ML19319B036
| ML19319B036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1970 |
| From: | Case E US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Morris P US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319B039 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001070537 | |
| Download: ML19319B036 (2) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.. w 'JUL 15 la ~ Feter A. Morris, Director Division of Beactor 1te==ing DUEE POWER CosE' ANT, rumm NDCLEAR STATION, DOCKET NOS. 50-269 -270, i AND -287; SAFETT EVALBATICE The enclosed asfety evaluation was prepared by the Electrical Systens Branch, DRS, for inclusion in the DEL report to the ACES concerning the ne== Nuclear Station. The evaluation covers the protection systems and the muziliary electrical power systems, but the review by BBS of several items within these systems is not coglete. The evaluation identifies two " unresolved" items (1) the lack of a diverse reactor trip signal, which is required to onsure effective ECCS action, and (2) the use of automatic transfer functions in the anziliary m e power systems. The DEL position on the first ites was forwarded to the applicant in your let.ter of February 13, 1970, and our report reflects that position. The sae= d item was discussed in my memorandum, Ess-26, of May 15, 1970, and our report reflects the i j position re h d in that memoranden. is a copy of the memo to files, ESB-32, dated June 29, l 1970, in which the EsE identified those questions for which acceptable answers have not been received. We recognise that FSAR Ecvision 6 may contain some of the additional information which we require, but we hr.ve not completed our review of this==nament. If edequate infor-motion is not received or if our review of the information discloses , additional problema, we will be prepared to report orally to the ACES. ~ W In order that the scope of our review be fully understood, we wish to make the following points clear. We have not reviewed the circuitry associated with those functions which the applicant claims are not required in order to meet reactor safety criteria, and we have not attegted to verify the accuracy of these claims. However, we note that the appliennt's safety analysis and the techn cal specifications discuss several of these factions, including the followingt 1. Operation of the turbina bypass valves; Detection of an inoperable control rod and the subsequent 2. reduction of unit load demand; ~_ _ -__._
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o Peter A. Morris 2 JUL 151970 3. and group sequence interlocks; 4. Boroa dilution interlocks; and 5.- Isolation of reactor butiding purge lines upon detection of high stack radiation. For functions that DE determines are required for safety, the ESB will, if requested, assist in determining that the systems ditch per-form these functions are designed in accordance with protection system standards. Original signed by, l E. G. Case j Ess-56 Edson G. Case, Director DES E55 IDF Division of Esactor Standards Enclosures 1. safety Evaluation 2. ESB-52, Memo to Files Dated June 29, 1970 cc w/encle Distribution: sw huppl.
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- 1. 5. Boyd, DEL DR Reading D. J. Skovholt. DEL DRS Reading C. G. Long, DEL ESB Reading A. Schwencer, DEL bec:
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