ML19312E790

Forwards Request for Addl Info as Result of Review of FSAR & Editorial Comments on Sections 7.6 & 7.7.Requests That FSAR Be Amended to Reflect Responses

ML19312E790
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	05/28/1980
From:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Stampley N MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
FOIA-80-505 NUDOCS 8006090533
Download: ML19312E790 (9)

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UNITED STATES y

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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MAY 2 81980

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Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417 Mr. N. L. Stampley, Vice President Production and Engineering Mississippi Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205

SUBJECT:

REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2)

As a result of our review of the information contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units I and 2, we have rieveloped the enclosed requests for additional information.

Included are questions from the Instrumentation and Control Branch and the Containrent Systems Branch.

In addition, editorial comments on Sections 7.6 and 7.7 of the FSAR are provided.

We request that you amend your Final Safety Analysis Report to reflect your responses to the enclosed requests as soon as possible, and to infom the Licensing Project Manager, Thomas C. Houghton, of the date by which you intend to respond.

Please contact us if you desire any discussion or clarification of the enclosed requests.

Si cerely '

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' l'. t'lft/N u A. 'Schwencer, Acting Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

Requests for Additional Information ecs w/ enclosure:

See next page 8006090533

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I cc: Robert B. McGehee, Esq.

Wise, Carter, Child, Steen & Caraway P. O. Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.

Conner, Moore & Corber 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.

Washington, D. C.

20006 Mr. Adrian Zaccaria, Project Engineer Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Bechtel Power Corporation Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760 Mr. Alan R. Wagner, Resident Inspector P. O. Box 469 i

Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 1

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031.0 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 031.89 It is not clear whether or not the LPCS and LFCI injection valves 7 3.1 are interlocked to prevent them from opening tnless reactor 7.3.2 pressure is low enough for injection to be passible.

The 7.6.1 3 following indications of how the system functions were found:

T7 3-4

1) Section 7.3.1.1.1.5.7 states that "the LPCS ptnp discharge T7.3-5 valve is automatically opened up3n receipt of the initiation T7.3-8 signal."

T7 3-9

2) Section 7 3 1.1.1.6.2 lists vessel pressure transmitters as F5.4-16 part of the inst.rtmentation and controls essential for LPCI F5.4-17 operation.

F6.3-4

3) Section 7.3.1.1.1.6.4 states that the LPCI injection valves Dwgs MPL autanatically open when the nuclear systs pressure is low E12-1030 enotgh for injection to be passible.

.E12-1050

4) Section 7 3 2.1.2 3.1.8 states that the system inputs for E21-1030 LPCS and LPCI are reactor vessel low water level, high E21-1050 drywell pressure and reactor low pressure.

5) Tables 7 3-4, 5, 8, and 9 do not include any reactor pressure i

transmitters alth306h Tables 8 and 9 do indicate that the differential pressure across the injection valves is one of the trip channels required.

(It should be noted that Table 7 3-8 also indicates that LPCI B and C have three punps and three injection valves.)

6) Section 7.6.1.3.5 3 states that the pressure setpoint for RHR isolation valves are given in Section 7 3 (actually identifies Table 7 3-2 which is the table for HPCS.)

7)

Figures 5.4-16, 5.4-17, and 6.3-4 do not show any pressure

e transmitters across the injection valve; however, a pressure transmitter is shown between the injection valve and the testabla check valve. The figures indicate that pressure switches controlled by these transmitters are used in the LPCS and LPCI control circuits.

8) The RHR and LPCS vendor drawings do not show any reactor pressure interlocks on the automatic actuation of the injection valves.

The pressure switches shown en the P& ids (7 above) are shown to be permissives for manual operation of the injection valve when no automatic initiation signal is present.

Revise the appropriate documents as necessary.

In either the _,,

design criteria or the analysis section of 7 3, provide the basis on which your decision to interlock, or not interlock, the LPCS and LPCI injection valves was made.

031.90 Revise your FSAR and the appropriate drawings to remove 7.4.1.2 inconsistencies in the discussion of the Standby Liquid Control 7.4.2.2 System as follows:

F9.3-24

1) Section 7.4.1.2 states that power to the tank heaters and MPL Dwg No.

heater controls is provided from the Division 1 ESF bus.

C41-1050-R1 Drawing C41-1050, Rev 1, indicates the power is non-divisional with a note stating " Heater power shall be connectable to standby AC supply."

2) Section 7.4.1.2 states that the active components and instrument channels are redundant.

Section 7.4.2.2 states

g that the heating elements, discharge panps, pump motors, explosive valves, and tank discharge valves are redundant and that the control circuits far the " discharge pumps and motors and explosive valves" are independent (controls far tank discharge valve and heaters not mentioned).

Crawings C41-1CSO and F9 3-24 indicate that there are two heaters, a mixing heater and an operating heater, but do not give any indication that they are redundant (only the operating heater is subjected to temperature control).

In addition, the tank temperature, tank level and the injection pressure instruments are not shown to be redundant. The valve continuity monitors are not redundant since they monitor different valves.

3) Figure 9.3-24 and Section 7.4.1.2 indicates that an analog.

indication of tank temperature is provided in the tank room.

Drawing C41-1050 does not show a temperature indicator.

4)

Figure 9.3-24 shows heat traced piping associated with the SLCS that is not shown on drawing C41-1050.

The revision to the FSAR should address the design bases of the SLCS, particularly as related to the temperature environment required to assure system operability and the redundant or diverse means used to assure this environment (discussed in Section 9 3-5).

i 021.0 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Question 021.38 (6.2.1)

In Amendment 34 to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), you state that for 80P equipment, the structural response resulting from SRV actuations de-rived from the Interim Containment Load Report (ICLR), Revision 2 methodology is multiplied by a factor of 0.65, based on the results of the Caorso SRV tests.

We will need more than a simple comparison between the predicted and measured 1

results at Caorso to justify a reduction in the desion SRV structural loads for Grand Gulf since there are significant differences in the physical parameters (e.g., the air volume in the SRV discharge lines) between Caorso and Grand Gulf.

Therefore, to use the Caorso test data to support a reduction in the SRV bubble peak amplitudes for Grand Gulf, these data should be combined with the original test data used to develop the loads described in the GE topical report NED0-11314-08. The statistical techniques outlined in this topical report can then be used to prescribe the new SRV design loads. The details of this calculation should be submitted to us for our review.

o INFORMAL EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON SECTIONS 7.6 6 7.7 0F GRAND GULF FSAR 7.6.1.3.3.6 Last sentence implies that sensor is in a different ESF division than its cable.

7.6.1.4.4 No text is provided under this heading.

7.6.2.4.2.1 RG 1.22 - First sentence infers that design performs the pe riodic tes ts.

7. 6. 2. 4.~2. 2 Criterion 30 - The word "also" indicates that other Icak detection systems are the primary basis of the analysis.

All the applicable systems should be identified using subsystem nomenclature of 7.6.1.4 Criterion 33 -.The analysis does not appear to address the criterion, but the criterion does not appear applicable to leak detection.

7.6.1.5.3 5 4 FSAR says preamps are outside drywell (SRM) and inside containment (IRM) but prints (C51-1070) show all preamps outside contain-ment.

7.6.1.6.3 The parenthetical comments contradict the stated number of allowable bypasses.

7.6.2.8.1 Last sentence of second paragraph is true for stop valve, but only one-third of the time for control valves.

7.6.2.8.2 Paragraph 4.7 - The last sentence is un-necessary.

Paragraph 4.19

"... is addition..." ?

Paragraph 4.21

" Repair sensors and..."

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RG 1.47 - 7.1.5.3 should be 7.5.1.3 4

Criterion 29 - Redundant endings.

7.6.1.10.6 believe the CCW and SSW are redundant rather than diverse, particularly since the CCW must transfer its heat to the SSW.

7.6.1.11.9 Design Basis No. 3 - Table 7.6-11 does not show location of sensors.

2 7.6.2.12.1 First sentence - Reference to 7.3.2 is wrong or you are not talking about "all sa fe ty-related systems."

7.~6.2.12.2 Paragraph f -

would feel better if you deleted the second sentence of first paragraph.

Paragraph h - It would read better if first sentence were omitted.

Paragraph 1 - The reference section is short enough to repeat here.

Paragraph m "Wherever..."

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T7.6-2 Heading error - last two columns.

T7.6-10 ESF division assignment for fuel pool heat exchanger SSW inlet / outlet valves is incon-sistent.

' T7.6-12 Sheet 1 - Shouldn't PS2-F221 B have a pilot valve?

Sheet 2 - No ESF division noted for G33-F235.

F7.6-11 What unit of length does a degree symbol represent?

F7.6-12 Figure is not clear on what contacts are used in the protective circuit.

Is it the contacts of the unidentified relay?

7.7.1.1.3.1.6

" Seal" should be " seat" in title.

7.7.1.1.5.3 Second paragraph - Reference chart is not included on Figure 7.7-1.

7.7.1.2.3.2.1.1 The "each millisecond" quoted in third para-graph appears to disagree with "0.2 milli-seconds" quoted in paragraph 5 and shown on F7.7-3.

7.7.1.2.3.2.1.4 Last paragraph appears to be out of place 3

(should be part of 7.7.1.2.3.2.1.2).

7.7.1.2.5.2 First paragraph - Table 7.7-1 does not contain as much "information" as implied.

7.7.1.3.1.1 Second paragraph

" recirculation flow control valves low frequency M-G (LFMG) set" missing punctuation?

Also, second sentence is unclear; is " automatic operation" really the only mode that can be used above 25% power?

- s.

3 7.7.1.3.3.1 Reference to Figure 7.7-5 in paragraph I seems premature; it should be at the end of the third paragraph.

7.7.1.3.3.4.3 First sentence of second paragraph doesn' t make any sense.

Should " core flux" be " core flow"?

7.7.1.3.3.4.8 It is not clear what the limiter does as a result of the last sentence.

Doesn't the limiter stop and hold the valve at the current position when the permissive is not s a t is fied?

7.7.1.3.5.2 Second paragraph - Figure 7.5-1 appears to be a worthless reference for this discussion.

7.7.1.4.5.1 Last paragraph implies that reactor shutdown alone will stop water level from dropping.

7.7.1.7.3.1 Bottom of page 7.7-40

" processes the same characteristics"

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7.7.1.9.3.1 It is not cicar whether "(higher signal)"

means more or less differential since differential is quoted as negative.

7.7.2.2.2 Paragraph b - The RC 5 IS is the reactivity control system?

7.7.2.3.2 Paragraph c - The statement does not address GDC 26.

T7.7-2 Typo

" Charcoal Beds 3as outlet temperatures"

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