ML19319B923
| ML19319B923 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1977 |
| From: | Roe L TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001290658 | |
| Download: ML19319B923 (17) | |
Text
'
1,5 u.s. NUCLE A3 REGULATO2Y C;WISSION DOC UM E NRC DISTRis:dT,10N FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL FROW T5: Mr J M tt'lz Toledo Edison Co DATE OF DOp,}E,NT/7 Toledo, Ohio L E Roe DATE RECEIVED 3477 ELETTER ONOTORIZED PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED '
RIGIN AL
- {}UNCLASS!FIED one gggngg DESCRsPTION ENCLOSU R E Addl info Concerning containment vekse1gola-Ltr trans the fcilewing:
tion systems & tests 4 inspectionse.......
1p 15p
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NOTE: THIS MATERIAL WILL BE INC'L,UDED IN REV d 27 o f the FS AR....
ACp4V: nrm-cJ-PLANT NAME:
Davis 3 esse 41 DO NOT &._.mv,3 rm
- 1 SAFETY FOR ACTION /INFORMATION emfTun 3-10 77" ehf 1
/] ASSIGNED AD:
V4 55e // O (th-I AssTrven A9 (33Ab'CH CHIEF!
SfoIL uninnt mrTew.
/, PROJECT M. WAGER:
En,Io PROJECT MANAGER:
! l
/ LIC. ASST. :
k}C lfen LIC. ASST. :
i '
s INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
/fUc FTU3 SYSTEMS SAFETY PLANT SYSTEMS LSITE SAFETY &
/ NRC PDR HEINEMAN
/
TEDESCO [4.M ENVIRO ANALYSTS
/ I&E(M SCHROEDER
/
BENAROYA DE!Pr0N & WT T '7 OELD
/
TATNAM GGSSICK & STAFP ENGINEERING
/
IPPOLITO ENVIRO TECM-MIPC MACARRY KTRKWOOD ERNST CASE
/
BOSUAK BA! LARD HANAUER
/
SIHWEIL OPERATING REACTORS SPANGLER HARLESS
/
PAWLICKI STELLO I
SITE TECH.
PROJECT MANAGEMENT REACTOR SAFETY OPERATING TECH.
/
CAMMILL [E)
BOYD
/
ROSS (Lts)
EISENHITr STEPP
/ P. COLLINS
/
NOVAK SHA0 HULMAN
/ HOUSTON
/
ROSZTOCZY BAER PETERSON
/
CHECK TalTTLER SITE ANALYSIS MELTZ CRIMES
/ VOLL}ER (4 f*)
/f BUNCH
/ HELTEMES
. iT & I SKOVHOLI
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J. COLLINS SALTZMAN RUT 5 ERG
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KRECER EXTERN AL DISTRIBUTION CONTROL NUMBER
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CONSULTANTS:
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Docket No. 50-346 March 3, 1977 i'
y j Serial No. 235 g
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27A b Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief Droer,Q}
c Light Water Reactors Branch No. 1 Cy Division of Project Management p
4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission w
Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Stolz:
The Davis-Besse Unit 1 FSAR Sections 6.2.4 entitled " Containment Vessel Isolation Systems" (including Table 6-8) and 6.3.4 entitled " Tests and Inspections" have been updated so that the Davis-Besse Unit 1 Technical Specifications will be consistent with the latest docketed information.
These updated sections will be included in Revision 27 of the FSAR.
Yours very truly,
Enclosures:
Davis-Besse Unit 1 FSAR Section 6.2.4 including Table 6-8 Davis-Besse Unit 1 FSAR Section 6.3.4 cp d/2 1
25'71 THE TCLECO EDISCN COMPANY EDISCN PLAZA 300 MACISCN AVENUE TCLEDO. CHIO 43652
F3 CONTAINMENT VESSEL ISOLATION SYSTEMS 6.2.4 6.2.4.1 Desian Bases The general design bases governing isolation valve requirements for contain-ment piping penetrations are as indicated in the following paragraphs.
Leakage through all penetrations not serving accident-consequence-1fmiting systems is minimized by a double barrier so that no single, credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in loss-of-isolation. The installed double barriers take the form of closed piping systems, both inside and outside the containment, and various types of isolation valves.
Containment vessel isolation valves are provided in lines penetrating the containment vessel to ensure that no uncontrolled release of radioactivity from the containment can occur, particularly following a radiation release type accident.
Containment vessel isolation occurs on a safety features a,cuation signal.
Development of the instrumentation circuits and signals is presented in table 7-5.
The isolation system closes all penetrations not required for operation of the engineered safety features system.
In addition, all pneumatically operated isolation valves, wie's che exception of those that are part of the engineered safety features,will fail closed. All motor-operated isolation valves, upon loss of normal and reserve electric power, are supplied with power from the emergency power system. Motor-operated isolation valves also have a manual override to be used in case of motor operator failure.
Isolation valves located outside the containment vessel are located as close to the containment vessel as practical. Upon loss of actuating power, the isolation valves are designed to maintain their present position or to take 3
the position that provides the greater safety.
All remotely operated contaic_,ent isolation valves are provided with control and safety features actuation signal block switches and position indicating lights in the control room.
Revision 3 November 1973 6-44
NB To ensuie the added reliability of containment integrity, the following penetration systems are designed in accordance with the_ASME Code,_Section
.III, Class 2, designed and analyzed as seismic class _I2 protected._aaainst missiles and all high energy piping, suitably restrained so that passive failure of one component does not damage adjacent components, and sub-3 jacted to strict quality assurance program to ensure that material and workmanship meet specifications:
a.
All piping between the inside and outside isolation valves up to and including the valves.
b.
In a closed system having only one isolation valve outside the contmirment, the entire system inside the containment to and including the isolation valve.
The design of the containment isolatien system confor=s to AEC General Design Citeria No. Sh 55, 56 and 57 and AEC Safety Guide No. 11 with the
,.excipt1'o6F iAdicat W in subsecticE'6.2.4.2._
'3 6.2.h.2 S dtem Desizn
~~
~
. iping penetratiens which require isolation after an accident are classified
~'
P as follows:
Tne I.
Each line that is part of the reactor ecolant pressure boundary and that penetrates the contain=ent vessel is provided with containment isolation valves as follows:
a.
One Iceked closed isolation valve inside and one locked f
closed isolatica valve outside the containment; or b.
One autenatic isolation valve inside and one Iceked closed isolatien valve outside centainment; or c.
One locked closed isolation valve inside and autc=atic isolation valve cutside the containment (checkvalves are not used outside the containment as isolation valves); or d.
One. autcmatic isolatica valve inside and one autenatic isolation valve outside centainment.
(Check valves are not used cutside centainment as isolation valves.)
.m-:
=-
Revisien 3 November W 3 6-45 c
D-B All veld 3 in thic type of pen:tration ara subjict to p;riodic inscrvice inspec' tion in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI.
Trpe II.'
Each line that connects directly to the containment vessel atmosphere is provided with isolation valves as follows:
a.
One locked closed isolation valve inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside containment; or b.
One automatic isolation valve inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside containment; or c.
One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside the containment (check valves are not used outside containment as isolation valves); or d.
One automatic isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside containment.
(Check valves are not used outside containment as isolation valves.)
e.
One blind flange inside the containment and one blind flange outside.
9 These lines which do not normally connect directly to the containment atmosphere, but may fail following a seis=le event are considered to be Type II.
This consideration is applied to Penetrations 12, 16, 21, kl, h2-A, h3-A, kh-3, h8, and 68-A.
The following penetrations afi exceptions to AEC Criterion 56~as described
'above:
1.~
Containment vessel vacuum breakers.
l3 2.
Containment vessel leak test inlet line, g
3 Fuel transfer tubes.
h.
Contain=ent vessel differential pressure sensors.
3
- 5. ~ Containment vessel hydrogen purge outlet lines.
3 6.
chemical cleaning line.
The above exceptions do not present a ha::ard to the public or safe operation for the following reasons:
1.
Each containment vacuum breaker has one motor-operated isolation valve and one check valve attached outside the containment vessel between the vessel and the shield building. These two talves pro-vide a double barrier complying essentially to AEC Criterion 56.
The outside installation of the vacuum breaker facilitates per-iodic inspection, leak testing,and setting of.the _vacdum breakers while the station is in operation.
27 Revision 27 6 h6
D-B 27
~'I7 The containment leek test inlet line is locked closed during 2
station operation and is only open at station shutdown when con-
'~~
tainment leak testing is performed. There is one locked closed
~
isolation valve outsTde the containment and, in addition,' the pipe ends inside and outside the containment are fitted with blind flanges.
4 This provides a double barrier.
. E Each fuel transfer tube has one blind flange with a double 0-ring 27
_ seal installed on the inside of the containment vessel. This provides 20 a double barrier. The outboard valve is not consicered part of the containment boundary.
^
~4.
Each containment vessel differential pressure sensor has one
~
normally open remote manually (activation from low radiation area) operated valve outside of the containment. Beyond this 3
valve, 3/8 inch dia. tubing is run to the pressure transmitter which provides a barrier to the containment. All components of this system are designed in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III, Class 2, designed as
!smic class I, protected against missiles, and are under a strict quality assurance program to ensure that material and work =anship meet specifications.. These sensor systems satisfy the requirements 27 of AEC Safety Guide No. 11.
5.
The containment vessel hydrogen purge outlet line has double isolation valves provided outside containment for redundant isolation of the flow path. The maximum operating conditions (LOCA) and seismic loading will cause stresses much below the allowable stresses of the penetration system. In addition, op-eration of this system is required only after the pressure-temperature conditions of a LOCA have been substantially reduced.
These valves have been located outside to make the system more reliable. These are not required to be cien until six to 3
eight weeks (if at all required then) af ter LOCA. Although the valves are designed to be operable under LOCA conditions, one
. l hundred percent assurance cannot be given that a valve, if in-stalled in the containment vessel, will open when required after such a prolonged closute underJ ost-LOCA environment. _.
By bringing the valve outside containment it can be manually
~
opened if it fails to open automatically.
~ ~ ~
~
6.
The chemical cleaning line is required for steam generator secondary side cicaning. One blind flange is installed inside and one outside the containment vessel t,. provide a double barrier. This penetration will be open only during station shutdown.
M*1 m.
Revision 27.
\\
6-47
= -. -
D-B
~
= - - _. - -
= - - ~ _ _. --
TYDe III.
Each line that penetrates the reacter containment vessel and is neither part of the reacter coolant pressure bound-ary ner connected directly to the containment vessel astmos-phere has at least one containment isolation valve, which i
is either autcmatic, locked closed or capable of remote j
=anual operation. Check valves are not used as autcmatic isolation valves outside the containment.
The main stesa and main feedwater pipe penetrations have guard pipes installed around the penetrating process pipes to pro-tect the containment vessel against jet effects in case of pipe failure.
Tyre IV.
Each line that serves the engineered safety features systems and penetrates the contai:: ment vessel is provided with iso-lation valves as follows:
a.
One automatic isolation valve inside and ene automatic isolation valve outside centainment (check valves are not used as isolatica valves outside centainment); or
- ~
U.
One autcmatic isolation valve outside centainment. Check valve's are not used as isolation valves outside centainment.
These isolatica valves are autcmatically operated by the safety features actuation signal or, remotely frem the control recm.
^
Depending on function, all components of the systems outside the contain-ment and beycnd the outside contaf nwant isolation valve, up to and includ-ing the normally closed system bicek valves, are designed in accordance with the requirements of the ASME _ Code,Section III, Class 2 or Class 3,. _
des _igned and analyzed as_ seismic CJass I and protected against =issiles, w__
All high energy piping is suitably restrained, so that passive fail-3 ure on one component does not damage adjacent components. A strict quality assurance program is applied to ensure that material and work-manship meet specifications.
The following penetrations are exceptions to this category:
1.
The containment vessel emergency sump recirculation lines are opened by the STAS during emergencies when the BWST level is low.
i l
Although they are open to the containment vessel atmosphere, g
outside of the containment they form a closed loop system termination inside the containment vessel. All components of the closed loop system are in accordance with the ASME Code, as per table 3-2, designed and analyzed as seismic class I, protected from damage by missiles, and under a strict quality assurance program to ensure that mat.erial and workmanship meet specifications.
Revision 27
.6-48
~
v
- -. = -
,w.
g w.
g--
-y e
v w
m-y y
1 D-B The decay heat pump suction ~ line is normally closed, but is 2.
used post-LOCA for boron dilution, thereby providing an engineered safety feature function. The isolation valves inside
~
the containment are remote manual valve DR-11, manual (locked closed) valve DH-23, and relief valve PSV-4849. This line forms a closed loop outside the containment andterminatas inside the containment vessel. All components of the closed loop system are Class 2, designed and analyzed as seismic Class I, protected from missiles and under a strict quality assurance program. The design temperature and pressure rating exceed that of the contain-ment. The relief valve set point is greater than 1.5 times the g
containment design pressure. At all times, after a LOCA, there will be a water seal from either the BWST or (upon recirculation) the emergency sump to ensure that there is no path for leakage from the containment a.mosphere backwards through the relief valve.
3.
The containment pressure sensors penetration design is as indicated for Item 4 under Type II penetrations.
j
_ _. Additionally, there are varicus arrangements in each of these major groups, i
The individual system flev diagrams shev the manner in which each contain-l ment vessel isolation valve arrangement fits into its respeative system.
For convenience, each different valve arrangement is shcwn in table 6-8 and figure 6-12.
Listed are the medes of actuation, the types of valves,~their cer=al and emergency positions, and closing times. The specific system penn rstions to which each of these arrangements is applied are also presented.
Criteria for establishing clasure times for nor=al'.y open isolation valves i
are such that the requirements of centsinment integrity are met prior to peak centainment pressure and temperature for the largest credible pipe rupture. The normally closed valves vill receive a elesde signal t6 -
close them if they are open, otherwise the signal serves as a "=ake-sure signal."
The conta4-nt isolation syste= and all of its compcnents, including piping, valves, supports, etc., are designed in such a manner that dynande forces resulting from inadvertent sudden opening or closure of a valve i
- under operating conditions will not result in 1 css of containment
~
~
~~
integrity. In addition, autanatic centrols are provided cn the doub1'e isola -
tien valves en the normal decay heat removal system to prevent inadvertent opening of these valves and overpressurization of the decay heat re= oval system.
A detailed description of thise intericek system is in section T.6.1.1.
If a main steam isolatbn$alve closes suddenly during ncrmal statien
~
~
operatien, increased steem system pressure vill cause the ecde safety valves to open.
Revision 27
_ _.6-48a
s e
I tabt.6-8
- Containement Vessel Teo'ation Valve Arrangeeniente Normal Flow Valv.
Nemeber of Valve
. CIS Clostas/ Opening Fasist ration,
Service Directi m Arranneennt Isolation Velves Type Signal Poettion Position Time ***
7
- r
' Note 1 t
1 Preasuriser Sample Liaa Out 2
I SA Closed Closed 30 sec.
l I
l3 l
3fg3 2
Steam Cene'ator Out III SA Opea Closed to sec.
SeconJery,l'eter Sample L'.e 3
Caesponent Cooling Water tulet Line In 2
III SA Open Closed 15 sec.
27 4
Component Cooline Water Outlet Lin.
Out 2
181 SA Open Closed 15 sec.
i 5,6,7 Contelament Air Cooling Unite Service Water In 1
IV SA Opem Open l3 8
Inlet Lines g
h e2 8 A-J Containment Vessel E
[
Vacuane Breakers la fe 1
11 SA Open Closed 15 eec.
27 m.
e 9, 10, 11 Containment Air a
f[
Cou!!ag Unita 1
IV SA Open' Open 3
[
Service Water Out 0.ti.t u.a.
?.
a 12 Cosaponent Cooling Water 2
II SA open Closed 15 Sec.
l3 y
Supply to Control Rod Drive la i
Hechanisme 13 Coatelament Vessel k ruel Sump Drain Out 2
11 SA open closed 15 seca 27
- 14 letdoun Line to 2
I SA Open Closed 15 sec.
l3 Furification out Demineralisere l
15 Spare
'c 16 Contelament Veneel out 2
11 SA opea closed 10 sec.
p Equipment Vent Needer Blind local lecked locked 17 Containment Va. eel II Hanual Closed closed l25 Flauge l i
Leak Test Inlet Line la i
b l
.s__
. ~Bevision 27 g
" 7g".
.1 h
I t
..q Table 6-8 (cont'd)
Containment Vessel Isolargon valve Arrangemente 4
Moraal Flow Velve Muaber of Valve CIS Closing /Opealag r
Sar,ges Directfon Arrenu.ent _
leolastoa valves Type Signal Poettica roottion Time see hy i
13 Stems Camerator Secondary Water Saaple Line Out I
III SA Opea Closed to sec. j h3 ui
- 13 51 4 Freasure lajectica.
la 3
IV SA Closed /Opea Open/ Closes; IS Ac.
3 27 3
Line 20, 21 IF***""* I'l**"I**
l g,
2 gy ga Closed open gg.,,,,
21 Demineralised Water 1
-)
O en Closed 10 sec.
I3l Supply Line la 2
11 SA P
23, 24 Fuel Trauefer Tube in, out Blind Flange II Manual Closed Closed 20 3
25, 26 C
laamat spray
=
Ta IV SA/ Manual i Closed Open 35 sec/~
bl I
27, 28 low Pressure Remote il lajection Lines la 2
IV Manual open Open l17
~
i t
29 Decay Heat 3
- senote Man-i t a rump Suction Line out 3
IV ual and Closed Closed l1l2$
a m,,,g e
k I-30, 31 Contalument vos.nl g
i IV SA closed
- Closed Y
Emergency Susp Be.
Out y
circulation Lines g
en t
w l
l 32 Reactor Coolant Systes l
A 2
I sa Opus Closed 10 sec.
Drain Line to B.C.
as y
Drain Tank e'
C":"D 33 Containment Vessel Purge Inlet Line la 2
II SA Closed Closed 10 sec.
gg
.C..t.i _.t V..
Purge Outlet Line out 2
Il SA Closed Closed 10 sec.
\\
c 31, 36 Aux!!!ary Feed Water Remote Lines la I
III Masmaa!
,Open l Open l1l1627 37, 38 Main reeduater Lines la I
III SA Open Closed 15 sec. l1 h3
- e39, 40 Mais steen Linea Out 1
Ill SA Open Closed to e,
i 41 Pressuriser Quench f
Tank Circulating la 2
31 SA Open Closed to sec.
l i
8 lutet Line
_. ! _.as..see, Air Sample Retura In 2
11 gg
" Pen,
closed 15 sec, ft 25 l21 j
1,
...
e' *** T* * * * - --
~
e hRevision27 l
~
L.
+
Q T.ble 6'-s (Cont 'd)
Coareineent Vessel Isolation Velve Arrentemente Normal Fenetration flou Velve Numt,er of Velve CIS Clostag/Opealag thent.o r Service Direction Arrangemente ? Isolation Velves Type Slanal Poeftton Foottfoe Time ese 27 s
42-A Service Air Supply i
Line In 2
Il SA opea Closed 10 sec l3 43-4 Instruneat Air Supply Lgne In 2
II 8A O *a Closed 10 sec.
P 4 3. B Custetament vessel Air Sample Retura la 2
Il SA opea closed 15 sec.
I 5 y 44-A Core Floodtog Tank ft!! and Microsea Supply Linee la 2
III SA Closed Closed 10 sec.
l3 44-8 Pressustaar Quench Tank l
l
)
Nitronea Supply Line la
{
J f2 II SA opea closed 10 sec.
g3 45 Spare l
46 Spare n
-8 22 47-A Core Floodtog Tank E
Semple Line out g.
3 III SA/ Remote closed Closed to eacf -
l3 h auel I
47-8 Core floodtog Tank g
27 '
I T
Vent Line out 3
III 8A/88"t
- Closed Closed 10 eacf__
l3 y
E Me e1 i
48 Fressuriser Quench g
Tank Circulating outlet Line out 2
II SA Open Closed 10 sec.
49 Refmeling Camel F111 Locked Locked
=
l3 l27 Llos In/Out 7
11 haual Closed Closed 50 Migh Pressure Injectaon Line la 2
IV SA Closed Open 15 sec.
5 51 Hydrogen Furge System Eshauet Out 2
II SA Closed CiceeJ 60 sec. g3y 2,
C3 52, 53, teactor Coolent rump 54, 55 Seal Water Supply In 2
I SA Opea
.losed 12 sec. l3
- f56, Reactor Coolant Pump Seat Water Betura out 5
't SA Open Closed 30 sec.
I l27 C 23 57, 53 Steam cener4to temote l3 Drela Lines out 2
III hauel &
Closed closed
~OJ lace! Manuel 25 59 SeconJery Site Chemical t
Clemains Io/Out Blisal 11 h auel Closed Closed l9 y_
i Flange U
- 60. 4i, Spare e2
- 63. 64 Spare I
- 65. 66 Bevision 27 i
I t
e
e Toble 6-8(ront'J) 6 Comteinment Vessel lealtion Velve Arrangements llormal remetration Flow Velve Number of Velve CIS Clostas/Opentes' ~
e unal,e r Service Direction Arrangement Isolation valves Type
$lanet Posittua Posities Time een 7
67 MyJrogen Diluttoa 64-A Pressuriser Quencia Closed Closed 60 sec. l py '
$yelem Supply la 2
11 SA Tank Seeiple out 2
11 SA Closed Closed 30 sec.'
l3 Conseimment Air
~
68 4 Semple out 2
11 SA Open Closed 15 sec., l 3l15 27 69 Hydrogen Diluttoa System SupplF 1m 2
Il SA Closed Closed 60 sec.
lI
}
70 Spare 4
71-A Coateineent Pressure Demo t e' Sensor out 1
IV ltenuel Opea Open l3 71-8 Contesament Air j
Semple out 2
11 SA opea Closed 15 sec. l3 l27 I c.
71-C Core FlooJina Tank j
N Fill Line la 2
SA Clueed closed to sec.
l3 2
72-A Coateinment Pressure Remute l27 1
IV hauel Opem Opea l3 Seneer out j
72-8 Spare I
li5 l
[ *a
[
72-C Contelancor Freasure Out 1
'I semote opea Open g3 l 27-w Differential Treemaister Neuel 73-A Containment Pressure temote 22 l3 Sensor Out I
IV bnuel open Open
=
73-8 Conte! ament Air Semple out 2
Il SA Open Closed 15 sec.
l 3 l1927
}
O 73-C Containment Pressure Out 1
II Demote opeo Open
=
l3
. Differential Transmitter Neuet C
76-A Containment Pressure acause l3 Seneer out 1
LV hauel Opea open t'
c-Out 2
SA Open Closed 15 sec.
l3 2) w=a
,a r
,,....ri..r A.aiti.r,
...ot.
Sprey In 2
1 mouel closed Closed
- l75, 76. 77 Spare t
- 78. 79 t>-
[
00 Emergency lock
[
l I,g See Chapter 3 for descri 4 ton e' y
I 4*8aj. -.
01 Personnel lack and arrangement,.
Revision 27 e
02 Equipment Match l
"15
~
.~.
m m.
.7 Table 6-8 (roat'e l
i Contalnannt Vs oel ToolaHon Valw Arrangement e J
tiermal I
Cloetas/Opeala[h7 temetration Flow Valve theber of valve CIS Time ***
Ilumbe r Service Direction Arranaement Isolation Valves Type
$ianal Position Posittaa 101 Electrical tenetrations k
1 22 102 Electrical Feestrations 6
e aosmal When level Valve la i,,.t..ly closed and will stay closed on containment isolation etsnel.
112 J,o,.
ter sto...e t.a.. vaiva o,en..
6
- Bach nata steam llae also contales the folluutag laolation valves which are upstreme of Llas
+
l asia isolation valves code safety valves, atsoapheric vent valve, male stema leigh polat lII
.)*
veut valve. etartup drata valve, and nata isolation valve. The response time for the main g
Seeletion valve is 3 escuaJe and f or the mala teolation valve bypass valve (normally closed) l23 8
{
is 10 eaconde. The aust11ery feed p=np turbine valve la a remote, manually operated 8.olation 3
l i
valve.
{Q Note 1. SA signal denotes safety features actuation signal.
- diesel start aaJ sequence delays, or SA signal response times included.
1 f
Response tian for the MOV ine!Je contatusent to 13 seconJag for the pne tic valve outs 1Je f
conceineent it in 10 seconde.
27 ff hosponse time for the HOV's inside containment la 30 seconda; for the pneumatic valve outsiJ*
4 u
containment it la 12 seconJs.
ia i
D
' i w ' el i
i i f5B @B F-caED N >_EJ 1
r I
E g
i i
i s
U 8:
U2
.s,
~y n
~t 3:.r.
p NB 6.3.h TESTS AND INSPECTIONS Portions of the emergency core cooling system. are not ncrmally operating.
In order to affirm that the nor= ally idle emergency equipment is in a state of readiness to operate in the event of an accident, periodic tests are con ~
~
~
~- ~
~~
ducted whic'hTe~rify the opeiability and function of that equipment.
~~
In order to verify that the emergency core.cco1ing ystem functions as designed, periodic system tests and periodic ecmponent tests are perfer ed.
During each refuelitig' interval,_the_ccre ficoding system, the high pFessure
,injectien system and the icv pressure _ injection _ system are _ tested. _ Each_
system is tested by itself affd it is evaluated so that_ the system'_s emergency core cooling functional requirements are ccnfirmed to be fulfilled.
The test en the core floodinglystem is perfor=ed while the RC system is
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b_eing depressurized. As the RC system pressure is being reduced through 675 psig, an alarm annunciates in the centrol roca signifying that the core l17 flooding isolation valves are open at too lov a RC system pressure. The RC system continues to be depressurized through 600 psig and the levels in the core ficoding tanks are observed. As the RC system pressure gradually decreases belov 600 psig, the level in each of the core ficoding tanks begins to decrease. The drop in level indicates that the flev path of the core flooding water frcm the ccre ficoding tank through the isolatica valve and the two check valves into the reactor vessel is open. After the core flooding tank levels have dropped approximately five inches, the core ficcding tank isolatica valves are closed. The core f1 ceding system test is acceptable when the core flooding tank levels have decreased the five inches in accer-dance with the RC system pressure change. The reason for the level changes being considered indicative of system perfor=ance under accident conditiens is that the core flooding system is passive in nature and that the differential pressure across the core flooding check valves is in actuality the device which causes the system to operate. Since the tari level range indicates that fluid has passed frcm the tank into the connected piping (the reactor vessel) the level change is censidered to be firm basis for test acceptability.
The test of the high pressure injectica syste= is perfor=ed when the reacter l is shut devn for nornal Fefueling. One train of the equip =ent which veuld be called upcn to operate in the event of an SA actuatien accident is tested with the HPI pt. p motor breaker in the test position and an SA signal applied l l3 l to the HPI pump =oter breater and the EPI valves which are required to cove i
i at the initiation of the accident. Each of these devices is censidered I
' to have operated satisfacterily when it obeys the SA signal as noted.
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The test is considered to be acceptable when the devices requiring active motion obey their respective SA signals within the specified ti=e interval.
27 The valves which are required to =cve are to be in. their safety positien within 30 seconds. Quarterly, the HPI pumps vill be tested in a recircula-13 tion mode to the 3'4S"' to assure the capability of the pu=ps to perfers their SFAS function as verified by pu=ps reaching and =aintaining a
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. specified point en their head-capacity curves; also these applicable i
valves, as per ASME Section XI, in the HPI system which are required to =cve vill be stroked quarterly to verify *, heir capability to functicn.
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once per 31 days, each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not secured in position is verified to be in its 27 correct position.
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The positions of the valves are monitored by the valve position lights in
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the control roca. The status of the pumps is menitored by the status 3
indicating lights and the statica ecmputer. The HPI flow is_ monitored by the flow indicators and alarms by the station ecmputer and annunciator.
The system test of the low pressure injection system is performed when the reactor is shut down for normal refueling. One train of the equipment which would be called upon to operate in the event of SA actuating accident is tested. With the DH pump motor signal breakar in this test position of SA signal is applied to the DH pump motor breaker and the LPI system valves l
which are required to move at the initiation of the accident. Each of these devices is considered to have operated satisfactorily when it obeys the 4
signal as noted. The test is considered to be acceptable when the devices _
requiring active motion obey their respective SA signal within the specified time interval. The valves which are required to move are to be in their safety position within 30 seconds. Quarterly, the decay heat pumps will be 1 23 tested in a recirculation mode to the BWST to assure the capability of_ the 27 pumps to perform their SFAS function as verified by pumps reaching,
2 3
_..and maintaining a specified point on their head-capacity curves. Also, those applicable valves in the LPI system will be stroked quarterly to verify their capability to function.
Once per 31 days each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path, that is not secured in position, is verified to be in its correct position.
The once per fuel cycle testing frequency of the systems related to emergency core cooling is based upon an annual shutdown for refueling frequency. The
, _, _ _ annual test frequency is considered to be satisfactory. The test is con-i sidered to give a demonstration of emergency equipment readiness. The individual active components (those requiring active motion that are not normally in their ESSC position) within the emergency core cooling systems 27
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are tested no less frequently than quarterly (13 weeks) to verify that the component is capable of performing its ESF function. The method of conduct-l6 l 13
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ing the test is by manually actuating the component from the control roem.
The device is considered to have operated acceptably when it goes to its SFAS status.
13 127 The individual components which are tested are listed in table 6-17.
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r-D-B Table 6-17 Cemoonent Procedure and Requirement for Accettability Frequency HP Inj. Pumps Start pumps and open HPI valves via SFAS Quarterly i
and Injection-signal by pushing button on SFAS panel -
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Ik l2'i
- Valves
- check status lights and developed head.
i Decay Heat Start Pump and Open valve via SFAS signal Quarterly
,,by pushing button on SFAS panel - check l
ik Pumps, _ _ _,
LPI Valves and ' status lights and develcped head.
f DH Pump Siction
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- ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~
Valves BWST Isolation i 5 5 is normally open Close valve Quarterly
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Valves via remote manual switch, then open valve via SFA_S signal and verify pesition via position indicating lights.__
EPI Syste=
SA signal applied to HPI pu=ps and Refueling Response Time U I injection valves for that train Test 2*
LPI Systen SA signal applied to DHR (LPI) pump Refueling Response Time Test HPI and LPI Verify correct position 31 days Valves that are not secured in pcsitica S
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6-87h
r' D-B 6.3 5 INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION The instraentation provisions for various methods of actuation are discussed in Chapter 7 Design details and logic of the instrumentation are discussed in Chapter 7 4
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