ML19319B245

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Summary of ACRS 730809 Full Committee Meeting in Washington, DC Re Core Operating Parameters & Power Peaking Factors,Core Flooding Tank Line Break,Reactor Vessel Internals Mods & Loose Parts Monitoring
ML19319B245
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/15/1973
From: Desiree Davis
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 8001130051
Download: ML19319B245 (3)


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70, 50-289 AND 50-313 APPLICANTS: DUKE POWER COMPANY, METROPOLITRI EDIS03 AND ARERISAS POWER MID LIGHT CO!? MiY FACILITIES: OCO'IEE UMITS 2 MID 3, TilREE MILE ISLAND, UNIT 1 MID ARKANSAS NUCLEAR CNE, UNIT 1 ACRS FULL COMMITTEE HEETING, AUGUST 9, 1973 WASHDIGTON, C.,

CONCEENING GENERIC MA1TERS ASSOCIATED WITH B&W FIACIORS OF THE OCONEE DESIGN The full ACRS cocnnittee met August 9,1973, to discuss several generic subjects associated with the operating license applications.

g for the plants specified above. These generic subjects included;

1) core operating parameters and power peaking, 2) a postulated

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break of a core flooding tank (CFr) line, 3) the redesign of reactor vessel internals and 4) loose parts nonitoring. Af ter the presentations and discussions ~ associated with these su'ojects were completed, the technical experts (E&W and stnf f) in these areas were excused from -

the remainder of the full cocnittee necting. Meetings on each plant-followed, with Ocones Units 2 and 3 and Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 being considered on August 9,1973 and Three Mile Island Unit 1 being considered on August 10, 1973. The discussion of the generic subjects mentioned above is sun:narized below:

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1.

Core Operating Parameters and Power Peckinst Factors

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. This. subject had been discussed in significant detail on the

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1 previous day, August 8,1973 with a working group from the ACRS.

A summary of the August 8 discussion was presented. This included

. the values to which peak power must be limited and the factors which are considered to assure the reactor will not exceed these limits. The LOCA limits were expressed as a function of axial elevation in the coro. This was noted to be an extension l

of the ECCS evaluation models in a manner similar to the way the models had been extended to consider the effects of fuel

-densification andaa "carryovar rate fraction" entrainment 3t model during reflood.

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-In answer to ACRS quest' ions, B&W expressed confidence in their prediction of end-of-life peaking factors. Also, 3&W indicated i

that since power peaking was more limiting at beginning-of-life f

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then end-of-life ~, additional f) cxibility could be incorporated ;

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o' The affeeted applicants-and B&W had not' documented inforcation establishing these LOCA limits and the procedures to be used to restrict power peaks below these limits, na staff specified thel areas to be resolved and outlined the procedures which would

~be used in our review.

Ifr. Ross stated that there vould be no undue difficulty in establishing a suitable set of technical specifications and there was no reason to alter our conclusion regarding the acceptability of these plants.

2.

Core Floodink Tank Line Break _.

As a result of discussions in the ACR5 subcomittee meetings, the -full coenaittee indicated that they would like a discussion of

,the staff's independent analysea associated with this postulated

.j accident. ne staff presented the modifications rada to the ECCS as a result of our enmination.

The independent analyses described were 1) blevdown calculaticas to investigate the possibility of entrainment of injected water and the amount of water remaining in the core, 2) calculation of two phase uixtura heights in the core, and~3) calculation of the clad heatup transient.-

3.* Reactor Vessel Internals Modifications

'The modifications to the reactor internals were described by E&W.

These nodifications were naccesitated by failures in these cc=ponents during the hot functional testing of Ocen'ee, Unit 1.

Coincident with the investigation into the ecu:.es of the failures, BW instituted a redesign of the internals to reduce the forces acting on the components.

" beefed" to the =axit:um extent possible.In the redesign the cenponents were of these failures to be flow induced vibration.EW indicated the cause tW described the instrunentation associated with the hot functional testing of.the redesigned internalo.

A cunnary of the results of the tests was also' presented.

internals were well within E&W's acceptance criteria.The results indicated 4

Looso Parts Menitoring BW describdthe loose parts-nonitoring cysten presently installed at Oconee.. The syste:a contains redundant sensors leading to the 4.LLtul-%)

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A control room where each is alarmad. An audio output from any channel is available. Provisions are included for online tape recordings of thess signals and for output to a broad band tape recorder.

This system was indicated to be able to detect a 0.2 ft-lb inpact and alarn at a 2.0 ft-lb impact with ca inum background noise.

Two tape recordings from the Oconce 1 aysten vera played to the ACRS co=ittee. One indicated the response of a ha car impacting during operation at 75% power and the other indicated noisa from-tha failed internals during the hot functional tests in early 1972.

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Den K. Davis, Project Manager j

Pressuri::cd Water Reactors 3rcuch 173 4 Directorate of Licensing

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