ML19317E953
| ML19317E953 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1978 |
| From: | Butler W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Stello V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001070748 | |
| Download: ML19317E953 (2) | |
Text
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I I 1973 NEMORANDUli FOR:
V. Stello, Jr., Acting Assistant Director for Operating Reactors, Division of Operating Reactors FR0!i:
W. R. Butler, Chief, Plant Systems Bran'ch, D0R
SUBJECT:
OCONEE FIRE PROTECTION - DEDICATED SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM Plant Name:
Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 Docket No: 50-269, 270, 287 Licensee:
Duke Power Company Responsible Branch: ORB M Project Manager:
M. Fairtile Status of Review:
Essentially complete. The attached itens require j
resolution.
Our further review of the safe shutdown system proposed for Oconee has resulted in certain additional staff positions which should be implemented.
We have identified in the enclosure the additional staff positions which the licensee should adopt. The licensee shculd also be requested to describe how he will comply with these positions.
W. R. Sutler, Chief i
Plant Systems Branch Division of Operating Reactors
Contact:
H. George x28077
Enclosure:
As stated i
cc w/ enclosure V. Stello D. Eisenhut e
R. Ferguson R. Reid A. Schwencer D. Neighbors
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pswww MAR 16197g STAFF POSITIONS 1.
A fixed automatic or manual suppression system should be provided in each cable spreading room and each equipment room.
2.
Repair plans should be developed for restoring power to equipment required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown where redundant cold shutdown cabling are routed in proximity to each other and may be lost in a fire. Material needed for repairs should be available on site.
3.
Interim plans should be developed for the period until the dedicated safe shutdown system becomes operational to assure safe shutdown can be achieved.
In addition to the plans developed for item 2 above, interim plans should be developed for restoring power to equipment required for hot shut down where redundant cables for this equipment are routed in proximity to each other and may be lost in a fire.
Material needed for repairs should be available on site.
4.
The design criteria for the electrical and instrumentation and control aspects of the dedicated safe shutdown system shculd be provided. The functional part of the design need not meet the single failure criterion.
However, the design should meet the single failure criterion with respect to those failures or inad-vertent operations that can cause accidents or transients.
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