ML19318C534
| ML19318C534 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/03/1980 |
| From: | Carroll D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Wright G ILLINOIS, STATE OF |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007010607 | |
| Download: ML19318C534 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES N
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
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799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOls 60137 APR 3 1980 State of Illinois Department of Public Health ATTN:
Mr. Gary N. Wright, Chief Division of Nuclear Safety 535 West Jefferson Street Springfield, IL 62761 Gentlemen:
IE Circular No. 80-03 dated March 6, 1980, was inadvertently sent to you without the enclosed attachmenta. We are sorry for any inconvenience this may have caused you.
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Power Company D. C. Cook 1, 2 (50-315, 50-316)
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Zimmer (50-358)
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Perry 1, 2 (50-440, 50-441)
Commonwealth Edison Company Braidwood 1, 2 (50-456, 50-457)
Byron 1, 2 (50-454, 50-455)
Dresden 1, 2, 3 (50-10, 50-237, 50-249)
La Salle 1, 2 (50-373, 50-374)
Quad-Cities 1, 2 (50-254, 50-265)
Zion 1, 2 (50-295, 50-304)
Consumers Power Company Big Rock Point (50-155)
Midland 1, 2 (50-329, 50-330)
Palisades (50-255)
Dairyland Power Cooperative LACBWR (50-409)
Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 (50-341)
Illinois Power Company Clinton 1, 2 (50-461, 50-462) l l
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State of'Ill!nois
- APR 3 1980 Iowa Electric Light & Power Company Duane Arnold (50-331)
Northern Indiana Public Service Company Bailly (50-367)
Northern States Power Company Monticello (50-263)
Prairie Island 1, 2 (50-282, 50-306)
Public Service of Indiana Marble Hill 1, 2 (50-546, 50-547)
Toledo Edison Company Davis-Besse 1 (50-346)
Union Electric Company Callaway 1, 2 (50-483, 50-466)
Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach 1, 2 (50-266, 50-301)
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Kewaunee (50-305)
Sincerely, g
Dorothy E.fcarroll, Acting Chief Administrative Branch Attachments: Sections 2.2.1-2.2.2; 2.2.3 and 6.4 of NUREG 75/087 cc w/ attach:
Mr. D. W. Kane, Sargent & Lundy Central Files Reproduction Unit NRC 20b Local PDR NSIC TIC
NUREG 75/087 o naco U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f
g STANDARD REVIEW PLAN l
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SECTION 6.4 HABITABILITY SYSTEMS REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Accident Analysis Branch (AAB)
Secondary - Hydrology-Meteorology Branch (ifiB)
Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB)
Effluent Treatment Systems Branch (ETSB)
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AREAS OF REVIEW The control room ventilation system and control huilding layout and structures, as described in the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR), are reviewed with the objective of assuring that plant operators are adequately protected against the effects of accidental releases of toxic or radioactive gases. A further objective is to assure that the control room can be maintained as the center from which emergency teams can safely operate in the case of a design basis radiological release. To assure that these objectives are accom-plished the following items are reviewed:
1.
The zone serviced by the contml room emergency ventilation system is examined to ascertain that all critical areas requiring access in the event of an accident are included within the zone (control room, kitchen, sanitary facilities, etc.) and to assure tnat those areas not requiring access are generally excluded from the zone.
2.
The capacity of the control room in terms of the number of people it can accommodate for an extended period of time is reviewed to confire the adequacy of emergency food and medical supplies and self-contained breathing apparatus and to determine the levels become excessive.
length of time the control room can be isolated before CO2 3.
The control room ventilation system layout and functional design is reviewed to determine flow rates and filter efficiencies for input into the AAB analyses of the butidup of radioactive or toxic gases inside the control roce, assuming a design basis release. Basic deficiencies that might impair the effectiveness of the system are examined. In addition, the system operation and procedures are reviewed. The ASB has primary responsibility in the system review area under Standard Review Plan (SRP) 9.4.1.
The ASB is consulted when reviewing hardware and operating procedures.
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STANDARD REVIEW PLAN 3
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGUNTION IDENTIFICATIONOFPOTENTIALHAZARDSINSITEVICkITY l
$ECTIONS 2.2.1 - 2.2.2 I
REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Accident Analysis Branch (AAB)
Secondary - None I.
AREAS OF REVIEW Locations and separation distances from the site of industrial, military, and transportation facilities and routes in the vicinity of the site. Such facilities and routes include air, ground, and water traffic, pipelines, and fixed manufacturing, processing, and storage facilities. Potential external hazards or hazardous materials that are present
'7 or which may reasonably be expected to be present during the projected life time of the proposed plant. The purpose of this review is to establish tne information concerning the presence of potential external hazards which is to be used in further review in Sections 2.2.3, 3.5.1.5, and 3.5.1.6.
II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 1.
Data in the SAR adequately describes the locations and distances of incustrial.
l military, and transportation facilities in the vicinity of the plant, and is in agreement with data obtained from other sources, when available.
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2.
Descriptions of the nature and extent of activities conducted at nearby facilities, including the products and materials likely to be processed, stored, used, or trans-ported, are adequate to permit evaluations of possible hazards in Part 3 review se tions dealing with specific hazards.
3.
Where potentially hazardous materials may be processed, stored, used, or transported in the vicinity of the plant, sufficient statistical data on such materials are l
provided to establish a basis for evaluating the_ potential hazard to the plant.
111. REVIEW PROCEDURES Selection and emphasis of various aspects of the areas covered by this review plan will i.
be made by the reviewer on each case. The judpent of the areas to be given attention during the review is to be based on an inspection of the material presented, the similarity
,g of the material to that recently reviewed on other plants, and whether items of special safety significance are involved. The following procedures are followed:
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STANDARD REVIEW PLAN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SECTION 2.2.3 EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS REV!EW RESPONSIB!LITIES Primary - Accident Analy is Branch (AAB)
Secondary - Applied Statistics Branch (ASB/MPA)
I.
AREAS OF REVIEW The applicant's identification of potential accident situations in the vicinity of the plant is reviewed to determine the completeness of and the bases upon which these potential accidents were or were not accommodated in the design. (See Standard Review Plans 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.)
The applicant's probability analyses of potential accidents involving hazardous materials or activities in the vicinit" of the plant. if such analyses have been performed, are also reviewed by ASB/MPA on request by AAB to determine that appropriate data and analytical models have been utilized.
The analyses of the consequences of accidents involving nearby industrial, military, and transportation facilities which have been identified as design basis events are reviewed.
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II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The identification of design basis events resulting from the presence of hazardous materials or activities in the vicinity of the plant is acceptable if the design basis events include each postulated type of accident for which the expected rate of occurrence of potential l
exposures in excess of the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines is estimated to exceed the NRC staff objective of approximately 10 per year. Because of the difficulty of assigning accurate numerical values to'the expected rate of unprecedented potential hazards generally con-sidered in this review plan, judgment must be used as to the acceptability of the overall risk presented.
The probability of occurrence of the initiating events leading to potential consequences in excess of 10 CFR Part 100 exposure gurielines should be estimated using assumptions that are as representative of the specific site as is practicable. In addition, because l
of the low probabilities of the events under consideration, data are often not available to permit accurate calculation of probabilities. Accordingly, the expected rate of occur-rence of potential exposures in excess of the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines of approximately 10-6 per year is acceptable if, when combined with reasonable qualitative arguments, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower.
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The cff; cts of design basis cvents have been adequately considered if analysis of thm l
effects of those accidents on the safety-related features of the plant have been performed and measures (e.g., hardening, fire protectien) to mitigate the consequences of such I
events i M e been taken.
1 III. REVIEW PROCEDURES g
y In some cases it may be necessary to consult with or obtain specific data from other
-,j branches, such as the Structural Engineering Branch (SEB) or Auxiliary Systems Branch l
(ASB), regarding possible effects of external events on plant structures or components.
The applicant's probability calculations are reviewed, and an independent probability analysis is performed by the staff if the potential hazard is considered significant enough to affect the licensability of the site or is important to the identification of design basis events.
'I All stochastic variables that affect the occurrence or severity of the postulated event are i
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identified, and judged to be either independent or conditioned by other variables.
probabilistic models should be tested, where possibh, against all available information.
If the model or any portion of it, by simple extension, can be used to predict an'observ-
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able accident rate, this test should be performed.
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The design parameters (e.g., overpressure) and physical phenomena (e.g., gas concentration) selected by the applicant for each design basis e,ent are reviewed to ascertain that the values are comparable to the values used in previous analyses and found to be acceptable by the staff.
Each design basis event is reviewed to determine that the effects of the event on the 1
safety featJres of the plant have been adequately accomodated in the design.
If accidents involving release of smoke, flamable or nonflamable gases, or chemical
- 5 bearing clouds are considered to be design basis events, an evaluation of the effects of these accidents on control room habitability should be made in SAR Section 6.4 and on the
'l operation of diesels and other safety-related equipment in SAR Chapter 9.
Special attention should be given to the review of standardized designs which propose criteria involving individual numerical probability criteria for indflidual classes of 3
external man.eade hazards. In such instances the reviewer should establish that the 4
i envelope also includes an oserall criterion that limits the aggregate probability of exceed-ing design criteria associated with all of the identified external men.made hazards.
j Similarly, special attention should be given to the review of a site where several man.made
'4 hazards are identified, but none of which, individually, has a probability exceeding the
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acceptance criteria stated herein. The objective of this special review should be to assure that the aggregate probability of an outcome that may lead to unacceptable plant
,' j damage meets the acceptance criteria of part II of this SRP Section. (A hypothetical
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example is a situation where the probability of shock wave overpressure greater than design j
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overpressure is about 10*I per reactor year from accidents at a nearby industrial facility,
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and approximately equal probabilities of exceeding design pressure from raf fway accidents, 1'
Individually each any be judged acceptably highway accidents and from shipping accidents.
f Iow; the aggregate probability may be judged sufficiently great that additional features of design are warranted.)
(, '1 EVALUATION FINDINGS IV.
If the reviewer verifles that sufficient inform;lon has been provided and that his evaluation i
is sufficiently complete and adequate to meet the acceptance criteria in Section !! of this SRP, conclusions of the following type may be prepared for the staff's safety evaluation
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't report:
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"The applicant has identified potential accidents which could occur in the vicinity of the plant, and from these has selected those which should be considered as design l basis events and has provided analyses of the effects of these accidents on the safety-related features of the plant. The applicant has demonstrated that the plant is adequately protected and can be operated with an acceptable degree of safety with i
regard to potential accidents which may occur as the result of activities at nearby
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industrial, military, and transportation facilities."
1 V.
REFERENCES Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclea power Plants," Revision 2.
t Affidavit of Jacques 8. J. Read before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the matter Docket Mos. STN 50-522,523.
of Skagit Muclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2. July 15,1976.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, Supplemental Initial Decision in the Matter of Hope Creek Docket Mos. 50-354, 355.
Generating Station Units 1 and 2. March 28,1977.
Section 2. Supplement 2 to the Floating Muclear Plant Safety Evaluation Report, rocket No. STN 50-437, September 1976.
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