ML19312E718
| ML19312E718 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/03/1978 |
| From: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19312E711 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-08-80-338, CON-NRC-8-80-338 SECY-78-365, NUDOCS 8006090436 | |
| Download: ML19312E718 (8) | |
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July 3,1978 SECV-78-365_
O COMMISSIONER ACTION For:
The Comission From:
James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs U Thru:
Executive Director for Operations,
Subject:
HEALTH AND SAFETY (H&S) CONSIDERATIONS IN NRC REACTOR EXPORT LICENSING AND NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS Cateaory:
This paper concerns a major policy issue.
Purcose:
To present the results of staff studies in the subject areas requested by the Comission, to identify areas.
where further work is required, and to solicit Comission views on the recomer.dations of this paper.
Discussion:
On May 10, 1977, the Comission requested that the Export Study Group conduct an examination of possible approaches to health and safety (H&S) issues affecting reactor exports.
The examination was to include, among others, approaches analogous to the air frame certification done by the Federal Aviation Administration for aircraft exports, and the possibility of onsite safety reviews in foreign countries.* The staff was to emphasize the availability of effective mechanisms for conducting these programs, additional resources needed to do an effective job, and any additional legislative authority required.
Two recent events reflect Congressional concern about H&S aspects of reactor exports. On January 4,1978, Congressman Clarence Long wrote a letter to Chairman Hendrie requesting answers to several questions t
on the H&S aspects of U.S. reactor exports:
Contact:
J. D. Lafleur, IP, 492-7131 H. B. Senechter, IP, 492-8155 t
nges in requirements for fuel exports have noc been considered; inciple, any restrictions or conditions placed on reactor e could be applied to licenses for export of fuel or t l
sed by NRC under NNPA of 1978, as well.
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--Should U.S. reactors be sold overseas without assurance (1) that the reactors will be designed and built safely, and (2) that the countries can operate them safely?
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--Why aren't the American nuclear vendors held responsible for the design and construction of nuclear plants sold abroad?
--Why doesn't the NRC move toward a regulatory safety review of all U.S. reactors :old overseas?
More recently, Congressman John J. Cavanaugh proposed an amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act, which called for NRC to provide, as a condition of Ex-Im Bank financing of the sale of a nuclear reactor, "an evaluation based upon an analysis (i) describing the nuclear regulatory organization and practices of the recipient country, and (ii) indicating the extent to which the Health and Safety standards adopted and implemented by the recipient country are consistent with those established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission." At this writing, the amendment was awaiting House floor vote.
On a related subject, over the last three years the Commission and its staff have discussed opportunities and policy alternatives for providing safety assistance to countries embarking on nuclear power programs.
In accordance with various Commission requests, the analysis also compares bilateral assistance arrangements with multilateral assistance provided through the IAEA, and identifies the principal factor: to be considered in providing assistance, such as resource limitations, and how to avoid the risk that countries might misconstrue NRC safety assistance as relieving them of responsibility for indigenous efforts to improve safety.
Because of the close relationship between H&S measures that could be incorporated into the export licensing process, and those ordinarily handled through NRC's international cooperative efforts, the staff (EDO staff, OGC and OPE) has combined the two analyses requested by the Commission irto a single analysis, the report of which is attached to this paper. The issues raised by Congressmen Long and Cavanaugh are also addressed in this analysis.
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Sections I-VII of the attached report present a general overview of the subject. They examine factors contributing to the present concern for H&S implications of U.S.
reactor exports (particularly exports to developing countries); review the statutcry context governing NRC's activities and responsibilities regarding foreign H&S; discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of bilateral and multilateral assistance; and summarize the existing NRC H&S assistance program.
Section VIII considers seven alternative measures that would expand NRC's role in foreign H&S matters related to U.S. reactor exports. Alternatives 1 and 2 review opportunities for further NRC efforts in bilateral and multilateral advice and assistance to the H&S programs of developing countries. The staff concluded that Alternative 1, which proposes an increase from the level of the current program (12 myrs/yr when fully implemented), to about 16.5 myrs/yr, would make a contribution to improving H&S of exported reactors with only minor impact on NRC domestic activities and resource requirements.
The staff concluded that a major new multilateral effort in advice and assistance (Alternative 2), including a U.S. initiative in the IAEA to expand the Agency's role in the safety area and to upgrade the national H&S programs of importing countries, would be the most productive and cost-effective approach to H&S improve-ment, and would not impair U.S. international relations, including the attainment of U.S. H&S and nonproliferation objectives. Such an IAEA program would complement the present IAEA reactor standards and training programs.
It could benefit from a new fund, proposed June 9 by the U.S. in the UN Special Session on Disarmament (5500),
that would give to NPT countries added IAEA-administered assistance in safety and environmental protection for power reactors, among other areas. The staff concludes that NRC should develop in conjunction with other federal agencies an action plan spelling out U.S. strategy, including securing political and financial support from the technically advanced IAEA members for this new assistance.
The Comission instructed the staff to consider initiating a system of certification of nuclear exports patterned after the FAA system of certification of exports of the
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aircraft industry. Because of the many differences between the export of aircraft and the export of nuclear equip-ment, the staff considered instead, for purposes of evaluation, a possible requirement for NRC verification that exported nuclear components meet NRC domestic safety requirements (Alternative 3). Such a system would impose quality assurance requirements on export licensees like those that are now imposed on domestic licensees.
In light of the significant verification and monitoring functions already performed by U.S. equipment manufacturers, and the many other phases of plant design, construction and operation in which quality assurance had not yet been perfected in the developing countries, the staff does not believe that NRC verification of quality assurance of exported equipment would oring to foreign nuclear, safety programs sufficient benefits to offset the costs and other adverse effects of the
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additional regul atory requirements. The staff therefore recommends again3t adoption of Alternative 3.
NRC already informs foreign countries about many important safety developments in the U.S.
Under Alternative 4, NRC and the exports licensees would supply recipient foreign governments and utilities with additional infor-mation, including data on all safety-related changes in U.S. equipment similar to their reactors imported from the U.S.
Three possible ways of selecting and transmitting such information were considered:
--Selection and transmittal of detailed infonnation applicable to each exported reactor.
--Selection and tr.ismittal of generic information on all safety related changes applicable to exported reactors.
--Transmittal and periodic updating of complete licensing dockets of U.S. domestic plants similar to the exported plants.
The staff believes that this alternative merits further review, and that a 3-6 month study should be made to define more closely the need for additional information, as well as the best way to provide it, and to develop better estimates of costs and benefits.
Under Alternative 5, prior to export, NRC would conduct an H&S review of the design of the proposed reactor and other aspects of the project. This review would consider i
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available information en all plant design features, but to a more limited depth than that of domestic reviews.
A report of the staff's conclusions would be issued, carefully describing the limitations of the review, and making comdents on all aspects of the project, but not approving or disapproving the safety provisions of the project. The staff estimates that not more than a total of 6.5-10 manyears of NRC effort would be needed for each export review.
In light of current reactor export trends (about three under review at all times) one can assume that 10 myrs/yr would represent a reasonable upper bound on HRC manpower requirements. The staff believes that these reviews would be resented by importing countries, which would view them as an intrusion into their internal affairs.
The production of a review report, describing what NRC considered to be safety deficiencies, and pre-sumably calling for corrective action by the importing country, would be especially resented.
The staff believes that problems such as difficulties of obtaining design information, delays in licensing that would result, and the fact that this approach does not provide inducement for developing countries to establish their own indigenous regulatory capability also make this alternative one which cannot be recommended.
The staff also notes that a recipient country can contract to have such reviews performed by commercial architectural ngineering companies, and believes there is little justification for the NRC to compete with these companies.
On the other hand, the staff believes that the conduct of safety reviews performed in close, voluntary cooperation with the developing country (and not as a part of the export license approval process), and planned to maximize assistance to, and training for, the developing country, should be included by the U.S. and other countries within the scope of the expanded assistance initiatives envisioned in Alternatives 1 and 2.
Alternative 6 " Require a Finding of Regulatory Capability and Adequate H&S Standards in Recipient Countries," would condition issuance of an export license on a finding by NRC that the recipient country had developed a regulatory capability and was implementing acceptable H&S standards.
IAEA assistance might be solicited in making this judgment.
The staff believes that NRC should not undertake to make such judgments about the internal activities of foreign countries, and that, moreover, getting the information
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needed to make these findings would be extremely difficult, as it would involve either U.S. or IAEA inspections of the importing countries. Both of these steps would be resisted by importing countries, and the IAEA could be expected to reject such a role.
Alternative 7 considers the advisability of NRC making H&S reviews for other U.S. agencies, such as the Export-Import Bank. The staff concludes that, for reasons similar to those discussed under Alternatives 5, 6, and 7, above, the dRC should not become officially involved in H&S reviews, oer se_.
The staff would not be opposed to an approach in which the NRC might temporarily assign a few safety experts to assist other agerecies informally in performing the program feasibility reviews, and other reviews that they already conduct. Further study would be needed to define more precisely the interagency mechanisms and divisions of responsibilities that would be most suitable for such an effort, if and when NRC is specifically called on for such help.
In sumary, based on experience with the existing assistance program, the staff believes that most of the potential benefits of mandatory programs involving further conditions on export licenses can be better obtained by voluntary means such as the expanded assistance programs of Alternatives 1 and 2.
In general, the staff believes that new NRC H&S efforts should rely primarily on voluntary measures selected on the basis of their potential to impsove the capability of governments of importing countries to carry out their responsibility for protecting the H&S of their citizens, rather than on externally imposed mandatory approaches. Assistance should be limited to that expertise which NRC is best equipped to supply, and should be provided in careful coordination with the assistance programs of other U.S. agencies and 1AEA, stressing the four criteria adopted by the Comission in previous decisions (SECY 77-189A).
If such assistance is made available, the staff believes that the governments of importing countries will respond favorably without mandatory conditions on export licenses.
Recommendations:
That the Comission:(1) approve the recomendations of this staff paper, namely (a) approve expansion of NRC's H&S assistance as outlined in Alternative 1; (b) authorize the staff to urge the Executive Branch to pursue a 8
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multinational initiative to upgrade international safety efforts, as outlined in Alternative 2; (c) approve further study by the staff of Alternative 4; and (d) direct the staff to report to the Comission regarding discussicas it has on any requests for unofficial support of other agencies as described in Alternative 7.
(2) Note that, in view of the high interest outside NRC in this subject, including this staff analysis, this staff paper will be forwarded shortly to appropriate members and comittees of Congress and other interested persons along with any separate coments the Comissioners wish to make.
Resources Impact:
It is estimated that approval of the recomendation to imple-ment alternatives 1, 2, and 4 could cost initially as much as 19.25 MY/YR and 5400,000/ year.
Alternative 1 - Expand Assistance Program The total cost of the Expanded Assistance Program is estimated to be 16.5 MY/YR and $100,000/ year. This is an increase of 7.5 HY over tne current assistance program or 4.5 MY over the assistance program when f'il"..;
implemented.
Alternative 2 - U. 5. Initiatives in the IAEA It is expected that the initial cost will be 4.75 MY/YR and
$200,000/ year with the likelihood that this will increase in the outyear.
Alternative 4 - Provide Design Modification and Other H&S
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Information There are four options under this alternative that range in cost from 0.5 MY to 10 MY/YR and from 550,000 to $100,000/ year.
Funds MY/YR Outyears M
X Alternative 1 100 4.5 some increase Alternative 2 200 4.75 expected Alternative 4 50-100 0.5-10.0 TOTAL 350-400 9.75-19.25 Coordination:
NRR, IE, SD, ELD, OPE, and OGC concur in the recomendations of tnis paper.
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Jam (s R. Shea, i.ctor Office of International Programs
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8 Commissioners' comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Friday, July 14, 1973.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, shculd be submitted to the Commisioners NLT July 11, 1978, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIP'JTION Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations Regional Offices Secretariat t
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