ML19317G513

Forwards Evaluation of Facility Instrumentation & Electric Power to Be Included in Rept to ACRS

ML19317G513
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River, 05000303
Issue date:	03/11/1968
From:	Moore V US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	Boyd R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 8003180802
Download: ML19317G513 (11)

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L'Boyd,Assinant.DirectorforReactorProjectaN' Tus:

S. Levin, Anistaat Director for Reactor FAR 111E8 Technology, DdL 1

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Inn :=;entatica & Pover Tech:1gy 3rsach, DEL 7LORIDA PCM C3RPC2ATION C173TAL RIVER UNITS 3 & 4, INSTEMENTATION

- AND EIRCTRIC Pom'35 VIE 6 - DocnTS 50-302/303 I&FTE DEL: TAI is JV5 - RT-432 The enclosed revitar was performd by Mr. T. A. Ippolito and Mr. J. 7. Burgess of. he I&ET 3 ranch, and is submitte.1 for inclusien in your ACKS report oa Crystal'Kinr.

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Crys _tal River _ Mug1,apr Generatinn Plant _ -

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Instru.entatten-

%e instrunentation has been evaluated against the General Design

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Criteria 'and the proposed IFE St:ndard for Nuclear Power Plant Protectica Systero. A concrh0a has b:en made uith the Oconee and Wroc Mih Island instrumentation. H e reactor protaction system and the protection system which initista enginsated safety features for Crystal River are essentially identical to those proposed and found tacceptable for the Ocenaa and Thraa W,la Island Stations. We evaluatica vill be limited to those sroes which differ in dcaign froa those previously reviewed.

Specifically, the steas art!

(ij *cacter Coolant Fic; hotection Instruuantation (h) Separation of Protection sad Controi instrumentation (c) Control E04 Scra Cas and Ciruitry (d) Dinnity of Enara,ancy core Geeling Actuation Sipa (e) Neu Info mation g

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Reacter Cool.+.nr Th=9 Protection Instrumnterion

%t applicant originally proposed to use an indirect method _for monitoring reactor coolant flev. The original design made use of pump'.

n monitors to continually sense'the' electrical current to each peop indl i.

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normally high or icy current.. ' ha,facta that theicurrent was; too high er. l.

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.a Staff exprasmed ccmcern with this desf ga:in-thet-it3did met comply with our~ ;y

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requires that to the extent feasible '4nd practical, prettetion systou

'inputz shall be derived fre= s'ign:Is which are: direct measures of the damired

.variablas. Further,'we were concerned shout the ability of. the ' proposed systen to =enitor all possibis'reJuced flow conditions. TheapplicantstatEl in ' Supple:nnt 2 to the PSAR that his design of the resetor coolant flow protection instrumentation was being revised and that it would be' the sama i

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as that proposed sud accepted for Wree.Mila Island Station (Docket 50-289).

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Separation of Safety and control Instrumentation Protection ryste1 channels which ronitor the nuclear peeer ram;e. reactor 1

coolant pressure, and recetor coolant flow are interconnected with the plant integrated coatrci systen. The applicant's original design preposed interemseting all four nuelcar power range channola, ons of four reactor coolant pren channels, aM me of four resetor coolet fim chsenet:

to the in::; rated con:r71 system. V2 dir:n sed with the srplicent tha interconnaction of protection and control instrumentatica in light of the recent ACES letters on the Diablo Canyon and Wree 1 tile Island plents.

I*r appli-at, in :hppienent 2 to tha FEA2, has modified the design such that only one of four channels monitoring each of the above rsentioned processes are Latercoenested with the' control system. n is modified design la similar

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to those proposed.for Oconee and Three Mile Island.

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cWe.belispthatj a sinimum acceptable.'systes' is one which provides

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anared channearwietiewthat'the syseenwproposed with:ene 'possible-

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exception providea sufIicient channala-independent of control to most-the sing 1c failure critation. Tae reeans to be used for colecting any one

. of four protection channele for interconnection'with the control sysca:s may reduca the degrea'of separation. 'Our evaluation.of the proposed design

- indicatas that the system can be bu'ilt to provide sufficient independent protection channels, three, with an additional protection channal inter-

- ccnneccad wit.h control which will not cause inturactions.

If tha *us for palacting a protection channsi for intercounsction with contrca is socisfactory, va b411ava ths.c the proposed sy=te= has adaq"ata

.:e;aration of protmwa and control lastrantation and weets the in ta cf the Li9_12 Cenyen and 'Ihrc. hile laland Acks lotterc.

!!a will report orally to tr.c Comittes on the asna to be provided for this selection preca s::.

c.

Control F.od Sercm Sus ar.d Circui:*ry

^Ihe applicant hso wadified the design of the output circuitry of the reactor protection systata associated with the control rod scram bus to

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, : satisfy the fellowing criteria:

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At least one -a of tripping shall ba' testable whiin the plaat

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All mans of tripping shall be testable while the plant is shut h.

We agree with these eriteria and our evaluation of the revised i

preliminary design indicates that these critoria have bean satisfied. The applicant has stated however that the revised prelisinary design is subject to revisica during detailed design. Wa will insura during the operating licansa review that aay revision to the dastan will ec= ply with tha-above stat d criterin, d.

Diversit-r of 3mer?ney Cera Celin;t Arrnation Simuls As crinically proposed, the e=>.rgney core evoling system (ZCCS) es tai::iated by redundant reacts: coolant ice pressurs signale erranged in e tw out =f three logic matrix.

Thc applicant has revised his deett,a by adding a second method to initiste the ECCS. This saccnd wothod of initiatien is provided by redundant primary contain:,ent high pressure signals arranged in a two out of' three logic catrix. We believe that this addition of a ~dLvarse signal;has-~a'dded to plant. safety and is' thers-

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e.. Nev'Informattee-An incors flux uonitoring. syste1 is provided.for the purpose of cellectingdataforeffectivejadministration:ofthe'fuelmanage=cntpro-y,;

grans and to provide the aparator with confirming information regarding

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pover distributiet in.the reactor.oore. Thi incore instruaantstion is

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expectedfto alert the; operster by means of.en alarin whenever xenon oscillations exist.' no plant ceouter will provide an incere readout -

on demand.

If.the computer is not operating, an alternata readout which

~ independently monitors a.signiffcant number of incors detector will be placed in operation. ' If neither' readout system'is in operation,.the operator will be required by technical epecifications to reduce power to n level at which xauon oscillationa can never cecur, na applicant la continuing' ucudies or. the po:;oiblo use of partial langth control roda for staoilizing renon oscillations. The results of this study vill have an igact on the acaquacy of presenting this infarracica to the operator in

a. :,:cauingful unnasr to intura effoetiva centrol actions are ta'ca.

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' rocults of this study vill be' nvalur. ten uuring tha operating license

roview, b appliaat has abced that a sc aa will Lo daveloped to mily distinguish protection system cables, wires and cog onents from similar I

cxponents which are not related to protection. We beltava that the applicant's stated intentions are adequate for the construction peImit

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' n e applicant will provide test data-to confiria that those electrical ce=ponents, Ltutrunants and estles loc 4tod S the primary containwon: vill ht capable of performing their function during and sr.bsequent to a Df:A for the length of ticr requir:4. We belis te this cce:2itment is adequate for

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the construction permit reviaw.. na data will be avaluated during the Joperating license reviowQl

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~w Nt Tha-spplicant has-stated that ths racetor protection system and'the protection system -shich actuatcs the'caginecred safcty features are being _

desigec4 to the proposed IEE Standard. Our analysis of the preliminary l

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.IILt2 Standard.

2.

Electric Fower a.

imelli ef Flectric Power-

!?e have evaluated the' auxiliary electric power system assinst the 4neral Denip Criteria and draft Supplensatary Criteria. General Criterica 39 rcquir:s that both tha offsite pouer systen and the onsite power cystc:2 havo tha capacity to _ supply power for operating engineerad udsty featur:2 he effsita cnd onsite systa:s are ecch indetemdsnely reptred to h:ve thic capacity essuming s failure of : single s cive cc pencnt l1a each peaer s7:tsm. So draft t;pimentary Critsria provide sarc apeci m guidane la tha i=picutation of Criterica Z.

We eval-ustad the offsite power sud the onaits power system separately for

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W-The applicant's studies of system load stability show that-the systen- -

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River site (units 1 and 21 that are connected to chia substation, and-eeuldsuppkypowertothenuclearunitsintheeventoftransmission line troubles.~ This'substacion is considered as a reliable source of power for the single feeder that feeds Unit 3 Starcup Transformer and Unit 4 Start ap. Transformer..-

m.

Each^startup transformer will be sized to supply engineered safety

-feature loads ~for one unit and safe' shutdown loads for'the other unit.

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a startup tranateroer fails, tha' faulted transfor:eer my be tuntally iso-Inted to place the sacend startup tr=nsfomer hacic in service. Faccuse of the cos.wien feeder.froci the substation, and comen connections to the safe-

usrds busesi thane transformara cannot-be considered rodundant. Ta provide redund

st trancforr. era, the applicant has made prm isien to isolate the geuoratu fruis the 500 G eyttem by disconneccin;; links in the icolatud phaso 'cua-cnd to supply cafe

y lorAo enrmtah the Unit heiliac Trnasformar.

With the linte-open ymrc can he suppliad from tha 5G0 ri suictatica unic.h is connected to 'the grid by run trant.edssion lines. The opticant estic:as that in the ev:'nt of the lors of normal fe:J from the St:rtup Transferner.

that offsite power can' he restored to the buses in one hour. This arrangs-

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ment permits offsite power to meet criterion 39 for the post accident long

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With~only ons unit in operation, tharc would be a period of ties

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isezediately Sc11owing' an accidsut '(before tha links are disconnected) when' the failste of a startup transformr venid causa the ices of offsica

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power... While; for this-period of tims' the 'lottar of Critorion 39 is not setrwe ballers the desian -is ade6ateeva believe the ' grid ' (not the - ~~

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'.startup transforcer) is tha-li=iting iten affoeting offsita yewer reliabilihy;1mnadiately following an accident' and~ the acceepanying

' generator trip. Therefore, inmediately following an accident, redundant transfomers would add little to the reliability of offsito power.

Since a nonredundant transformer arrangement might becccc a limiting ite:2 af ter the grid has cease'd ~ to be in a' transient state, we believe redundant-transforzers are required to protect against randon failure durin3 long tara cooling. Within an hour the grid vill noreally recover to its utes. y-r, tate cr a.*.itten an.1 Ca 2003 uill be in che lon~; tora coo!.ing coda.

If both nuclear units were opera.;ing at the :i=o of an accidsac, the other unit could pw-1A ansther remrce of per, er.

Ala, cither cf tha wo coal fired unita can provida emer nr the : clear unito For t-reaccar stcted aihovs, wa battaw the s* pply of offeitu t. power 5 engiMared ssf??-> Tonturec and *e rbtdes.- 10-5 i: adcpate, e,

tw be Mr The ensin: red saf2ty feat.ure icm4 end the 1 cads, req,iired for scfe i

chutJ1.m ars connected to three 4160 volt buns 4ad tha corresponding i

thr.-a-480 volt busen which vill serve both units. Tha loads are dis-tributed so that, 'if one diesel fails to start, the rc cining two can

- easily carry the engineered safety feature loado of one unit and tha shutdown loads of the other unit.

SufficienEfualwillbestoredtoallow two dieaals to operate at full load for seven dayc.

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The dissals trill start upon:(1) loss of voltage on the 4160 ' volt bus, (2) initiatice of safety infectica opera::foni cr (3) reacter building y

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-hiEh pressure. ' All: breakers on the bua are automatically tripped before the diesel generator breaker closas, and equipment is then started as recuired. Under accident conditionr# the engineered ufety futures ars automatically started in sequence..

. Breakers are interlocked to prevent one diesel generator from being connected to another. The system, howsver, hea been designed so that if a' diesel.sentrator fails'to start, its bus can mcnually be connected to snother Benerator. Lile this feature is u : squired to euct cho singio failurn criterion, it allovo the system to +iithstand certain multinic failures without the loss of long tara cmi!.n3 ceability.

Eqvipment will he Iecated so ao te eininize vulnernbility to phya.ical d:=sga frm nachanient ecucca, fire, or utter. ito canincared saic:y feature 4160 volt M tchque end 480

• alt i.end M-tcrs d 11 be phfd ectly separated from aceh ether ed fr. n the.mit milicry cuitehtum and located in a CI m I structerc.

Diessi,;enenters will be located to rAnimira the likalthood of ncchraical, firs, or wac2r da.aage.

h applica-tion cad routing of controir instrumentatien and pouct cables vill 1 c ecch as to minisine their vninerability to; damage from. any source.1Planc a.

' bstteries and associated charscra,and inverters pill be'in a Class I-

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