psig 55 psig 63.3 psig d

131 750 45, Top Hoop 94 275 353 432 497 Rebar Merid. 42 122 156 191 220 132 Bottom Hoop 88 257 331 404 465 Rebar Merid. 38 110 141 173 199 H p 82 239 308 376 433 133 Concrete 4

Merid. 34 98 127 155 178 134 Liner H p 46 133 171 209 241 Merid. 9 27 34 42 48 167 Anchor Radial 135 165 45, Top _

Hoop 94 275 353 432 497

, Rebar Merid. 42 122 156 191 220 13 6 B tt m Hoop 88 257 331 404 465 Rebar Merid. 38 110 141 173 199 H p 82 239 308 376 433 137 Concrete Merid. 34 98 127 155 178 138 Hoop 46 133 171 209 241 Liner Merid. 9 27 34 42 48 169 Anchor Radial o Top  ; Hoop 94 275 353 432 497 139 255 45,

  • Rebar Merid. 42 122 156 191 220 Bottom Hoop 88 257 331 404 465

, 140 Rebar Merid. 38 110 141 173 199 Hoop 82 239 308 376 433 141 Concrete Merid. 34 98 127 155 178 Hoop 46 133 171 209 241 42 Liner Merid. 9 27 34 42 48 '

, 168 Anchor Radial 143 45, Top Hoop 94 275 353 432 497 345 l Rebar Merid. 42 122 156 191 220 '

144 Bottom Hoop 88 257 331 404 465 ,

t Reba - Merid. 38 110 141 173 199 j Hoop 82 239 308 376 433 145 Concrete Merid. 34 98 127 155 178 146 Hoop 46 133 171 209 241 Liner Merid. 9 27 34 42 48f 170 Anchor Radial NOTE: No limiting or acceptance values are provided for the predicted strain

, changes since these values are highly susceptible to localized effects which cannot be predicted by the analysis of the overall structure.

' Additionally, no predicted values for strain change in the radial anchors have been provided since the expected strains are smaller than the in- 1 strumentation can accurately register.

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l'Il C 4 N 121977 i D-co.,o...o- - ---

B d -- } January 6, 1977 C:<i : C! .

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Mr. John Stolz

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.) L-nrr/h L Branch Chief 'IOJi_lQL) -

Light Water Reactors Branch I Division of Project Management 37 JANI 21977. 8  !

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission comssrm Washington, D. C. --2 0 55 5 -- -

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Subject:

Florida Power Corporation  % 3 Crystal River Unit #3 Docket No. 50-302

Dear Mr. Stol:

On October 4, 1976, we received your October 1, 1976 Request for Additional Information concerning equipment failures dur-ing a degraded grid voltage condition.

Specifically, you requested Florida Power Corporation to evaluate the design of the CR#3 Class IE electrical distri-bution system to determine if the operability of safety related equipment, including associated control circuitry or instrumen- <

tation, can be adversely affected by short term or long term )

degradation in the grid system voltage.

Attached are forty (40) copies of our response to the questions contained in Enclosure No. 2 of y6ur October 1, 1976 letter Our response is in question and answer foraat to facilitate your review. e i 1

i If further discussion of this matter it required, please do l not hesitate to contact this office.

Very truly yours, ,

l l

J. T. Rodgers Asst. Vice President JTR/iw Attachments.

351 General Office 3201 inirty-fourin street soutn . P o sox 14o42 st. Petersburg. Fiorica 33733 813-866-5151 l J

- - IN WITNESS WHERE0F, the applicant has caused its name to be hereunto signed by J.T. Roagers, Assistant Vice President, and its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed by Betty M. Clayton, Assistant Secretary, thereunto duly authorized the 6th day of January,1977.

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION By j?'

J .T.Vdodgers O Assistant Vice President

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ATTEST

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J Betty M. Clayton Assistant Secretary (CORPORATE SEAL)

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 6th day of January,1977.

Notary Public My Commission Expires:

Notary Public State of Florida at Large My Comission Expires July 9, 1978 i

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, QUESTION 1.a:

Describe the plant conditions under which the plant auxiliary systems (safety related and non-sa fety re-lated) will be supplied by offsite power. Include ,

, an estimate of the fraction of normal plant operating time in which this is the case.

] RESPONSE:

The unit is provided with one full size. Auxiliary Transformer and one full size Start-up Transformer.

The Auxiliary Transformer is connected to the Generator and will serve as the normal source of power to the -

i non-safety related buses. The sta rt-up transformer is connected to the 230 KV substation and serves as the normal source for the safety related buses as well as providing a source of power for start-up, shut down and after shutdown requirements. Each of the trans-formers has two isolated secondary windings , one at 6900 volts and one at 4160 volts. Each transformer is capable of supplying the normal full load require-ments of the unit. Transfer capability is provided so that upon loss of the unit voltage, the non-safety related buses will automatically be transferred to the Start-up Transformer.

Based on the above, the percentage of time the buses are supplied from offsite power during normal operation is as follows:

Safety Related Buses 100%

Non-Safetf Related Buses 0%

QUESTION 1.b:

The voltage used to describe the grid distribution ,

system is usually a " nominal" value. De fine the normal operating range of your grid system voltage and the corresponding voltage values at the safet related buses.

RESPONSE: -

Normal operating range of 230 KV grid system is 238 KV to 242 KV. Nominal value is 2JO KV. The corresponding voltage values at the sa fety related buses a re as follows:

GRID 4160V 480V VOLTAGE BUS BUS 238 KV 4200 V 485 V 240 KV 4235 V 489 V 242 KV 4270 V 493 V QUESTION 1.c:

The transformers utilized in power systems for pro-

!- viding the required voltage at the various system distribution levels are normally provided with taps to allow voltage adjustment. Provide the results of an analysis of your design to determine if the voltage profiles at the safety related buses are satisfactory -

._ __. for the full load and no load conditions on the system

, and the range of grid voltage.

i

RESPONSE

The voltage values at the safety related buses for no load and full load conditions and the range of grid voltage are as follows:

No Load Full Load GRID 4160 V 480 V 4160 V 480 V VOLTAGE BUS BUS BUS BUS 238 KV 4200 V 485 V 3961 V 451 V 240 KV 4235 V 489 V 3994 V 454 V 242 KV 4270 V 493 V 4027.V 458 V These voltage values are satisfactory for the full i

load and no load conditions on the system and the range of grid voltage.

QUESTION 1.d:

Assuming the facility auxiliary loads are being carried by the station generator, provide the voltage profiles at the safety buses for grid voltage at the normal maximum value, the normal minimum value , and-at the degraded conditions (high or low voltage, current, etc.) which would require generator trip.

Rl!SPONSI!:

The normal operating range of.the Unit 3 Generator is 22 KV t 5*., or 20.9 KV to 23.1 KV. The voltage values

4 at the safety related buses for no load and f~ ull load conditions and at the normal operating limits of the generator are as follows:

No Load Full Load GEN. 4160 V 480 V 4160 V 480 V VOLTAGE BUS BUS BUS BUS 20.9 KV 4053 V 468 V 3867 V 439 V 22 KV 4267 V 492 V 4071 V 462 V 23.1 KV 4480 V 517 V 4274 V 485 V The Unit 3 Generator is designed to trip only during an underfrequency trip condition at 38.0 HZ. The underfrequency device is set to trip the unit in 12 seconds at 58.0 HZ. The voltage output is never expected to vary outside the normal operating range of the generator. During an underfrequency condition, the generated voltage may be reduced. To maintain

- rated KVA at the less-than-rated frequency, a com-parable increase in excitation to the generator field windings is required. This is accomplished automa-tically with the voltate regulation system of the generator.

QUESTION 1.e:

Identify the sensor location and provide the trip setpoint for your facility's Loss of Offsite Power (undervoltage trip) instrumentation. Include the basis for your tri;p setpoint selecti'on.

RESPONSE

Each 4160 V and 480 V safety related bus has undefvoltage relays. Thes.e relays are located in the respective switchgear panels. The 4160 V setpoint is 2375.1 V, or 56.5%. The 480 V setpoint is 271.4 V or 56.5%. The -.

480 V starters and contactors are capable of withstand-ing a momentary voltage drop of 55% of rated voltage for a period of 2 seconds without dropping out. This is the basis for an undervoltage trip setpoint of 56.5%.

-QUESTION 1.f:

Assuming gperation on offsite power and degradat ion of the grid system voltage, provide the voltage values at the-safety related buses corresponding to the maximum value of grid voltage and the degraded grid voltage corresponding to the undervoltage trip setpoint.

RESPONSE

Maximum value of grid voltage is 242 KV. At this value 7

the voltages at the 4160 V and 480 V buses are re-spectively 4270 V and 493 V.

The grid voltage corresponding to undervoltage trip'on 4160 V bus at 2375.1 V'is 142,736 V.

s QUESTION 1.g:

Utilizing the safety related bus, voltage values identified

in (f), evaluate the capability of all safety related loads, including related control circuitry and'instru-mentation, to perform their safety functions. Include -

a definition of the voltage range over which the safety related components, and non-safety components, can-operate ' continuously in the performance of their design function.

RESPONSE

All magnetic devices (contactors and starters) associated with the 480 V safety related buses are designed to operate at 55% of rated voltage for 2 seconds. All safety related and non-safety related components are designed to operate continuously at t 10% of their rated voltage.

QUESTION 1.h:

Describe the bus voltage monitoring and abnormal vc1: age alarms available.in the control room.

RESPONSE

Voltmeters are provided in the control room for each -,

of the unit auxiliary buses (safety and non-safety related). Also potential transformer troubic alarms (indicating, for. safety related buses, that one out of three undervoltage r,elays has operated or, for non-safety related buses, that one out of two under-voltage relays' has operated) and undervoltage alarms on each of the buses are availabic in the control room.

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QUESTION 2:

The functional gafety requirement of the undervoltage trip is to detect the loss of offsite (preferred) power system voltage and initiate the necessary actions required to transfer safety related buses to the oasite power system. Describe the load shedding feature of your design (required prior to transferring to the onsite [ diesel generator] systems) and the capability of the onsite systems to perform their function if the load shedding feature is maintained after the diesel generators are connected to their respective safety buses. Describe the bases (if any) for retention or reinstatement of the load shedding function after the

, diesel generators are connected to their respective buses. -

RESPONSE

Loss of the preferred AC power source will result in undervoltage relay action on the 4160 volt Engineer 2d Safeguards Buses 3A and 3B. Each bus is equippedwich undervoltage relays to provide this action. The operation of these relays will result in tripping all loads connected to the buses except for the Engineered Safeguards Block 1 loads. The operation of these relays will also isolate the two safety related channels entirely from each other.

.The load shedding teature is not maintained after the Diesel Generators are connected to their respective buses, therefore, this part of the quest, ion is not applicable to Crystal River Unit 3.

QUESTION 3:

Define the facility operating limits (real'and reactive power, voltage, frequency and other) establishe,d by the grid stability analyses cited in the FSAR. Describe .

the operating procedures or other provisions presently -

in effect for assuring that your facility is being operated within these limits.

RESPONSE

i Generator Speci fications l 989,400 KVA l

22 KV 25,965 A 0.9 P.F.

3 Phase 60 liZ 1800 RPM

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Cperating Limits Maximum Real Power - 890.46 MW Maximum Reactive Power - 431.27 MVAR Voltage Limits - 22 KV

  • 5%

, Frequency. Limit - 58 HZ The- facility 'will be operated within the above limits as per Crystal River Unit 3 Operating Procedure OP-204 for Power Operation. -

QUESTION 4:

Provide a description of any proposed actions or ,

modifications to your. facility based on the results of the analyses performed in response to items 1-3 above.

RESPONSE: .

There are no actions or modifications necessary on Crystal River Unit 3 based on the above results 1-3.

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