ML19317F518
| ML19317F518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1973 |
| From: | Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Mangelsdorf H Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001140750 | |
| Download: ML19317F518 (5) | |
Text
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we JUL 6 1973 DocketNos.b-270 and 50-287 Mr. H. G. Mangelsdorf Chairman, Advisory Comittee
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on Reactor Safeguards N
U. S. Atonic Energy Comission
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Washington, D. C.
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Dear Mr. Mangelsdorf:
Sixteen copies of the Safety Evaluat$on prepared by the Directorate of Licensing in the matter of Duke Power Company's (Duke) Oconce Units 2 and 3 are enclosed for review by the Committee. Copies of the Safety Evaluation have been forwarded to the applicant and the Public Document Roons.
We consider our radiological safety review of econee Units 2 and 3 to be essentially coepicte. In performing our review, ve have elected to defer final conclusions on several matters. These natters and our reasons for deferring them are summarized below. We plan to assure that each of these matters is satisfactorily resolved prior to our final determination on issuance of operating licenses for the Oconee Units 2 and 3.
Fuel Dennification (SER Section 4.2.6): The Oconee Units 2 and 3 1.
plants are two of a serics of Babcock and Wilcox plants of which Our review of the fuel Oconee 1 is the lead plant and prototype.
densification phenomenon has concentrated first on Oconee Unit 1 and has been completed to the point where operation at full power is acceptable within specific operating limits catablished for that plant. Meanwhile, Duke Power Company has furnished us a fuel densification analysis of Oconee Unit 2 in which they, similarly, i
have proposed reduction in allowable flux imbalance limits and a
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two percent reduction in the overpower trip setpoint.
complate our. fuel densification analysis for Oconee 2 and 3 in a We are manner consistent with our analysis of Oconee Unit 1.
satisfied at this point, however, that operation at full power within operating limits approximately the same as those proposed i
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- 11. G. Mangelsdorf.
by. the applicant will be acceptable for Oconee Units 2 and 3.
We will modify the Technical Specifications to establish the required limitations before issuance of an operating license for oconee Units 2 and 3.
2.
High-Energy Line Rupture (SER Section 7.1.11)_t Our review of Oconee Units 2 and 3 for high-energy line rupture external to the reactor building has been completed. The applicant submitted its final detailed analyses and the staff has completed its
' review. We are satisfied that the applicant has used our criteria and identified those areas where design nodifications are necessary.
1 These are discussed in the Safet.y Evaluation. None of the required modifications constitute a major change in plant design and tlw applicant has committed to make the necessary changes.to Unit 3
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Reactor Building Structural Design (SER Section 6.2): The staff and the applicant have reexamined the LOCA generated overpressure analysis for the Oconee Units 2 and 3 steam generator subcompartments.
The staff and applicant agree that the conservatively calculated overpressure is slightly less than 15 psi. The design overpressure for these subcompartments was 11.1 psi. The applicant has reevaluated the structural capability of the subcompartment walls and concluded that they will withstand an overpressure of 15 psi with 30% margin. The staff has no*; completed its review of the subcompartment wall overpressure capability but plans to do so prior to permitting reactor operation.
4.
Spent Fuel Handling System (SER Section 10.6): The staff has reexamined the design of the spent fuel handling facility with regard to radiological releases resulting from a fuel handling accident. Although the releases are well below 10 CFR Part 100 without iodine filters in the facility vent system, the staff considers that the addition of filtars is practical and prudent because of the relatively, higher probability of the fuel handling accident.- The applicant will be required to comit to this modification prior to startup and to make the modification in some reasonable time period.
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H. C. lisngelsdorf JUL C 1973 5.
QA for Operations (SER Section 12.6)1 The staff is performing a periodic review of the applicant's QA for Operations Program and will resolve any areas that require upgrading with the applicant prior to operation of Oconee Units 2 and 3.
Sincerely, R. C. DeToung, Assistant Director for Prescurfzed Water Reactors Directorate of Licensing l
Enclosure Safety Evaluation DISTRIBUTION Dockets PWR-4 Rdg 1APeltier ASchwencer RCDeYoung
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