ML19312E719
| ML19312E719 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/28/1978 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19312E711 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-08-80-338, CON-NRC-8-80-338 SECY-78-365, NUDOCS 8006090437 | |
| Download: ML19312E719 (55) | |
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HRC STAFF ANALYSIS HEALTH AND SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS E
REACTOR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS June 28, 1978 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wasnington, D.C.
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NRC STAFF
- ANALYSIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY (H&S)
CONSIDERATIONS IN REACTOR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS June 28, 1978 I.
INTRODUCTION Under current laws, the export of production and ut11iration facilities from the U.S. requires a determination by the NRC that the exports (1) would meet statutory export criteria ** and be subject to an agreement for cooperation with the recipient country;*** and (2) would not be inimical to the common defense and security or constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety (H&S) of the public (of the United States).
Public health and safety implications at foreign sites where U.S. nuclear exports are to be utili:ed are not now explicitly taken into account in the export licensing process. 9er are any health and safety requirements included in export licenses. However, the Commission has concerned itself with foreign health and safety issues within the framework of bilateral
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and multilateral cooperative assistance programs.
The United States
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government, as one of the originators of a highly complex technology which requires careful regulation to avoid adverse impacts on public health In this report, tne term " staff" means the staff of the Executive Director for Operations plus the Office of the General Counsel and the Office of Policy Evaluation.
These criteria are set forth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), which amends the Atcmic Energy Act of 1954.
- The terms " recipient country" and " developing country" are used in this report to mean a country that is currently embarking on a program of con-struction of nuclear pcwer plants, and has a need for advice and assistance in H&S regulation of these plants. These countries are not necessarily among those identified as "less developed ccuntries" (LOC) by the IAEA.
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anc safety, has an interest in satisfying itself that tne technology i s transferred under circumstances which indicate that it can be safely utilized.
Moreover, the experience of foreign countries has a direct bearing on the utilization of nuclear power within the United States.
Information transmitted to the United States by these countries on foreign health and safety issues and the operating experience of reactors based on U.S. designs has been factored into the Ccmmission's regulatory process.
For these reasons NRC has followed a policy of conducting a number of health and safety activities designed to assist countries which import U.S.
nuclear commodities, and U.S. nuclear vendors have assisted recipients in building and operating plants safely.
Several of the recipient countries have requested additional NRC L21 stance in carrying out their H&S responsibilities.
Scme members of Congress and public interest groups, both foreign and dcmestic, have raised questions about U.S. Governnent responsibilities in H&S aspects of nuclear exports and called for explicit consideration of H&S issues in export licensing.' During the past three years the NRC has developed its legal and policy position on the foreign health and safety issue in two formal opinions issued in licensing proceedings involving challenges by intervenor groups to proposed export licenses.
Also, this f
position was arrived at, in part, after analyzing staff policy papers 1
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3 addressing tha nature and scope of NRC's safety cooperation pregrams with other countries and international organi:ations such as the Inter-national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The Commission's view of its foreign H&S authority in the export context is set forth in its Tarapur (India) nuclear fuel decision of May 7,1976,*
ano its Burgeraktion decision of June 27, 1977,**
both holding that regulation of foreign health and safety matters is the responsibility of tne recipient country.
In response to increasing interest both inside and outside the Government, the Ccmmission requested the Export Study Group to analy:e the feasibility of incorporating health and safety considerations into the export licensing process (Ref.1).
The Ccmmission directed the Group to examine possible approaches to safety regulation of reactor exports and the extent to which, as a matter of policy, it might be desirable to give regulatory attention j
to health and safety of individual exports. The Ccemission also recuested analysis and policy recommendations regarding NRC's nuclear H&S assistance Both of these program to countries initiating nuclear power programs.
requests are addressed in this report.
In the Matter of Edlow International Co., 3 NRC 563 (1976).
In :ne Matter of Gaococx ana wilcox, 5 NRC 1332 (1977).
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THE H&S ISSUE The nuclear H&S practices and regulatory capabilities in countries importing US nuclear reactor equipment have increasingly become a focus of attention of the Executive Branch and the Commission, primarily because of increased worldwide attention on nuclear health and safety matters, and the increasing number of less-developed countries embarking upon nuclear power progrcms, most utili:ing U.S.-supplied reactors and comconents. This trend marks a departure from the past, when U.S. nuclear commodities were exported primarily to advanced, industrialized nations.
In contrast to the advanced nations, most of wh'ich have nuclear regulatory organizations similar to our own, though generally on a smaller scale and wit less separation between regulatory and development functions, most developing countries today enter the nuclear power age lacking a well-established regulatory capability.
Several factors have an impact on the safe operation of nuclear plants in ceveloping countries:
A.
S ta f fi ng.
Many countries currently embarking on nuclear power programs, although concerned about H45 matters, lack the technical and management experience and expertise required to establish and staff an indigenous safety organization. This is frequently related to budgetary limita-tions and other national priorities.
In some cases the importance of establishing a competent regulatory authority at an early stage of a 3
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country > s nuclear program may not be adequately appreciated by officials of the recipient government.*
3.
Multiole sucoliers.
For economic or other reasons, plant ccmponents and systems are often purchased from multiple suppliers, and imported systems and ccmponents are ccmbined with those produced locally.
Design integration of such plants must therefore be done by the pl ant owner, or for him, by an organization other than that of the U.S. exporter.
Thus, except in the case of turnkey projects, management of the design integration effort often beccmes the responsibility of the rather inexperienced utility organization of the developing country.
(The utilities of developing countries often maka effective use of inter-national architectural engineering companies in this project management effort.)
In some cases, the limited safety resources available within a country may be concentrated in the electric utility organization (often a government-owned enterprise) while the national regulatory organization is being organized and staffed.
However, the IAEA Code of Practice on Governmental Organization for the Reculation of Nuclear Power Plants states (Sec l.2)
'it is regaroea as essential tnat the government of a tiember State embarking on or implementing a nuclear power programme establish a regulatory body."
Describing the role and responsibility of the regulatory body, the Code provides:
Owing to the differing constitutional and legal systems and the varied experiences of the Member States, the regulatory body may also be established and authorized to operate witnin a govern-mental bcdy bearing responsibilities, for example, in such fields as heal th and safety, environnental protection and security.
When the regulatory body is established within a greater govern-mental unit, it should nevertheless be instituted as a functionally autoncmous body within that greater unit and its independence in I
i evaluating safety or environmental protection issues should not be ccmprcmised.
(Sec. 2.1.3)
6 C.
Evolutions in desion.
It may be difficult, during the 6-10-year ceriod between plant purchase and time of plant commissioning, for inexperienced, understaffed organizations in the developing country to keep informed cf changes in safety provisions that arise due to design evolution in similar plants and to evaluate the significance of these changes as applied to their own situation.
D.
rifferences in site characteristics.
Since each reactor site is different, speciai consideration must be given for each site to such factors as seismic. design, flood protection, ambient temperature and wind conditions, i
and cooling water sources.
Indigenous technical staff is often not well equipped to perform all aspects of the work, and foreign consultants are nct always familiar with local site conditions.
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These observat' ions are consistent with conclusions of some recently published papers, including two papers presented by an IAEA staff specialist in nuclear safety (Ref. 2,3), and other material presented at the March 6-10,1978 IAEA
" International Symposium on Problems Associated with the Export of Nuclear Power Plants."
Another expert (Ref.4), suggested that top foreign govern-mtnt officials have to be made aware of the need to solicit periodic indepen-dent outside evaluations of their regulatory organizations as a means of
' spotting deficiencies and taking corrective action.
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7 Although these deficiencies exist, from discussions conducted by the Ccmmission's Office of International Programs (OIP), it accears that nuclear energy authorities recognize their responsibility to protect the public H&S. Recipient countries generally take advantage of assistance provided, and their level of regulatory comoetence rises as a result of that assistance. This suggests that assistance can be an effective means of accomplishing H&S objectives.
III.
THE STATUTORY CONTEXT The legal framework which sets forth tne NRC export licensing respon-sibilities is contained in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (EFA). A June 1977 report to the Commission (SECY 77-280), prepared by the Export Study Group, concluded that neither of these two Acts requires the Commission to establish
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health, safety or environmental standards governing the use of nuclear exports in the recipient country, or to assess site-specific foreign impacts associated with exported materials and facilities.*
The Export Study Group found that while the AEA and ERA are not precise i
on the point, the underlying legislative histories revealed "... no Congressional intent that the Commission should establish health and safety standards for exports, review exports on H&S grounds, or other-wise assess the health, safety, or ervironmental impacts of exports."
- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), which amended the AEA, does n'ot alter the Study Group conclusion.
8 Also relevant is the long-standing AEC and NRC acministrat ve oractice i
of not. considerinq foreign H&S matters in the licensing conti xt.*
There is some legislative history on this point associated wit.t 'he NNPA of 1978 which may have some limited value in assessing what Congress intends in this area. The Act does not incorporate recommendations made in Congressional testimony (Ref. 5) that nuclear export licensing should include a complete foreign H&S analysis.
There are limits, however, to interpreting a statute on the basis of What Congress failed to include in it. What is clear is that any legal obligation to conduct foreign H&S reviews would thus have to be based en Federal stat"tes other than the Connission's own organic statutes. The most imoortant of these other acts is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).
The primary focus of NEPA is on the US domestic environment.
Section 102(2)(F) of that Act also directs the Federal agencies to " recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment." Other i
language in the Act and its legislative history encourage the recognition of the " global character of ecological relationships.""*
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- In the Matter of Edlow International Comoany, 3 NRC 563 (1976).
In the Matter of Babcoch & Wilcox, 5 NRC 1332 (1977).
- See, for example, the stateme7t of Senator Jackson during floor debates on NEPA (115 Cong, Rec. 29082, Oct. 8,1969).
9 In September 1976, the Council on Enviret.nental quality (CEO), whose interpretation of NEPA has normally been accorded great weight by the courts and other Federal agencies, contended that the impact statement requirement of NEPA Section 102(2)(C) applied to all Federal actions significantly affecting the environment, regardless of whether the impact occurred within the'U.S., the global commons, or within the territorial jurisdiction of foreign nations.
On January 11, 1978, pursuant to E.O.11991, the CEQ issued a set of draft regulations (currently under interagency review) for implementing NEPA which wculd clearly extend NEPA's scope to include "Significant Environmental Effects Not Confined to the U.S."
The Commission staff and individual Commissioners have forwarded comments to CEQ on this proposal, which continues to be a matter of active debate by affected Federal agencies and the Congress.
After carefully reviewing the legislative history and judicial deci-sions on the subject of NEPA's foreign reach, the Export Study Group determined that the most reasonable interpretation of NEPA is that NEPA requires only an assessment of domestic and to the extent feasible, global impacts. The U.S. should encourage and,' if recuested, assist the recipient nation in analyzing foreign impacts. The Study Group concluded that the policy considerations which are analyzed in SECY 77-280 establ-!sh that assessments of foreign imcacts of US nuclear export licensing activities.should not be made.
In Edlow International (Taracur),
3 NRC 563, 582 (1976), the Commission noted that "...it would be extra-ordinary, as a matter of international law, to conclude that we had
10 authority to address ourselves to, or attempt to regulate (health anc safety.) matters so clearly domestic to the Indian nation and within the purview of its own regulatory responsibilities." The same basic stand was reiterated in connection with the export license proceeding on a proposed reactor sale to the Federal Republic of Germany (Babcock and Wilcox, 5 NRC 1332,1353). The Department of State's position on this matter, reflected in its May 31, 1977, letter to James R. Shea of NRC, was that "any U.S. attempt to make site-specific assessments of envircnmental impacts within the territory of another country we' ld u
have major, adverse pol 4*ical consequences."
While Section 102(2)(F) does not mandate any specific agency activities, it requires some effort on the Commission's part in this regard, to the extent " appropriate" and " consistent with the foreign policy of the U.S."
While the law does not impose an obligation on NRC to assess foreign H&S matters, Nic has fulfilled the mandate of Section 102(2)(F)
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by initiating and participating in numerous programs designed to assist countries which import U.S. nuclear facilities and materials in protecting the health and safety of their populations.
IV.
CURRENT NRC H&S ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS The NRC, pursuant to its NEPA obligations and existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation arrangements, exchanges nuclear H&S infor-mation with other countries, and encourages both adoption of H&S standards and establishment and improvement of safety and regulatory d
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11 practices by foreign governments. This effort is part of the overail U.S. Government program for assistance to countries newly emoarking on nuclear power programs. Agreements for cooperation between the U.S.
and individual foreign countries and groups of countries pursuant to AEA Section 123, provide the legal framework for nuclear and a basis for cooperation on many aspects of nuclear power H&S.
exports Although these government-to-government agreements for cooperation do not require exchanges of H&S information, the NRC currently has agency-
'o-agency " agreements" or " arrangements".with 15 countries, including ive countries presently embarking on nuclear power programs (Brazil, Korea, Republic of China, Israel, and Iran), which provide for the exchange of regulatory and safety research information and for other other cooperation and assistance projects.
In addition, arrangements with the philippines, Mexico, Egypt, Greece, and Yugoslavia are under discussion at this time.
As part of these exchanges, the NRC provides notification of its decisions affecting design and operation of reactor types similar to those exported; analyses of problems similar to those encountered abroad, if requested; and copies of NRC standards, criteria and other H&S documentatica.
The agreements thus offer a framework for providing a significant amount of safety assistance and advice to countries embarking on the construction and operation of LWRs.
The staff believes that such cooperative arrangements should be entered into with the regulatory agencies of all countries with active nuclear energy programs.
12 NRC also arranges for representatives of foreign regulatory organizatiens to be assigned to the NRC technical staff to work with NRC safety experts for periods of from four months to two years to cain exoerience in safety and regulatory matters.
Representatives of developing countries also attend 1-3 week NRC training courses on a range of regulatory subjects such as inspection procedures, analysis technicues, and nuclear power plant design and operation.
Foreign observers also accompany NRC inspectors on inspection tours of U.S. nuclear facilities.
In adcition, about 500 foreign nuclear safety officials, of whom about 15% are from developing countries, visit NRC annually, primarily for detailed technical discussions of safety analyses performed by the NRC staff.
Senior representatives of foreign H&S organizations also visit the Commission and senior NRC staff.
In addition to these broad-based foreign safety assistance activitics, NRC has recently received requests for bilateral H&S assistance on selected subjects from several countries. NRC has agreed to assist these governments, within the limits of available resources, both under existing bilateral arrangements and in coordination with the i
efforts of other advanced nuclear countries within the IAEA program.
To date, the NRC has not entered into contracts to furnish safety services, because of resource limitations and because these services can be adequately provided by commercial firms, among other reasons.
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13 Other U.S. riovernment agencies have also participated with the NRC in multilateral assistance programs.
Interagency activities have been aimed at assisting the IAEA to plan and implement procrans in the areas of health, safety and environmental protection.
U.S.
Government contributions have included training in safety matters by staff members of NRC and other agencies, dissemination of technical reports on health, safety and environmental matters issued by various U.S. Government agencies, participation in international conferences, paneis, seminars and working groups on a wide range of safety and re9ulatory topics, and recruitment and assignment of safety experts, including NRC staff members, to serve as IAEA advisors in developing countries.
Reccamendations by the U.S. and several other nations have promoted the IAEA to undertake a significant effort to provide expanded power reactor safety advice and assistance to developing countries.
The IAEA Board of Governors approved in September 197a a program to develop codes of practice and safety guides for nuclear power plants, and established a Senior Advis'ory Group (SAG) to guide this work.
Technical Review Connittees were set up in five subject areas:
Governmental Organization for the Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants; Nuclear Power Plant Siting; Safety Criteria for Safe Reactor Design and Construction; Safety Operation of Nuclear Power Plants; and Quality Assurance of Nuclear Power Plants. Codes of practice for each of the five areas have been essentially comoleted, and work is e
14 progressing on over half of the approximately fifty proposed safety guides (about 35 are presently in draft form).
NRC has been the lead U.S. agency in this work.
NRC staff members also participate in IAEA reactor safety missions.
Typically these involve 4'-5 safety specialists from various countries, who visit developing countries for periods of 1-5 weeks to advise on safety matters related to siting, construction and operation of power reactors.
Tour criteria are generally applied to uecide the priority which NRC should accord to participation in a given safety mission abroad (SECY 76-189A):
(1) Is it a U.S.-supplied reactor?
(2) Would experience gained by the safety mission have some applicability to U.S. domestic safety problems?
(3) Can the NRC provide a unique type of expertise, and (4) Is NRC manpower available?
The Coamission has also expressed interest'in adding a fifth criterion aimed at ensuring that the assistance would'not be misconstrued by the recipient country as substituting for a sound and fully supported indigenous safety program. The Commission has requested the staff to consider what steps should be taken, ptehi;! is a condition of NRC's continuing participation in IAEA reactor safety missions, to ensure that IAEA and NRC assistance efforts add to, rather than substitute for, the best efforts of the country being assisted.
Several possible formulations of assurances that NRC might request 9
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15 have been considered (SECY 77-390).
The staff believes that the assistance measures recommended in this paper, escecially Alternative 2, would provide constructive means of ensuring that adequate f
indigenous attention will be devoted to H&S matters. Within this framework, the U.S. Government could also make clear, whenever assistance is given, that'it is intended to assist, and not replace, indigenous H&S efforts.
l IAEA technical assistance efforts also include such activities as the assignment of experts for up to 2-year tours of duty in developina countries.
For example, through IAEA's technical assistance program, the NRC has furnished experts to Mexico, Korea, and the Philippines.
Their duties include, among others, providing advice to national regulatory authorities on the startup of their power reactor programs.
Other assignments are being arranged through the IAEA for Iran, Mexico, Bra:il, and Korea.
These long-term assignments are described in SECY 77-153.
NRC participation in IAEA-sponsored training courses also includes supplying experts to lecture on regulatory practices and assistanca in the development of course curricula.
In April-May 1975, for instance, NRC hosted for the third time an IAEA co-sponsored three-week orientation course on the principles and practices of nuclear energy regulation. NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research annually hosts a Water Reactor Safety Research Information Meeting.
Each of these meetings has been attended by more than 100 representatives
16 of foreign governments, industry and universities.
Also, in Feeruary of 1978, NRC hosted a seminar for specialists from 26 foreign countries and international organi:ations on safety aspects of increasinc s;ent fuel storage capacity.
The, following is a summary of the more important assistance programs and associated levels of current NRC effort:
A.
Participation in IAEA's multiyear progr3m to develop codes of practice and safety guides for nuclear power plants (4-5 manyears/
year).
B.
Providing staff experts to serve on IAEA reactor safety missions (0.5 manyear/ year).
i C.
Hosting or participating in IAEA safety training courses or safety seminars (0.5 manyear/ year).
D.
Providing staff experts to serve as IAEA reactor safety consultants i
for periods of 1-3 months in developing countries (0.5 manyear/ year).
E.
Relearing staff experts to serve directly with the IAEA in Vienna, or as IAEA safety advisors on 1-2 year technical assictance assignments in developing countries.
(Three NRC staff members are currently assigned, ona each to Mexico and Korea, and one to the Philippines; another has been nominated for Iran.)*
o These 1-2 year assignments are not included in the manyear estimates shown herein for current NRC H&S activities, because during the assignments the incumbents are not counted against NRC personnel ceiling, and salaries are paid by IAEA. Only minor fringe benefits are paid by NRC (See SECY 77-153).
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Providing staff excerts to attend meetings of IAEA advisory groups or consultants, usually in Vienna, on reactor safety issues or programs (0.5 canyear/ year).
G.
Conducting bilateral information exchanges under formal agreements
(:urrently, of the countries now embarking on atomic power programs, exchange arrangements are in effect with Korea, Brazil, Iran, Israel, and the Republic of China (ROC); arrangements are under discussion with Egypt, Mexico, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Philippines).
H.
Admission of foreign regulatory personnel te.1-3 week NRC training courses conducted by IE, and spec'2., arseas presentation of NRC ccurses (Mexico, Spain, Philippines, Israel, ROC and Korea).
I.
Assignment of foreign regulatory employees to positions on the NRC staff for periods of four months to two years (Spain, Israel, Korea, Philippines, Mexico and Turkey).
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Bilateral consultations on regulatory planning or technical issues (Mexico, Korea, Iran, Philippines, Spain, Egypt, Israel, and ROC).
The activities mentioned above total approximately nine manyears/ year of effort, about half of which is concentrated in the IAEA safety standards program.
In the planning and execution of this assistance, emphasis is p aced on measures that assist the developing countries in imoroving their regulatory capabilities and encourage wider acceptance of uniform and high-cuality safety standards and regulatory practices, rather than en measures that might supplant indigenous effort.
18 It is as yet t:0 early to assess precisely the effects of these efforts to uograde the H&S capabilities of local regulatory bodies.
However, it is clear that the assistance provided by the U.S. Govern-ment, by other countries, and by the IAEA has had a beneficial impact in raising the level of attention devoted to safety matters in developing countries, in increasing the number of people with safety expertise, and in helping developing countries to establish regulatory organi:ations and solve particular safety problems.
(For a developing country with a small reactor construction procram, always having 2 or 3 persons in speciali:ed U.S. or IAEA training, on 1-2 year assignments over the entire 6-10 year period prior te reactor startup, can add up to a significant cadre of trained personnel.)
Efforts are underway in the IAEA to evaluate safety measures in developing countries.
For example, a section of each IAEA safety mission report now is devoted to a critique of the adequacy of the national safety program of the country visited. However, these reports, which sometimes contain critical observations and recomendations, are generally given limited distribution (only within IAEA headquarters and to the visited country). The IAEA does not have authority to require recipient countries to accept and implement its safety recomendations, except in cases where IAEA assistance is provided in the form of supply of materials or equipment. For these Agency-assisted projects
- there is-a firm basis for the agency to require Of the 22 Agency-assisted reactor projects in the past 17 years, only two (Yugoslavia and Mexico) have been power reactor projects.
(The remainder involved research reactors.)
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19 that One recipients comply with the safety provisions and guiding arincioles set forth in its It1FCIRC/18/Rev.1 (Safety Standards and "easures).
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MULTILATERAL VERSUS BILATERAL ASSISTAtlCE Most of NRC's assistance to date has been provided through multilateral programs, especially those of the IAEA. Working with and through the IAEA offers several advantages:
A.
The legal, political and administrative framework for IAEA programs is nell defined.
3.
IAEA is able to plan, screen, and set priorities in its assistance program.
It is also able to coordinate safety assistance worldwide to ensure that fair and balanced assistance is provided to all member states requiring it.
This frees flRC from the need to make such determinations and provides a useful buffer between t4RC and the recipient courttries.
In addition, the multilateral character of IAEA assistance is politically more acceptable to certain nations than direct U.S. assistance.
C.
flRC's cooperation with,and support of IAEA assistance programs help maintain the prestige and effectiveness of the IAEA.
This is consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives.
D.
NRC's participation in IAEA activities is integrated, with the assistance of the Department of State and the Department of Energy, into other U.S. programs, commitments and foreign policy.
(For example, 00E expends 1-2 manyears/ year to coordinate contributions of various U.S. agencies to IAEA.)
20 E.
IAEA or USAID funds are often made available for NRC travel anc other expenses associated with IAEA assistance activities.
Some NRC assistance programs, however, are better handled on a bilateral basis (c ordinated with other U.S. agencies, as appropriate).
A.
If assistance is straightforward and simple to provide, IAEA involvement may beceme a delaying or complicating factor.
(At times, countries requesting NRC assistance have expressed preference for direct bilateral arrangements because of this concern.
However, in cases where
requesting country provides the funding to pay for the assistance, experience has shown that the IAEA can process such requests reasonably promptly.)
B.
In cases involving information exchanges or other negotiable elements, a bilateral cuid pro cuo arrangement may be easier to establish and implement.
C.
Bilateral assistance enables NRC (and the U.S.) to have greater control over the details.
The staff believes that existing bilateral and multilateral nuclear safety assistance programs have made useful. contributions to the nuclear H&S capabilities of developing countries, and should, at a minimum, be continued at their present NRC staffing level of nine manyears/ year.
(Twelve manyears/ year when fully implemented.)
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21 VI.
H&S ASSISTANCE BY OTHER ADVANCE 0 COUNTRIES France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Sweden are also exporting LWR's.
It has been reported that these exporting c:untries assist recipient countries in regulatory reviews and other safety activities.
The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) and j
the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AE0I) reportedly have entered into an agreement.under which UKAEA would perform such services for AE0I. These internaticnal agreements are mentioned in two papers presented at the IAEA International Symposium on Problems Associated with Export of Nuclear Pcwer Plants, previously cited.
One of tnese papers (Ref. 6) makes a brief reference to FRG expert assistance to AE0I in licensing matters.
Except for this single reference, it appears that the assistance reported as being rendered to regulatory authorities by exporting countries is being provided by either commercial organizations or purely ccmmercial elements of national atcmic energy agencies--in other words, the kind of assistance that can be purchased frem any of several U.S. architectural engineering companies.* In fact, these papers indicate that U.S. AE firms are emoloyed in parallel with these national-ccmmercial firms of the exporting countries.
It appears that AE0I has employed the UKAEA under just such a commercial arrangement, apparently using the UKAEA almost interchangeably with U.S. commercial firms.
Although
- Commercial AE firms may not exist in scme other countries, where such services are often a government monopoly.
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22 other ex;crtinc countries also cooperate at a government level in the IAEA technical assistance program, and the staff has heard recorts of French and German government bilateral safety cooperation with imoorting governments, the staff believes that most of the safety assistance is being done on a purely commercial basis, and is equivalent to what can be purchased from U.S. firms.
The NRC does not make its services available to developing countries on a purely reimbursable basis.
Such services are available from U.S. and foreign AE contractors, and the staff believes that NRC shouip not become a competitor in such commercial activities.
Furthermore, NRC should give its assistance, consistent with U.S.
foreign policy objectives, in an even-handed manner to all countries that need such services, regardless of any offers to pay.
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VII.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER NRC EFFORTS NRC could do more to improve the scope and quality of H&S programs abroad. The present NRC program, described above, has been limited by manpower constraints imposed by higher-priority domestic activities.
Several alternative H&S programs have been examined for possible inclusion in NRC's foreign H&S effort. These alternatives include expanded bilateral and multilateral assistance efforts and H&S approaches which would be accomplished via the export licensing process.
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23 A.
Evaluacion Criteria For ourposes of this analysis, the staff adopted the folicwing criteria for evaluating the relative utility and attractiveness of H&S initiatives:
1.
Legal authority or basis for implementing the program.
2.
H&S benefits to recipients, including development of indigenous capabilities.
3.
Impact on the present export licensing program.
4.
Foreign policy implications, including acceptability to foreign governments.
5.
Estimated costs to NRC.
6.
Impact on U.S. nuclear industry and dcmestic regulatory programs.
7.
Implementation difficulties.
3.
Evaluation of Alternatives 1.
Alternative 1:
Excand Current Assistance procram A one-third increas'a in the current H&S program has been evaluated
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favorably under the above criteria. The staff has concluded tnat NRC's presen't assistance programs could materially benefit from this 4.5 myrs/yr increase in suppart. A 4.5 myrs/yr increase in NRC manpower, resulting in a total NRC effort of around 16.5 myrs/yr, could result in a substantive expansion in the breadth and depth of coverage of these programs, thereby significantly increasing the benefits to the recipients. As with all other NRC assistance, this expanded program would be carefully coordinated with other U.S.
agencies and other ongoing programs (U.S. and IAEA).
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24 The increased efforts could be allocated as follows:
a.
Excanded NRC support for IAEA reactor safety missions and individual consultant assignments abroad (about 2 myrs/yr).
(Section IV, B and D, above.)
b.
Expanded NRC support for additional safety training opportunities, either in the U.S. or through special missions abroad (about 2 myrs/yr).
(Section IV, C and H, above.)
c.
Increased support of IAEA safety and regulatory training programs (about 0.5 myr/yr, plus, with Congressional authorization, possible financial support of IAEA's training course at Argonne National Laboratory).
(Section IV, C, above.)
As noted in Section VII, above, the current foreign H&S assistance program, even when fully implemented, has not been allowed to i~nterfere with domestic programs.
It is anticipated that the additional 4.5 myrs/yr would sometimes result in minor delays in NRC's domestic programs, because tne increase in scope and nature of assistance efforts might octasionally demand key NRC expertise which cannot be provided simply by new hiring. More extensive increases in current NRC bilateral and multilateral efforts would have increased impact on NRC's other activities.
This first alternative proposes a relatively low level of increase of NRC manpower commitment, which would have a minimal impact on NRC domestic activities. The staff believes that before making
(
any additional contribution, the U.S. should explore diplomatically f
the possibility of eliciting similar contributions from other i
countries.
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25 2.
Alternative 2:
U.S. Initiative in the IAEA While various agencies of the U.S. Government have devoted significant efforts over the years to the improvement of foreign H&S programs, these efforts have been expended to some extent in an ad hoc fashion, often as a byproduct of cther U.S. nuclear energy assistance programs (e.g., the Atoms for Peace Program). The total U.S.
effort could benefit from a more structured and integrated interagency approach. Alternative 2 proposes early develocment of an interagency action plan to improve H&S in developing countries, akin to the action plan for improving IAEA safeguards recently produced by an interagency effort. This H&S action plan would include a ccmprehensive set of approaches for the U.S. to take within the IAEA to upgrade national H&S programs.
At present, highest IAEA priority in the safety area is being given to manpower training and to developing a comprehensive set of IAEA safety guides for nuclear power plants.
The staff believes that greater emphasis should be placed on the application of IAEA's
~~
standards by developing countries and to other direct IAEA action, in accordance with INFCIRC/lS.
This would assure strong safety and regulatory oversight of power reactor projects.
In May 1978, with NRC staff encouragement, comments to this effect were made to the IAEA by the U.S. Mission in Vienna during meetings to consider the IAEA budget for 1979 and the proposed IAEA program for 1978-84 These U.S. comments expressed a need.for an IAEA plan or program to help developing countries to develop sound indigenous regulatory programs and to build and safsiy operate
26 nuclear ::ower plants despite their initial lack of experience.
Alternative 2 proposes building on this start.
The U.S. mignt ask, for examole, that the IAEA staff and interested Aember States embark on a formal effort to develop and implement a safety improvement program. The following examples illustrate the kind of actions that could be advocated by the U.S.:
a.
Establishing an IAEA program for upgrading national safety programs, which would encourage and coordinate the contributions of other countrics, as well as those of the U.S.
The program would be integrated and coordinated with IAEA's reactor safety standards and nuclear energy training programs.
b.
Within tnis framework, intensifying efforts to promote the establishment of competent nucleaP regulatory authorities in all nations having nuclear programs, and to promote and assist in the adoption and implementation by these authorities of acceptable nuclear standards and regulations.
(This would provide also a basis for implementing the intent of Alternative 6, should one wish to do so.)
c.
Requiring that countries give assurances to the IAEA about tneir safety programs as a condition of eligibility for any new IAEA assi.itance.*
d.
Providing increased IAEA safety missions and training and other advisory assistance to developing countries.
- The Foreword of all IAEA Safety Codes and Guides stated that member countries
. wishing to enter into agreements for assistance with the IAEA will be required to follow tne relevant parts of the Codes and Guides. However, as noted earlier, except in the case of Agency-assisted Projects, there is no existing mechanism for deteriai'ig whether or not the assisted country does in fact implement this cor.ai*. ion.
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27 e.
Requiring the IAEA to make available to Member States an evaluation of national safety programs scmewhat akin to the evaluation of safeguards in the Special Safeguards Implementation Report.
f.
Requiring that the Director General report to the Board of Governors on the adequacy of national safety programs, with IAEA assistance to each count;y perhaps conditioned on the government's demonstrated support of its national safety program, including responsible follow-uo action on any problems identified by the IAEA safety missions,* and further requiring the Director General to report to the Board of Governors, on a country-specific basis, any serious deficiencies which have occurred.
(It should be noted that items e and f would probably require amendment of the Agency Sqatute, a cumbersome and lengthy process, or agreenent of all of the Member States.)
Adoption of these steps would provide the U.S. w th better informaticn than at present about H&S problems abroad.
To encourage action, J
the U.S. could offer significant assistance and funding and encourage other advanced countries to do likewise. One possible source of increased U.S. funding is an IAEA trust fund of Si million,
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- This can be accomplished when a reactor or its fuel is provided through the IAEA.
INFCIRC/18/Rev. I obligates a Member State to apply IAEA or equivalent safety standards to the c.ctivity, to submit to the IAEA timely information necessary for assessing the effectiveness of the safety measures, and to provide to the IAEA a description of the safety organi., Men and administrative system set up to evaluate and ensure the safety of " e activity.
The IAEA makes on-site visits (safety missions) to observe the safety programs and to pursue problem areas.
+
28 per year for five years, announced by Ambassador Young in :ne United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (S500) on June 9,1975.
The fund was established,in part, to provide assistance in nuclear " safety,... and environmental protection for pcwer reactors." The U.S. would first seek to obtain the support of the IAEA staff and the other Member States, including increased technical assistance contributions of other advanced countries.
The NRC staff believes that expansion of the present IAEA standards-plus-training program to include a new regulatory improvement effort would be supported by other countries. However, if strong international support were not received, greater U.S. emphasis and s,upport would be needed.
In addition to use of the SSOD fund described above, NRC and other U S. agencies might consider sucn measures as gradual diversion of resources from lower-priority U.S.
IAEA contributions, and possibly providing additional NRC manpower.
As the program became better defined, the magnitude of NRC contributions would be better estimated; and specific, detailed proposals would be made to the Commission. NRC effort would be confined to those areas of special NRC capabilities--especially the H&S expertise of NRC personnel--through which NRC could most effectively make its strengths felt. The U.S. program would emphasize those assistance measures that build up indigenous regulatory capabilities rather than those that merely carry out some of the regulatory workload of the developing countries.
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29 Like Alternative 1, this alternative is evaluated favorably under the criteria. One positive aspect of this alternative is that it would be expected to have a comparable impact on all exporters--
U.S. and foreign--and, therefore, should not have an adverse impact on U.S. exports or cause an attendant reduction in U.S. influence in safety and non-proliferation matters.
(Actually, one part of Alternative 4 would place a minor, information transmittal require-ment on licensees.)
It should be recognized that attainment of objectives of this alternative would involve a prolonged effort and some of the objectives might not be achieved.
The staff recommends that the Commission instruct the staff to e'xplore further with the Executive Branch the possibility of developing an integrated action plan to guide U.S. initiatives for upgrading IAEA H&S activities and gaining support of other nations for this effort.
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3.
Alternative 3: Reoulation of Ouality of Excorts Under this alternative, NRC would amend its regulations to require reactor exporters to assure the quality of exported equipment to the same extent that the quality of such equipment is now assured under domestic reactor licenses.* The export licensee would be required--just as the domestic licensee is now required--to set up quality controls and a system of records, applicable to all
- Comestic licensees are usually electric utility ccmpanies.
U.S. vendors, who suoply equipment to these licensees, are not licensed by the NRC.
In contrast, export licensees are usually the major vendors, who thus are licensed as exporters cut not as equipment suppliers.
30 tiers of procurement, in order to be able to demonstrate to NRC inspectors that the exported equipment is being fabricated, tested, and delivered in accordance with NRC standards and criteria.
In addition, the present NRC vendor inspection program would be expanded to verify the quality of components to be exported, to tne same extent that the quality of domestic components is now verified.
(Under the vendor inspection program, NRC inspects ccmponents in factories; under the licensee inspection program, NRC inspects quality records at licensed facilities.)
i The Commission requested that a system similar to the FAA certification of exported aircraft and aircraft components be censidered. Because of the many differences between aircraft production and nuclear power plant construction *, the approach outlined here differs from the FAA program, but is considered to be more useful for purposes of this evaluation.
This alternative should be considered because regulations of developing countries initiating nuclear power programs may not require licensee (utility) auditing and monitoring of vendors. These countries may lack experienced indigenous personnel to perform vendor auditing and monitoring and may not deem it necessary to obtain the services of a satisfactory agent to perform these tasks.
Since NRC does not presently inspect documentation related to products intended Aircraft are manufactured on assembly lines, within the country of origin; reactors are assembled at the place of operation, using imported equipment and both local and imported labor. Aircraft are mass-produced; reactors are largely custom built. Each exported aircraft must be acceptable for service in several countries; each reactor operates in only one country.
e
1 31 l
for export, vendor services and manufacturing activities for export reactors and equipment probably do not now receive the same level of regulatory attention as equipment foi U.S. domestic projects.
Under this alternative, samples of records of quality-related activities, such as quality control tests and inspections, would be audited by NRC to verify that the program was being properly implemented (i.e., at about the same level of verification now devoted to similar products covered by domestic construction pennits). NRC regulations, licensing case records and inspection reports would evidence this NRC regulation of export product quality; no special NRC certification would be issued.
In order to reduce the NRC effort required to become familiar with importer requirements, the regulatory verifications might be performed only for ccmponents said to be manufactured in accordance with requirements, codes and standards similar or identical to those l
used for U.S. dcmestic plants. Otherwise, large amounts of NRC effort might be required to analyze and approve unfamiliar export designs.
32 In foreign applications, U.S. exported equipment must often interface with systems and components of other foreign supoliers.
As described above, NRC regulations would cover only the quality of the U.S. products. More extensive involveinent by the NRC, such as monitoring installation and operating procedures in coun-tries buying U.S. components, would considerably increase NRC resource requirements and the chances of being held accountable for equipment malfunctions, or of being accused of interference or intrusion in areas of foreign jurisdiction.
A positive aspect of this alternative is the assurance it would give that U.S. exporters are net applying a double standard in their dealings with U.S. and foreign customers.
Such a program might increase buyer confidence in the quality of U.S. nuclear exports Inclusion of equipment not manufactured in accordance with NRC standards and regulations in this program (and therefore unfamiliar to NRC inspectors) would require a major new analysis effo'rt,~ and thus would introduce a step increase in costs.
For this reason, verification would be limited to those products manufactured in accordance with NRC standards and regulations.
4 One disadvantage of this limitation is that an exporter could effectively avoid the verification of some of his products by claiming they were manufactured to requirements that differ slightly from NRC requirements.
In this sense, the program would be voluntary--if the exporter and his customer wanted NRC veri-fication, they could obtain it.
If not, they could avoid it.
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e 33 Such new NRC regulatory measures would provide a large measure of inspection assistance to the responsible foreign regulatory ~
authorities, with export licensees incurring the expense, admin-istrative burdens, and possible delays of assuming the quality assurance responsibilities.
Although the magnitude of this impact is not clear, the staff would expect that it would be significant, and would tend to place U.S. exporters at a disad-vantage.
Regulatory requirements for quality control of U.S. manufactured components alone would not assure that foreign health and safety would be acequately protected.
Such a new license requirement would not take into account the interface between components pur-chased frem multiple suppliers, or the ability of the recipient country to install the components properly and operate the plant safely. The staff believes that adoption of this alternative would provide little additional real safety assurance because nuclear components exported frem the U.S., which are manufactured under the same quality assurance system as domestic components, are already of high quality.
The staff estimates that 4-5 inspectors could manage a verification program as long as codes and standards identical, or similar to, those for domestic components and services were applied.
If re-quirements, codes and standards differed frcm those applied to domestic licensees, the required resources would be significantly increased.
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34 On balance, the staff believes that U.S. resources should te focused on areas likely to be more productive, less costly to NRC and its licensees, and to apply more evenly to U.S. and foreign exporters (Alternatives 1, 2, and 4).
4.
Alternative 4: Provide Desian Modification and Other H&S Information Under Alternative 4, regulatory agencies and possibly importing utilities of foreign countries would be given detailed information on safety-related modifications made to U.S. reactor equipment similar to that exported to these countries, in order to assist these agencies in maintaining and upgrading the safety of imported reactors.
This could be accomplished by one of the following approaches: First, the NRC could evaluate information from licensing dockets involving similar U.S. plants, select information on changes considered to be applicable to each exported plant, and transmit it to the importing government.
Second, the NRC could inform foreign regulatory authorities of the U.S. resolution of generic safety issues applicaole to exported reactors.
Third, NRC could transmit complete licensing dockets of cases relevant to exported reactors, to foreign governments.
The information may be assembled either by the NRC or by the export licensee. Fourth, NRC would promulgate a regulation requiring export licensees to provide such information directly to their foreign clients, and to NRC for transmittal to regulatory agencies.
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35 Currently, a foreign utility contracts with a manufacturer (who is usually the export licensee) to receive a complete facility or a portion of one (e.g., a nuclear steam supply system) of a certain vintaae.
The contract typically specifies that the product will incorporate all safety features required by NRC as of the bid date, which is usually several months prior to signing the contract, several years prior to export, and 6-10 years prior to startup.
Understandably, the vendor does not usually accept financial responsibility to incorporate in the product any changes that may later be required in the U.S.
Also, of course, the importing country is not obliged to accept U.S. domestic changes. However, it is usually in the interest of the vendor to keep the customer informed of changes required in the U.S. after the bid date, in light of the possibility of later sales of equipment or services required by such improvements.
Major U.S. excorters have informed the staff that they now keep foreign customers (though not their governments) informed of design changes required in the U.S. through newsletters, ad, hoc notices, and periodic meetings.
U.S. exporters might, hcwever, fail to inform customers of every change. The. fourth approach would require that exporters perform this service and that NRC inspect to assure that they do.
36 The benefits to recipient foreign regulatory agencies from this alternative would largely depend on the effectiveness of implementa-tion as well as tne capability of the recipient to absorb anc apply the information received.
Full information on changes in U.S. designs is kept on file in NRC's PDR's (Public Document Rooms), and selected important changes are regularly reported by private subscription services. One way of informing these foreign agencies would be to send them complete PDR dockets of similar U.S. plants and continue to update them. This approach would be simple to implement and would require the least NRC staff effort, but would have the disadvantage of not selecting care-fully and highlighting for the recipient foreign governments what is applicable to them from the large amounts of material on file.
Conversely, transmittal of screened and evaluated information of direct relevance to a recipient country should be of greater utility i
to the receiving governmer.t and require less effort on the part of that government, in order to be able to use the information than transmittal of the full docket, but would require more NRC resources.
If NRC j
itself assembled the information, the NRC staff would have to be sufficiently familiar with the designs of exported systems, as well as all major U.S. systems changes, upgrades and regulatory require-ments, to offer meaningful information and interpretation to foreign governments. Since there often are many differences between U.S.
domestic plants and exported versions of a given plant, a considerable 6
37 staff effort might be required.
In addition, there it at present no mechanism for the NRC to be kept informed of cnanges made overseas to U.S.-exported plants.
Those changes often involve modifications in the functioning and interrelationship of various systems and subsystems.
While the supply of information on changes in similar U.S. plants would not guarantee upgrading of plant safety, it would ensure that reactor safety information was made regularly available to interested foreign parties, without infringing on their national authority and responsibility. The staff, therefore, believes I
that such an effort could make at least a modest positive contribution to the overall H&S effectiveness of NRC's reactor export licensing program.
With respect to approach number 1, preliminary estimates indicate that an NRC staff effort of around 10 manyears/ year would be able to carry out this function, if NRC undertook itself to make the selection, interpretation, and transmittal of detailed information applicable to each exported plant.
With regard to approach number 2, U.S. exporters already select and transmit generic information to domestic and foreign clients.
In NRC, NRR keeps track of safety developments on all U.S. plants.
We believe that about 3-5 manyears/ year of NRC staff effort would be needed to combine the generic change data, now distributed by excorters to clients, with the resolution of generic safety
38 issues developed by the NRC staff, and to distribute such i
generic information to imoorter customers and regulatory authorities along with the rationale for making the changes.
For the third approach, the supply of POR documents for reference plants, one-half manyear'/ year should suffice.
If the NRC required export licensees to assamble the information for transmittal.to importing governments,1 manyear/ year of NRC effort wo,uld be required to review, edit, package and transmit the information.
Based on informal discussions with exporters, the staff believes th,at 1 manyear/ year per exporter would be needed if NRC required licensees to demonstrate that they keep their cl.ients informed.
(Acoroach No. 4) About 0.5 NRC manyear per year would be required to. inspect to assure that licensees were complying.
Alternative 4 (particularly the generic information approach) appears to offer a cost-effective approach to filling any infor-mation gaps abroad, provided that a closer examiriation corroborates concerns that existing information transmittal is inadequate.
If the Commission wishes to pursue this option, the staff could undertake a careful assessment to establish a better basis for a more specific recommendation. This would include (1) a review of prevailing foreign perceptions of their H&S information needs;
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39 (2) an evaluation of the scope and adequacy of present vendor and government information dissemination programs in the area of H&S-related modifications to U.S. " reference plants"; and (3) definition of a suitable procedure involving NRC and the excort licensee to bridge any infomation gaps uncovered in the study.
It is estimated that such an assessment would take 3-6 months.
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40 5.
Alternative 5 - H&S Reviews of Procosed Excorts Under this alternative, prior to export, as part of its export licensing process, the NRC would perform a limited technical review of the nuclear reactor systems, designs, and equipment proposed for export to a foreign country. Approval of safety provisions would not be required as a condition of exp' ort.
The review process envisaged would not be as thorough as the current licensing process for domestic reactors.
The reviews would span tne same breadth of technical issues as those evaluated for dcmestic reviews, but would be in less detail.* Upon completion of the review, and prior to export, the NRC would issue a letter of safety findings and recommendations for use by the recipient country as it saw fit.
The letter would delineate what safety reviews were performed on the basis of the available information, and would provide the staff's conclusions and recommendations.
It would not be feasible or desirable to attempt to approve or disapprove of the safety of the exported plant in such a one-time, limited review. However, we believe that the conclusions and recommendations of such a review would carry great weight with exporter and client; and in all likelihood noted deficiencies would be corrected prior to startup.
This review would be similar in this regard to NRC cr.a-time reviews of non-licensed reactors of other U.S. Government agencies.
"In arriving at cost estimates, the staff assumed that the H&S reviews would differ from demestic reviews in that, for example, no environmental imoact statement would be prepared, no public hearing or question and answer dialogue would be conducted and no ACRS review would be made.
Available environmenta,1 infprmation would be considered.
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41 This alternative would have positive and negative features.
On the one hand, adoption of this alternative might result in certain benefits to foreign recipients of exported equipment. An NRC review might increase buyers' confidence in the safety of US exported plants.
i j
As noted above, the NRC's letter of safety findings and recommencations should also have a positive impact on the overall safety of foreign nuclear power programs. Other benefits to a recipient country (e.g.,
training) would result if personnel from that country were asked to participate in the NRC review of the equipment exported to that country.
Implementation of this alternative would create substantial impacts on NRC' staff requirements.
Increased manpower would be required to perform the technical reviews. The staff estimates a requirement of no more than 10 myrs/yr for export reviews.*
On the other hand, there would be major disadvantages to such reviews.
The additional scrutiny of reactor exports, and the attendant
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administrative burden, would be viewed by importing countries as t
intruding into their internal affairs and imposing new unilateral conditions for receiving US nuclear exports, especially when results of the reviews became public. The published review reports would tend to put officials of the recipient country under pressure to act,
I
- This assumes, #or the first few reviews, roughly 10 myrs/ review and 2-3 years to comolete a review, and takes into account likely export I
trends over the next few years.
(Current domestic manpower requirements are about 10 myrs per construction permit review for safety and environ-mental factors. As experience is gained and procedures established, this could decrease to as low as 6.5 man-years per review.
Early difficulties which might be expected to arise, for example, in understanding the foreign acclicaticn of US designs, and in obtaining adequate site-related information, might add ;c early costs.
1 42 l
I i
which would be resented. Also, such reviews could give the false im-pression that NRC was assuming responsibility for foreign facility safety.
I There would also be practical problems in defining the procedures, scope and depth of the review process, and possibly in obtaining new legislative authority to include a review program as part of the present export licensing process.
The staff questions the safety value to the recipient country of any evaluations performed.
Nuclear safety in the US has been the result of many factors, including the combined NRC review and inspection activities which continue throughout the life of the facility.
The many changes and modifications which would be introduced abroad during construction and integration of all system components could invalidate safety conclusions reached by the NRC during a pre-export review.
If the staff's evaluations are to be meaningful, the intended use and
-equired performance criteria of the equipment proposed for export would have to be known. Additionally, certain detailed site-related informa-tion would be necessary to reach conclusions regarding the adequacy of the seismic design.
The availability and quality of this type of information would greatly influence both the timeliness and value of the staff's conclusions. Depending on the type of review undertaken, and the inevitable delays in receiving the necessary information, the time required for issuing an export license could materially increase.
It is e
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43 unlikely, for example, that the Commission would be able to ccmply with the time schedules provided for export licensing decisions under Section 126 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended.
Should delays in the issuance of an export license become commonplace, a foreign country's perception of the US as a reliable supplier of nuclear comoonents could be adversely affected.
Basically, there is no reason why NRC should perform this service for a developing country.
Ccmmercial consulting organizations are available which can do the same work, at a small percentage of total project costs; NRC should not compete with these companie:.
The export delay factors, described above, as well as other penalties which US exporters would inevitably incur as a result of this addi-tional scrutiny of US exports, would tend to work to the advantage of foreign competitors of US exporters, thus weakening US influence.
in safety and nonproliferation abroad.
Considering the basic problems and needs of developing nations embarking on nuclear power programs, the small benefit which the staff believes that these nations would receive from the NRC review discussed in this alternative, the high NRC cost involved, and the fact that the re' views can be obtained commercially, the staff cannot recommend its adoption as a condition of export licensing. On the other hand, NRC-assisted safety reviews, performed with the approval
.m.
44 recipient countries, tailored to meet their needs, and carefully planned a part of a larger effort to train, advise, and supplement--rather than to replace--indigenous reviews, could make a significant contributien within the scope of the IAEA program envisioned under Alternative 2.
Alternative 6 - Recuire a Findina of Reculatory Cacability and Adecuate H&S Stancarcs in Recioient Countries Under this alternative, NRC would make issuance of an export license conditional on a finding that the recipient country has developed a nuclear regulatory capability and has adopted acceptable standards and regulations (US, IAEA, or equivalent). There are two possible approaches to this. alternative.
First, such a finding could be made on the basis of an NRC staff analysis, supported by advice of the Executive Branch, and also, perhaps, US inspections or visits to the recipient countries. Second, the US could rely on the IAEA to verify that these requirements were satisfied in the recipient country.
The finding called for here would require that several determinations be made, including whether the recipient country has an adequately staffed and funded regulatory authority.
It would also be necessary to determine whether this authority is properly positioned to exercise the needed control and supervision over its own utilities and nuclear vendors. Another consideration would be whether the recipient country has adopted an adequate set of nuclear safety standards.
In 'the absence of any one of the above factors, the NRC could inquire whether tha recipient country has made arrangements to have access to sufficient outside expertise to augment its own capabilities.
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45 By requiring, for foreign reactor purchases,that the recipient govern-ment develop an acceptable nuclear regulatory capability and adequate health and safety standards, the US might be able to help ensure that other countries aoproach their nuclear programs with the same sense of responsibility that has evolved in the US and in other technically advanced nations, and also reduce the likelihood of accidents involving exported US-supplied reactors.
US insistence on the above conditions as a prerequisite to the issuance of an export license, on the other hand, is likely to be resented by recioient countries, and viewed as an unacceptable intrusion in their national affairs. This resentment would be further aggravated if the US were also to insist on independently verifying a recipient country's compliance with the above conditions. Such verification would be difficult to achieve in practice, and could give rise to serious difficulties between the US and its nuclear trading partners. Also, it would be very j
difficult to establish practical criteria for making determinations called for above. Enactment of this alternative probably would require legislation to provide the resources and authority to conduct such reviews.
Such a new criterion, following so closely on the enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, could erode foreign confidence in the US as a reliable supplier.
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J 46 It is estimated that 4 myrs/yr of NRC effort would be needed to carry out the necessary evaluations and reviews, if this alternative were to be implemented on a bilateral basis, and were to involve inspection visits.
Instead of the US verifying a recipient country's compliance, the US could seek to have the IAEA inspect and verify that the criteria outlined above are met.
The IAEA could also conceivably review continued adherence to the standards and practices, once adopted.
About 1 myr/yr of NRC effort m,ight be required if a multilateral approach were employed, after the intial effort of setting up the IAEA system had been completed.
The difficulty of establishing such an IAEA system should not be under-estimated. Member Countries have accepted the IAEA safeguards system, l
most of them accepting NpT or other inspections within their territory, because they recognize the dangers of nuclear proliferation and cannot obtain enrichment services or certain nuclear technology or equipment without agrcaing to such inspections.
It is not clear that reactor accident risk is viewed as seriously as the problem of weapons proliferation.
Further, it is not clear that other nuclear supplier countries would agree with the US to prohibit sales to countries that did not accept IAEA safety regulation. The new strains on already e
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g 47 sensitive relationships in the IAEA that would result if the U S. or a group of supplier countries attempted to impose this alternative could well weaken the Agency's effectiveness.
More importantly, the IAEA has no mechanism for enforcing adherence to its safety standards, and has not been willing to report on compliance by individual countries.
Such a role for IAEA would probably require amendment of its Statute or the agreement of all of its members.
If IAEA evaluations of adequacy of regulatory programs is a' desired objective, the staff believes that this could be best achieved as an eventual result of the
, action plan outlined in Alternative 2.
The staff believes it would be quite difficult to obtain the support of IAEA and other nations for implementation of this alternative.
In addition, the possible constitutional question concerning delegations of any NRC functions in this area to IAEA would have to be studied.
As with other alternatives which impose special additional
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requirements on our export licenses, this alternative would work to the disadvantage of U.S. exporters in favor of their competitors abroad, thus weakening U.S. influence in safety and non-proliferation abroad.
For these reasons, Alternative 6 is not favored.
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48 7.
Alternative 7 - Assist Other U.S. Acencies to ?erform H&S Analyses of Nuclear Excort Projects Under tnis alternative the NRC would assist other U.S. agencies involved in reactor export projects, which may lack technical expertise for evaluating H&S aspects of nuclear export projects.
Such NRC advice, on behalf of the Export-Import (Exim)
Bank, for example, might be required for future Exim Bank decisions on foreign development loan applications for projects involving U.S. reactors.*
Under this approach, NRC would officially perforn an assessment of the H&S programs of prospective importing countries and would make this assessment available to the recipient country and to various U.S. Government agencies involved in nuclear export aporovals (e.g., the State Department and other Executive Branch agencies, the Exim Bank, and Congress).
The assistance could include some inputs concerning technical aspects of the proposed project, and assessments of the regulatory capabilities and nuclear standards in the imperting country.
Alternative 7 combines certain features of Alternatives 5 and 6 and thus shares many of the serious disadvantages of those options (e.g., infringement of national sovereignty, likely lack of support from other supplier n'ations, etc.).
"This need would arise if Congressman Cavanaugh's proposed amendment to the Ex-Im Bank Act of 1945 (H.R.12157) were enacted.
This amendment, in its current form, would require NRC to provide, as a condition of Ex-Im Bank financing of the export of a nuclear reactor, an evaluation "(i) describing the nuclear regulatory organization and practices of the recipient country, and (ii) indicating the extent to which the Health and Safety standards adopted and icolemented by the recipient country are consistent with those c'stablished by the Nuclear Regulatory Comission."
49 This alternative would recuire unilateral U.S. health and safety reviews. As noted in Alternatives 2, 5.,
and 6, the staff believes that review assistance should be provided in the context of cooperative assistance programs.
Another disadvantage of this approach is illustrated by the anomaly that would be created if an unfavorable NRC evaluation led to an Ex-Im Bank decision not to finance a transaction, and the apolicant then found other financing and submitted an export license application to the Commission.
Under existing practice, 1
the Commission would not consider this H&S information in its eAport licensing determination, and the export license would be issued if applicable statutory criteria were met, despite refusal of the Exim Bank to approve the loan for the project.
On the other hand, if the Commission decided also to incorporate H&S considerations in NRC's export licensing process, adoption of Alternative 7 could give rise to some scheduling and work duplication problems, since Exim Bank's loan review activities precede NRC's licensing effort by about 2-3 years.
In that case, NRC would have to repeat part of the H&S review effort, and update the analysis to account for the 2-to-3 years that have elapsed.
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.. =..
50 NRC canpower requirecents for this option would depend on the depth of the technical analysis which NRC would perform, and the amount of first-hand information NRC might have to colle:t to make its detennination about the adequacy of the recipient's regulatory organization and the H&S standards adopted and implemented.
Costs to conduct these latter two analyses are not expected to be significant (possibly on the order of 0.5 myr per eval uation).
Regardless of the cost factors involved, the adverse political impacts noted in the discussion of Alternatives 5 and 6 would also exist in this case, and for this reason the staff cannot recommend that the Commission adopt this alternative.
It has also been suggested that NRC might participate unofficially in such export analyses new regularly performed by other U.S.
agencies (such as Exim Bank). Although such unofficial assistance is not well defined, presumably it might include lending NRC assistance to provide independent, expert advice in such analyses. The staff has no objection to such expert assistance, providing: (1) analyses would not bind the NRC to findings and 1
conclusions developed by other agencies; (2) sufficient NRC experts are available; and (3) the reviews are part of a presently existing program of the other agency to make overall. project and feasibility assessments.
e e
e'
51 VIII.
CONCLUSIONS 1.
There is no clear-cut evidence that developing countries are ignoring H&S responsibilities. Further, it would be cifficult for the U.S. to move unilaterally to impose stringent H&S standards on these governments.
Such an approach would certainly arouse resentment on the part of recipient nations, and would have adverse effects on the U.S. ability to remain a leading supplier, thereby jeopardizing U.S. ability to influence foreign H&S and non-proliferation in general.
Therefore, initial steps should focus on voluntary increasing support for a larger IAEA H&S assistant
.,o role based on a consensus of the IAEA Member States.
2.
Regardless of other actions taken, a modest expansion of current assistance to developing countries--assistance that
-~
can be provided with only minor impact on NRC resources or on domestic priorities--is desirable (Alternative 1).
3.
A major coordinated U.S. effort to improve the nuclear energy regulatory programs of developing countries, centered in the IAEA, is desirable and should be undertaken (Alternative 2).
NRC should work with other U.S. agencies to plan and carry I
out a U.S. initiative to gain IAEA support and supcort of other IAEA Member States for thfs effort.
If possible, majcr financial support of the U.S. and other exporter nations should be sought.
l
52 4
Varification of quality assurance as an excort licensino recuirement (Alternative 3) would not significantly improve foreign H&S of exported reactors relative to the costs entailed.
5.
Providing design modification and other H&S information (Alternative 4) might make a contribution to H&S of exported reactors at a reasonable cost. Tnis alternative should be further studied as described acove.
6.
Alternatives 5 and 6 would impese significant new regulatory requirements on U.S. exports and probably would be viewed by the developing countries as intrusive into their iniarnai affairs.
The staff does not believe that the pote'!cial benefits of mandatory NRC HSS erliews, and determi1ations as to adequacy of foreign regulatory programs, would outweigh
~~
the adverse political impacts likely to result frcm their adoption.
However, certain positive elements of those alternatives, conducted on a voluntary basis and not as export licensing requirements, should be conside"ed for incorporatio.1 into the IAEA-centered program discussed in Alternative 2.
7.
Practical and political problems discussed in connection with Alternatives 5, 6, and 7 make it undesirable for NRC to make, a
e 4
O
53 en behalf of another U.S. agency, official H&S reviews or deteminations as to adequacy of foreign regulatory programs.
However, the staff has no objection in principle to NRC giving unofficial assistance to other agencies by making a limited number of technical experts available on a loan basis to those agencies for the conduct of their own analyses.
8.
The following table sumarizes estimated costs of the various alternatives.
6
SUMMARY
OF COST ESTIMATES Manyears/ Year
~
Funds Total U.S.
l
$1000's NRC NRR IP IE Et D I AEA Exporters Alternative 1 - Expand Current Assistance Program 100
.4.5 2.0 1.0 1.5 0.5 Alternative 2 - ti.S. Initiative in the IAEA*
200 4.75*
2.0*
1.5*
1.0' O.25 3.0 Alternative 3 - Regulation of Quality of Exports 100 5.0 1.0 3.75 0.25 2.0 Alternative 4 - Pro' vide Design Modification and Other ll&S Information:
NRC Transmits Detailed Info 100 10.0 8.0 1.0 1.0 2.0**
NRC Transmits Generic Info 50 4.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0**
2.0**
NRC Transmits Dockets 50 0.5 0.5 Exporters Inform Client 0.5 0.5 2.0 3-6 Month Study (by contractor) 150 Alternative 5 - Il&S Reviews of Proposed Exports 100 10.0 9.0 1.0 5.0 Alternative 6 - Require a Finding of Regulatory Capability and Adequate H&S Standards in Recipient Countries j
tillateral 100 4.0 1.0 1.75 1.0 0.25 IAEA 100 1.0 0.5 0.25 0.25 3.0 Alternative 7 - Assist Other U.S. Agencies to Perform II&S Analyses of Nuclear Export Projects Informal Assistance 50 1.0 0.9 0.1 s
- This is a rough estimate for the first year or two of Alternative 2.
Exact costs would depend on the directions taken by the IAEA proqram.
The development of the Action Plan would require about I manyear/ rear divided among IP/NRR/IE.
- Ihis represents maxinun exporter manvears under this aunroach.
l
55 REFERENCES 1.
S. J. Chilk's memo of May 10, 1977, to L. V. Gossick, "H&S Reviews for Exports."
2.
Morris Rosen, "The Critical Issue of Nuclear Power Plant Safety in Developing Countries," IAEA Bulletin, Vol.19, No. 2, April 1977.
3.
Morris Rosen, " Raising the Level of the Safety Assessment of Exported Nuclear Power Plants," IAEA-SM-223/33 (Attachment 2).
4 Leslie Fitz,
" Regulatory Problems in the Developing Countries," IAEA-SM-223/22 5.
Testimony of Eldon V. C. Greenberg, Hearing before Senate Committee on Government Operations on S. 1439, 94th Congress, 2nd Session 1
(January 29, 1976).
6.
H. Bahmanyar and W. 86*rkle, " Reference Plants, Safety Standards and Unique' Safety Issues Related to the Nuclear Power Plant Iran Supplied by KWU," IAEA-SM-223/7.
Full Names of SECY Paper References SECY-76-189 and 189A, "NRC Participation in IAEA Reactor Safety Missions and Technical Assistance Assignments to Developing Countries."
SECY-77-390, " Status Report on Pending International Questions."
SECY-77-153, "NRC Staff Details to International Organizations."
SECY-77-280, " Export Licensing Study Group Report - International Reach of the National Environmental Policy Act."