ML19317G457

Responds to 770107 Addl Info Request.Events Causing Pressure Increase Combined W/Assumed Single Failure of Overpressure Protection Reviewed.Present Facility Design Adequately Protected Against Reactor Vessel Overpressurization

ML19317G457
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	02/17/1977
From:	Rodgers J FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8003160065
Download: ML19317G457 (32)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ _ _ NR$ Pah.M 195 u.S. NUCLEAR REoULAToHY M Ml"S12 N DOCKET NUM"E R l'A *8 50-302 -- NRC DISTRIBUTION roR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL TO: FROM: DATE oF OoCUP. Florida Power Corp. 2/17/77 Mr. John Stolz. St. Petersburg, Fla. DATE RECEIVED J. T. Rodgers ~ 2/18/77 SLETTER ONoToRizEo PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER oF COPIES REC 16 % ORIGIN AL kNC LASSIFIE D One signed OCoPv i l Of 3CRIPfloN ENCLoSU RE Ltr. notorized 2/17/77...re car 1/7/77 - *~ ltr....trans the following: Consists of requested additional, information concerning NRC evaluation of the measures available to prevent reactor vessel ovprpressurization in. Babcock & Wilcox reactors......' REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSURIZATION DISTRIBUTION PER G. ZECH 10-21-76 s' . g ---. c w a. -

(2-P) (29-P)

PLANT NAME: Crystal River Unit No. 3 f SAFETY FOR ACTION /INFORMATION 2/22/77 RJL ><' BRANCH CHIEF: (5) Stolz >< LIC~. ASST: Engle y PROJECT MANAGER: Hylton INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION V:'T FW M NRC PDR Y I & E (21 X Ot'T.n M GOSSICK & STAFF V KNICHT V PAWLICKI V NOVAK Y EISENHUT Y SHAO X BAER y BUTLER N ZECH ~ EXTERN AL DISTRIBUTION CONTROL NUMBER MLPDR: Crvs t m1 R f ver. fin. ( X TIC: e /. g %f (. l )( NSICr /c:rve 'm n [#- I- (M72) VACRS /d CYR = m s.- 8003160065 f "ZCFIRM 195 (2-76)

y ~ mc. p 7 lCn B a:6,4.- sy}{.

1. - w e,%

us %.y c-ROdd8 Power Co mpo n a isom February 17, 1977 {' gG /6 Mr. John Stolz 6 t,! ;N i Branch Chief Light Water Reactors Branch I g ,- 4 Fte g f,_ 7._ j, Division of Project Management U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission p, s.gpg gAW e Washington, D.C.. 20555 '2p/; w' wa ,.i In RE: Florida Power corporation V'- ..#, 4/ Crystal Rive', Unit #3 Docket No. 50-302

Dear Mr. Stolz:

I Your letter of January 7,1977 requested Florida Power Corporation to provide additional information needed by your staff to complete their evaluation of the measures available to prevent reactor vessel over-pressurization in Babcock & Wilcox reactors such as Crystal River Unit 3. Attached for your review are forty (40) copies of our response to your request for additional information. Our review addressed the events which cause increasing pressure combined with an assumed single failure of either of the two redundant methods of overpressure protection. The results of the enclosed evaluation demonstrate that the present CR #3 design adequately provides protection against the occurrence of over-pressurization of the CR #3 reactor vessel. If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please contact us. Very truly yours, i"O ?. .s .? _ Q'i p s,. n J.. Rodgers /N'/' Assistant Vice President //;;' (y 'g i:. \\ ~i /g '.- JTR/hw 3/17 r a i / / s. e, Attachment en 1

• -o...

,Ji s ~ ,,)/ General Office 3201 Tnaty-fourtn street soutn. P O Box 14042. St Petersburg. Fionca 33733 e 813-866-5151

IN WITNESS WHERE0F, the applicant has caused its name to be hereunto signed by J.T. Rodgers, Assistant Vice President, and its corporate seal to be hereunto c+ fixed by Betty M. Clayton, Assistant Secretary, thereunto duly authorized the 17th day of February, 1977. FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION By_ b,, OA ^us J.T. 'Rodgers (/ Assistant Vice President ATTEST Betty.M. Clayton Assistant Secretary (CORPORATE SEAL) Sworn to and subscribed before me this 17th day of February,1977. I a Notary Public My. Commission Expires: Notary Public State of. Florida at Large My Commission Expires July 9, 1978 4 + e E '. ~,. _ _ - _ _.,

RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Request No. 2 The criteria discussed at the November 5 meeting are listed below: -1) Credit'for operator action 2) Single failure criteria 3)- Testability 4) Seismic design and IEEE 279 criterie Provide information regarding how you intend to meet the design criteria as identified by the staff during the November 5th meeting. Where deviations from the criteria are contemplated, please provide a detailed justification including the technical basis for not meeting the criteria and, when significant, the impact on the schedule for implementation. 4 Describe all redundant and diverse systems which are available to provide to provide overpressure protection.

Response

Credit for operator action - One of the redundant methods which provides l-overpressure protection is operator action to terminate the event before

~

an overpressure condition is reached. As conservatively shown in Section 3, 4 of Appendix A, the operator has more than 10 minutes to take action for i the most rapid event (Makeup valve failing full open). If this event were to actually occur under realistic conditions rather than the conservative assumptions and initial conditions used for this evaluation, the operator would have a much longer time to react to prevent overpressurization. Single Failure criteria - The two methods which provide overpressure protection as described in Section 3 of Appendix A are redundant and diverse; thus single failure criteria is satisfied. Testability - The pilot actuated relief valve will be tested during shutdown using methods and procedures in accordance with Section 11.0 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Seismic design - Detailed stress analyses have been performed for the pilot actuated relief valve in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 1 requirement. The valve design has been found to be adequate for Class 1 application. Stresses are shown to be within the allowables as specified i in ASME Section III,1971 Edition. Through conservative calculations, the natural frequency is shown to be greater than 500 Hz, well above l seismic excitation frequencies, and the maximum axial plus bending stress in the motion of 3.0g horizontal and 3.0g vertical is significantly lower than the allowable.. Testing with simulated seismic loadings has l w P-e- --**--e--r-- = y vs 6 -7 (-----;- w---g-wM-9 aye* ---9 +-ew-w-w--T = '-- T'

Seismic design - Continued not been performed as this was not a requirement at the time this plant was designed and constructed. The Makeup System is the source of a b potential increasing pressure transient but it can increase pressure to 550 PSIG only if the pressurizer level is initially above normal, as shown in Section 3 of Appendix A. The Makeup System is not normally operated with the plant in a cold shutdown condition. The Makeup System is operating for only a few nours during the initial stage of plant heatup and the stage of cooldown operations when the RCS . temperature is below the reactor vessel RTNCT. It might be argued that a major seismic event could restit in a non-operable condition for the pilot actuated relief valve because it has not been demonstrated otherwise by actual testing. However, it is considered incredible that all of the following would occur concurrently. r 1. Plant is in initial stage of plant heatup or latter stage of plant cooldown with temperature below the RTiiDT of vessel. 2; A seismic event of large magnitude occurs. 3. The pressurizer water level is above normal. 4. The makeup tank water level is above normal. 5. The makeup valve fails full open. 6. The control room operator fails to take action. 7. The pilot actuated relief valve fails to open. For six plant shutdowns per year, the Makeup System would be operating for a total of approx. 2 days per year

• den temperature is below the vessel RTNDT. It is considered to be an acceptable risk that all seven conditions above would not occur concurrently in a specific several hour period which occurs only six times in a year.

IEEE 279 criteria - The installed electrical control circuit for the pilot actuated relief valve was not designed to meet the requirements of IEEE 279. This was not a requirement when the plant was designed and ^ constructed, nor is it necessary to do so now. The overall overpressure protection system for postulated events during shutdown conditions consists of (1) a steam or nitrogen bubble in the presurizer which provides the control room operator sufficient time to terminate an event, and (2) the pilot actuated relief valve located on the pressurizer. The two sub-systems are separate and independent and together they provide single failure protection against overpressurization. The -'tuation of the relief valve is testable and its relief capacity has been determined by test. Thus, the overall protection system meets the intent of IEEE279. n.

Request No. 3 Provide schematic piping and instrumentation diagrams of all systems which are utilized during plant shutdown and startup operations, indicate primary and alternate flow paths, fluid and heat sources, pressure and flow controllers, RCS pressure protection systems, and ECCS and make up systems.

Response

' Attached as Appendix B to this filing is a listing of FSAR schematic piping and instrumentation diagrams of those systems requested above. Request No. 4 Provide a failure modes and effects analysis of the overpressure protection system for startup, shutdown, and tes. ting operations which defines the Jimiting combination of initiating event and additional single failure or operator error subsequent to initiation of the overpressure transient.

Response

The limiting single failure would be failure of the pilot actuated relief valve to open. With failure of this subsystem of the overpressure protection system, the redundant subsystem, which is operator action, will terminate the transient produced by an initiating event. The initiating event which produces the fastest rate of pressure increase will result in the shortest time available for the operator to tenninate the transient. Thus, the limiting combination of initiating event and additional single failure would be an initiating event with the fastest rate of pressure rise combined with single failure of the pilot actuated valve. For plant cooldown and heatup operations, the limiting combination is failure to the makeup control valve to the full open position combined with failure of the pilot actuated valve to open. For the most limiting set of initial condition, the operator has more than ten minutes, which is-more-than-sufficient, to terminate the transient. This transient is shown in Section 3.5 of Appendix A. l In the plant shutdown condition with the Makeup System shutdown, the limiting combination is_ temporary loss of decay heat removal combined with failure of the pilot actuated relief valve to open. Section 3.7 of Appendix A shows that the operstor has 30 minutes to terminate the j transient based on an initial RCS temperature and pressure of 280F and 250 PSIG. In the plant shutdown condition with the Makeup System

hutdown, the operator would have more than 30 minutes to terminate the

.ransient because-the decay heat generation rate would be less and the initial RCS temperature and pressure would be less than 180F and 100 PSIG.

During testing operati0ns in the shudown mode, potential for RCS over-pressurization exists during the test of HP injection pumps or the test of a makeup pump after maintenance or for periodic operation. Discussion concerning the limiting combination of initiating event and additional single failure concerning the HP injection pump is addressed in Response flo. 7. For testing of the makeup pump during shutdown, the initiating event would be that the makeup valve goes full open and the single failure is that the pilot actuated relief. valve fails to open. The operator would terminate the transient prior to reaching 550 PSIG RCS pressure, as he has longer than ten minutes to act because the initial BCS pressure during shutdown would be less than 100 PSIG (See Section 3.5 of Appendix A). Request flo. 5 Indicate for your low temperature overpressure protection system how the system has been designed to handle common failure modes such as those e resulting from loss of offsite power and seismic events. Describe the failure mode of the air operated makeup flow control valve and the letdown flow control valve upon loss of air supply. Identify the events / failure modes which could result in loss of air supply.

Response

The two sub-systems (or methods) of the overpressure protection system are sufficiently independent and diverse so that there is not a known failure mode which commonly could defeat both subsystems. A loss of offsite power will not affect the pressurizer steam bubble or the operator's action ability. A loss of off-site power also will not affect operation of the pilot actuated relief valve. Power for the instrumentation which controls the pilot actuated relief valve and other parameter indications and alarms will be supplied either by the diesel generator or batteries for a loss of offsite power. A seismic event will not affect the pressurizer steam bubble or the operators' action ability. A seismic-event also should not affect operation of the pilot actuated relief valve. The air operated makeup flow control valve and the letdown flow control valves all fail closed upon loss of air supply. Since this failure mode is a safe mode, identification of failure modes causing a loss of air supply is not necessary. pequest fio. 6. Discuss the basis for determining the most limiting initial conditions for analysis of the overpressure transient. Items that must be considered include but should not be limited to: RCS pressure, valve opening time, steam generator temperature difference, reactor coolant pump seal pressures, pressurizer level, makeup tank level, accumulator pressure, relief valve water relief capacity, and pump heads and flows. I w---

Response

This information is contained in Section 3 of Appendix A and in the response to request No. 7. Following is-other information which is not contained in the locations noted above. Any valve involved in injection to the RCS has been assumed to open instantaneously. Actual opening time would be approximately 10 seconds. RC pump seal pressure is not involved in the initial condition other than the fact that the Makeup System should be in operation to supply seal injection whenever RC pressure is above 100 PSIG. The liquid relief capacity of the pilot actuated relief valve has been determined by the basic formula for . liquid capacity using a conservative value for backpressure. The resulting subcooled liquid elief rate of 550 GPM was confirmed by an isentropic expansior -nalytical model. Pump heads and flows used were taken from the manaf.s Wars ' certified test curve. Request No. 7 Please provide a transie., .id ysis of the reactor coolant system response t.o inadvertent actuation of a single train of high pressure injection pumps. Describe what administrative controls and procedures are used during startup and shutdown, and during component and/or system testing to justify the assumption that inadvertent injection by more than one high pressure train is'not credible. Provide a similar discussion and analysis of a core flood tank dishcarge. For both situations indicate the basis for identifying the limiting single failure or common failure mode.

Response

Figure A-1, attached, presents the analysis requested. The pressure response of the RCS for actuation of one HPI train is shown for initial pressurizer water levels at the hi level a; arm (220") and at normal level (180") for initial pressures of 250 PSIG and 100 PSIG. The pressure response was calculated using the computer code DYSID. Letdown flow was not used in the calculation. The pilot actuated relief valve has a steam (or nitrogen) relief capacity greater than the injection rate of two HPI trains and a liquid relief capacity equal to/or greater than the injection rate of one HPI train. This event is considered not credible because the circuit breakers for the normally closed HP injection motor operated valves are " locked out" during the plant cooldown prior to startup of the Decay Heat Removal System. ~ The breakers would not be " locked in" during plant heatup 'until RCS temprature reaches 280F. No testing of the HPI pumps during shutdown, as required by CR#3 Technical Specifications, will ~ be performed except when the Reactor Vessel Head is physically removed from the vessel. An analysis of a core flood tank discharge was performed. The conservative initital conditions used were: 1. 640 PSIA CF tank pressure (Tech. Spec. maximum pressure) 2. 400 Ft3 CF tank nitrogen volume (Tank Spec maximum level) 3. 275" (Hi Hi level alarm) pressurizer water level. 4. 275 PSIG RCS pic;sure (niiddle.of pressure " window" or gher-pressure "wfndow" in allowable pressure band for startup of the Decay Heat Removal System during plant cooldown).

Response to Request #7 - Continued The calculation was performed without steam condensation in the pressurizer or nitrogen temperature decrease in the CF tank during the surge, both of which are conservative. The equilibrium pressure reached (at the end of the discharge) is 450 PSIG which is significantly less than the 550 PSIG allowable. This event also is considered not credible because at 700 PSIG or less, operated block valves, CFV-5 & 6, will be closed and the breakers placed in the " locked out" position and tagged in accordance with CP-115. It is difficult to identify a limiting single failure for an event that is not considered credible. If, somehow, HPI could be actuated, the limiting single failure would be failure of the pilot actuated relief valve to open. This chain of events would require the following to occur: 1. Operators fail to " lock-out" circuit breakers for the motor operators of the closed HP injection valves during plant ' cooldown even though this operation is under strict admini-strative control. 2. HP injection is actuated. 3. The pilot actuated relief valve fails to open. This chain of events is two failures plus an incident; two failures are not required by the design criteria. There is not a known common failure mode affecting both the pilot actuated relief valve ar.o the control room operator (s). Since CF tank discharge does not require action by the control room operator or the pilot actuated relief valve to limit the RCS pressure to 550 PSIG, a discussion of limitint single mode or common failure mode is not applicable. Request No. 8 Does your plant have relief capacity installed in the decay heat removal system that could provide additional protection in the event of an overpressure transient. What is the water relief capacityTf the valvi? Is the decay heat removal system automatically isolated on RCS high pressure. What are the pressure setpoints for the DHR relief valve opening and its automatic isolation? Response _. l The CR#3 Decay Heat System is designed to include redundant, diverse, interlock and automatic closure of both DH high-pressure isolation valves to prevent overpressurization of the DH system from the Reactor Coolant System. These features include the following:

Response to Request #8 - Continued a. Independent and diverse interlocks on each valve to prevent overpressurization of the DH system by preventing the opening of th'se valves when RC System pressure exceeds 284 PSIG. b. Instrumentation and controls to ensure autor a; closure of the valves if these same conditions exist. In addition, the DH System has the following installed relief capacity: Approx. Water Relief Capacity Valve Pressure Relief Setpoint at 10%&25% Overpressure 0 70 F(gpm) 10% 25% DHV-37(F) 300 psig 17 2P.3 DHV-38(F) 300 psig 17 28.3 DHV-44(F) 300 psig 17 28.3 DHV-17(F) 450 psig 20.5 34.2 DHV-28(F) 450 psig 20.5 34.2 Since the DH System is automatically isolated from the RC System when the RC pressure exceeds 284 psig, no additional relief protection from the DH System is available to the RC System in the event of an overpressure transient. Request No. 9 During the November 5th meeting, :he possibility of limiting the tolume of water in the RCS makeup tank was discussed. It was stated that this could preclude filling the pressurizer if the makeup control valve should fail open. Is this procedure a viable option at your facility? Is the water level in the Makeup Tank generally controlled automatically? Specify your assumptions for initial pressurizer level, makeup tank water volume, and other design considerations whicn would result in limiting RCS pressure to within Appendix G limits.

Response

m. -For the event of the makeup valve failing full open, there is a maximum water volume in the makeup tank (combined with initial conditions in the pressurizer) which would prevent exceeding 550 DSIG. This calculated value is as follows (no margin added): Initial pressurizer level 220" (Hi) 275" (Hi Hi) Initial RCS pressure 250" PSIG 100" PSIG Max. makeup tank liquid 2900 Gal. 2850 Gal. Indicated level 74.8" 73.2" l During cooldown, this tar.'c is involved in the operations. The pressurizer level controller is automatically removing water from the tank to makeup for RCS contraction. The operator is remote manually adding feed to the makeup tank to maintain its inventory. A more restrictive limit on makeup tank inventory to preclude RCS overpressurization would appear:to unnecessarily hinder the operator in controlling makeup tank inventory and ensuring that

Response to Request #9 - Continued proper suction conditions exist for the makeup pump. Also with the makeup tank level maintained at the hi alarm level (86"), two redundant methods of overpressure protection are provided as previously discussed. Therefore, as an alternative to limiting the makeup tank volume, we propose to limit the maximum pressurizer level during plant cooldown to 180" ~ or.below. By maintaining the pressurizer level at 180" or below and the makeup tank at or below the high alarm level (86") during plant cooldown, the RCS pressure would be maintained within Appendix G limits in the event 'that the makeup valve fails full open (See Figures 1 & 1A of Appendix A). We prefer this method of operation over the proposed one requiring manual restriction of the makeup tank level by the operator, as the pressurizer level is maintained at a preset level automatically by the pressurizar level controller and thereby reduces the likelihood of operator error. Request No.10 . Describe what instrumentation and alarms are avilable to the operator to aid in detection and tarmination of an overpressure transient.

Response

Alarms and/or Indications - The following alarms and/or indications are available tc the operator to aid in detection of potential for and/or termination of an overpressure transient. A. Pressurizer high level alarm (s) B. Higher than normal makeup line flow rate indication C. Lower than normal makeup pumo discharge pressure D. Full open indicating light for makeup valve E. High temperature alarm for relief valve discharge line F. Higher than normal RCS pressure dndication G. . Higher than normal pressurizer level indication H. Higher than normal letdown flow rate indication to makeup tank I. The "on" indicating lights for all pressurizer heater banks J. HPI actuation alarm K. HPI pump status indication L. CFT. discharge valve (s) position indication and alarms M. CFT level indication N. Pressurizer pilot actuated relief valve position indication and alarm 0. Makeup tank level indication and high and low level alarms P. DH pump (s) status indication Q. DH pump (s) low flow alarm (s) S. DH pump (s) flow rate indication T. RC pump (s) status indication U. RC drain tank level indication

Request No. 11 4 What precautions are taken during startp, shutdown and testing to verify that critical procedural steps are performed to reduce the likelihood of inadvertently initiating an overpressure transient & minimizing the impact of the transient on the RCS. Would steps such es lock out of pumps and accumulators and reducing the water level in the pressurizer and makeup tank be accomplished by double checkcff and signoff procedures to insure against error? What procedures normally are followed for altering the status of pumps or valves under administrative restriction?

Response

The cooldown, shutdown, startup and testing of CR#3 are perfonned in accordance with approved plant operating procedures and technical specifications. The operator must initial each step of'an operating procedure until completed. Following completion of a procedural section, the shift supervisor checks to see that all steps were performed and tiien signs the procedure indicating his acceptance. Procedural steps requiring the removal of equipment from operation or the locking out of pump and valve breakers, etc. must be performed in accordance with Procedure CP-ll5, In-plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders. This procedure requires that the operator must obtain from the shift supervisor an In-plant Equipment Clearance Order prior to removing equipment from service or locking out breakers of pumps and valves. i Once the Equipment Clearance Order has been executed by the operator the equipment will bc tagged in accordance with CP-115. For electrical purposes, red tags are placed on all open switches or control hand'es when these switches are not to be closed. For mechanical purposes, a red tagged device shall not be operated or moved from its tagged position. In the case.of locking out breakers of pumps and va 'ves, red tags are placed on both the control room breaker switches ano at the breaker location. Once this equipment has been placed under these administrative restrictions, the status of this equipment cannot be changed until the Shift Supervisor issues the appropriate Equipment Clearance Order allowing j the change of status. Request No. 12 If powe.; is removed from valves as part of administrative controls used for overpressure protection, what status lights and indicators are j availabie to verify their proper alignment. When administrative contols call for removing power from a valve or a pump, is this accomplished . from the control room or from a motor control center?

Response

The circuit breakers for the four normally closed HP injection motor-operated valves are " locked out" in the closed position during plant . coodown prior to startup of the DH Removal System. This is accomplished by opening and-tagging the selector switch in the Control Room and locking out and tagging the breakers located at the Motor Control Center. The operator has indication that power has been removed as the status lightsiin the Control Room will be off.

Response to Request No.12 - Continued At 700 psig or less, the CFT motor-opercted block valves, CFV-5 & 6, will be closed and the breakers placed in the " locked out" position and tagged in accordance with CP-ll5. The locking out of the breakers is accomplished at the breaker location outside the Control Room. The status of the position of the CFT block valves is indicated in the Control Room by position indicator lights and is alarmed should the position change. As part of our cooldown procedure, the pressurizer heater banks will be ' placed in the off position during cooldown to prevent erroneous energizing of the heaters. This function is performed by the operator from the Control Room. Position indicator lights in the Control Room provide the operator with continuous str.tus of the heaters. Request No. 13 Describe any testing procedure proposed to insure operation of overpressure devices. At what times would these tests be performed?

Response

The pilot actuated relief valve will be tested during shutdown using methods and procedures in accordance with Section 11.0 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Request No.14 The problem of prassurizer relief valve maintenance was also discussed at the November 5th meeting. The relief valve is normally isolated and removed during shutdown conditions if maintenance is required. This would reduce the level of protection available to mitigate the consequences of a pressure transient. Please discuss what measures will be taken at ) your plant to provide overpressure protection when the relief valve is removed from service and ;adicate how the criteria enumerated at the November 5th meeting will be met.

Response

If the pilot actuated relief valve has been removt:d from service during a plant cooldown because of malfunction or untolerable high leakage, this does remove one of th; two redundant overpressure protection methods. For all credible pressure increasing events, the control room operator has sufficient time to tenninate the event before 550 PSIG pressure is reached. To provide redundant protection in this situation for failure of the makeup control valve. The pressurizer level will be controlled automatically at 180" or below during cooldown. By maintaining this level in the pressurizer and the makeup tank level at or below the high alann level (86"), the RCS pressure will not exceed 550 PSIG in the event of makeup valve failure even without operator action to tenninate the transient. e c, -m,- - f-e y -

Response to Request No. 14 - Continued The other credible events either do not increase RCS pressure to 550 PSIG or the pressure increase to 550 PSIG takes so long that it is unreasonable to hssume that the control room operator does not terminate the transient. Locking-out of the circuit breakers for the electric motor operators of the HP injection valves in the closed position and testing the HP injection pumps only when the Reactor Vessel Head is physically removed from the vessel will ensure that erroneous HPI actuation does not occur. G D 6 m W m m r.r

y

p

-.p g - .qe y c -.- y. l "] - t i i .. ;....... : v ]. - 1. cu. L i. '- r-- 7,' .i.

I i

t. I l .. N.I.

1.. _

.a. j 1 J 1 g .,i t i .i. !g.. g'I'N s._I_....h l ... ;. sl - I c,. - l:

l.

.j' _.. t..... _L l' : ' 4, ,, ' j; = l-l

.1 q

. ;_ c. ....... !...-..!. k

l'

!li !l: b b 'N I i

• f

-l.

l.

-~;: - J _.L,f.: . X::

i. [.

]i ..:1.

)d.: iF-

.; _ 'l .. u;.

.; n-1

-i H .I_ A 1 j.' 1 .::.i:: : .:1.

1

'7 ,nl1=. 2:~ [. I.b 3 n.= :.d. .. :L =;n 7f . : 1. . N., j 'j;- g 1 ~p-' . W. . *; -y... .. t1 ..L. 14J n .j q . n. I:, 9._1: p .j q .a.. I 'N 6 j t -* _Q -.. 'O ::-~ 1 o .a.. 1.;,. y l r

n --

. y::;;;,w, y-', I,,_ e ...l. ...- g l.. _..l.... ~ l.:.; ;..'.

j y

c. i .. y;.

0 l

.k I -, ' - - - :- --*~ "O iD - 1:. . "*,:r ;- - ;-- - l-v .g. .:). l :.,' ' - l" -l

nf.

.L.:,l..; ._h,;>. ::

::_:.=.:.2 4 _

O-

t

. 1 ..; A. .,; :1 \\ .1; . j /@M ~I.Wl ' - I: n :1:-

4

t ti:

I gg,i_.q6 j, C P -l: it: t -l. L N,C C . :l.: =. };*\\ .A

I d.:'.

.! pl: ". .8 l'- .l: 4..

3.. :

..l: ..--} :. .....Px p - --t,: - - - !:- ~~

}:::.'

f..

l:...

_f =.:).: x. !,. y3> j. q . 4, .g. , d...,, c\\ 7 }.. hk... m... ...g.... _ _. g., t.;,. g. _~ .e .!g. . V I- =..a_...j=; =c :; r .... tf. D -" !D- ~ !. { (g t,,j.--

.-- r.

u n. =... P. .4 ..,3 ... 7_ ...'o .. _.'.. ~.'"y-i. ..m .. j. 1 ... l:. :y.{. -. - {. .( g .l. NY h4. 3 .. t- * ' - - --'h@ \\-J-'-- ' -* p ---; 7 --- l \\ ;;l *.* l..- cr.t;'- ;

l:

n{:.

= "- 1 : - '...,.--

,g. ti " *" *l

• t t')*k

-M...).. l3,"-.'lr :-'--"+l 3.d.....r..~:t:::.;-'.: .l..1.... .-l !s 4 - .:.c. j.,. i \\ .+..:. .= . g.. .y a. t' ~

2..* l. i........

ri. LU. : M.:.@.2.i... M ' _.9 I5., ~: Cil:._.

f l

_,h,, _;j.f._ Q, .g .A .y n x .;s: :l- - :rg. g1 t y W'.; .i. si ui t -.(_ I I .-t f: t . =:]':: I. q'- ce

h

.{:-~

g : :.l,

r ,, : l,..

g.

n-g'g;s. t..(

.. l:.

l..

y

. g a. = p - f.. - . h. o .C .= ) ~~** . -+l :

g.

p:.

k. o,h... .l-t,. _f. [ ]ikl: -. 6,_ I.

D

p f

n

.1: :

u.

2 u.2

.....h 2 x- ..;.... a .=. ]i ~ ~ R!!.:4 ' \\i ifi ~ ql. N d 4

1; f

M. ::f :

ed

i.

1 h:

}-

t:

it: 'i: [y: ... l: = - - l- ~. 1. -..l: T, h_ l, ' LM... t ,g' = d I i .t. W

1

.u W d,'l..:t:

n

= .~r \\.: : .l. Q' N Y

1:

~ T ',u >T;..t.di. ...:{ 9 l. ... I: y.

d.. i

= t"

\\;-l:

D ~ t-f l' V'

l:

ij: I gu 3 LUl Lo % hj.gtQ:.N;' an : ih.:_: : 1 j. . b:.

l.

n._;-

.- =. a.i. .j. 4

j :.

n :nics.

.O I ti ,3 c, l t,. g. _. ._._. p =$ i l- ...g.. 3= a ..i.... d. .= .u.l.. ;jua n=.n..

;..;;.. n;:.; =..nc a.= u.a l

1 .1. i 1 . t-O. a l t

I:-

- - -1: 1: -q &.6_

== 4 =.==

G 9

g

6 i ..l.. --- I A.. n = = zu m: 9 I:

t m-:

l. N.. _M_..._.. +_...._. -,i-. .2 h.. _ . _.fOSSQ..~W....~d.. ]- (f.S cf). 'f ij . g...

== .=.. ; = .==...=..= .... = ..= 1 l'

l.

% m m. & wm @ M-i! O5 5 =

APPENDIX A EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSURIZATION 1. Pur'ose p The purpose of this evaluation is to examine the system design and operation for susceptability to overpressurization events during start-up and shutdown and to determine the pressure response of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to potential events which cause pressure increases. 2. Events Evaluated The events examined in this evaluation were: a. Erroneous actuation of the High Pressure Injection (HPI) System. 3 b. Erroneous opening of the core flood tank discharge valve. c. Erroneous addition of nitrogen to the pressurizer. d. Makeup control valve (makeup to the RCS) fails full open. All pressurizer heaters erroneously energized. e. f. Temporary loss of the Decay Heat Removal System's capability to remove ~ decay heat from the RCS. g. Thermal expansion of RCS after starting an RC Pump due to stored thermal energy in the steam generator. 3. Results of Event Evaluation 3.1 General For events which cause the RCS pressure to increase, the pressure will increase significantly faster in a " solid water" l system than it will in a system with a steam or gas space. The RCS always operates with a steam or gas space in the pressurizer; no operation involve a " solid water" condition, other than system hydrotest. Two redundant and diverse methods will provide overpressure protection for postulated events. These are: (1) operator action to terminate the event, and (2) the pilot actuated relief valve located on the pressurizer. The steam or gas space in the pressurizer will provide a time period of 10 minutes or more before the pressure will exceed 550 PSIG thus providing the control room operator with ample time to terminate an event before an overpressurization conditions is reached. The pilot actuated relief valve will terminate the pressure increase at 500 PSIG for an event without opera-tor action. The overpressure protection provided complies with single failure criteria because the two methods are i

redundant and diverse. Considering the modest rate of pressure rise (because of non-solid pressurizer) from the events and the high level alarms in the pressurizer and other alarms that would normally alert the operator, it is' reasonable to expect the operator to terminate the event prior to reaching an overpressurization condition. However, without operation action, the pilot-actuated relief valve located on the pressurizer will terminate any pressure i increase, thus preventing an overpressurization condition. The original B&W evaluation (submitted to NRC) indicated less than 10 minutes for the pressure to exceed 550 PSIG in the event ~of the makeup valve to the RCS failing full open. Two changes have been made to lengthen the time to 10 minutes or more, these are: (1) The original evaluation of the pressurizer pressure response assumed no condensation of the pressurizer steam on the cooler vessel walls or on the cooler liquid interface with the steam during the compression of the steam bubble. The pressure response for the makeup valve failing full open event has been re-evaluated using the computer code DYSID which does account for the heat transfer from the higher temperature steam bubble to these cooler surfaces. No mixing of the cooler insurge water with the hotter pressurizer liquid was used. (2) The original evaluation of the pressurizer pressure, response was based on the initial pressurizer water level being at the high high level alarm point. In this re-evaluation, the initial pressurizer water level has been changed to the high level alarm point. During the startup and shutdown conditions at temperature below the Decay Heat Removal System " cut-in" temperature, a level above the high high level alarm point will be permitted only at RC pressures of 100 PSIG or less. A dual setpoint is utilized for the pilot-actuated relief. valve to provide overpressure protection during startup and shutdown conditions. The lower setpoint is enabled by actuation of a switch in the control room during the plant cooldown prior to startup of the Decay Heat Removal i System at 280F.RCS temperature. Characteristics of this valve at the lower setpoint are: i l I I L .g,-

Open Setpoint 550 PSIG Close Setpoint 500 PSIG Steam capacity at 550 25,985 lb/hr PSIG Equivalent liquid insurge volume rate into pressur-izer 2,650 GPM Liquid capactiy 0 550 PSIG 550 GPM Nitrogen capacity 0 550 PSIG 32,420 lb/hr Equivalent liquid insurge volume rate into pressur-izer 2,350 GPM All events involving insurge to the pressurizer were evaluated with the pressurizer and makeup tank water levels initially at high ;evels. For the pressurizer an initial water level at the high level alarm setpoint was used for an initital pressure above 100 PSIG and an initial water level at the high high alarm setpoint was used for an initial pressure of 100 PSIG or below. The relationship of these levels to the other pressurizer water level setpoints are: 0"-320" Level Indicating range 275" High high level alarm 220" High level alarm 180" Normal level 160" Low level alarm 40" Low level interlock (heater cut-out) and alarm For the makeup tank, which is the normal suction source for the makeup /HPI pump, a water level at the high level alarm j setpoint was used. The relationship of this level to the 1 other makeup tank level setpoints is: 0"-120" Level Indicating range 86" High level alarm 73" Normal level 55" Low level alarm j l The initial pressurizer level used for the event affects the rate of pressure increase; the lower the initial level, the slower the pressure increase will be. The initial pressurizer level used does not affect the peak pressure reached except for events involving injection to the RCS; lower levels can result in peak pressures less than 550 psig where the source of injection water is exhausted before the pressure reaches the relief valve setpoint of 550 psig. m ~~%, e l

3.2 Erroneous Actuation of the HPI System This event is not credible because the circuit breakers for the closed HP injection motor operated valves are " locked out" during the plant cooldown prior to startup of the Decay Heat Removal System. These valves are shown on FSAR Figure 9-2. Startup of the Decay Heat Removal System occurs at an RCS temperature of 280 F. 3.3 Erroneous Opening of the Core Flood Tank Discharge Valve This event is not credible because this valve is closed and the circuit breaker for the motor operator is " locked out" during the plant cooldown before the RCS pressure is decreased to 700 psig. -~ 3.4 Erroneous Addition of Nitrogen to the Pressurizer It is not credible that this event can overpressurize the RCS. Nitrogen is added to the pressurizer during plant cooldown at an RCS pressure of 50 psig or less. Nitrogen addition is controlled by a 50 psig regulator and a 100 psig regulator, arranged in series. A relief valve located downstream of the 100 psig regulator provides protection in the event of regulator failure. This system is shown on FSAR Figure 6-28. 3.5 Makeup Control valve (makeup to the RCS) Fails Full Open This valve is MUV-17 on FSAR Figure 9-2 and is automatically controlled by the pressurizer level controller. The pressure response of the RCS to this event is shown on Figures 1 and 1A. If it is assumed that the operator does not take action to terminate the event during the pressure increase, the peak RCS pressure is limited to 550 psig by the pressurizer pilot actuated. relief valve. Initial conditions used for the analysis were: a. 220" pressurizer water level (high alarm setpoint) --for-250-PSIG-initial pressure b. 275" pressurizer water level (high high alarm setpoint) for 100 PSIG initial pressure c. 86" makeup tank water level (high level alarm) d. 32" GPM total seal injection flow to RC pumps (automatically controlled) e. 45 GPM letdown flow from RCS to makeup tank f. no spray into pressurizer (normally there would be during cooldown) 0 m

M>[I* kgkk

1. 9 IMAGE EVALUATION NNNN TEST TARGET (MT-3) ils m m 1.0 sl NE I.I iy lM l.8 l.25 1.4 ll 1.6 la.,

,4 6" MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART l

1. 4

• $hfN/

s

%$4 4 %$* b> h llll,%k }$' / b he &//g'$$$ //,/ ?}/ g5 \\ IMAGE EVALUATION NNNN TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 "f m g23 is al is 22 U Ea D bN l,l l.8 l 1.25 ' l.4 ' i.6 I l 6-MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART l II l k /s H^+.4.,$el>, Q 'er;/ //>,

1. ++& y

.;_ / l o 6 d'

Figure 1 is for an initial RCS pressure of 250 PSIG. This is the RCS pressure at which the Decay Heat Removal System is started up during plant cooldown or at which the RC pumps are started,during plant heatup. Figure 1 depicts two pressure response curves. One pressure response curve is for the initial pressurizer water level at the high alarm setpoint (220") and the other pressure response curve is for the intital level at the normal level (180"). At this pressure (250 PSIG) during the startup or shutdown operation, the level would normally be below the normal level of 180" which would result in emptying of the makeup tank and termination of the transient at a pressure much lower than 550 PSIG. Figure 1A is for an initial RCS pressure of 100 PSIG which is about the lowest RCS pressure at which the makeup system would be in operation. Two pressure response curves are depicted; one for an initial level it the high high alarm setpoint (275") and one at the normal ley.1 (180"). The level during the cooldown operation at a pressure of 100 PSIG could be above the normal level e of 180". The pressure response for Figures 1 and 1A was detennined by using the computer code DYSID as described previously. Relief through the pressurizer relief valve will be terminated by operator action (stop makeup pump or close makeup line isolation valve) or without operator action when the makeup tank water volume is exhausted. Peak insurge rate into the pressurizer is 260 GPM. In addition to the alarms shown on Figures 1 and 1A, other alarm and indications which would alert and aid the operator in evaluating the event are: a. Pressurizer high level alarms (s) (with initial level below high high setpoint which would be normal). b. Higher than normal makeup line flow rate indication c. Lower than normal makeup pump discharge pressure d. Full open indicating light for makeup valve e. High temperature alarm for relief valve discharge line (after relief valve relieves) f. Higher than normal RCS pressure indication g. Higher than normal pressurizer level indication All Pressurizer Heaters Erroneously Energized 3.6 The pressure response of the RCS to this event is shown on Figure 2. If-it is assumed that the operator does not take action to terminate the event during the pressure increase, the peak RCS pressure is limited to 550 PSIG by the pressurizer pilot actuated relief valve. An initial pressurizer water level of 50 inches (10 inches above low level heater cut-out interlock) was used because the lower water level results in the f astest pressure -x

increase. Even with the low level, the pressure increase is very slow. The pressurizer water level will not change during this event as it is being automatically controlled. The heaters are generating 1625 lbs of steam per hour in the 500 to 550 PSIG range. In addition to the alarms shown on Figure 2 other al' ns and indications which would alert and aid the operatior i evaluating the event are: a. Higher than normal RCS pressure indication b. Higher than normal letdown flow rate indication to makeup tank (due to increasing RCS pressurizer) c. Higher than normal makeup line flow rate indication due to increasing letdown flow rate. d. High temperature alarm for relief valve discharge line (after relief valve relieves) e. The "Ori" indicating lights " lit" for all pressurizer e heater banks Relief through the pressurizer relief valve will be terminated by operator action (de-energize heatcrs). Without operation action, the heaters will be de-energized when the pressurizer water level drops to the heater cut-out interlock setpoint. Since pressurizer water level is on automatic control, water is transferred automatically from the makeup tank to the RCS to replace that which is lost through the relief valve. For an initial makeup tank level at the high alann setpoint, it would take six (6) hours to emty the makeup tank and thus result in pressurizer water level decreasing to the heater " cut-out" setpoint. 3.7 Temporary Loss of Decay Heat Removal Systems Capabiity to Remove Decay Heat From the RCS The pressure response of the RCS to this event is shown on Figure 3. I If it is assumed that the operator does not take action to terminate the event during the pressure increase, the peak RCS pressure is limited to 550 PSIG by the pressurizer pilot actuated relief valve. Loss of decay heat removal capability could only be caused by loss of flow in the Decay Heat Removal System or in the cooling water system serving the Decay Heat Removal System. Loss of flow in either system would inanediately actuate low flow alarm (s), thus alerting the operator. Relief through the pressurizer relief valve will be terminated by operator action restoring the decay heat removal function. Insurge. rate into the pressurizer is 120 GPM in the 500 to 550 PSIG pressure range. The pressure response was determined by the computer code DYSID. Conditions used in this pressure response analysis were: a. Event occurs during cooldown after startup of Decay Heat Removal System and shutdown of steam generators, b. Pressurizer level at 220 inches, normally it would be near 180 inches e w e. e'w-~

c. Cooldown to the Decay Heat Removal System " cut-in" temperature at 100 F/hr., this produces maximum decay heat generation rate. d. All decay heat absorbed by reactor coo' ant, no heat absorbed by the metal components or by the steam generators. Actually, these are heat absorbing sinks. 32 GPM total seal injection flow to RC sumps (automatically e. controlled) f. 45 GPM initial letdown from RCS to makeup tank with no increase due to increasing pressure. g. No spray into pressurizer. 3.8 Start of an RC Pump with Stored Thermal Energy in OTSG Secondary Several postulated situations have been examined which may lead to primary fluid expansion due to energy absorption from hot OTSG secondary water after start cf an RC pump. The two types .of situations which lead to possible RCS pressurization have been ivantified as follows: Type A. Filling of OTSG secondary side with hot water with subsequent start of an RC pump, and Type B. Restart of an RC pump during heatup following a period of stagnant (no flow) conditions. 3.8.1 Start of an RC Pump Under Type A Condition Figure number 4 presents results of RCS pressure versus time for the worst case Type A (see above) condition. Initial conditions for this transient are a result of filling of the steam generators with feedwater at 420F. This temperature is a result of the failure of the feed-water heating controls causing auxiliary steam flow to the heaters to produce a feedwater temperature in excess of the allowable value of 225F for OTSG fill operations. The temperature of the feedwater in the OTSG secondary side following the filling operation reaches a temperature of 240F as does the primary water contained in the.1CS at eleva- ~ ~~ tions greater than the OTSG tubes and primary watar during OTSG filling where heated primary water circulates to a limited extent through the RCS. At the end of the filling operation, the RCS water located below the OTSG lower tubesheet remains at the initial value of 140F. The primary system pressure versus time as shown in Figure 4 is based on an initial pressurizer level at the maximum value of the high high level alarm for a 177 FA plant. The initial pressurizer level is normally kept much lower to minimize the heating requirements for raising the pressurizer temperature 9 4_. ,.,._ ~

and pressure in preparation of starting an RC pump. The initial pressure is 300 psig, which is well above the normal pressure required prior to starting an RC pump. fio credit has been taken for pressurizer level control. The pressurizer level increases during the transient by 30 inches; the level would have to rise an additional 70 inches before (...tering the upper head. Other conditions of primary and secondary temperatures which may exist prior to starting of an RC pump have been evaluated and-are bounded by the results of Figure 4. These conditions include the situation where the feedwater temperature entering the OTSG's during filling operations. is at the normal maximum value of 225F but the operator fills the steam generators beyond the maximum allowable level and completely fills the steam generators. In addition, the results presented here bound the case where the intial RCS temperature is 50F before filling the steam generators. 3.8.2 Start of an RC pump Under Type B Condition e Figure number 5 presents results of RCS pressure versus time for the Type B conditions (see above). Initial conditions for this transient are a result of the accumulation of pump seal injection and makeup injection water in the RC cold leg piping during stagnant (no. flow) conditions. Although the operator is required to initiate a cooldown of the RCS if RC pumps are inoperable and RC temperature >250 (Plant Limit and Precautions), the assumption is made tilt the operator fails to do so while allowing makeup and seal injection water temperature to drop to 50F, which is below the minimum value of RC temperature less 120F. The cold water is assumed to accumulate in the RC cold leg piping without mixing with hot RC water. The RC pump is started following a period of one hour of stagnant (no flow) conditions in the RC System. The primary system pressure versus time as shown in Figure 5 is based on an initial pressurizer level at the maximum value of the high high level alarm for a 177 FA plant. The initital pressure is 450 psig ) which is approximately midway between the Tech. Spec. and RC pump l NPSH pressure limits at 275F. fio credit has been taken for pressurizer i lev.el control. The decrease in pressure at approximately 2 minutes is a result of hot RC primary fluid entering a steam generator which has been cooled by the passage of the slug of low temperature RC fluid J (the mixing of RC fluid and heat transfer through the OTSG tubing brings the RC fluid to a constant temperature and produces a net contraction of the fluid and a. decrease in system pressure at final equilibrium conditions). The pressurizer level increases during the transient by 13 inr* 's; the level would have to rise an additional 87 inches before enterir the upper head. The pressure response calculation for Figures 4 and 5 did not assume any steam condens'ation.during compression of the pressurizer steam bubble. n

+ 4 ~ 4. Conclusions . The preceding evaluation a'nd analysis demonstrates that the reactor - vessel is protected from overpressurization during events which cause_ increasing pressure combined with an assumed single failure of either of the two redundant methods of overpressure protection. D 9 m 5 + ? e 5 6 9 e 5 + y -7 +- e + a&4y q w% y yW 3p y m- --Sr--;m%.--we ~g s -'-y3y e--+nsw w w

l -i g J_ 2' .' u.l-3 j l ) [- 3 5 r _ - L -( ~ { l1 5 .!if' .1 .* j l Ill;jJ ~ ' N-9_ .-Q.- . m_ .lj;: u _.. ! ,l C. W j.! j 7 r

a

4!

?, O ._i , ;/ - I ;m i I D ,{ ,i.g 2 ~ T- ',l- > ! L_ l } j i.

a I.;tg1 ji E

5 _ r o b ;L l fIlii i . 1N i = ,l* , f

=._.,.

t.

f 2_ P R F S j_ P.Q ..l , pt_ jli iit ~ 7 pt. i; ji_ .G i ,E-L je t e .S~ ,[l1' ,t' GhT 1I u~ t 7 i i R-. l.. ,i r !

~

u u 4. - C r( , g S' s' 3 !' d rg}m.0 yjl-t l. ) F s I /G 0 j h$3. i L s 6 s s L:l= .! S s 1 /G; ,.l i ',u O c _1_ l 4q7 s a jqo - r 1 t 8! U P 5 T I 6 <A L! L.i; [.!

t. __ C

[- iq;;! !qI A F M .l! 4 j. E J / it' 'i_; F R e r q_ VI.A: i F' l L 5 T . -.)S TE [-' _ IL..' C S i. D g t C Y [N _.k.#.d;.7 j! . s. j. $

w. i,. h.[p: o.:'

7 1 R !S W~6 o . @ j'! ~ F-TCl l . NH~Qljg: l +i l A . f.3.'7 1 ,i ]'- i r L L. ,.2. '- d.R ( R MT 7 i i e i rf_ Ij[l.! .i i' i Q dlUt l. hli A E L. j +I M .i ,d l R / y V hs. f p- ~ F 'r d 3y ,l' V v Ms. v A i T i t. ,1'jI ,f.]qi1.- ._ !j )l AM _ p r. : _~ - i P P T NV_. b .1 1 .h .,hc ; U. . ~ i: .ji i.!

E i

, n [ R. j4 r Fm. G 5 A Mto j .m ^ I j _. 1 rF A.A.A-

Rri L

i S M P W L. . _ M-i i; f }_ o L.. P c. l T. M iE 1 LA0 L_ .1ri l i:! i. .I n O M'E

v -

.i =i__. p. 8 iit c a v t e 7 . ~ ' ~ ~ F '5 i i. t l. ,, j.# gE,...; l ,u. i I.! ..m Nl , c._pL - h 5 M }" v @ L. c g_,I. t( s S = 3. w L 2 f'Ls 'h H a;_ jp. = N E I )'E ij- .._ I J fi r K R i i' !l.i_ 5 J! l @I _ H l A p'i g t r. r., t - L_ ygj .iil . R h hTtgZ [ .~ M i. pR .= p I I r t l. h, lP uU e~ 2 , 4 p,U sG Il;' E i l. 1 j uC sS R = l I i. U l Qk,_rt ,l' 'q[ 2 i-iI ,iti. E i ~ Aaa p L.!, = S

q

= S

• .M._P P

. s

239,

.;4' 5ia_ ' } .;i f-. i; -i .. : p: l ag7 I i-t, j1j t- . R I P i l! \\_! i t '{ o_ l u_j . 3 - z _![ _ \\l _. 6 _g. + pgg ; y iu l w1 .gzl o6. y%3~! ) ,[ gz@gg W5rGsN*i r 3g 9a@ 3 _E 2 2' a B t

M _ E *0 M to TO THE CENTI. MET.E.".) 46 1510 es a M C" runct a cssu u ]-....l. l- . j!. Hl.:

.L

i: p i:,

- p]l 4 i ~--- aq.:.. --.}- =; 4 . x: u L =. - r-r-- y i_. i 2 ' ! blfEL/PEbrP jAbski i N{YNmA .m JS)?^%ey 9y l EWE 9 MA l 'sn 1 :lH l'R SSURE y ' 1;_ W W" ?}'~# h. u ~ j-SYEL iA APM: . - f"WNRMU ? ?C -l

3) PR ?SSURI.d.R Hu !Levet. ALARM eclip _1 s.

fpie icS A:r.. Il-9 'A1wb CS, _..- i 4)_P.R_k. NVNYZES 5l 5 GVEI.--.h..L ARM 'O ^' q Sd.ug6 . 3 1 L._f ff ) N[.D r 8 C M f,_ D. CY E. E .L .~ ---i C-- t y-3:- f -l - ]- ~;:} ' 7 ' ' - II' '-T*~~ l i q) - 41

j i

i l 5 ^ s.x ;_ L .u Ii.. . A.{i. N' .1-..~ S - - t.: .l 'a JLG l '- .-) ~ 1.l:..

l '

i abk.a.

~~ 1 ~ ~ - - - - Q.,_

u. Q. a'. :

.l L- ~.L ~ ~~~ '~ ~ -" : -' ' ~ - ~~~ '-~ * * * - Q p I a.i t r gg[& e q A. VRGL~s i C&R 'q t-1 -'- Y' = ~h' t T T Ei ^ -- Pth.ofrAc -l i--

== =- ATED ': '-i ~'; -{-

in HEUEE-M y

l ^l! ' l' i G t.OSLG. !=-

E; i

I k ". e - .a = JL

1. JL 4-.

-- C j- ~.i ) .. g, . - - - g ~* -]- r- *y.

~

?- ,y 3 y q;t .i- _i . ie ,) ___1 _-.l.i_ ___= ..- }_._ .._I: g g; .q. g 2 - 12- -."h- ---h - + ~ m -- 1" I- .I T

.g..

.s Q,... s ? I -.. _u u.- 2 a-

- =

g g g-i,p p,; z

=

= q r - "- j- .t. (_ ^ ^ ' 1 . C. l.: = .';~.. ,r; 1 -* - J-t -- ---h' s.. $ ' ^h ? i L

---

t--

--i- - I - - ---r--'

• (j

-]. f-l:: ~ 7l .]~ -i

j -- +

e: S-3 4 Q. .i[ 1.- - p. 1 3:

. t

/{ -- t-- [ al. =

- -M

--= - L--

----

- =f- = j=- l.,b... = c lh Lg. /:5-- - "+ + - f -- ' Q -..u... l l A 2: .. 4 - = l = = a- - y 3... -Q ~

d. a 5 5 # 4,'3 7

- i - -- ----- q g (I). ....}:.t i i_....._'t_ #_, _ l tr U i. IW

2..L.U r

-[..A /; --r y y,y, At j,svE,_ 1 1 i. i 1: WJ_ e zzo - m, I' i O, f j6t*r** 5NlTl k r."- t v-0, C l A 0 $...l....?...,., Q b i lNV WY.{$ ~ y 53 t t { D3 j. .. 'i....!... -j.. ..... -F I G UR F-- ~l h-- "h"i I ~' I-- - -- i- --f-q I j ^1 t -3 t ~ i s t. 1 1 l 1 i Ppr rsd'RE TRAHS frNT FOR -_MAYNup I Wilve \\(To! RC5) [.-AIL!Ns Fut L G ONN i i 1 e.t i, noo i eses wrrht: !ac! s c rrM P e rs ;;,'z! $ _i i

'- r--]i:7 y q y y i- ~ ". r .u .t t i. ...i. J.... _. y :_ ._;. L_.. m! l .A f l f~;- W21/~lY l -l I l l U

T 5

idnssadd riv!W ~ l' {.W]

_a- _L>i/N_f.../CM-w ds.].._.-._:._ I.. i ll.

l j i +.;_ ';.. Ab __. i i W: Z I I- . I ' :i].. ;.

1.. ; 1..

II g

).

.[ .l. J ] .. +.. d_. _.._ j.. . ;. _ 4.:...[..d h D . 2 8 1 .... _.. I I .l 6, ...i. a..; . :i-t -l.-.. l.. i i 1 t!] [ ] q

l:

y. l._.___; t _. 7 g- - h i i .. : k:j.. .. k._. _,:; ..._i......I..;_:!::. p l .~ -q.l._.... '.. X

1.._.

... t. 3 7.. g I 5; ""~~' ~t- .i .c t' (_ _ _ b _D' 1

_a__,

N.. l .l. ...l. .:l:.. .l.. t to : m h- .n --~~}'_~ ~ 7 3 T-~ yl-1 .l. .d

r.

T i hj i r-e Id o t. t

l

_N ye =. :! : '\\, N... :---- -i -..p j. ..:l. v- .{. .1.. t-- q-l: i I '93 i. + - _ _.. .3 .. A ~4 N __. ! .:1:. l-j. u.._;

.a].-

.,T_- -i. - :t. : v

4

.j ' 2_l_. G v.; .lt.u)

F =:

i i N;- .l. .l: I-I m 7 .-g ..l. l ~ gi 11!.. a: : ~ W-T'- T O~ -a.. -..:1, .l. i .n . g, .~: ., 3" T - d ..j.. 7 ]. ai h, -".

u c

.y r "l j' E"

l:'id::j.~ _._.._.l. -. '.l -

3.l., MlG -J j

t n.-

g-2 y._. :.. q a _.u.-...__... A ?, I y 3 T V]- . Y. :i .[. .? ..h 4 .l.. -r-- .I ] 1 "' j @i - - - Q-I -{r ]", ,-(Q l..3y d [. [. .tj. y, .tlj... r. . n. "M.1 2 c::l :%].. ii. _ . i~; "L... . g.... y]IU;g.._..!_.._ 25- .. '. h. J:;.r _.,I l.. 4 '.>_.. t ::

• t-

-'--[- ...t. . ;. N., '.t% 1 .~.. . $., - l': ~ y, .{- l _ g] -- l -! : -

L.

.I y:. 1 s i;

rf Q. r

1:.; : La. H t, N 5 {' ,e -+ I g g: '.._...t,' _g .: *'.4.} ...;J, ' g ,i ..{ j. .f. .j. D3) I,g ~'4,y. Q.J:3.

I

~~ n 144 g.

• l '...Q.f.

,K b_g

1.

..l* .t.: l

I l

~ '.).

l::

Tl\\ ]- .i .r t al. p

p t

e 1 .i i > s . p(;. - -Q. ....l: I _:... .:l e z3 ,N .~. . d) e.*=* g. l. . l' .l 4 g ., q-g. b 3

=. _h

^* 2 F.h /_. ..:...= =_ 21... ; .._n u-

a..'l..

..Lm i3

C

.2.. .u.. 22. M, -l ! tD ).

• i- ~~~w

.u; . Q.4 7;. le#

:..w.. :..u

.s....z. L.; J

. = mad.

.h. O" .;.C. :. p a n. ._..- 4 n. .l j. .l.... l 1-. ... p. ..g. I i i i I C kl 0 D

g.

g l-l q _.._. . p,. 4 L. .. y. _r... .y. y y._. l ~~i~ ~I~ ~ 1. l j j (W$2QT N88Wd W3M$ M1 -l-e i i l l g - p rn g Q .d a s o Ullu wl} Jj a

1,

{,

ac. .u. .a.n. up .: u ..j.. !.. ;ui.l; . - '.. _..... + - l .u?:u....;.. : .:3 - - - a:..G . -.. ~. l. 1 l l. t 1 ,u_ u l---_ .L b ab;u..N.c.

.x sp.

i

. :.;d.

2.u.

nu. au n-7l 1 ..._4__ 4... ,9,.. _! -q - Mli.. l..,.. : i. I.....,.. t ^' . p . l "- i .g _1 .l. . Hj !'N.'. _. .-1... ~ ~

li

.:t- .... : f :... .. :l..- .:t* . :P

. N. t

j:'

. 1;

j:

1 .L.; _. . b-i; s i 't i ,. ! [ ,jf. f' k.. 5:. ;" ~* .,f. _......k ...g ,. l.- .l. s : - : g -

g.

t-4 o u.. .g y[. ;..... .; :.j-..-..[ 2..1...:.:b. I. .t. N, e .h. h. .q $~ .u: u.it - M .,y Q.. t . ((...

g

'.p-g nu-n Ou: . _. I... {'.. t r. x'_ i- - l. i N \\ C.-- .:...n C: :; . : U,*.: > 2. : . l. _. _.-l.'_-... t.i-. I ..... Q1 __ a _._ 4 z.- ..-u n.. r n:: - : -J :. : - - -

: : *r.

",. ? N! 2:t T: - s: N. rf,

t.

s.

--"f hj ~ : : l: :t-i ^-

y--

n'I Mi t i ,3. l 'i tu-A (T) s l O tg, l. 3

I.

$iiii__.

. _.:. _ Q. 4 1_.. if. h.:U!!!- I

i

>l\\ 9.. bl.lij._ *g l i. u.: i l gt. I I .=: n ~ - (e.J

Ux:

j,,

l'

.(~,. L jn; _A*l '

y, "g.

.. l' -:Q u.. 1... 1 nu n:Q:

r t-

t-

-l [ .s' .= :- -.:w: ,,y n... ;; : :p.t:,:

l:..

.x -...-l... . _.t. ..T ., k' ...A.[- -l .y y _......g... ._.. q. n t'. M _ :r. u;- n _ n: :. :u: : -.,.: a E y,

n... :.. g;. = :.

nn p. x. g, te V ...!: :q :- m ..e.- . (1... _"' d S N ....( i ii:!L1 (%. $hE -il!.:pf T -Y ili .4 \\'., l

== a . x.a..- 1 .u. p .. -..t.n ~- i. y '/ n ;.

l;

.j; a,

C

- g.j l, ;{ q..

g:.-

.i p g I l-4,

i Q..:

ui

• :lC'-

u: :n.. l '; k ' u:

f.

..

. u :. .:. L ~) .i +.:. _ m) '!. D .i

l.tu

. q g.

t _..l.. - : .l, I.. . ~ s 1 l .)

l:

l:

I. I , g,;,,,,.. l . a. _= 1 . _. u. nn. .2a. .an:. g. :.= .. g. ..o.... .. fJ) ' l..... T....,.._. 3l: Ql . y, 4_. l ~ f f

,f.

l: I tr) :., _....J...__ I f I 1 e (c tQ 32:mji 3dcj Ws%g zu j p ; [ j. i i I 4 a gym gym ~ M J AUL

.t=..

q...

1: c. 1. t. 1 ::. l. a- - a :: e . x r ~[j '. r .t"

1..

1.-

1..

..-"g -l. t. 1,.:. l~t-r.

t

.j 4 y, jj. 4 4~ l p.. ,s..}. c - - t i .. j.. ') Q ap.. l .,,: I lr... '. j .I. : l,8 .j ..".,a .{. . i '....... l : ' I l i I. 1 J"e L. I ...9... j ~ i.. l 8 9 t, 'M..: : [..... i. l. t-... '. t '.. i .g -I. '.'t .l ~s .l .g. -t.. f j-' ' !. I. ' : t. '

f. ' :

I-1. .: I.., ...l. ~~ 'I"f..,..l.r'.+ i

k E,:....

4.. '

I .l.' ?' I .! " g Vi IM +. i --l !'..k l, ],, ; ---.'_i'. E j.

.l LI

j'

. I {;_ _.- -.2.- t

L

.;p'. L... - i... - .- {.. .p . 9:;.. f.,.. g.. .t.. 690 ". h..:

]:.

1:.

f

...f : j ::. . i. t M. P.. !. ::.... ~' P ' r.. l 1.

.l:: -

...f t !E 9:[i!kEE

b' i;I.

ii': 'h bhb

l.)

j.* ik_

Ihi-hi 5

. (. : J g g 3/g g; M :

1. ~ ! E =:

]i i:! iu.m.7;3l"i i :

i:igl:p i i 5p:,, Agl)

"0...... -,./JPf"M /)//

V Q,f~f7( : 6;~ ! 7WC

....S.. ^. 4-/L _ j C3_ B yrrs,w w -d - B./w Lg.wr;. ...N ..A FI..-

s. -

u=ri= =7.=- =;= +...suw ig =;s =. -4; ar =ry; =;4=: =gg..-gy; :fe gwp=yg.,.j,p.r=;.n

1. E:m'.L fit

=#1 =ilh. SirJyyni_f}77-&ckd&pgfj& MW 1~

6 =! =

ET 5f=! EiE E4i= FOE E it:i!!s*R *l:dF=i A-i elMbihlE J4G!4_ Mii"5MsiN - i =: o M e I =i-5 '=:ifd=H=ilM=j ~=rE IM.yMp'75-I=\\ ':: =W:iET~ii=518 M=EiE=a=isEg}En=2Mk G ~ @ = l=E JE =i4W =n-==ht:. % f.EL.E-i=E 4 -i-\\WYGW=M %@M MP.=1d$ =W E EmEl@E=i==E" MME Mgupgggj2.7 g.sywgs.gi=itsp.g = sEE ib e E =

s im EnE!=f= 52E+EasM ii-!EE!"=i EE==4 f*iHEEsiift=h ~ -E!EtsiMi;=5?Mh -iZ=ME

._E_ E=_q. __d.=_r_.."_=y__=.=. ._u....ps. i...=p....-1=_Eg__=1. _s_-4

!. =_..i1.=__

s..e..a.._. __

._s_=5_c. c c. s..a__._=_:-=. _=2=}E. s.a_ c t __1 ii~=55i"EEiSICT~"~.

:r=., :=h: = s=

= _u==~.. ...t = I. = =- -_1=*' -*=J =;=- t = n'= n.: = nri==_ _ =.. _=. _ . 3 .:r,=:= u. .:c u.. z.=

.

rj =_...,y---- t=- rr. w,=.._.__,._p,=tr:= r= r r-r: i;1=-- 4 : p--. :l:=-- u $..., -- : --t a-*_--t- - r_J _4. m-' :D-4_- 1_.__._-4. _ - -7.-_- r- !=+-::= _ x__

r:..

u 2.=:=m m-_ ..,.i = ,m - nr _ a __.4 3_ gq=._g s t..r:rge;;.q=_ 3.:..l.=J _;- +l_,-1__, _.]_._._=._...7 -* -+.n :r4--r -t -- ! - - r=_. _ - E_ r.:4 3_.:q. gsg =..!:rc-= ra; " =L._. .___t_._ .__.j____... _ _ _ _ . q. _ .._ t . _. r- . 3. h.ii i_5._ 55.-'._.i23=. E. l' ~ E... 6..=. _~.i=.._.i}

.. _. 3_ _.5

._, C_-j. n.. _:.;Jr.. _ I - }5.. _h. _53...=. _ f=..-.."N T_ _ __~_D. _ _._'M N __m ~ Rb - - '.'_.'_. L. J.32fI r-U ? /; = .r.- _.i_. 7;_-} 1 ~ tr_44:= =,=- r 4._._... l =. _ '. _'.. :". - h =:r=t----L=t-- ::::._.'."f :u-- =&n-Lun;nnt=:= p

:-r=~;

3. J

= L7. I.

t

- _:.= = -r--~ rng,n,3,.,,,,,,,_ .__g,_., = = 1 r._- _.F- ;r,;=;, g- -.---t: -r. = - m-.____ _._.._.__r_ _ _. -

=

~

.,.;.-- -- t-

.C . {.T C# :- = _' ' :~_-_.7:_.: ten,4C=t Of-- /.- ; F,.C4= -- i-. r~ '_' j. C--T_ -.;* = u =. - + afe- -/::= c

n

n- - tr.=

r===

___; r - --

: :n..

=__. n-t

=J --- t -- -- f._. r=+l=. ;nuj __u.__'- t-

_.:. - - - -- -i=. E $.nn @Nar m.'E.t u:- =. rg/ r: =_ =+- ,_i r r_._ rrt --- -: =3 27 x =2 ~ 1 Mli"Ii"- 5i:-}5si5EEEEN5i@lEE'_.-r--lE.S_ 'l! =f ~l_T E.i = 2?EE 1 A f5 54=-E. ~IE = = =._ _n.. 2_s_E_ t.a. E=..q,.. m _ +.... =_p_51_- - .. _ _m... _.i. _. t.m.._ %g m..s. 5._=_ ]m._ im.__. =._i_ ;=__ __. _ ja,_a,:2. wv.p..=..=.. f. ~5' i EEi:15EIEfi~iEElEfi'Efi"E"lEiEEiEEliE E fE ""lE = a =Ef= =!E~ E"I~E=EiE/' E!E;N'iis- = i = =t-H 5.__ b E. N. t _C.__.'t._ _b. _. 't _N_.5* -5 E i 2. __ ..~.f.i.f9_. }5_5.O-t d.i.E._ f___*r. - i.s_' f.5_5.__.. ! I9

p. s

%o "Ff~.5 _dh. 5=i.d._;_if3_3-25_3..Ih_2 .!_#=/.. E.;5. _5..!;c. =lS_ ~C... Z 4

55iEli 5NI5E !!E!E:i 5 i~

i E E .__h N~E Eff5 !-INN id5[$NIE E-I ElEI5= !IEEE -lie 5i=lEif'if 5E15~lES"# ZEiE :=Mi M=i ti=/=#iM =ti=E tim nii = m ::=ti-iiH=li=i=- MiE =in= GF = =i=ET:ir=+ H +' y

• =dE 'i=fE- = -i=E +::K" =Et!E=!iE

!E=f =~ii= "5iEi!!E!Eb=il"iilEIEs!+EliE aE=i=ti==EiE fUE d$ =it. =idi= :=*: +=i EDE Ei= difE =:ii# =id "=E.i"E E=

lis

E= lei =E5t Mik= iiEK=

#!Ml=M EEIE EEI"' ~!55" I!IF 'El5 5Il[= 7i5 25 5 } I5; '-M INlEl =iiI=F ' :!I' 5f"5 'lil? "i,y Jl~;' ~=[ 2 Eifi:3 x

Elis =: !=JE i4=: :se'.-!!!: 91th-ni!i !;hr. "i:isni!! EMi?.jith!Jii-is #!=ilski

E!!:=

tie

.rps 5p A=

rgr =p 5ip=

sin. 3:p= nipmby=g. =p:ja!=.-gis=pias.sim. npi = = F hH : d!ii - -II[E i -iihi= 5i}h lihi 65-i :hi$L :-E!=- :5}!!= i.4hi "-!rii ! :"-!ii= _-I-5 iiM5i 2hii!- iil=== h}:ii j[i- ! yip

lii

-if i i:!:: m: .W ~ ' j]:i( gc-my rp g{:i

ilE ili-j

{ .I' .:{.' . *--.$d E!n !EC ! . '..!do.l.ii4:40! da ibi-4:.4 AO: ifM

Fi-i 5I HI O YUi:

'~i e g{ ']'. T,. ' :1. ; ':.{ f lii. !!P i:b ni i

'!QQMg

.' M g i:l:.hhih.hi T(l& 5hh lN Ejii i El4 JF: i:iJ p!I His ill i" $d Y li ~ '!~ piu "

r s'

alk Lin 6h i: h!h hi:: chi !!i;!

• {

}:

I I I

ll=.. i :...*

1 M

eF: DFi iii EH .{.-

h..

+ .I. A >.. e:5 m-.....m....cr., ul.. ~ h-..

.,n n

m: W ,,12 A

i: ~' l - T -"- i' ~ ~ ~ ' ' - T ~ ~ ' ' ~ ~ ~ 7 J ' 7 ~-l~ j "T, { j T ~~ ;. t-l e ; -) i

I i.

i. e, l - .g.. i j 4 .l.. i ..__._..I.. _. ].. _... i j j i -i .q. 3 -l i 7 i l I .-.3.. I

i. _

j t l I l l-i. I j i. i i. 4 . L. j... i. i f .i.... .I (.: I, t. l l i .. L. ..,._r i i i l i 4.. r .-{.. .i {.... j.. ..a. l t 4 s - i 4 t I -{- l ^ i l:

1...

.i.

9. _.

t -j i ._i... i1] l i. j r 0 /d'E~ 0, .I.. . d}Fa*CL.cE.15Va*ENJN,E w E/W.,Y Nhkff..] o I I 3 I \\ t i O 2 ..t ! $W W 0 Eb?! s' ~~- /?2'O 7XW/~ l. 6i,/? g, I....... 'S// l'..bYW/NG.. _ N 'Y.'S&//VI* fCN G*/h/.$h%h/G /YJ'//7t/P $ I^ I i i i i i l l I I - [- ._i _l__./?Yo.,,./y. L. -- /7~ Yk.,. e /: k i 5, i .i / __ s n..:c.., t'. u,/V... ..;pp.. qgs y,3_= z 7.t, 2 75. 6,. ' e k i t i i l J..' l (>i ._--.,.a. e _a.._l e I _.8_.. t. -._ _.u.....__._ t .i. ..i. -..i..._.:. 5 .y. 1 i r w. ..,_a l 5 i r 6 i i . l..

.1 _

.. i _. _i. .f.. i.._.l _.i [ ('I t _. gg;. r-1 i _ 3

3... l !

_~ i l

7...

I l t I I .i t;, .:._t. U,

l I

l i l-I j j l 8- .j l t-I l _..a. L. i I I e %y, _ L. .. _j. l I i -I i I i g 3 w I i- . l._ _ i_.. ..j . i. m; _ L._. !..__ }... w... i j i, i -j N { j. -j t g ..f.._ I - ..1....: ..4 j. i l :- . l i. ...i. T l i i i i W '/ddi ,i ,i - i i, i .t I . I..... . _. j - I . p i. a . l :. l l-8 3 .,l i i j g a.. 4 . q._.. _a. ..a. _..t... I [ i 1. I i i .. j-E b. I<",d j ' G,' './... /. C ! ! ~."$. NN~/P_X'dME, i".# ' l.__ l I I i. i I~ i I.. / l l-i - i i. [.. .j.. .I. ,i ~ i i I '.l'. ..t.. i j l l .l. I I .I. J._ _ i I .. j.. i i

O APPENDIX B A) Systems Utilized During Shutdown and Startup Operations Reactor Coolant System FD-302-651 FSAR Fig. 4-1 Simplified Schematic Diagram of Engineered FSAR Fig. 6-1 Safeguards for Core and Building Protecti; Core Flood Tank System FD-302-702 FSAR Fig. 6-2A Nitrogen and Hydrogen Supply System FD-302-673 FSAR Fig. 6-2B Makeup and Purification System FD-302-661 FSAR Fig. 9-2 Decay Heat Removal System FD-302-641 FSAR Fig. 9-6 Liquid Waste Disposal FD-302-681 FSAR Fig. 11-1 Gas Waste Disposal FD-302-691 FSAR Fig. 11-2 B) Flow Paths The primary and alternate flow paths are described below. The alternate flow path is designated by brackets. Core Flood Tank System From CFT-1A thru CFV-2 and CFV-1 to the Reactor and from CFT-1B thru CFV-4 and CFV-3 to the Reactor. Nitorgen and Hydrogen Supply System From the Nitrogen Supply thru NGV-153 (NGV-155) thru NGV-8 thru a) NGV-82 thru NGV-93 to the R.C. Drain Tank b) NGV-82 thru NGV-84 to the pressurizer c) NGV-81 to the Steam Generators d) NGV-62 to the R. C. System Hot Legs Pakeup and Purification System From the RC Pumps 3B2 suction thru Letdown Cooler 3A [3B] thru the Block Orifice [MUV-51] thru Prefilter 3A [3B] thru Demineralizer 3A [38] thru Letdown Filter 3A [B] thru the Makeup Tank thru Makeup l l Pump B [A] [C] thru MUV-31 [MUV-30] to the R.C. Pump 3Al discharge. i ~~ ~ ~ - - m m.

b Decay Heat Removal System From the RCS "B" Hot Leg thru DHV-3 thru DHV-4 thru DHV-41 thru Decay Heat Removal Train A [ Train B] thru CFV-3 [CFV-1] to the Reactor. Gas Waste Disposal From the RC Pump Vents the steam Generator Vents the Pressurizer Vent, and the RC Drain Tank thru WDV-406 thru WDV-405 thru WDV-274 thru the Waste Gas Surge Tank [WDV-382] thru WDV-465 thru the Waste Gas Compressor 3A [3B] thru Waste Gas Decay Tank 3A [3B] [3C] thru WDV-436 [WDV-437] [WDV-438] thru WDV439 to the ventilation Filter Units. C) Heat Sources - Pressurizer Heaters e Reactor Coolant Pumps Fluid Sources - Core Flood Tanks Nitrogen Supply System Makeup and Purification Tank Demineralized Water System Reactor Coolant Bleed Tanks Borated Water Storage Tank Waste Gas Surge Tank D) Pressure and Flow Controllers - RCV-10 MU Block Orifice [ Alternates: MUV-51,MUV-48] MUV-16 [ alternate MUV-17] MUV-31 [ alternate MUV-30] NGV-85 E) RCS Pressure Protection System - Dual setpoint, pilot actuated relief valve RCV-10 [RC-RV2 in FSAR Fig. 4-1] F) ECCS and Makeup Systems Emergency Core Cooling System-ESAR_Eig. 6-2 Makeup and Purification System FD-302-661 FSAR Fig. 9-2 1 l 6 g}}