ML19319A868

Summary of 670214 & 15 Meeting W/Util,Bechtel & B&W in Bethesda,Md Re Util Application for Cps.Agenda Encl

ML19319A868
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	03/09/1967
From:	Grimes B US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	Long C US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 7912191029
Download: ML19319A868 (10)

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• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum To Tgg yILES DATE: MAR 9

• S67 T'dRU: Charles G. Lonn, Chief.

Reactor Projects Branch #3, DRL f

3. Grimes, Reactor Projects Branch #3 4 j FROM' :

Division of Reactor Licensina 4

SUBJECT:

Mgg713G WIT'd. DUKE POWER CCP?f."I AND B&W ON CCONEE STATION CONST'TCION PERMIT APPLICATIONS - DOCKET NCS. 50-269/270 On Februarv 14 and 15,1967, a meeting was held with representatives of Duke Power, Babcock & Wilcox and 3echtel in the 3ethesda offices to discuss the Duke Power Comnany application for construction permits for two reactors to be located in Oconee County, South Carolina.

An attendance list of the applicant's representatives and the meetine anenda are attnehed.

In addition to those -listed, Ben Person, Dames and Moore; ?oy Snapp, consultint attorney, and Ray Luken, B&W aid the following staff attended:

R. S. 3cyd DRL C. G.

Long B. Crims

0. Allen D. Fischer R. Waterfield F. Schauer D. Sullivan A.

Revisions in Engineered Safet~ rentures Rather than requiring the low pressure injection ou:ps to provide encuth cooling water af ter a major ytpe break two " core f17eding tanks" (accumu-lators) vill be proposed. These tanks are driver be nitro.een at 600 psi and 'together vill cover one nalf the core before the (averace) clad teen-erature reaches 25000F. The hot spot will be covet od before meltine. The applicant stated that a single failure analysis anc, a study showing ihy the injection pressure was chosen vould be submitted.

Mr. Wascher of 35W was informed that the particuin points of emphasis in our reviev vould be (1) thermal-mechanical stabili':y of the core dur'n; the temperature transient, (2) mechanical stability of the reactor internals during the blowdown transient, (3) verification of coolant flow to the core and (4) a parametric study of the accumulator syss en from a perfornance viev-point.

Pumps in the low pressure injection system are no longer shared bet seen Units Similarly, the spare hi,h pressure injection pumps are no lenter 1 and 2.

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shared.- The applicant stated that these changes came about partly because of p

the complications in the instrumentation and control of the shared systems, c

Three pumps are now aligned to each unit for each system.

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MAR 3 1967 TIIE - FILES The containcent spray systems are now separate and the coolers have been removed from the spray lines. This raises the pessibility of pumpinc

saturated water, but the applicant 'clains that the recirculatten lines will

.not be required uniel 45 minutes after an accident (the caeacity of the borated water! storage tank has been increased) and that the water would be subcooled by this time.

The initially propcsed air washers have been replaced by a tubular-type heat exchanger to provide' a "different principle"~ for removing decay heat.(an ?&D effort vculd-probably have been required for the air washers). The decay

• heat is removed by the service water system and the ecmponent ecoling water

. system no' longer serves a safety function.

3. - See reenev ? ove r The applicant wishes to claim the two adjacent hydro plants as the on-site power source. These peaking plants will be nornally centrolled from the

. reactor control room in respense to load requirements relayed by a dis-patcher.. An overhead and an underground line can supply e sraency pover-to the' station (either hydro plant feedinc, either line). The total startun time of the hydro plants will be about 25 seconds and voltane to the erer-gency pumps will be rer,ulated so that they will be brournt to speed as the hydros are brought to full output.

The two hydro unit's share a con =cn penstock. The reculatin: cates are operated by stored energy drives which are actuated by redundant d.c.

b atteries. tie ' shared penstock presents the raf or difficulty in allerinc credit for. the hydro plants.

Dewate rin7 For inspection and raintenance vill be required, on the avert;e, for.10 days every 10 years.

^ uria? this tire there veuld be no en-site power available to the nuclear plants exca-t the other unit.

Since cadt unit. represents' a lar;c hlcek of-power, Duke teates. that it would be impractical to shut them both devn at the same tire.

Sefuelinc,s veuld also be scantered for best us2 of persennel. The staff sungested that.a portable diesel unit nitte be the solution and 'uhe indi-cated that the (cornany presentir ownad ne suen unit.

cther hydro units, 16 milea away, ar2 seneduled fer operation in 19 74 C.

Gite.

ruke indicated that several pieces 'of land -within the ene mile 'exclusien radius uere still not purchased 'and - that ene or two riaht be bought and releasec. to.the tenants uith an agreenent that they ceuld be evacuated en short notics.

2. 'lacarfield indicated disagreement with the meteorological calculations

= cat' noticeably 'that }the -1.9 ceter per iecend ialue of wind speed shculd be ene:eeter per secend. for the two hcur dese. This may have a atenificant

' e f fect ' on. che desi;n containment leak rate.

'!acerfield held a seaarate sessien'to discuss;the eeteorolocical medel.in detail.

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L MAR 9 567 I T'dE ' FILES The reason stated for releasing liquid effluent into the hydro plant tailrace was' to allow dilutien of the discharge in case of an accident.

Di gre'Analvsis C. Allen noted that the feedback of the positive reactivity in the coolant

. loss accident (due to the positive terperature coef ficient) is slower in the B&Wl calculations than in Westinghouse calculations (one second ccepared to 0.25 second).

We' also requested a-detailed discussien of the basis for the choice of. a maximum acceptable positive moderato. temperature ccefficient.

The applicant was also asked to deterninewhether there was an unper 11=it

-to. the. matnitude of the positive temperature coefficient which could be corrected for if it should be found necessary to reduce or eliminate the

. positive coefficient.

As indicated in the DAR the calculated stability with respect to xenen oscillations is borderline.

3&W indicated that ecans uculd be provided to correct for any oscillations-possibly partial centrol rods.

E.

The rnal Analysis Our concerns in this area center mainly en the encineerina hot channel factors,

which appear less conservative than Westinnhouse and on the ef fect of the perforated ocans on the coolant flow. Documentation of current CN3 experiments with non-uniformly heated bundles to the extent possible will be requested.

F.

Centsineent

' F..Schauer conducted a separate session to discuss the containment design in detail. This containment is. substantially similar to the Turkey 'oint and Palisades centtinrents but will require documentatien on a nunber of ite?.s and look further at certain aspects of the design (lap-solices in 7 articular).

A project ortanization chart was supplied by Ouke (attached) which indicates that the quality centrol aroup does not report to the job surcrintendent but to the resident engineer.

(Even further autencry 7.inht be desirable)

"o sche:c for leak' testing the penetrations which enter the "penetratien room".was. proposed to substantiate the claim that at least 50" of the leak-are would be through these penetrations.

Duke did propose, however, to run a vent line from the area between the seals of all other testable penetrttiens to the-penetraticn room.

(The negative pressura maintained in the Sonetra-

. tion rcon during out accident would be only a fraction of cne inch of water).

M..decident insivsta C. Long delineated' our methods of locking at centain-ent carability and

. angineered safety features design marcins. :le indicated that the spectrum

of break ~ sizes should evaluated to' determine the ?.cx1=um containment bicu-dcun pressure -using minimum safeguards (not includine accunulators).

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MAR 9 B67 THE FII.ES -

EDuke indicated that the reactor vessel cavity is now floodable to the level-of the core and that. drains would not take more than the 6500 gpm makeup flow.

- B&W stated that the heat transfer coef ficient now used after blowdown was:

one second of nucleate boiling, then a linear decrease from h=1000 to h=0 at the end of 10 seconds.

The steam line break analysis was discussed and it was indicated that the

' feedwater must be isolated to prevent significant cooldown of the steam generator shell.

In the once-through design, a shell cooldown could in-posed significant stresses on the tubes.

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- No isolation valves are proposed on the steam lines. Uc pointed out that if tubes were leaky or broken as a result of stresses imposed durine an

- accident, fission product release fron the nrimary system to that atmos-phere would be possible.

(Also, in the case of a coolant loss accident, the

" double barrier" concept would n;t be maintained if the tubes were not intact.)

The applicant was asked to calculate the results of a core relt-through but on an infornal basis at this tire.

H.

Inst rument ation The applicant was advised that the single f ailure criterien should aoply to load shedding sub-systems, d.c. supplies, etc.-

He was also advised that we will request a detailed fault analysis of all emernency electrical systens for which redundancy is beint claimed.

The applicant stated that the emerrency power systen will be desiened such that a conflict (within the system) betvcen the safety requirements of the power sources and those' oE the safecuards devices will be autenatically re-solved in favor of the safeguards.

For exaeple, and overloaded circuit vill centinue to ' function if the safetuards loads at the circuit are essential to

- public safety. ;

The ability. of the nuclear plant to withstand a total bl ekout (no a.c.) war discussed.

This incident can occur durint full power oeeration and persist indefinitely without ' causing damage to the reactor core. This is accomplished by -a 57.' capacity feedvater pu=p driven by decay heat secam. The final heat sink is. water passed throuds the 'cendenser by travity flow from the lake to

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f The reactor; protection ' system is, vith _ene exceptien, based en 2/4 locic throukh'out.The : excepted case is tha-1/2 "startup rate" trip, e'ach channel o f which - has 1 contacts in all feur of the relay contact locic chains which trip the scran circuit._ This tends co reduce th2 indenendence of. the logic

chains and also-makes it difficult to test for the: existence o# eertain

". firs t failures." LThe applicant is considerint sone redesign in -this arsa.

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1The Filds',

tod positien vill be. displayed en 69 individual indicators. 'Any ene.

trod position - can be ' selected for displav en a reter at. the console.

?osition is' sensed by either of two identical LVDTs at each red.

Rod.

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deviation will.be alarmd.

Developant v.ork is. prceressing satisfactorily on the "nutating"' red drive system. Tests have 'shown that it ;is icoessible for the driving' and ' driven' gears to be re-engaged c 2cc a.- rod drop is initiated.

.The: entire protection system 1's being--designed in'.accordance with the provisions 'of the proposed.IEEE standard. The' 3ailey :'.eter Cocoany 'is supplying the instrumentation'and will conduct equip-ent qualification tests in accordanca with the IEE ' standard.

Instrumntacien which actuates containant isolation and engineered safeguards will meet pro-taction syste= standards.

Our criteria for the. design of centainrent isolaticn valve syste-s have-been ' studied by the applicant, and his proposed isolatica system has been r.odified accordinglf.

The applicant ias advised that he will be asked to varify that the sirul-taneous red vithdraval accident (startup accident) uhici has been analyzed la, in. fact, the worst casa accident in ter.s.of prctectica system '

capability. :

Attachnents-As stated above LDistribution:

2.-'3. Joyd

-C. G..Lenp,

3. Gri-es

- D. Fischer

2. Waterfield~

F. 3 ciaue r C. Allen 3.1Sullivan 32L 'eadin; r3 -J3 7eadin3 '

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~ Duk a Pownr Comptny '

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[P H Barton,' Project Engineer,: Steam Production' Dept'-

EM D,Carcon,1 Senior Designer,< Engineering: Dept e

L;C Dail, Principal Civil ~ Engineer, Engineering Dept

?R-L' Dick,L rojects. Manager, Construction Dept P

=E C'Fiss,: Nuclear, Engineer, Engineering-Dept, W H Grigg, Assistant. General _ Counsel,. Legal Dept n

.lS;B Harar,-: Design Engineer, Engineering Dept 1W S. Lee, Vice President, Engineering W H 0weni Principal. Mechanical Engineer,, Engineering. Dept W 0 Parker,' Assistant Manager - Operation & Maintenance, Steam Production Dept lE D Powell, Manager,/ Steam Produetion

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-C A Price," Designer, Engineering Dept

.B'M Rice,iSenior. Engineer,-Engineering Dept l'

.D S: Robbins," Senior-Engineer, Engineering Dept

~A_C Thies,.Vice. President. Production-Operation C E Watkins, Assistant Vice President,~ Construction

~T F Wyke fAssociate: Engineer,LEngineering Dept 4

LC 'J Wylie, Principal' Electrical Engineer, Engineering l Dept F E CourtneyJJr.: Meteorologist, Lockheed-Marietta and Dames & Moore I

The Babcock &'Wilcox Company 1

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'Lynchburg

'B B Cardwell,; Group Supervisor, Electrical.- Nuclear Power Generation Dept

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J.D.Carlton, Design Engineer, Control Analysis - Nuclear Power Generation Dept

^ H E Flora,- Group Supervisori Nuclear Safety - Nuclear Power Generation Dept

'A H. Lazar, Ass't Manager, Reactor Design Engineering *- Nuclear Power Gen Dept

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.J Mallay, Design Engineer, Nuclear Safety - Nuclear Power Generation Dept 4

'J H:McMillan, Manager, Reactor Design Engineering - Nuclear. Power Gen Dept D_S Montgomery,-Project Manager - Nuclear Power Generation Dept

' M F Sankovich, Section Manager, Core. Design - Nuclear Power Generation Dept T Schulers Group Supervisor, Nuclear Analysis - Nuclear Power. Generation Dept 4

H H Stevens,. Group Supervisor,7 Instruments' & Control - Nuclear Power Gen Dept

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J,H Taylor,-Group. Supervisor,. Systems Design- Nuclear Power Generation. Dept

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R E Washer,. Manager, Nuclear Safety Section - Nuclear Power Generation Dept 1

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Barberton

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D E.Heyburn,. Manager,. Contract: Engineering:- Nuclear Power Generation Dept J Kreps,zDesign Engineer ' Nuclear.&:Special' Product Dept

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W H Rowand,

Vice-President' -Nuclear. Power Generation Dept'

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T Sprague, Manager,l Design Engineering.- Nuciear & Special Product Dept

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'Bechtel-Corp'

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JR~Arbel, Mechanical 1 Engineer u.

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~ ' LW Bushnell, ' Assistant 1 Project Engineer: (Mechanical, Instruments & Control)

~C~Corley,' Chief Electrical--Engineer'(Washington D C)

N.F,Rau, ProjectfEngineer-J;Reilly,~iProject Electrical Engineeri g _' 'isjSloan,iChief= Civil? Structural Engineer

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TJ Smith, Mechanical Engineer (Instruments & Control) -

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2 LJ;Tkacik,

Project' Civil Structural Engineer T ~~

llJ;Utegaard,iAss'istantxManager, Enginaering, Project Sponsor

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R; Williams 6 Project Mechanic 1(Engineer

' y H Osgood,]Enginear

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10CONEE 1 -' 2 '

f MEETING AGENDA.

FEBRUARY 14, ~1967 '

DOCKET NOS.- 50-269 & 50-270'

-1.

Introduction

-a.

Who i.s attending

b. -

Status of work'at site, including dams Jc.

Basis of proposed agenda-L2.

Summary of Plant Changes:

~. - Add core flooding tanks-a b.

Split L P injection systems c.

Split H P injection systems

~ d.. Split reactor building spray systems

~

e-Delete spray coolers

f. - Replace R B emergency air washers with bare tube coolers - put on service water -

. Increase capacity of Borated storage to 350,000 gallons

g.

h.'

Voltage of reactor coolant pump motors i.

Engineered safe' guards in service 25 seconds after blackout 3.

Other Items 'of Interest:

Seleeted Bingham as reactor coolant pump; supplier

= a.

b.-

Up-to-date information on residences within the site boundary C

" 4. Nuclear ~ Analysis:

.a.

? Discussion of reactivity balance, accuracy of calculaticas and possible range;of coefficients ;over core. life

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'Ag:nda - Cdntd b..

Control rod' group assignments,. function and worth -

t Estimate of beginning of life moderator cofficient - statement on c.

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- fixed shims - if ' shewn to be necessary - -

5.- : Thermal Analysis:

a'.

Discuss' ion of DNB correlation

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6.

Elestrical Power Supply: =

Summarh of system arrangement,- including hydro units, their leads,

a. -

and startup.

b.

. DC and vital AC power supply ~to instruments and controls 7.1 Instrumentation and Control'Sy-tems (Separate session suggested) 8.

Accident' Analvsis:

a.L Review of steam line failure analysis, including cool-down effects b.

Discussion of pressurizer high water level reactor' trip-c..

Loss of reactor coolant accident

.d.. Rod ejection accident 9..

. Reactor Building Design:

a.

Discussion of detailed design calculations, including loadings b.

' Criteria for-allowable stress c2 Seismic design, including damping factor and model for damping and

- stiffne s s'

..-d.

Liner design - criteria and design details fe.: ' Shear-de sign

f..

Penetrations ~- reinforcing of Luilding and liner at penetration

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. Other design details:

.1)? Crane support L

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2) Rebar splice s --

13) ' Corrosion protection - of liner and tendons 10.iDuke's Construction:

. a.

l:. Organization

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M Inspection and quality control

c.

Conformance with ACI Codes' on concrete l11. - Environmental Analyse s:

. Meteorological model (Separate meeting? )

a.:

-b.

~ Recirculating system leakage outside reactor building

' c.

Liquid effluent discharge into tallrace

.12. -General 1 Questions:

La.

Credit fo: penetration room ventilation system

b. -

NPSH on' L'P. injection and spray pumps c.z Answer questions about primary and secondary systems

.d..

Reactor cavity flooding ei. Starting up Unit 2 with irradiated fuel l f. -

Conformance with isolation criteria

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