ML19317F044
| ML19317F044 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1973 |
| From: | Thornburg H US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Murphy C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001080740 | |
| Download: ML19317F044 (4) | |
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...,'k Docket No. 50-269 REGION I DUKE POWER COMPANY - INSPECTION REPORT i
NO. 50-269/73-7 C. E. Murphy Enclosed are copics of revised pages 2 X
i REGION II and 5 of the Summary and 16 of the Details for the subject report. Please insert copies of-these pages in the report to be sent to Duke for proprietary review and those copies to be distributed externally REGION III I
(PDR, e t c. ). We will make distriubtf wof the corrected pages to the Headquarters recipients of the original report.
As discussed with you by R. C. Paulus, the inspection report should be sent to Duke for proprietary review by Region II.
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REGION V This can be done at any time af ter the Headquarters enforcement letter has been dispatched.
Enclosures As stated cc: RO Files
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d DATE.
8/14/73 H.D.Thornb rg, Chief Field Support & Enforcement Branch Directorate of Regulatory Operations i
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-7
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS I.
Enforcement Action A.
Violations Certain of your activities conducted under AEC Operating License No. DPR-38 appear to be in violation with license requirements as indicated below:
1.
Violations considered to be of Category II severity are as follows:
I Paragraph 50.54(1) of 10 CFR 50 specifies that manipulation 3p - '
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of the controls of a facility shall be under control of a licensed operator.
Contrary to the above, an unlicensed maintenance technician manipulated the control rods while performing miscellaneous test procedure " Check of Safety and Shim Centrol Rod Actuators for Frictional Binding."
(Details, paragraph 5.b.(3))
Paragraph 50.59(b) of 10 CFR 50 requires a documented b.
safety evaluation of the basis for the determination that a change of the facility does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
Contrary to the above, written safety evaluations were not prepared for modifications of the following safety related equipment:
(1) RCP Oil Drain System.
(2) Turbine Bypass Control Modification.
(3) Feedwater Flow-Turbine Trip.
(4) Electrical Auxiliary Transfer.
(5) CRD Motor Fault Time Delay.
(Details, paragraph 3) i Criterion II of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 requires the 4
c.
establishment of a QA program consistent with the work schedule.
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Contrary to the above, the Nuclear Safety Review Committee (NSRC) agenda contained a list of eighteen items wb'ch dated from November 1971 to January 1973 which i.ad not been acted upon.
(Details, paragraph 6) ggnskd Ihhhhi$h v
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I a-RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-7 Contrary to the above, following performance of miscellaneous test procedure " Auto Transfer from 1T to CTl Transformer without Generator Lockout," the status of the emergency start relays was not verified.
(Details, paragraph 5.b.(4))
h.
Criterion XVI of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 requires that conditions adverse to quality be promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, there is apparently no formal method for assuring that the superintendent be made aware of unusual events and abnormal occurrences so that these may be, assigned for prompt investigation l
1 and correction.
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(Details, paragraph 9) 1.
Technical Specification 6.1.2.1, " Station Review Committee," specifies the functions and responsibilities of the Station Review Committee (SRC).
C6ntrary to the requirements of this technical specification:
(1) The SRC failed to have a quorum in attendance at its meetings on June 7,1973, and June 8,1973.
(Details, paragraphs 4.c and 5.b. (2))
(2) The SRC failed to review new procedures and proposed revisions to safety related procedures.
This is recorded in the SRC minutes of March 29, April 5, 10, 16, 19, 25, 27 and 30, May 8 and 22, and June 15, 1973. Miscellaneous test procedures "4160 v Bus Transfer Time Test" and " Shuffling Control Components in Spent Fuel Pool" were not reviewed by the SRC.
(Details, paragraphs 4.e.(2),
5.b. (1), and 5.b. (7))
(3) The SRC failed to review station operation and safety considerations.
Specifically, the minutes of the SRC did not reflect that the SRC had reviewed:
(a) the oil fire on RCP 1Al; and (b) the premature i lifting of the main steam relief valves.
(Details, paragraph 4.e.(2))
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-7 (i) The procedure did not require that a licensed operator manipulate the controls or to be present when the con-trols were manipulated.
(Controls in this case being 5
the air hoist.)
Failure to provide adequate procedures appears to be contrary to the requirements of Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
The method prescribed in the proc 4 dure for the conduct of the test specified that the hoist operator lif t each control rod with an air hoist and, by measuring the pounds of force required, detertaine the friction drag on the drives and rod.
I The procedure required that voice communication be main-J tained between the hoist operator and a licensed reactor operator in the control building.
>+=xa Part 50.54(i) of 10 CFR 50 provides that the licensee not permit the manipulation of the controls of any facility
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by any one who is not a licensed operator or senior operator unless the manipulation is done under the direction of and in the presence of a licensed operator or senior operator.
An u.nlicensed maintenance technician operated the ~ hoist in conducting this test. The manipulation of the control rods by an unlicensed person appears to be a violation of Part 50.54(i).
(4) Auto Transfer From 1T to CT1 Transformer Without Generator
' Lockout The purpose of this test was to verify that the time required for die transfer of station pcVer from the unit station service transformer IT to the reserve station service transfer CTl would not cause a lockout of the main generator.
This procedure was approved by Smith on February 3,1973, and was performed on February 4,1973. The procedure required the disabling of the emergency start relay for the Keowee Hydro Station. The operating license for Oconee 1 was issued on February 6,1973, and the Keowce Hydro Station provides emergency power for the Oconee Nuclear Station.
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