ML19319D280

Summary of NRC 740423-25 Meeting W/Util,B&W & Gilbert Associates,Inc Re Review of Diagrams Concerning Reactor Protection Sys,Engineered Safeguards Actuation Sys, Electric Power Sys & Related FSAR Sections

ML19319D280
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	05/21/1974
From:	Buckley B US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 8003130920
Download: ML19319D280 (9)

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50-302 APPLIC a r : FLORIDA PCHER LtEuTIOli (FPC)

FACILITY. : CFJSrN. RIVER; UNIT 3 SLWAVG MEETING (APRIU 23-25,1974) s On/pri1E23through 25, 1974, the Regulatory staff ret with repredentatives of FTC, Gilbert Assccictes, Inc. (GAI) and rdcock r.nd Wilcox (M'0 to revis the reactor protecticn system (EES) sc'ter. otic r

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m MAY 21 1974 ATTACRIENT 1 Significant Areas of Review 1.

Reacto'r Protection System (RPS) ne RPS was reviewed by discussion of one of the four redundant protection channels using the BSN schematic diagrams and the FSAR figures, tables and text. The following items were noted in the review:

Diagrams E3040962L, D8042368E, ES042329E, DR0d2332D and D8012200G It was noted that tae Power /RC pump trip, removed by the applicant from participating in the RPS, was shown in the drawings submitted for review.

He applicant agreed to correct the drawings showing the deletion of the circuitry associated with this trip. Also, the applicant was told that the Regulatory staff has not yet concurred with the deletion of this trip function from the RPS of Crystal River Unit 3.

We indicated that the applicant will be notified accordingly in this regard.

Diagram E8042329E The reactor coolant ficw transmitter pcwer supply fuses were noted as being incorrectly connected.

The applicant agreed to examine this.

Diagram DSO42331D It was not apparent how the low pressure permissive bistable associated with the shutdown bypass pushbutton can be tested with the plant at normal operating pressure. The applicant indicated that the RC pressure test module utili::ed for testing the high and low pressure trip bistables is also used for verifying the operation of the low pressure permissive bistable. We inoicated that the Technical Specifications (TS) should include the testing of the low pressure permissive bistable.

Diagram D8012200G It was noted that the annunciator contacts, indicating that an active trip bistable unit has been replaced by a dumy bistable, were shown in RPS channel A drawing, but not in channels B, C and D drawings. The applicant agreed to correct this.

Section 7.2.2.3.2 of FSAR (Page 7-20)

We asked the applicant if the unit computer printout was the caly means available to verify control rod assignment to designated groups after reprogra= ting of the rods through the patch panel. The applicant indicated that each rod assignment to a group after reprogra=:ing is also verified through the control rod indication system, and it agreed to correct the 1

FSAR to reflect this..

. 2.

Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) ne review of the ESAS was confined to one of the three redundant analog channels and to one of the two redundant digital actuation channels. GAI elementary diagrams and related FSAR figures, tables and text were discussed in the review. The following items were noted:

Diagram EC-210-486 It was noted that the RC pressure sensors and bistables associated with the HHR isolation valve (DhV-3 and DHV-4) interlocks were not of diverse erinciples.

The applicant indicated that this drawing reflected the old design and submitted new logic diagrams for our review.

We stated that the design of the RHR isolation valve interlocks will remain as an item pending review.

Diagram ES-AB07 It was noted that a single failure in the ESAS indicating lights power transfer control switch will compromise the independence of 120V ac vital Bus 3A and 3B. The applicant agreed to modify the design so it would not be vulnerable to single failures.

Fim2re 7-5 of FSAR It was noted that the logic she m in Figure 7-5 with regard to manual actur. tion at a system icvel of the ESF did not reflect the actual design depicted in the drawings being reviewed. The applicant agreed to revise Figure 7-5 to be consistent with the design drawings.

Section 6.3.1 of the FSAR (Page 6-14)

It was noted that this section did not include all the acceptable and attainable combinations from the electrical system standpoint of reactor building sprays and air recirculation units. The applicant agreed to correct this section of the FSAR.

Table 6-9 of the FSAR (Page 6-29)

We asked the applicant to supplement item 5 of this table to state that the third redundant-reactor building air recirculation unit was not required for satisfying redundancy requirements. The applicant agreed to correct the FSAR.

i.

3

. 3.

Post-Accident Surveillance We asked the applicant to supplement Table 7-8 of the FSAR (Page 7-56) to identify those parameters that will be used for post-accident surveillance. The applicant was infomed that our position for Crystal River Unit 3 with regard to post-accident monitoring was that:

the design providedfor at 1 cast tw redundant channels for each parameter monitored and at least one channel be continuously recorded, and the other(s) indicated.

In addition the monitoring infomation from these channels is to be available to the operator in the control roaa.

4.

Reactor Building Pressure Sensing 6 Testing The testing of the reactor building pressure sensors is accomplished by energizing a solenoid valve to inject instrument air into the sensing line at a pressure greater than the trip setpoint. We noted that cnce the air to the pressure sensors is cut off, there were no design provisions to verify solenoid valve closure. We told the applicant that if the instrument air supply header was depressurized after testing, then, there

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was no way

- aining if the sensor testing solenoid valve was closed or if the

. ave in series with the solenoid valve leaked. Thus, in the eres of an accident, the pressure within the reactor building will not reach the pressure sensor irnediately but instead it will first pressurize the instrument air supply header. The applicant indicated that it was its intentien to maintain the testing instrument air supply header at pressure, and will be documented in the FSAR.

5.

Electric Power System The electric power system including its safety-related loads and actuatien devices, control circuits, and its interfaces with non-Class IE equipment was reviewed by discussion of one of the two redundant portions of the system, using the GAI elementary and single line daigrams, and related FSAR figures, tables and text. The following items were noted in the review:

Diagram CF-01 and CF-02 It was noted that the design of the core flooding tank isolation valve control circuits did not include the features that the applicant has comitted to provide and documented -in the FSAR, Page 6-5.

The applicant indicated that these drawings reflected the old design and submitted new drawings for our review. We stated that the design of the core flooding tank isolation control circuits will remain as an item pending review.

Diagrams DC-01, MJ-01, RW-04 5 SW-02 It was noted that certain ESF punps (such as the decay heat closed cycle cooling water pumps, makeup and perification pumps, emergency nuclear service sea water p.nnps, decay heat sea water pumps and emergency nuclear

m service closed cycle cooling water pinps) could be running during normal plant operation at a time that coincides with the periodic testing of the actuation device starting circuit associated with these ptsps. Thus, it was pointed out that testing of the starting circuit when the ptaps are running may not be feasible and in any case would be meaningless. The applicant indicated that if such is the case (of ESF pumps being running at the time that the ESAS periodic testing was going to be perforced, then,)

the running pump will be stopped and restarted through the ESAS. We indicated that this procedure should be included in the Technical Specifications.

Diagram EG-05 It was noted that the design of the emergency diesel generator start ciret.it did not provide indication showing that the diesels have been selected for automatic start upon an ESAS trip signal er an undervoltage condition.

The applicant agreed to provide such indication.

Diagrcms ?fr-09. ifr-11 and >rr-15 It was noted that the design of the centrol circuits for breaker pa rs 3205 and 3206, 3207 and 3208, and 3211 e::d 3212 provided for paralleling of the redundant diesel generators. We stated that under no c..rcumstances should the independence of the diesel ;eneraten be ccmpr eised.

"~he applicant agreed to modify the design to proviu this independenc2. Also, it l

was pointed cut that if any one of these breakers is maually tripped fr:m l

the control room and subsequently closed locally from the switchgear, l

contacts 7-7c of the control switch 1ccated in the con 7 ol recm will stay open. This will result in the disablement of the undervoltage trip of the breaker which is connected in series with these contacts, thus, preventing the separation of the emergency buses from :he rest of the l

ncn-Class IE electrical system in the plant.

The applicant agreed to mcdify the design to prevent this occurrence.

Furthermore, we indicated that the TS should include requirements for testing the trippirg of each of these breakers through the undervoltage trip circuit path.

Diagram Sfr-26 It was.noted that the design of the control circuits ?or the plant auxiliary transformer-3, Breaker 3222, did not incit:de the features that the applicant had comitted to provide and docunented in Page 8-4a of the FSAR. The applicant indicated that the drawing reflected the old design and will submit a new drawing for cur review.

We stated that the design of the control circuits for Preaker 3222 will remain as an item pending review.

-Diagrams M-37 and >fr-38 It was noted that the independence of the emergency buses would be ccmprcmised at the 480 V level through tie breakers 3390 and 3391. To assure independence-

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. the applicant agreed to include autecatic cpening of the tie breakers upon an ESAS trip signal.

In additien, the applicant agreed to consider opening the tie breakers when the low side breakers of the two redundant 4160/480V transfomers are closed.

Diagram EC-206-11 We advised FPC that the drawing showing the transfer switch utilized to connect the MCC 3AB to either one of the redundant emergency buses 3A or 3B had not been submitted for review. The applicant provided the drawing Off-125). Also, we requested that motor-driven emergency feed-water pump breaker centrol circuits be submitted for our review. We stated that the design of the transfer switch and the motor-driven emergency feedwater pump breaker centrol circuits will remain as items pending review.

Diagrams EC-206-017 and EC-206-041 and Figure 8-9 of the FSAR We informed FPC that the manual cross-connections of the redundant 120V ac vital buses will make the ESAS analog channels vulnerable to single failures.

Also, we noted that such is the case when the vital buses are being supplied from the non-Class IE regulated instmmen; buses. We stated that an acceptabic design should preclude the connection of the vital buses during those modes of plant operation where the plant protection system is recuired to remain eperable after a single failure.

With regard to the vital buses being supplied from the regulated instn:nent buses, we stated that an acceptable design should only permit the connection of one vital bus at a tire to the instrument bus and cnly then for a period not to exceed 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

It was pointed out that supplying powr to one of the vital buses from the instrument bus was not a requirement from the standpoint of safety but it could be considered a desirable feature from the st:ndpoint of preventing spurious signals from tripping the reactor or initiating the ESFs, while the normal scurce of power to the vital bus is being repaired. The applicant agreed to make the design acceptable and to reconsider the supply of the vital buses frca the regulated instmment buses.

Diagrams EC-206-017. EC-206-051 and Figure 8-9 of the FSAR The present design provides for manual cross-cennection of the two redundant main de distribution buses. Also, the two redundant de distributien systems can be interconnected through the 500 KV substation dc panels 3A and 33.

It was noted that there were no mechanical and/or electrical inter 1ceks provided to prevent inadvertent administrative errcr3 frce comprecising the independence of the dc emergency power system.

The applicant agreed to modify the design to assure that the independence

- of the'two redundant de systems is maintained by either supplementing

m

. administrative controls with mechanical and/or electrical interlocks or deleting the manual cross-connections between the redundant de systems.

Section 8.1, Page 8-1 of the FSAR It was indicated that if the electrical pcwer system is found acceptable it will be based on the design meeting the requirements set forth in the GDC 17 and 18 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, 1971.

This was brought to the applicant's attention because tne FSAR states that the design of the electrical system is in compliance with GDC 39-1967.

It has been previously discussed with the a design did not ccuply with GDC 39, however,pplicant that the present we have agreed to accept a design that meets the requirements of the GDC 17 and 18. We suggested that the FSAR should be revised to reflect that the electrical power system satisfies GDC 17 and 18 instead of GDC 39.

The applicant agreed to examine this.

Secticn 8.2.2.3, Pace 8-4 of the FSAR We inquired as to the effects on the electrical compenents (particularly the reactor coolant pumps) if the automatic transfer of all plant loads to Unit 3 startup transfomer was not accomplished within the six cycles stated in the FSAR. The applicant agreed to examine this.

Sections 8.2.2.6 (Page 8-5), 9.7.2.1 (k), Figure 9-12 of the FSAR We discussed the potential problems resulting from exhausting a hydrogen-air mixture emarating from the battery rooms into the control room.

We noted that such a design was fundamentally wrong and that we will require that in depth evaluation be perfomed to demenstrate that the potential problem of a f're and/or explosien in the control room is acceptably low.

This evaluation must consider the worst-case condition of hydrogen evolutien during the life span of the batteries and the propagation of the hydregen through the ventilation system to the control room. We indicated that the worst-case of maxian battery discharge and charge rates as well as the worst-case of battery cells degradation must be reflected in the analysis.

In addition, the analysis must establish under the worst-case condition the time period to produce sufficient hydrogen to yield an explosive mixture, assuming that no air make up and release take place in the ventilation system.

It was pointed out that this is the case during an accident that results in the isolation of the control room frcm the outside environment. The applicant agreed to perform this analysis.

Secticn 8.2.3.1, Page 8-9b of the FSAR With regard to the diesel generator qualification tests, the applicant agreed to submit information substantiating that the diesel generators for Crystal River Unit 3 have been previously qualified for use in Nuclear Pcwer Plant applications.

MEETING WITH FLORIDA POWER CORFORATION CRYSTAL RIVER, UNIT 3 APRIL 23-25, 1974 LIST OF ATTENDEES Atociic Energy Co:nmission B. Buckley L. Derderian C. Long J. Calvo

• S. Washburn Florida Pcwar Corporation W. Szelistowski

3. DuBois A. Gomez J. Rodgers Gilbert Associates Inc.

S. Hunt

'.. Ho::tenstein H. Haeseler V. Willems R. Jaco~oys-Babcock & Wilcox J. Walton C. 3arksdale P. Hamola A. Jenkins D. LaBelle J

' Denotes Part-Time Attendance