ML19319A785
| ML19319A785 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1977 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Case E, Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912120806 | |
| Download: ML19319A785 (13) | |
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NRC DISTRIBUTION pon PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
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cATE cp occuuRNT Edson G. Case Duke Power Co.
7/21/77 Charaotte, NC oATE mEcEivEo W.
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Enclosed info on the design of the
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emergency power systems as compared to the NRC staff positions on degraded voltage conditions and interaction between offsite and onsite systems indicate that the current design is comparable to that described in the
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' ' ' A'lW1 to this effect will be submitted by 9/15/77.
1p+11p PLANT NAME: Oconee Nuclear Power Station Unit No.
1, 2, and 3 RBT 7/27/77 CAvew FOR ACTION /INFORMATION ENVIR5NMENTAL I MRTCNED ADe P
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Mr. Edson G. Case, Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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%'p Attention: idr. A. Schwencer, Chief
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Operating Reactors Branch #1
Dear Mr. Case:
Your letter of June 3, 1977 requested that we compare the design of the Oconee Nuclear Station emergency power systems with the staff positions to assess the susceptibility of safety-related electrical equipment with regard te (1) suetained degraded voltage conditions at the offsite sources, and (2) interaction between the offsite and onsite emergency power systems.
It is our conclusion, as documented in the attached analysis, that the design of the Oconee emergency power system has equivalent capabilities and protective features to those described in the staff's position.
Your letter requested that an amendment to the Facility Operating License be proposed to incorporate comparable Technical Specifications to those provided in the staff position. This amendment will be submitted by S ep temb.e r 15, 1977.
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'l Very truly yours,
& _ a. m' c-WilliamO. Parker,Jr.j MST:vr 772,yiry3?2 j
r OCOMEZ m'C'.ZAR STATION Resocnse to "RC Staff Position on Detraded Systen Conditions The design of the Oconce Nuclear Station ensite emergency pcwer sys:es has been reviewed and compared with the Staff position as requested.
It has been de:ermin"d : hat the existing pro:ection systa=, relating to degraded offsite system ccaditions, has equivalent capabilities and protec: ion features to those described in the Staff's positien.
The voltage protec:1cn incorporated in the design consists of two-cut-of-hree conincident undervoltage relay logic monitoring the offsite pcwer systen. The undervol: age relays in this logic hava inverse tire characteristics : hat will protec: the onsite distribution systen fre= :he effects of va.fing degraded offsite systen conditions. The undervoltage protectica will initia:e sepa-ration of the ensite emergency buses from the 'effsite power systems immediately upon complete loss of of fsite power or at a time delay depending en the ~ extent the degraded condi:1on.
s, For the postulated conditions when the emergency buses must be separated frca the offis:e pcwer systems due'to sc e degraded condition, emergency power is supplied frea the ensite Keewee 'dydro Sca icn. Ivo S7.5 MVA hydro-electric generating units are available to serve the energency buses as described in FSAR Section S.2.3.
Due :o the enormous capacity cf :hese onsite energency power sources, Icad shedding and sequencing of the energency loads is not required. Therefore, the present protection system incorporates all levels of protection required for degraded offsite pcwer system conditions due to the inherent capabilitites of the inverse time undervoltage relay.
The following discussion addresses the cc parisca of the design of the U
- 2. 3e Nuclear Station emergency pcwer systers with the stated Staff positions:
Position 1-a') ' In response :o :he August 12, 1975 NRC reques: for informatica, an analysis of ths Ocenee elec:rical dis:ribu,tien sya e: was perfor cd, documentea, and submitted to the Staff. A suttary of this repor is enclosed as A :achten: !.
This cnalysis, covering the vol: age requirements of the elec:rical equip =ca: under degraded conditiens. defined :he under-voltage trip setpoin: for the inverse-: ire underzelta,s protection relays as 38" of the rated bus vel: age.
This satpoint will initiate : ripping
-at the following vol: age leve'.s and time delays, thereby providing pro-taction over the full range of vol: age dechys:
Percant of Satpoint Tine Delay
.sr 99%
> 5 see 95:
5.0 see 90%
3.6 see S0:
2.0 see 30%
l.0 sec
<33"
_0.3 see 4
. This setting provides adequate =argin sufficient to assure the operability of the emergency loads under short-ti=e or long-ti=c voltage degradetion within the capability of :he equipment and withf.4 the setpoin: limits.
b)
The dasign of the voltage protection system conforms to this position in that it provides two-out-of-three coincident undervoltage relay logic to preclude spuriously separating the emergency buses from the offsite jower sources.
c) The time delays sssociated with the se: points which are listed in the preceding response :o Position 1(a) were selected based o'n the following considerations:
1)
The allowable time delay, including margin :o trip offsite powe,r and to provide emergency onsi:e pcwer, does no: enceed the 23 seconds period for a LOCA condition or the 23 ninute period for a non-LOCA condition that is assc=ed in the FSAR accident analysis.
- 2) The tina delays selected prevent short ters :ransient conditions from reducing the availability of the offsi:e pcuer sources and sinimice the effects of these disturbances.
- 3) The inverse-:1:e charac: eristic of the undervoltage relays used for voltage protection is well within the allovable limits estab-lished for the safety systens equiptent. This protection will, therefore, separate the emergency buses from the offsitt power sources before any voltage icvel is reached wh1.ch may be detrimen:al to the safety systens or components.
. d)
The undervoltage protection. logic automatically initiates the disconnectica of the offsi:e pcwer scurces from the e=ergency buses whenever the voltage setooxa: and : ice delav have been exceeded.
e)
Althou2h designed orior to the issuan:2 f IIZZ 279-1971. the undervol: age protection logic satisfies
- he requiremen:s cf this standards, f) Technical Specifications will be revised :o make provisions for the voltage protection monitors.
Posirion 2 The onsi e energency power fer the Oconee Nuciear Station is supplied by the Keowee Ey' ro Statica as. described in the FSAR Section 3.2.3.
3ecause of :he d
ample capability of :he two Keowee units (37.3 MVA aach), no load sh '. ding -
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or sequencing of ecargency loads is required. Therefore, no pre'entive inter-
- locks, autocatic bypasses, or re-instatement fea:ures are required.
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4 Position 3.
The Technical Specifications will be revised as sppropria:e to include test requiraments tha:' demons: rata the full functional operability and independence of the casite power sources at least one per 13 months.
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ATTACMENT I Summarv of the Analvsis of Ocnnee Ecernency Pnwe r Dist ef bution $ / stem I.
I?RRODUCT ICN The following analysis evaluates the Oconee emergency po.,er distribution system to determine if the operability of safety-related equipment, including associated control circuitry and instrumentation is adversely affected by short term or long term degradation in grid system voltage.
The evaluation has been directed toward identifying all possible voltage conditions (i.e., normal and degraded) that can exist on the plant, distribution system cnd comparing equip. rent operating limits to these voltage conditions.
II.
EV4.UAT10M Figure i shows a one-line diagram of the Oconee Unit 3 distribution
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system which is the basis of our analysis of voltage profiles throughout s
the distribution system.
Since the distribution systems for Units 1 and 2 are similar to Unit 3, the results of this analysis are applicable to all units.
In performing the analysis on the Oconee system, the limitations of the safety-related equipment, including associated control circuitry and instrumentation, were defined to establish the voltage range over which the components could operate continuously 'n the performance of their design function. These continucus operating voltage ranges are:
Voltage C omoone n t Ratina limiti: 3 Vo;ta:e Rance Motors 4000 V (210%) E00/3600V 575 V (110%) 633/5187 200 V (ilOS) 220/i80V M 0 Valves 575 V (z10%) 633/518v (t 0%) 220/130V 1
200 V Motor Controllers 600 V (235%) 510V 208 V (235%) 177V The voltage ranges defined for motor continuous operation are the most restrictive ocerating conditions and, therefora, establish the Scunds of continuous system operation.
Thi s analysis adresses the condition when the normal auxiliary loads are being cupplied by of fsite p2.'er fr:n Juke's 230 kV system. These
.gr normal auxiliary loads are supplied fr:m the offsite power system during re fueling, olent startup, plant shutdown, and abnormal trip-of the unit. During accident conditi:ns the offsi:e source is the
. pre ferred source to supply the required safety loads also. This source of supply in either normal or accident conditions i3 available through startup transfor.mer CT3 which supplies the 4.15 k" distribution buses.
Since the norma 4 opersting voltage range (i.e., 227 kV to 2i7 kV) for the grid system is below the nominal 230 kV system voltage, startup transformer CT3 is set on the 218,500 volt tap in order to optinine voltage profiles throughout the auxiliary systen. All ad center transformers as shown in Figure I are set on nominal taps, in orcer to determine the voltage profiles at the safety-related buses for full-load and no-load conditions and the range of norra! grid voltages defined above, computer studies were run for the folleaing two cases:
Case I: With the grid voltage assumed operating at 227 kV and the aux!!!ary system under minimum loading conditions, the voltage pro'iles for the safety-related buses were calculated. This case provides :be highest expected voltages of 4252/613/212V on the safety-related buses for the highest normal operating grid voltage.
it should be noted tha since a no load condition does not practically exist on the auxiliary system,the condition of mininum loading during cold shutdown has been used instead.
Figure 2 sumnarizes the results of tSis case.
Case 2: With the grid ve.tage assumed operating at 217 kV and the c1 auxiliary system under maximum loading (i.e.,
full load) conditions, i
the voltage profiles for the safety-related buses were calculated.
This case provides the lowest expected voltages of 3802/5L3/1397 on the safety-related buses for the lowest normal operating grid voltage.
Figure 2 summarizes the results of this case.
For all other possible auxillary system loading c:nditions with the 230 kV grid system operating between 227 kV and 217 kV, the voltage orofiles for the safety-related buses will
>e within the range established by Case 1 and Case 2 defined above.
Under normal conditions the Oconee Unit 3 auxiliary loads are carried by the Unit 3 generator thrcush unit auxiliary transformer 3T as shown in Figure 1 The normal caerating range for the generator terminal voltage is 13.9L kV to 17.68 kV.
In analyzing the voltage profiles at the safety-related buses, computer studies were run for normal generator operating voltages (i.e., Cases 3 and 4) as defined above and for degraded conditions (i.e., Cases 5 and 6) requiring generator trip. The case studies are as folicws:
Case 3:
With the generator voltage at its normal neximum value o~
18.94 kV and the auxiliary system under minimum loading conditions corresponding to the condition of the unit tied to the transmission system and under load, the voltage profiles for the safety-related buses were determined. This provides the highest expected vo!: ages of 4397/633/219V on the safety-related buses for the highest normal generator operating vo!: age.
Figure 3 summarizes the results of this case.
Case h: V!th the generator voltage at its normal. minimum value of-
- F' 17.68 kV and th+ auxiliary system under maximum loading ccnditions, the voltage profiles for the safety-related buses were determined.
This provides the icwest expected voltages of 3973/573/192V on the
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safety-related buses for the Ic.ses normal generator operating voltage.
Figure 3 summarizes the results of this case.
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' Case 5: With toe generator voltage assumed at tne overvoltage setpoint of 19.91 kV requiring generator trip and the auxiliary system under minimum loading conditions corresponding to the Unit tied to the transmission system and under load, the voltage profiles for the safety-related buses were determined. This provides the highest possible operating voltages of 4626/667/230V on the safety-related buses with the generator voltage at the overvoltage setpoint of the Volts /Hert: protective relaying.
Figure 4 sumcarizes the results of this case.
Case 6: With the 230 kV transmission system operating at its norra!
minimum value of 217 kV and with the generator assu-ed operating in a degraded loading condition (i.e., under-excited condition) corresponding to the loss-of-excitation relay setpoint, the voltage crofiles (i.e.,
3952/569/1979) for the safety-related buses were deternined.
Figure 4 summarizes the resuits of this.
III.
CONCLUSIONS All pertines t combinations of coeroting ccnditions were evaluated for
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2 the Oconee auxiliary system, and it was determined that all safety-related loads, including associat'ed control circuitrv and instru-entation, will perform their safety functions as required.
To ensure that the operability of system components is not adversely affected by short term or long term degradation in system grid vo!tage, the undervoltage relays that monitor the of fsite pcwer system are set at 88% (3660V). This ensures that an acceptable voltage level requi red for continuous operation of non-safety and safety-related equiptent will exist. The time delay inherent in these relays will eliminate spurious trips and ensure that degraded undervoitages are detected and cleared before they can adversely af fect safety-related loads.
Figure 5 shows the results of Case 7 which provides the voitage profiles on the safety-related buses under degraded offsite po'.ser conditions corresponding to the undervoltage relay setpoint of E3% (36507).
Tnis Case demonstrates that voltages below the continuous operating Ilmits of the safety-related loads cannot exist wi:hout causing a separation from the degraded condition.
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