ML19319A861
| ML19319A861 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1967 |
| From: | Danielle Sullivan US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Long C US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912191014 | |
| Download: ML19319A861 (3) | |
Text
P I
APR 2 S E57 Chief C. G. Imag,jects Branch f3, DEL Roseter Pro TEED:
V. A. Meers. Chief Instiimmentaties & Feuer Techselegy Breach, DEL D. F. Sullives 6 Instrumentation & Feuer Techselegy Breach Division of IMbester Lisenslag l:
l DOCKET Nos [50-269) Alm 50-270 DUIX PouRE 63E%NT AIgunas TO DEL QUESTICES D&TED MkaCX 23, 1967 subject answers have been submitted by the applicant as Assedmont No. 1 and Es. 2 to the original applicatism. Inferentism pertaining to instru-mentaties and power is some= M principally in revised sese w s 5, 6, 7, and 8, and in the aos supplemmats (Es.1 and Ms. 2) to Volums II.
At this writing, I have the felleming comments:
1.
Figure 3-59 (Rev. 4/1/67) and Figure 7-2 (Bow. 4/1/67) are still incomplets in that they de met show sufficient details of the p._, ::f circuits douastress of the underveltage coils (seram breakers) to pensit a single failure analysia by the staff. This sper:ific point uns raised by us during our last meeting with the applicant.
2.
The applicant has stated: "The protection systems will be designed to meet the p L,:::' IEEE standard for nuclear power plant protectica systems." Ee has alas stated that protecties system instrumentaties will be subject to accident envireemental (goalification) tests as required by the IEEE standard. These tests, housver, will not in-cinde the accident radiation envix===ne.
1 I believe that the applicaat's peetties is acceptable provided he deterutnes from existing radiatiam damage data that the estarials of constrecties are capable of surviving their accident environment.
3.
The "= h ttaneous-all-red-withdraus1" accident has been analysed over the complete spectriam of initial power levels. Details are gives en page 4.91 (Rev. 4/18/67) and Fig. 4.9-1 (Bew. 4/18/67) of Tel. II. This analysis was requested to detensine what " safety grade" interiesks, if any, might he required within the red drive selector syntas. The applicant cameludes:
"... me fuel damage would reesit from simm1taneens all-red withdressi from any pesar level."
I believe that the smalysis is sufficient to show that no require-most exists for " safety grade" interlocks.
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C. 4. Long APR 2 (i 1967 i
[(It is ey intent to defer questions relating to amplifier saturatism everlead7totheoperatingstagewhenprototypesoftheactualin-strumentation will be available for testing.)
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h autating red drives will not be used in these reacters. W red drive design is being changed to a rack and pinion drive actuated by as slestric gear meter and angnetic clutch assedly operating through a buffor seal.
Iqr various concerns relating to the natating cancept are thereby resolved, by defamit. h new design is in cameon use and presents no difficulties for me at the present time. I will, however, discuss j
the matter with the applicant.
5.
Two of the questions requested information and-failure analyses relating, respectively, to the 3-wire d.c. (station batteries) system, and the power / flew safety system. h applicant has sub-mitted answers which appear to be complete in all respects. At this writing, they are under review.
6.
Additional information has been submitted relating to off-site power. Deb Ferguson is reviewing this aspect of the power relia =
bility question.
7.
A revised table of containment isolation valve information has been received which reflects certain changes made within cooling systems.
The table is under review.
Summary:
a.
Schematics of these circuits downstrees of the scram breakers are still needed.
b.
h agenda for the April meeting with the applicant should include the following topiest (1)
Red drives (2) Fower/ flow mesitoring circuits (3) - Emerseecy Power (a.c. and d.c.)
.(4) 'cantainment isolation system.
(5) Provisions for testing instrument channels during reactor operation.
C. s. lems 3
APR 2 6 367 na**=== of the larga snount of informaties within the total appli-e,
-cation and the pressure of other work, it will not be possible to com-piste a thorough review in time for the June ACES asating.
(Reviews of ~ SH-1A, Wisconsin-Michisan, Jersey Centrol, and Millstone will necessarily take precedence). Accordingly, I plan to complete the review in time for the taesting subsequest to June.
d.
No serieus problems are outstanding.
ect S. Levine-
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