ML19319C589
| ML19319C589 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1974 |
| From: | Peltier I US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002191027 | |
| Download: ML19319C589 (14) | |
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3 APPLICANT : TOLED0 EDISON COMPANY FACILITY : DAVIS-BESSE lJNIT 1 REPORT ON MEETING llELD OCTOBER 1,1974 AT BETHESDA, MARYLAND Jumary A working meeting was held with Toledo Edisen and the Licensing Technical Review staff to discuss the results of the round-two OL review. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss and clarify the staff's positions and recuirements for any additional infonnation required to complete the safety review. Technical Review branches represented on a part-time basis were: Structural Engineering, Containnent Systens, Reactor Systrs, Electrical Instrumentation and Controls Systens, Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systens, Industrial Security and Emergency Plannino and Mechanical Engineering. Attachment 1 is the attendance list far the meeting.
Discussicn As a result of the discussions, a number of modificatient to the staff's round-two recuests and positions were made and the applicant comitted to clarifying the FSAR in a number of areas. Attachment 2 sumarizes the changes and comitments. Attachmcnts 3 and 4 contain the positions and requests which were deleted from the original review list as a consequence of the meeting. The remaining positions and requests will be forwarded to the apclicant fomally.
origins st;nd 11 I. A. Peltier, Project l'anager Light Water Reactors Branch 2-3 Directorate of Licensing-Attachments:
1.
List of Attendees 2.
Round-Two Discussions 3.
Positions Deleted 4
Requests Deleted a '" *
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O ahe ATTACHMDrr 1 MEETING WITH TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY OAVIS-BESSE 1 ROUND-TWO REVIEW HELD OCTOBER 1. 1974 i
LIST OF ATTENDEES Atomic Energy Comission I. A. Peltier R. E. Lipinski S. Chan J. Shapaker R. Kirkwood A. Szukiewicz R. Van Kniel A. Ungaro R. Bosnak Toledo Edison Comoany L. E. Roe E. C. Novak G. L. Hurrell Bechtel Corocration M. Patel Jin-Sien Guo V. U. Howard S. J. Lutz J. E. Reilly P. P. Anas M. K. Arras S. N. Saba T. R. Quay A. W. Wilk W. H. Mable I
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ATTACHMEYr 2 DAVIS-BES'SE 1 ROUND-TWO REVIEW DISCUSSIONS WITH TOLEDO EDISON AND THE AEC STAFF The following staff positions were discussed and resolveC as indicated.
For wording of position deleted, seu Attachment 3.
Remaining positions will be forwarded to the applicant formally.
Position No.
3.2.1 Deleted - Plant equipment is 90% installed.
3.2.2 Reworded - Plant equipment is 90% installed. Applicant will be requested to perform additional reasonable pipe weld examination.
3.9.3 Clarified
" Appurtenances" refers to small devices rather than large =otors and pump s.
7.1.2 Clarified - Discharge testing of batteries to be performed every refueling or 18 months which ever comes first.
7.5.1 Deleted - Applicant cocmitted to revising FSAR to clarify 7.5.1.
7.5.2 Deleted - Applic' ant co=nitted to revising FSAR to state that recorders have seismic qualification.
Clarification - Applicant cannot comply with this position.
7.6.1 Will respond with alternate position.
7.6.2 s leted - Applicant has provided information on page 9-3.2
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and Figure 9-12b in FSAR.
7.6.3 Clarification - Applicant complies with this position except for Item 2.
Will respond to position.
8.3.1 Clarification - Applicant will respond to and challenge this position with alternate position.
9.2.1 Clarification - Applicant will respond to and challenge this position.
13.3.1 Clarification - Applicant will alert offsite support groups whenever a local or onsite emergency has the potential for degrading into an offsite emergency.
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The following staff requests were discussed and resolved as indicated.
For wording of request deleted, see Attachment 4.
Remaining requests will be forwarded to the applicant formally.
Request No.
3.2.2 Deleted - Applicant committed to revise FSAR.
4 3.2.5 Deleted - Applicant committed to stating in the FSAR l
that the entire letdown line is not Seismic Category I.
3.2.6 Deleted - Applicant said.that Table 9-11 is not correct in FSAR. Co=mitted to correcting.
3.5.1 Clarification - Applicant will clarify Tables 10-2 and 10-3 in the FSAR to include assumptions used to modify missile parameters for building roof height, drag coefficients, etc., and justify position that missile will not penetrace.
3.6.8 Deleted - Applicant should properly categorize letdown line
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in Table 3-6a in FSAR.
3.6.9 Clarification - Applicant cannot perform volumetric examina-tion of welds. Can only hydro and check for leaks. Applicant will supply stress levels and allowables for guard pipe and flued head.
3.7.1 Clarification - Applicant will clarify Table 3 -7 with footnote --
that states that higher damping factors arc not used.
3.7.4 Delete - Applicant coemitted to providing a Fourier Analyzer and providing the AEC with data on all earthquakes above 1/2 OBE in Semi-annual Operating Report.
3.9.8 Clarification - Applicant will provide stress summaries for plant Class 1, 2 and 3 systems.
3.9.9 Clarification - Applicant will provide design details on globe valve design and supporting srgument that there are no safety consequences from valve shattering, A
3.10.1 Clarification - Applicant will provide assurance that deficiencies in old IEEE Std 344 are evaluated.
6.2.23 Clarification
" test" should read " text".
6.2.27 Clarification - Auxiliary feedlines are high pressure only.
Applicant does not have to assume failure of valves to =ake the line high temperature.
Delete Last Sentence - Information is provided in FSAR, pages 3 97, 3-132.
6.2.28 Delete - Information in FSAR page 11-99 (4 purges / year, 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> / purge).
6.2.29 Modify - Delete first two and last sentences. AEC position not firm yet.
6.2.30 Delete - AEC position not firm.
6.2.31 Delete - AEC position not firm.
6.2.32 Delete - Substitute request core appropriate for OL plant.
6.2.34 Clarification
-AEC will check Tech Spec 4-15 for adequacy.
7.1.1 Clarifit.ation - Sensing lines include hydraulic, gas and electric.
7.1.4 Delete - Applicant'cocsitted to provide ds ription of electrical penetrations.and exceptions taken to RG 1.63.
7.6.1 Clarification - Applicant will respond taking exception to Item b because it would require 4 shutdowns per year, AEC will consider this problem and call applicant.
9.2.4 Delete - Not appropriate for D-B 1.
9.2.6 Editorial - Should be 9.2.2.
9.3.4 Clarification - Applicant will elaborate on Request 9.3.4.
9.5.1 Clarification - Applicant will provide more information and deliberation on fire hazards in areas where there are no fire systems.
9.5.4 Delete - Will be answered with Request 9.5.1 response.
1 9.5.6 Clarification - PMF level should be corrected in Request to 584'.
10.3.6 Cla.*ification - Delete word " boiler" in Request.
13.3.2.4 Cla :ification - Applicant will attempt to comply even though County Sheriff is unwilling to commit in writing.
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O AITACHMENT 3 P'.*}TIONS DELETED Position No.
3.2.1 Your Seismic Class II classification of those portions of the Component Cooling Water. Systems which service:
(1) Reactor Coolant Pumps, (2) Letdown Cooler, and (3) Seal Return Cooler is not in agreement with current AEC practice.
The Regulatory staff considers systems which support other syste=s important to safety to be also safety-related. Therefore, the Regulatory staff position is that those portions of the Component Cooling Water System which service items (1), (2), and (3) should be classified Seismic Category I.
3.2.2 That portion of the letdown line of the Makeup and Purification System from valves MUS3, MUS7, and MUS6 through the purification filter, purification domineralizers, makeup filters, seal return coolers, makeup tank to the suction side of the cakeup pe=ps that is classified Quality Group C is not in agreement with current practice.
The Regulatory staff considers the letdown line of the Makeup and Purification System to be the normal flow path of. reactor coolant through the system and important.to safety. Therefore, the Regulatory staff position is that the letdown line of the Makeup end Purification System should be classified Quality Group B.
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7.5.1 The response to Request 7.5.2 is inadequate since it does not address the degree of conformance of your design to Regulatory Guide 1.47,, Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems, as requested.
The staff's position in this regard (for operating license appli-cations) requires that means for manual actuation of a system level inoperable status indication be provided (for each system i=portant to safety) to supplement administrative procedures used in connection with required maintenance or testing.
For example, this indication would be actuated by the operator when required maintenance involved closure of a manually operated valve which is not automatically indicated in the control room, and this valJe closure renders a protection system inoperative.
Therefore, supplement your response to include:
a.
Your intent to meet the above position.
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a sttt'ement of the degree of confor=ance of your design to
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Regulacory Guide 1.47.
7.5.2 The staff's position with regard to post-accident monitoring and safe-shutdown display instrumentation is that the instrumentation systems should be:
a.
Qualified for the accident environment (post-accident instru-ments only),
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3-b.
Redundant with at least one channel recorded (the recording system, recorders and associated circuitry and components are required to be seismically qualified to verify their operability following, not necessarily during, seismic event).
Energized from the onsite power supplies and designed in c.
accordance with the requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971.
The des ription contained in Section 7.5 of the FSAR refers to post-accident monitoring in only general statements and the referenced list (Table 7-8) appears to be' incomplete with regard to recording of parameters deemed essential for following accident and post-accident conditions.
Discuss the extent to which post-accident monitoring and safe shutdown equip =ent will conform to the position set forth above, and revise the FSAR accordingly. Your response should identify which channels are recorded and the location of these recorders.
. 7.6.2 It is not apparent frca the information presented in Section 6.2.5 on Combustible Gas Systems whether this system is designed to seismic Class I design criteria.
We require that this system, including the hydrogen analyzers and recording instrumentation be designed to Class I seismic standards.
(The recorder should be qualified to function following, not necessarily during, a seismic event.)
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4-1 Ve-ify that your design is qualified in accordance with the above 4
criteria, or modify your design to comply with the staff's require-2 i
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D ATTACHMENT 4 REQUESTS DELETED Request No.
3.2.3 Your response to Request 3.2.3 in Revision 3 to the FSAR is unacceptable since you have not identified where required the component code class.
For example, in Table 9-1, the Spent Fuel Fool Cooling System Pumps are identified as designed, fabricated and tested to code "b", which according to Section 9.0, is ASME Section III,1971 Edition. This is insufficient, since there are three component code classes in the 1971 Edition of Section III, Classes 1, 2 and 3.
Review Table 9-1 and as appropriate, include the component code classes.
3.2.5 Verify thct the entire letdown line of the Makeup and Purification System is classified Seismic Category I.
3.2.6 All major components of the Makeup and Purification System identified in Table 9-11 are classified as Seismic Class I
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except the Purification Demineralizer on page 9-66, which is classified Seismic Class II.
Review the classification of the Purification Demineralizer.
3.6.8 Section 3.6.2.7.1.5 indicates that only critical cracks were postulated in the coolant letdown system, but it also indicates that the criteria of the A. Giambusso letter of December 15, 1972 were met.
Reconcile these statements with the fact that apparently
- circumferential breaks were not postulated. Similar comments apply to the reactor coolant makeup system and several of the other systems of Table 3-6a described in detail in Section 3.6.2.7 for which the test apparently indicates only critical cracks but not circumferential breaks have been postulated in systems over 1" nominal pipe size.
3.7.4 Response to Requesc 3.7.4 is not satisfactory.
Seismic instru-mentation provided for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Station should meet the requirements stated in Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 1, April 1974, which stipulates the installation of response-spectrum recorders. Your intent to conply with Regulatory Guide 1.12 (Revision 1, April 1974) should be indicated. In addition, a plan for timely utili:ation of the data to be obtained from the installed seismic instrumentation should be submitted.
6.2.28 Discuss when, during nor=al plant operation, purging of the containment would be required, and the frequency and duration of
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purge operations. Estimate the fraction of time during a plant operating cycle that the purge system would be operated.
6.2.29 Provide an analysis of the radiological consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident assuming the containment purge system is operating at the time of the accident. The analysis should be done for a spec. rum of pipe break s' cs.
The radiological source term should consider toe activity in the primary coolant until fuel rod perforation is calculated to occur, then a fission product release model based on Regulatory Guide 1.4 should be assumed.
6.2.30 Discuss the capability of the structures and safety-related '
equipment located beyond the purge systems isolation valves to withstand, without loss of function, the environment created by the escaping air, steam and debris.
6.2.31 Provide an analysis of the pressure reduction caused by the escaping air and steam !uring a loss-of-coolant accident for ECCS backpressure determination.
6.2.32 Describe the analyses or tests that have been or will be conducted to demonstrate the capability of the containment isolation valves.
in particular, valves whose lines are open to the containment atmosphere,such as the containment purge system valves, to functica under the dyna =ic loading conditions resulting from high air and
.c steam flow rates and high differential pressures following a pipe break accident. Justify that test conditions are representative of conditions that would be expected to prevail following a pipe break accident. Provide the analytical and test results.
7.1.4 Confirm that all containment electrical penetrations will be tested in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.63 which supplements IEEE Std 317-1971.
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, -s 9.2.4 Describe the design features that protect against the possible release of radioactivity to the service water system during normal shutdown if there is a leak in the decay heat removal system coolers.
9.5.4 Discuss how the ventilation system can most adversely affect the fire detection and fire fighting with the portable extinguishers (in the areas these are employed). Discuss the accessibility of the area to personnel with portable fire extinguishers. Consider such problems as radiation exposure, smoke and toxic combustion products.
Expand the information in the FSAR to include a discussion of the annunciator system and the appraisal and trend evaluation syste=s to be provided in the fire protection system.
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