ML19312E427
| ML19312E427 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/01/1980 |
| From: | Kerrigan J NRC - TMI-2 LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE |
| To: | Anderson N NRC - TMI-2 LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006040395 | |
| Download: ML19312E427 (5) | |
Text
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a APR 1 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR:
N. Anderson, Westinghouse Les ons Learned Team Leader FROM:
J. Kerrigan, Westinghouse Lessons Learned Team Member
SUBJECT:
IMPLEMENTATION OF LESSONS LEARNED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA This memorandum documents the manner in which I have been implementing Section 2.1.4 of HUREG-0578. A previous memo (dated 3/14/80) specif1-cally documentsJ how I was implementing Position 3 of Section 2.1.4.
This memo discussed all of the positions included in Section 2.1.4.
The implementation method discussed in the enclosure is similar in content to review guidelines which were suggested by Cliff Anderson (CE Team) in an informal memo dated 1/31/80.
I believe that Cliff's suggested guidelines provide the basis for a realistic implementation revint of Section 2.1.4, for the Westinghouse plants.
J. Kerrigan, Westinghouse Lessons Learned Team Member
Enclosure:
Implementation of 2.1.4 cc w/ enclosure:
r B. Millstead D. Verrelli C. Anderson T. Telford G. Lanik
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IMPLEMENTATION OF 2.1.4 ON WESTINGHOUSE PLANTS (EXCl.UDING SEP PLANTS) 1.
All containment isolation system designs shall comply with the recommendations of SRP 6.2.4; i.e., that there be diversity in the parameters sensed for the initiation of containment isolation.
After confirming the validity of the FSAR table of containment isolation valves with the licensee, I verify that all automatic isolation valves listed in that table receive diverse isolation signals.
A single signal is found acceptable if that signal is initiated by diverse parameters (e.g., safety injection signal or main steam isolation signal).
Contain-ment isolation valves not meeting this criterion are required to be upgraded to meet the position. The licensee is asked to make a comitment to upgrade and to provide a schedule for completing the modifications.
In the interim, the licensee is required to manually isolate these lines upon the initiction of safety injection (after the signal has been confirmed, i.e., not spurious).
The diverse parameters sensed to initiate closure are not specified to the licensee.
The diversity is acceptable providing that at least two parameters are sensed and the isolation signal (s) are safety grade.
Isolation valves receiving a Phase B isolation signal are exempted from the diversity requirement.
2.
All plants shall give careful raconsideration to the definition of essential and non-essential systems, shall identify each system determined to be essential, shall identify each system determined to be non-essential, shall describe the ba:,is for selection of each essential system, shall modify their containment isolation designs accordingly, and shall report the results of the re-evaluation to NRC.
I verify that a list of essential and non-essential systems has been provided by the licensee.
The licensee is also required to provide a basis for the selection of each essential system in cases for which the basis is not immediately obvious.
In no instances has the licensee been asked to reconsider the clasrification of a system.
3.
All non-essential systems shall be automatically isolated by the containment isolation signal.
The manner in which this requirement has been implemented is documented in a memo from J. Kerrigan to N. Anderson dated 3/14/80.
In order to verify that each licensee meets the double barrier criterion outlined in that memo, I first verify the validity of the FSAR table of isolation valves with the licensee. Any non-essential penetrations which do not
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UNITED STATES g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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.g, 4y, WASHIN GTON. D.C. 20555
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April 1, 1980 OFFfCE OF THE COMMISSIONER Memorandum for Chairman Ahearne William J. Dircks, ActingExecutive Director for Operations /
Samuel J. Chilk Secretary From:
Richard T. Kennedy Subje.t:
STAFF PAPERS Increasingly staff papers are.being forwarded to the Commissioners with little more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time allowe'd for their study before they are the subject of consideration at a scheduled Commission meeting.
It has always been my view, and it remains so, that if a matter is of sufficient import to require consideration of the Commission at a meeting, it r
l should warrant personal indepth consideration by Commissioners 'before the matter is scheduled for discussion.
This seems the only sensible course (a) in the interest of a fair and thorough consideration of the paper in which considerable staff time has been expended; and (b) in the interest of the public with whose safety, health, environmental protection the Commission is charged.
I would appreciate it if we could take positive steps to return to the established practices of the Comission which require that papers be provided for review preferably not later than a week and in even extra-ordinary circumstances al least two days before a scheduled meeting.
cc:
Commissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Hendrie Commissioner Bradford h)
E. Hanrahan, 0?E L. Bickwit, OGC f j-
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