ML19316A490
| ML19316A490 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1970 |
| From: | Cady K US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Long C US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912200744 | |
| Download: ML19316A490 (2) | |
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ATCMIC ENEFIGY COMM!S5!ON FC ~ M s ~6,,e vs l !,)-l s l*!
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20345 N
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Juhe 8, 1970
-TO FILES IllRU:
Charles G. ~ Long, Chief, PWR Project Branch 2 b (f('
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. Division of Rasctor Licensing
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REVIEW OF BAW-10014
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References:
1)
BAU-10014, " Analysis of Sustained Departure f rom Nucleate Doiling,"
August 1969.
2)
" Preliminary Review of BAU-10014," Memo to C. G. Long from K. D. Cady, September 24, 1969.
3)
Letter to Duke Power Company, Dcchet Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287, November 28, 1969.
4)
Duke Power Compcny, FSAR Supplement 1, April 20, 1970.
5)
Review of BAN-10014, Le tter to A. Sch=~er, May 1,1970.
We have revieued BAU-10Q14.1) documented this review in detail in Reference 4
3
- 2), pr2 pared ques tions 1 based on this review, received a response from the applicant,4) and sent summary conclusions to the Duke-Oconee project -
leade r. >)
Operation at sustained DNB ccn be caused by two classes of phenomena i
1) low flow caused by local obstructions, and 2) high flux caused by.a misplaced fuel element or malpositioned control rod.
BAW-10014 only addresses itself to the first of these.
Based on our review
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4 of the topica1 and the Duke Power Company responses in Supplement 1 ), we f
conclude that operation at sustained DNB, if caused by single channel ficw blockage, is unlikely to propagate to adjacent rods and that cora damage would be. limited to the fuel rods surrounding the blocked channel.
The applicant proposes only administrative ~ procedures 5) to guard against the more serious problem of misplaced fuel assemblies. We understand the Oconee I first core user three' fuel enrichments, 2.0, 2.10,4)and 2.15 a/o but the a licant has failed to verify this in his' response to-our question.
- Because of closeness of the; three more enrichments, a mis -
placed fuel assembly at BOL of.0conee I is unlikely to be serious or
-detectable.. However, later cycles and Units II ~and III present the oppor-tunia/- for a more serious misplaced assembly.
This constitutes aa unreviewed safety hazard.
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To Files 2
June 8,1970 We recommend that in-core flu:c instru:nentation be required in the Technical Specifications on Oconee, and that cn futura BS'.! plants that an analysis of t to anticipated transients, " misplaced fuel element" and
" malpositioned control rod" be required.
h,L 0,&?), ' 'l v' K. B. Cady PWR Project Branch 2 Division of Reactor Licensing cc:
R. C. DeYoung R. S. Boyd PWR Branch Chiefs R. Klecker Attorney, OGC D. F. Ross F. W. Karas (2)
Docket DRL Reading PWR-2 Reading
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