ML19316A273

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Discusses Amend to Tech Specs Requested 770301 in Response to NRC Requiring Opening Force for Reactor Intervals Vent Valves.Cladding Temps Per BAW-10103 Essentially Unaffected by Proposed Change
ML19316A273
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/05/1977
From: Parker W
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 7912050844
Download: ML19316A273 (2)


Text

M.

NRC aonu 195 u.s. nucle An atoutarony couuissioN oocxtTNuuni t

,_ JQ: glio J70/)jEds NRC DISTRIBUTION ron PART 50 DOCKET MATERidL TO:

FRCM:

oATE or DOCUMENT Duke Power Company 5/5/77 N. R. C.

Charlotte, North Carolina o47,,g e s, y, o William 0. Parker, Jr.

5/12/77

-[.E TTa n ONoTenezco enoe suruTroeu Nuueca or comics sectiveo i

htGINAL NCLAS$lplEo p gg O co,,

s DE sC nt PTION ENCLOSURE.

Ltt:. consisting of information relative to previously requested Amdt. to OL requiring opening force for the reactor 1

)

,y internals, vent vlaves equivalent to 1.0 psid.......

,g-

[(,; _. - - *..-. WdhS,[h

. nig

.b,. '

(1.p)

PLANT NAME:

Oconee Units 1 2-3 9 ~.

RJL

~.

Dh

.s

.p SAFETY F0FTA'tif 89N/IN FO RM A TION

r. tvT en ASSIGNED AD:

I t

Agnyc.-n

.,n.

ZjaANCILCliCF

  • l 5)

I SoA/4tJ#hdEP nnAncu cuTev.

dI.ROLEU_M3AGER:

I#eAG#diddi PROJECT MANAGER:

I

/ LIC. --4S ST. :

E#AWW4D LIC. ASST. :

f 3

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION I

~

SYSTEMS SAFETY I

FLA'iT SYSTEMS SITE SAFETv 5 hn l'DR HEINEMAN TEDESCO ENVIRO AAlv5TS

/ I 6'E / '2 I SCHROEDER BENAROYA DEHIDN & M T T rn

/ OELD T.ATNAR

,' / GOSSICK & STAFF ENGINEERING IPPOLJI_T_0 ENVIRO TECIT.

MIPC MA_ CARRY KTRvWOOD ERNST

_ CASE L BOSNPC BALLARD

. / HANAUER SIHVEIL l OPERATING REACTORS YOU'iC3LOOD HARLESS PAWLICKI I

STELLO I

l l

SITE TECH.

PROJECT MANAGEME!.T I

l PEACTOR SAFETY l L OPERATING TECH.

CAMMILL BOYD ROSS V1 EISEhT.,T STEPP P. COLLINS NOVAK

[j SHA0 HULMAN HOUSTON ROSZTOCZY

/) BAER PETERSON

/ CHECK b

Blfri.ER SITE ANALYSIS MELTZ

/

CRIMES VOLLMER HELTEMES AT & I BUNCH SKOVHOLT SALTZMAN

/ J.10LLINS RUTBERC l

KRECER

- EXTEHNAL DISTRitlUTION CON THOL NUMu tid LP.DR;/44@fA/W i# 4(3 NATilAB:

I BRQ0K1!AY1'LN.W-TAM-4

!kQJgg l'$

TIC:

REG _V IE ULRIKSON (ORNL) t

[NSIC:

LA PDR ASLB:,,

CoiiSULTANTS:

7713 3' 'Me

/ ACRS[(:)CYS 6/ set T M C 474 g[

DUKE POWEH CO31Pm Powen Urn _niso 422 Sorin Curucn Star.ET. CiuntoTTE. N. C. ana4a

~. o. a ca.s.

May 5, 1977

, c, p.,, c,

c.c -ec: 4. c. : 4

,i'%_ !y, p.mc. 0 r2 4:e3

,?

k a.

. - d s,

~.)

p~..-

^

d'.. **,,'f) qh Director

{C c.. N /[O. N Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

' $~;..

C' U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission p%>f Washington, D. C.

20555 f

q s

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

)i

Dear Sir:

My letter dated March 1, 1977, submitted in response to your letter of October 12, 1976, requested an amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications to provide for surveillance testing of the reactor internals vent valves. The proposed change to the Technical Specifications required opening force for the reactor internals vent valves equivalent to 1.0 psid. This change will have no significant ef fect on the peak cladding temperature during a LOCA. The large break LOCA analysis which is reported in BAW-10103, was reviewed and it was determined that, with the exception of the first 0.2 seconds of the reflooding phase of the accident, a pressure differential in excess of 1.0 psid was maintained across the vent valves. Therefore, the vent valves would remain fully open during reflooding, except for the first 0.2 seconds, even if the proposed 1.0 psid force was required. For the analysis in BAW-10103, the vent valves were always fully open.

T'us, the proposed change could only have a 0.2 second effect.

Even if it were assumed that the cladding would undergo an adiabatic heatup over the 0.2 interval, the peak cladding temperature would increase by only 7oF.

In actuality, the 0.2 second interval would be decreased by the rapid increase in upper plenum pressure which would occur with the vent valves closed. Additionally, over the 0.2 second delay, the heatup would not be adiabatic. The expected increase in cladding temperature would be only 3 F.

Thus, *he cladding temperatures reported in BAW-10103 are essentially unaffected by the proposed change.

Very truly yours, w A' ca &

William O. Parker, Jr.

MST:ge "I 3 309.,g,