ML19317E981
| ML19317E981 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1972 |
| From: | Peltier I US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001070776 | |
| Download: ML19317E981 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON. D.C. 20545
\\;gf APR 4 372 R. C. DeYoung. Assistant Director, PWRs, DRL THRU: Albert Schwencer, Chief, PWR Branch 4, DRL / r SITE VISITS TO E POWER COMPANY - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 (DOCKET NOS 50-269 270/287)
Enclosed is a summary of discussions and observations resulting from the site visit on March 29-30, 1972, to Oconee. The purpose of the visit was to review outstanding items on the Oconee Unit 1 tech specs and to survey the damage recently done to the Unit 1 primary system during hot functional tests.. Personnel participating and contacted during the site visit are listed in the enclosure.
(b N*h OE' I. A. Peltier DISTRIBUTION:
PAMorris FSchroeder TRWilson RSBoyd DJSkovholt HRDenton EGCase RRMaccary PWR Branch Chiefs RWKlocker CO (2)
FKaras C1urphey CO II RPollard CRVanNiel VBenaroya IPeltier (2)
DLange GPawlicki Docket PWR-4 Reading DRL Reading 4
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ENCLOSURE I SITE VISIT TO OCONEE UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 MARCH 29-30, 1972 S_LHl!ARY I.
Tech Soecs Although the discussions were for the purpose of " wrapping up" tech specs for oconee 1, we gave Duke the benefit of our review of tech specs for Units 2 and 3 as an indicator of what would eventually be required in tech specs for all three units.
Duke was encouraged to go as far as it could in meeting these requirements for Unit 1, particularly with regard to Safety Guides 16 and 21.
Our om review revealed that Unit 1 tech specs were not too far off Guide 16 and Guide 21 in essential substance for Unit 1 tech specs.
Duke made the followinz connittments.
1.
Review Safety Guides 16 and 21 and incornorate them to the extent practical in Unit 1 tech specs.
2.
Place more information into the record on the actual hold up time capacity of the liquid and gaseous waste processing systems.
3.
Recalculate releases from the spent fuel handling area based on new war -
retention factors to be provided by DRL.
4.
State frequency at which the charcoal cartridge will be inspected, tested and/or changed in the vent radiation monitor (IRIA-44).
5.
Provide for the batteries of the 125-V DC Switching Station Power system to have the same testing requirements as the Keowee Station batteries.
6.
Propose technical specification for testing of the services and circuitry used to detect faults, isolate the 230 KV switchyard and connect a hydro unit to the switchyard.
7.
Place procedures for periodic testing of the diodes in the 125V DC Switching Station power system in the tech specs.
8.
Generate procedures for performing discharge tests on the 125V DC Instrument and Control and Keowee Station batteries in accordance with IEEE Std. 308-1970.
9.
Provide procedures for testing diode monitoring circuits on the basis that whatever. diode circuit fails the remaining system must meet single failure criteria.
- 10. Make minor classification and editorial changes to the Unit 1 tech specs as discussed at the meeting.
II Plant Inspection
.AEC people had the opportunity of viewing the danage to the Unit 1 Steam Generators and Primarv Vessel Internals which occurred during the hot functional testing. By April 6,1972, Duke will provide the AEC with 90 copies of a report on findings along with a limited number of sets of photographs showing damage.
BW was in the process of scoping its efforts on investigations, analyses, evaluations anc corrective actions. Arrangements were made to discuss this in a conference call on March 31, 1972, at 1:15 p.m.
III Other Matter,s Duke will take a look at the increased releases to the environment resulting fror. an opening of the relief valve in the waste Fas header while the compressor bice salve is stuck open. The increased releases result from an engineering chai.go in the size of the gas compressor outlet bleed valve to the header and a change in the size of the header relief valve. The engineering change was required to assure that the gas header operates in the desired pressure range.
A number of the plant gaseous radiation monitors have long inlet pipes with a number of bends (90 ) which do not appear to be up to the state of the art 8
for iodine monitoring. DRL will look into this matter.
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ENCLOSURE II o
PARTICIPANTS Duke W. O. Parker P. Barton K. Canady E. Smith B. M. Rice J. W. Hampton R. J. Ansell L. Lewis B&W
- T. O. Johnson R. V. Straub R. Scienke AEC A. Schwencer, DRL I. Peltier, DRL M. Hildreth, CO C. Murphey, CO Reg. II t
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