ML19319D276
| ML19319D276 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1974 |
| From: | Buckley B US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003130916 | |
| Download: ML19319D276 (9) | |
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St.!IM OF SU'E VISIT OF APRIL 29-MAY 1,1974 w
On April 29, 1974 representatives of the Directorate of Licenshg%isit$d '
the Crystal: River Unit 3 sito in Citrus County, Florica. The purp Me: oft th: visit m to Jr.spct installation cf high erar;y g.iping and taicenduct,
a revie e of the instr::entation, centrol m<1 electricci installation.as specified in the attsclal apnda (Attack.c.r.t 1).;
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ATTAC3 8.T 1 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Docket No. 50-302 AGENDA FOR SITE VISIT ( EI&CSB) - APRIL 1 - MAY 1, 1974 1.
Control Room a.
General layout b.
Nuclear & Reactor Protection instrumentation arrangement & layout c.
Rod position indication d.
Plant Protection System initihion & bypass switch arrangements e.
Diesel control board f.
Cabling in control room (separation, loading, etc.)
g.
Radiation Monitoring 2.
Cable runs & Cable spreading area a.
General layout b.
Degree of separation c.
Diverse Wiring d.
Tray or wireway density (percentage fill) e.
Fire Detection & Protection f.
Penetrations and cable teminations 3.
Switchgear Rooms a.
General layout b.
Physical & electrical separation of redundant units c.
Potential for damage due to fire, missiles, etc.
d.
Cable installation e.
Fire detection & protection 4.
Battery Installations a.
General layout b.
Physical & electrical separation c.
Potential for damage due to fire, missiles, etc.
d.
Fire protection and detection e.
Ventilation independence f.
Monitoring instrumentation 5.
Diesel Generators a.
General layout b.
Physical & electrical sepration from redundant units c.
Fuel supply system d.
Fire' detection & protectiori e.
Auxiliary systems - starting air, combustion air and service cooling water
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Transformers-(Switchyard) a.
Physical & electrical separation
- b. ' Potential for damage due to fire, flooding, missiles, etc.
c.
Fire detection & protection d.
Switchyard breakers control power sources
.7.
Reactor Building & Auxiliary Building a.
Protection system instrument arrangement & layout b.
Potential for' instrument damage due to fire, missiles, etc.
c.
Separation of piping & wiring to redundant instruments d.
Provision for testing protection instruments 8.
Shutdown Outside Control Room a.
Location for potential damage b.
Feedwater system, etc.
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- 7 MAY 17 B74 ATTACIMENT 2 Significant Points 1.
IIICil l!NERGY PIPING 'CUTSIDE CONTAIMIFNr A.
Main Steam and Feedwater Piping Seventy percent of the main steam and feedwater piping was installed or in position for welding. The staff reviewed the above piping including proposed location of main steam isolaticn valves, pressure sensors', piping restraints and cable trays. The general layout of the above piping and components was in accord with proposed modifications described in GAI's report " Effects of High Energy Piping System Breaks Outside the Reactor Building", dated October 1973 including Revisicn 1 dated November 1973.
B.
Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)
'Ihe RHRS compartment venting provisions and flood protection from pipe breaks exterior to the RHRS compartment were inspected. An RPRS compartment vent area of 30ft2 is required to preclude overpressurization of the compartment due to a break in the RHRS piping during RPRS operation. This 30ft2 vent area is provided by removal of two of five concrete plugs located in the RHRS compartment access hole when the RHRS is placed in ~cperation. The venting provisions appeared acceptable to the staff, however, we noted that the three remaining ccncrete plugs, in the RERS access hole, should also be analysed to assure that they would not be disicdged and drop into the RHRS compartment and cause additional system damage. FPC and GAI agreed to perform the above analysis. GAI stated that the staff's new criteria en high energy line breaks outside containment would not require the RHRS to _be treated as a high energy piping system since its operation is required only 2% of the time or less. The staff agreed with the latter comment but pointed out that the aforementioned piping criteria had not yet been officially approved; and while rejection of the new piping criteria was unlikely, it should be considered with regard to any new proposed RHRS modifications. FPC was also infonned that if they elected to apply the new staff criteria on high energy piping to the RHRS they would need to revise the GAI report " Effects of High Energy Line Breaks Outside the Reactor Building". The applicant and GAI agreed to update the latter report if they were to adopt this course of action. hhile not yet in place, we discussed and reviewed the
. concrete barrier FPC had committed to erect around the RHRS compartment access hole to preclude RHRS compartment flooding. This floed protection barrier appeared to be acceptable to the staff.
2.
DIESEL GENERATCRS (EG)
We-inspected the two diesel generator ccmpartments and concluded that adequate
. water drainage and separatien of Se DG ccmpartments was provided to preclude flooding of the ccmpartments during actuatien of the DG compartment fire
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,. protection system. We reonested that FPC provide confirmatory infomation that the diesels can operate satisfactorily during operation of the DG fire protection system. FPC agreed to provide this additional infomatien.
3.
CONTROL ROG1 VENTILATION We found that the ventilation ducts in the control room were located in the plenum above the ceiling.
In view of the tact that the design provides for exhausting the hydrogen from the battery rooms into the control room, concern was expressed to the applicant about the potential for accumulation of an explosive hydrogen mixture in the plenum. The applicant indicated that it will check if the formation of hydrogen pockets in the plenum is possible due to the difference in pressure between the plenum and the area below the control room ceiling.
Also, we asked the applicant to check health and perfomance implications to the centrol room operators resulting from being an evnironment containing a greater than normal percentage of hydrogen. The applicant agreed to look into this natter.
4.
REACTOR PRUTECTION SYSTB1 (RPS)
We noted that the steel conduits, which houses the cables that enter the bottom of the RPS cabinets, had been cut short thus, exposing redundant cables to air separaticn between each other. We infomed the applicant that this cable arrangement appears to be in violation of the separation criteria documented in the FSAR. The applicant indicated that if this cable installation violates the separation criteria, (1 foot horizontal /
vertical between redundant cables), barriers will be installed.
NOTE: We have since checked the FSAR and found that the separation criteria documented in the FSAR and accepted by the Regulatory staff is contrary to that stated by the applicant during the site visit. Therefore, we will require that the cable installation be made to comply with the separation criteria stated in Section 8.2.2.12, Item C(5) of the FSAR which includes the use or barriers when the minimum spatial separation between redundant cables can not be maintained.
5.
SWITO E \\R ROGIS FLOODINS We noted that a main firewater line was located cutside but nearby the safety related switchgear rooms. Ccncern was expressed to the applicant about the failure of this line causing the flooding of redundant switchgear rooms.
The applicant agreed to evaluate the potential flooding problem in the safety related switchgear rocms resulting fran this pipe failure.
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BAITERY ROCNS SEPARATION We found that the two safety related battery rooms are directly connected through the ventilation exhaust duct; the exhaust from one battery room discharges into the other redundant rocm.
We expressed concern about a fire and/or explosion in one room propagating to the other through the ventilation exhaust duct resulting in the loss of both redundant dc-systems. The battery rooms also shared a common wall and door. Concern was also expressed to the applicant with regard to the door being explosive proof and whether an explosion in one room could be propagated into the other room. The applicant agreed to provide additional information with regard to the capability of the exhaust duct and door design to withstand these type of events.
We suggested that the applicant's reavaluation of this matter should follow the guidelines for the worst-case condition of hydrogen evolution set forth in the minutes of April 23-25, 1974 meeting.
Moreover, we noted that ene of the battery rocms included a shower.
The applicant indicated that the shcwer was temporarily installed and it will be removed.
7.
230 kV SWITCHYARD BREAKERS C0hTROL PCiER SEPARATION Tc satisfy the requirements of GDC 17 with regard to offsite power, the applicant had committed to provide two independent dc control sources and feeds to the 230 kV switchyard breakers.
We found that the de control power cables emanating from fossil Units 1 5 2 batteries respectively must pass thrcugh a ccamen walk thrcugh a concrete tunnel before entering the switchyard. We noticed that the tunnel was flocded several inches deep in scme areas and the sump pumps were inoperative. Also, we noticed the absence of fire detection and protection in the tunnel. Concern was expressed to the applicant about the potential hazards existing in this tunnel and the susceptibility of the cabic installation to single events such as fire and flooding that could cause the failure of the two dc
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feeds.
In view of that one of the de control cable feeds was already installed-in trays running through the tunnel, it was suggested that it would be advisable to consider water-tight steel conduit to route the other de feed through the tunnel. The applicant was informed that the operability and surveilance of the tunnel sinp pumps should be considered as Technical Specificaticn requirements.
In addition, it was suggested that the applicant examine the tunnel
-installation and seal'in areas where water could enter the tunnel. Moreover, the applicant was informed that the Technical Specifications should include requirements gcVerning operability and surveillance of Unit 15 2 battery installations which met the intent of those requirements imposed upon the Unit 3 Class IE batteries.
S.
CCS, ROL RCD DRIVE PCWER DISCONNECT SWITCHES T
-We noted that the rod drive control system included manual switches e
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We indicated that
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in-Arkansas hbclear One'. Unit!1 which has been cited as having
.the same design as Crystal River _- Unit'3. The applicant agreed-
. to detemine the purpose.of;this design feature and advise us
- accordingly.
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KITACINENT 3 ATTENDANCE LIST Atomic Energy Commissicn B. C. Buckley J. Calvo E. Vallish, RGII R. Klecker T. Conlon, ROII F. Bower, ROII Florida Power Cornoration B. DuBois A. Gome:
W. S elistowski Gilbert Associates D. Cronk S. Fh:nt
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