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Forwards Review Comments Re Proposed Electrical, Instrumentation & Control Sys Tech Specs
	ML19319B088
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	05/26/1972
From:	Knuth D; US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	Deyoung R; US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
	NUDOCS 8001070633
	Download: ML19319B088 (7)
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Richard C. DaToung, Assistant Director for Pressuriand Water maac*ers Directorsta of Y.ima==1ag CCatElMTS W TN FNNCSED varmeTr=.AT. 3m Fog OCW M STATIM WI! ED.1 - DOCERT 30. 50-269 The 35. Electrinal. T==*=======*ia= and Centro 1 Systees Bransk has revissed the *=Maat syscifiaastans (through Revisian 19) for Osamme Unit 1.

Inclosed are 'our sanusats on those specifteetions that pertain to electrical, instrimmentaties and control systems.

Ori~f W tigned by t

Donald F. Xars

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ESB-71 Donald F. Xanth j

RStEIACSS BF Assistant Direstor for Reactor safety

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Directorate of Linesstag Eaolosure:

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Comments on Wem1 Specificatises j

for ocomme Unit 1 i

ec w/emals E. J. Block, DDR i

S. E. Bamauer, DETA A. t24 h, DDNF y'

E. G. Case 125.

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. J. M. Esadria, DDER

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F. Schroeder, ADER 1

A. Schmesser, FWE 4

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CCISErfS CE OCCEEE INIT 1 - TEGNICAL SPECIFICATICES l

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Specification 2.3 (Page 2.3-1 and Itaa 3 of Table 2.3-1) and specifi-i f

cation 3.1.8.3 ceaflict with regard to the trip setting limit for the I

i paap=== iter daring single loey operation. This isconsistency should t

be resolved.

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2.. Specifiemei== 2.3 (Itma 7 of Tabla 2.3-1) and Specification 3.1.8.4 r

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r conflict with regard to the remeter coolant tamparature trip setting i

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limit during slagle loop operariam. This iner=mistency should be i

t resolved.

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Specification 3.1.9.2 requires that "Startup rate rod withdrawal held I

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shall be in effect at all tiens." Revision 19 to the Teehafe=1 f

l Specification added the followies to the bases for that specifications i

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"Teebmimmt specificatima 3.1.9.2 will apply to both the source and j

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intermediata ranges." Since the bases are not part of the specification, l

this latter amatence should appear in the specification rather them in f

the bases.

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Specification 3.3.1b. (4) states that "Two core flood tank pressure i

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instrummat chamanis shall be operable". Each core flooding taak haa In f,

two pressere lastrument ehls'and two level instrusset channels.

'I addition, both pressure and level are addreened in Specification j

3.3.1b. (1). Therefore speelmation 3.3.Ib. (4) shemid, as a minimma, l

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require that ans pressere instrument and one level instrument he

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operable for each core flooding tank.

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Specification 3.3 is writtaa in terms of the requirements that seest be met before the reactor is made critical. Since the systems t

i-addressed by this specification are required for safety wheanver the I

i reactor is met in a cold shetdous condition (regardless of whether the r

f reactor is critical or not), the specification should be writtaa in

. f terms of.the ragmirements that senst be met before the reactor is hesteranswe's spec.ified temperature.

6.

Footnote (a) can be rmoved from Item 13 of Table 3.5.1-1.

When the l-r "Tarbine Step Valves closure" instressanta are not operable and the j

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reactor is la a hot shotdown condition, there is no asad to require a ll cold abstdeus only em the basis that those lastrusata are inoperabla.

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7.

Specificacian 4.6.6e should be changed to require that the battery discharged test be performed darfug each refuellag shutdema ratbar than the prc;rre five-year intervals.

8.

In our previous name* regarding changes to the Oconee tackafeal specifi-I cations, specific changes to Specification 3.7 were not causserated i

because it was comelanded that the entire specification s;Mded to be I

rewritten. It is r~ h that a meeting be schedalad to discuss i

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14tter from D. F. Knuth to L C. DeYoung, dated March 16, 1972.

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this speciftmatism. The following list of comments can serve as the topics 'for discussian at such a meeting:

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a.. The 230 kV transmission lines for the Oconee Station are lastalled k

I la pairs om deoble circuit teners. Therefore, Specification 3.7.la.

should not allos operation with only ese transmission 11maa in l

I service if these too lines are as the same teuera because this som1d I

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l violate General Design Criteries 17.

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Specification 3.7.1h. should be changed to: "Startep transformers j

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Ho. CT1 and Mo. CT2 shall be operehle and capable of supplying poner to the Unit 14160 Y Main Feeder Buses No.1 and No. 2."

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proposed "CT1 or CZ2" violates CDC-17 and the proposed " connected" i_

does not accurately describe the ime==^d mode of operation, i.e.,

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the mala feeder bases ars *===a-ted to transformer No.1T.

Becognizing that even if both CT1 and C22 are operabia, the desiga J

J will mot meet CDC-17 until after Beit 2 begins operatias, it should i

be acceptable to allow either CT1 or C22 to be est of service for a t,

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relatively lang time.

e.. It is geestioned whether the reference to Figure 8-5 of the FSAR is i

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Specification 3.7.1h. is acceptable because that FSAR gigure does not actasily shas the egelpammt la Unit 2 that sesst be operable for 4.

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safe operatima of Reit 1.

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The proposed Specification 3.7.2 alleus mait 1 to remmia critical

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4 or be restarted if one hydro unit or the underground feeder is not operable.. We do not concur that this is aseep*.able. Our evaluation of the Ocomme design was that the Lee Steam Station combustiam l

turbinas could rerve as an alternate power source to the station Stan 6y Power Buses only after more them one Ocamme suelear unit

- was operating and only after a reviser of the resulta of full load rejection tests on the Occuse =mita.

It was not concluded that the combustion turbias could serve as a substitute for a failed hydro unit. This position was previously waes-M to the applicant la a letter fresa F. A. 1brris, dated June 14, 1971.

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e. ~ The proposed Specification 3.7.3 allows Unit 1 to remain critical or be restarted la the event "all 230 kV transmission lines are lost'."'

We de not believe that startup should be allowed unless at least two physically i ' ; tt circuits are available to supply offsite power la accordanes with CDC-17. With respect to contimmed opera-tion fe11aring loss of all 230 kV 11 ass, Specificaties 3.7.3a should be rewritten to regaire that both hydre units-be started and run on standby with ens connected to the Steadby Power Buses and the other commseted threech the 230 kV switchyard to either transformar CT1 or CT2. Oms Las Steam Statism combustion turbina shon1d be started, m

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I the 100 kV transmission lias separated from the network, and i

s transformer CT5 emerstand. The esebustion turbine abeeld not be j

l commested to the Standby power Buses (as yL;: rd) because the j

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underground feeder circuit from the hydro unit is a more reliable j

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Specificaties 3.7.4, as presently worded, appears to sin parutsaism

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i for operation without regard to the condition of the electrical l

systems. Deless the appliener desires to identify specific degradations and to propose appropriate tr.chairmi specifications for those conditions, this specification should be reworded to include the following:

"In the swat of any degradation beyond Specification f

3.7.1, 3.7.2, or 3.7.3 above, the reactor shall be placed la a hot shutdoom condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . If the-requirouests of Specification 3.7.1 are not mat withia an i.

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additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , the reactor shall be placed in a cold t

shutdous condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ."

S ecification 3.7 is written with regard to the conditiens necessary 5.-

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yrior to bringing tha reactor critical. Since electrical power is j

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i reactor is saberitical, the specification should refleet that. sed.

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The introductory -em to spec 4 Hemei-3.7.1 could b. changed t

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ML19319B088

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