ML19319B947

Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3

ML19319B947
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	01/13/1978
From:	Roe L TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19319B948	List: ML19319B947 ML19319B949 ML19319B950
References
913, NUDOCS 8001290683
Download: ML19319B947 (2)

Text

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. REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL 50-346 REC: STOLZ J F ORG: ROE L E DOCDATE: 01/13/78 NRC TOLEDO EDISON DATE RCVD: 01/24/78 DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO COPIES RECEIVED

SUBJECT:

LTR 1 ENCL 40 LICENSE NO NPF-3 AFPL FOR AMEND: TECH SPECS PROPOSED CHANGE CONCERNING SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THROTTLE VALVES USED IN THE LOW PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM. NOTORIZED 01/13/78.

PLANT NAME: DAVIS BESSE - UNIT 1 REVIEWER INITIAL: XJM DISTRIBUTOR INITIT.L:

oooo************* DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS ******************

NOTES:

1. SEND ALL AMENDMENTS TO J. ROE GENERAL DISTPIBUTION FOR AFTER ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LICENSE.

(DISTRIBUTION CODE AOO1)

FOR ACTION: BRANCH CHIEF STOLZ**W/7 ENCL INTERNAL: REG FILE

• CPDR**W/E)CL f-E'E+*W/2 ENCL OE o JTc 74LY HANAUER**W/ ENCL CHECK **W/ ENCL EISENHUT+*W/ ENCL SHAO**W/ ENCL BAER**W/ ENCL BUTLER **W/ ENCL GRIMES **W/ ENCL J. COLLINS **W/ ENCL J. MCGOUGH**W/ ENCL EXTERNAL: LPDR'S PT. CLINTON, OH**W/ ENCL TIC **W/ ENCL NSIC**W/ ENCL ACRS CAT A**W/16 ENCL DISTR E GUTION: LTR 40 ENCL 39 CONTROL NBR: 44WEEEEER SIZE: 1P+7P g7g

• o**oo**********+++++++++++***+++** THE END ********************************"4*

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/.M'h, TCLEDO EDISON Serial No. 413 h, # #, E,Y W January 13, 1978

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Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Project Management United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Stols:

Under separate cover, we are transmitting three (3) original and forty (40) conformed copies of an Application for Amendment to Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-besse Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1.

The application for a change in the Technical Specifications addresses surveillance requirements for throttle valves used in the low pressure injection system as requested in your letters dated November 9, 1977, and November 18, 1977.

Yours very truly, sf d/1 A col lS THE TCLECO EC:SCN CCMPANY ECISCN PLAZA 3C0 MACISCN AVENUE Ilwo TCLECO. CHIO 43652 l

a EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS se

'd3 BASES I

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems with RCS average temperature > 280*F ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the core flooding tanks is capable of sup. plying sufficient core cooling to maintain the peak cladding tempera-tures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 280*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limitad core cooling requirements.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures, that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

The decay heat removal system leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage rates assumed for the system during the recirculation phase of the lcw pressure injection will not be exceeded. -

/1/'/ ' 9Q' 3/4.5.4 BCRATED WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the borated water storage tank (BWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on SWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sefficient water is available within containment -to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condi-tion following mixing of the BWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.

These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. The limits on contained water volume, and boron concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 11.0 of the solu-tion sprayed within containment after a design basis accident. The pH band minimizes the evoTution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion cracking on mechanical systems and canponents.

DAVIS-SESSE UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 m

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,o EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

5. Verify that a representative sample of TSP frcm a TEP storage basket has a densit.y of'> 53 lbs/cu ft.

6. Verifying that when a representative sample of 0.35 0.05 lbs of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 50 + 5 gallons of 180 + 10*F barated water from the BWST, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to 1 6 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by

1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path

- actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal.

2. Verifying that each HPI and LPI pump starts automatically upon receipt of a SFAS test signal.

f. By performing a vacuum leakage rate test of the watertight enclosure for valves DH-ll and DH-12 that assures the motor operators on valves CH-ll and DH-12 will not be fjooded for at least 7 days folicwing a LOCA:

1. At least once per 18 months.

2. After each opening of the watertight enclosure.

3. After any maintenance on or modification to the watertight s enclosure which could affect its integrity, b'

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DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 g

I Addition to TS. 4.5.2

g. By verifying the correct position of each mechanical position stop for valves DH-14A and DR-14B:

1. '41 thin 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of the opening of the valves to their mechanical position stop or following completion of maintenance on the valve when the LPI system is required to be operable.

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2. At least once per 18 months.

h. By performing a flow test following completion of a LPI system modification that alters system flow characteristics to confirm the following flow rates for the LPI system:

Inj ection Train 1 LPI flow race at reactor oo::leJ:2650 gps, for RCS ? 100 psig j Flow rate of DH pump R4000 gym, for RCS @ 0 psig 1

Inf ection Train 2 l LPI flow rate at reactor no: le r2650 gpm, for RCS @ 100 psig 4

Flow rate of DH pump 24000 gpm, for RCS @ 0 psig I

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