ML19312E052
| ML19312E052 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/17/1977 |
| From: | Minogue R, Casey Smith NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS), NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19312E053 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-77-283A, NUDOCS 8006030118 | |
| Download: ML19312E052 (96) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON SECY-77-283A ]
7g POLICY SESSION ITEM For:
The Comissioners From:
Clifford V. Smith, Jr., Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Standards Development Thru:
Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART 73 TO PROVIDE. STRENGTHENED PHYSICA PROTECTION AGAINST RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGEL AND THEFT OF STRATEGIC SPECIAL NtJCLEAR MATERIAL Purcose:
To obtain Comission approval to publish for public coment amendments to Part 73 which would identify perfomance requirements and system specifications to provide high assurance protection against radiological sabotage and theft of strategic special nuclear material.
Catecory:
This paper covers a major policy issue.
Discussion:
A series of staff papers (SECY 76-4T6 of August 13, 1976, SECY 76-416A of September 20, 1976 and SECY 76-416B of October. 28,1976) presented to the Comission the findings of the Joint ERDA-NRC Task Force on Safeguards and recommended actions to be taken to implement the task force recomendations for upgrading safeguards at fuel cycle facilities. Among other things, SECY 76-4168 recomended a program and schedule for upgrading safeguards which included publication of performance oriented safeguards regulations.
The paper also noted that a rule for upgraded guard qualification and training was under development.
ta gan In the Secretary's memo of December 23, 1976 the Comission 443-6973 announced its endorsement of a general safeguards upgrading program for fuel cycle facilities and transportation activities involving strategic special nuclear material.
Also, in the Decemoer 23 memo the Comission gave specific direction to the staff regaiding, among other things, J1 70 C y..
4 : c 1
Radiological Sabotage is a new term to be used instead of Industrial Sabotage to more clearly indicate that the sabotage of concern is that with radiological consequences.
SECY NOTE:
This paper, a revision of SECY-7528, is scheduled for discussion on Wednesday, June 22, 1977.
This is a duplicate of the document that was advanced to 'the Comission by EDO on Friday, June 17, 1977.
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The Commissioners,
upgrading safeguards for existing strategic special nuclear material facilities and transportation activities by public rulemaking.
Enclosure "A" to this paper is the statement of considerations and propo::ed amendments to Part 73 prepared in response to the Commission's directions. The proposed amendments include general performance requirements stated in terms of the capabilities to protect against adversaries as specified in the December 23 memorandum as modified by the Secretary's i
memorandum of March 29, 1977.
The amendments also describe system specifications which should meet the pe*fomance requirements. Provision also is made for alternative systems providing equivalent protection in relation to the performance i
requirements.
Included in the proposed amendments are references to the proposed contingency plan requirements published in the Federal Register on May 19, 1977 (42 FR 25744) and references to the proposed requirements for improved security personnel quality which have been presented to the Commission in a separate paper. ~ These references are included to show how the contingency plan requirements and security personnel j
i requirements would be integrated with the upgraded requirements.
l Amendments to the recently published new section 73.55 for i
nuclear power reactor protection are included to make it consistent, particularly with regard to guard quality and contingency plan requirements.
In addition the statement in the present 5 73.50 which provided for exemption of certain non-power reactors using high enriched uranium from the detailed requirements of 55 73.50 and 73.60 has not been included in the proposed amendments.
In effect, this would require all non-power reactors with formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material not irradiated to the 100 rem level specified in s 73.6 to meet the general performance requirements and capability requirements using the detailed system specifications or their equivalent.
There are currently six licensed non-power reactors that would come under the amended regulations (University of Missouri, National Bureau of Standards, Battelle, Renssalaer Polytechnic Institute, Westinghouse, and University of
-Virginia). Three of these (Missouri, NBS, and Battelle) would do so even if the exemption statement were left in because they have more than the formula quantities that have not been irradiated to any extent and are not in the reactor The other three have more than the fomula quantities core.
I
o, The Comissioners in the reactor or irradiated but not to the 100 rem level.
All six of these reactor licensee would need to take steps to comply with the amended regulations or reduce their inventories either by removing the material or by irradi-ating it to be above the 100 rem level. All but Battelle and Renssalaer would be able to maintain irradiation levels above the 100 rem level. These two would either have to remove some material to keep their inventory below the
. formula quantity or meet the proposed new requirements.
In addition, it is intended that pmtection of non-power reactors with less than formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material would continue to be required pursuant to 5 73.40. This section would not be rescinded until more specific protection requirements for less than formula quantities are promulgated.
This issue is addressed in a Staff Paper to the Commission (SECY-77-79 of 2/11/77 and SECY-77-798 of 4/8/77) recomending such protection consistent with IAEA recomendations.
The external adversary characteristics defined in the proposed regulation.are stated so as to differentiate them from those stated in 5 73.55 with respect to the size of tae adversary force.
The size of postulated adversary force against which the safeguards performance is to be evaluated has been expressed to indicate that the group is large enough to employ effective team maneuvering tactics, unlike the."several persons" single term postulated as the adversary in 5 73.55.
The difference in the des _ign basis for required levels of protection at power reactors and fuel cycle facilities reflects the relative differences in the potential consequences of i
successful sabotage at a reactor and theft of strategic special nuclear material and subsequent. detonation of a nuclear explosive device. The consequences of reactor sabotage are generally less severe than detonation of a nuclear explosive device. While these considerations are not amenable to precise quantification they have been reflected in the general performance requirements associated with 5 73.55 and the proposed amendments.
Even though the general performance requirements associated with the proposed amendments postulate a larger adversary group, this does not necessarily mean that a larger facility protection force is required to achieve adequate safeguards.
In addition to a well-designed defensive system and a well-trained response force, detemination of the assurance of
The Comissioners -
successful prevention of theft or sabotage would depend on analyses of site specific conditions that affect the tactics, maneuverability, and effectiveness of response to the postulated adversary. Numbers of response personnel are an important factor in such response, but of equal and perhaps even more significance would be the use to which such response forces were put. Factors such as those listed in the Statement of Considerations to the proposed rule (Enclosure "A", page 8) would be amono those considered in establishing the optimum response force' size.
Regardless of the differences between the adversary design characteristics postulated in the Upgrade Rule nr fuel cycle facilities and those postulated in i 73.55 for reactors, it should be noted that the Commission has publicly stated that existing safeguards at fuel cycle facilities adequately protect against the adversar "several" armed assailants (y design characteristic of as specified) in 5 73.55.
Because of this and the site-specific nature of safeguards
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assurance levels, upgrading for the present fuel cycle facility safeguards elements must proceed beyond the current baseline capabilities, as opposed to a comparison with reactor safeguards elements.
Safeguards assessment methods now under development should provide some rigor to quantitative evaluation of the effec-tiveness of physical protection systems in relation to various adversary characteristics. At present, however, evaluation must be on a qualitative, expert judgment basis.
In this same context "high assurance" cannot be quantified now, except on the expert judgment basis. The assessment methodology being developed should assist in better deter-mining the level of assurance associated with any given safeguards systems and specifically assist in arriving at a firm basis for the number of response personnel required in relation to adversary characteristics and site specific factors.
A separate value/ impact analysis has not been prepared. The impacts of the proposed amendments are discussed in Enclosure "B" entitled, " Environmental Impact Appraisal of Amendments i
to 10 CFR Part 73."
Some representative cost estimates have been included in the statement of considerations. These impacts and costs are extrapolations from, and consistent with, the draft GESMO Safeguards Supplement of November 1976.
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The Comissioners Recomendation:
That the Comission:
1.
Approve publication in the Federal Register for 45 days comment of proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73, as set forth in Enclosure "A", which would specify perform-ance oriented requirements and system specifications to strengthen the physical protection for fuel cycle facilities and transportation activities involving strategic special nuclear material.
2.
Note that the proposed amendments would apply the same general performance requirements to licensed non-power reactors having fonnula quantities of unirradiated strategic special nuclear material as would be applied for fuel cycle facilities with such quantities.
3.
Note that the April 29, 1977, report of the Task Force on KTTegations of James H. Conran has been reviewed by the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. That review has progressed to a point sufficient to assure that necessary steps already have been initiated in this proposed upgrading to be responsive to the recom-mendations of the Task Force which are appropriate to address in this rulemaking. Specifically, it should be noted that the final. threat statement and safeguards requirements in this rule may be affected by the Comission paper being prepared in connection with the staff response to recomendations of the Task Force.
Other recommendations will be treated apart from this rulemaking, and additional work in the development of a systematic licensing review methodology and improved guidance on acceptable levels of protection against theft will be accomplished before the time of imple-mentation of the effective version of the rule.
4.
Note that the proposed amendments provide for interim and longer term upgrade actions in that after publication of the ame.ndments in effective form licensees would be given:
Ninety.iays to submit a modified security plan to a.
meet the interira requirements.
~
The Connissioners b.
Six months, or ninety days after NRC approval, to implement his interim modified security plan.
Nine months to submit a modified security plan to c.
meet the longer-term upgrade requirements.
d.
Two years, or ninety days after approval, to implement his lo.nger-term upgrade security plan.
5.
Note that the appropriate congressional committees will be notified prior to publication of the proposed amendments.
6.
Note that a public announcement such as Enclosure "C" M be issued when the notice of proposed rule making is filed with the Office of the Federal Register.
7.
Note that an environmental impact statement is not required because the proposed rule would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment as discussed in Enclosure "B".
A Negative Declaration will be issued supported by the " Environmental Impact Appraisal of Amendments to 10 CFR Part 73" which will be placed in the public document room.
8.
Note that after publication of the proposed amendments the staff Will conduct a meeting with the affected licensees to explain the details of the proposed requirements.
Coordination:
The Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Inspection and Enforcement, and Nuclear Regulatory Research concur in and the Executive Legal Director has no legal objections to the recommendations of this paper.
The Office of Public Affairs prepared the draft press release, Enclosure "C".
A copy of the paper has been provided the Office of Administration for their coordination and information. 0GC comments are included as Enclosure "D" and staff response thereto in Enclosure "E".
OPE connents will be submitted separately.
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l The Comissioners Scheduling:
For consideration at an early open policy session.
- =,
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,7w C11 V. Smi th, Jr., Di re r
Offic of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
/
/bs/M.74 e Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Standards Development
Enclosures:
"A" - Proposed Amendments "B" - Environmental Impacts Appraisal "C" - Oraft Press Release "0" - OGC Coments "E" - Staff Response to OGC Coments DISTRIBUTION Comissioners Comission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations Secretariat s
.]
Enclosure A NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[10 CFR Part 73]
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS AGENCY:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission ACTION:
Proposed Rule
SUMMARY
- Based, among other things, on the findings of a joint ERDA-NRC task force, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission is considsring extensive amendments to its regulations. These amendments would include performance oriented safeguards requirements for strengthened physical protection for strategic special nuclear material and for certain fuel cycle facilities, associated transportation and other activities involving significant quantities of strategic special nuclear mate fals.
DATES: Coments mst be received on or before (date 45 days after publics.cion in FR).
ADORESSES: Coments or suggestions for consideration in connection with the proposed amendments should be sent to the Secretary of the Comission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Section. Copies of comments received may be examined at the Comission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
1 Enclosure "A"
l FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. L. J. Evans, Jr., Chief, Require-ments Analysis Branch, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555,(301)427-4043 or Mr. R. J. Jones, Chief, Material Protection Standards Branch. Office of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, (301)443-6973.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A joint ERDA-NRC task force was formed on March 17, 1976, to propose a plan of action for improvin3 the controls and protection of nuclear materials at NRC licensed fuel cycle facilities.
The task force addressed the current status and future direction of physical security protection at NRC licensed fuel cycle facilities now in possession of fonnula quantities of strategic special nuclear materials.I The task force report was issued in July 1976.2 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has determined, as a result of the joint task force findings and other subsequent delibera-tion regarding fuel cycle facilities and special nuclear material transportation, that safeguards at certain existing fuel cycle facilities and for transportation activities should be upgraded l
Strategic special nuclear material is uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope),
uranium-233, or plutonium. A formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material is 5,000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams Pu).
2Joint ERDA-NRC Task Force on Safeguards (u), Final Report, July 1976, NUREG-0095 ERDA 77-34.
2 Enclosure "A"
l through public rulemaking. The Connission, therefore, proposes to amend its regulations in 10 CFR Part 73 that specify physical security requirements for fuel cycle facilities and transportation activities involving formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material.
The proposed amendments also would apply to licensed non-power reactors possessing formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material that did not qualify for exemption under paragraph 73.6(b).
The proposed amendments would include general performance require-rrents stated in terms of the capabilities necessary to protect against adversaries. The general performance requirements would be the same for both fixed sites and for transportation activities. The perform-ance capabilities describe the functions to be performed by a licensee's safeguards program. Performance capabilities would be differe'nt for fixed sites and transportation, reflecting the basic differences inherent in fixed site protection as opposed to the protection of moving vehicles and transfer point installations. Although specifi-cally designed to prevent theft, the new safeguards requirements would also provide increased protection against sabotage.
To prevent, with high assuranco, theft of strategic special nuclear material cnd to protect against radiological sabotage,E fixed site safeguards must assure the licensees' capabilities to:
Y adiological Sabotage is a new term to be used instead of Industrial R
i Sabotage to more clearly indicate that the sabotage of concern is that with radiological consequences.
3 Enclosure "A"
Preyent unauthorized access of persons, material, and vehicles into Material Access Areas and Vital Areas Permit only authorized activities and conditions within l
Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas Pemit only authorized placement and movement of strategic l
special nuclear material within Material Access Areas Permit removal of only authorized and confimed forms and quantities of strategic special nuclear material from Material Access Areas Provide for authorized access, and assure detection and response to unauthorized penetrations of Protected Areas to prevent theft of strategic special nuclear material and to protect against radiological sabotage These bas %.srformance capabilities provide for interruptions of i
the followins aeric adversary act'ons which might comprise an attempt to steal strategic special nuclear material from a fixed site or to connit an act of radiological sabotage:
entry into Protected Areas, Material Access Areas, and Vital Areas actions within these areas which might facilitate theft of strategic special nuclear material or commission of an act of radiological sabotage removal of strategic special nuclear from Material Access Areas 4
Enclosure "A"
To prevent, with high assurance, theft of strategic special nuclear material and to protect against radiological sabotage, trans-portation safeguards must provide the capabilities to:
Restrict cccess and activity in the vicinity of transports Prevent the unauthorized access into, or removal of strate-gic special nuclear material from, transports These basic performance capabilities provide for interruption of the following generic adversary actions which might comp ~ise an attempt to steal strategic special nuclear material from v*ansports or to commit an act of radiological sabotage:
approach to the vicinity of transport entry to either the transport controls or cargo area removal of strategic special nuclear materici from the transport Descriptions of basic safeguards performance capabilities and functions required to implement them are sat forth in the following proposed amendments to the regulations.
The proposed amendments also would define systems and subsystems for fixed site and transportation physical protection programs.
These systems and subsystems are all presently required, but these amend-ments place them in context of the required capabilities and functions.
For both fixed sites and transportation the systems ano subsystems are 5
Enclo are "A" l
A I
a) authorization controls, b) access and removal controls, c) barriers, d) detection systems, e) security organization, f) response plans, g) connunications, and h) provisions to insure the continuing effec-tiveness of the safeguards program.
Individual physical protection programs will require specific measures, which will depend on site-specific or transportation system situations, to meet the performance requirements. Thus, within each of the systems and subsystems the proposed amendments identify elements and components normally included in a physical protection program to achieve the required performance.
For example, components normally included in such systems are hardened access control points for protected area perimeters; dua; independent, hardened onsite alarm stations; alarm station interiors not visible from protected area perimeter; duress alarms; armored escort vehicles; specific in-transit storage and transfer requirements; and secure cargo vehicles.
In addition, specific requirements are being proposed for testing and maintenance and for system redundancy and diversity.
The particular mix of system specifications included in the proposed regulations were developed on the basis of generic system analyses coupled with licensing and inspection experience with physical protection systems. The state-of-the-art of physical protection technology and the current societal and legal constraints under which such systems must operate also were considered.
Nevertheless, 6
Enclosure "A"
site-specific or transport-specific factors may dictate other approaches or modifications of those specified. The intent of the proposed regulation is to provide a generic reference safeguards system that normally would provide the capabilities needed to meet the general performance requirements. At any particular site there may be soma subsystems and components not needed or additional ones required to meet the general performance requirements.
In the final analysis it is the general performance requirements' and performance capabilities that a're the basis for providing high assurance of preventing theft of strategic nuclear material and protecting against radiological sabotage.
4 The external adversary characteristics defined in the proposed regulation are stated so as to differentiate them from those stated in s 73.55. The adversary postulated in the proposea regulation is different from that in s 73.55 with respect to the size of the adversary force. The size of postulated adversary force against which the safeguards performance is to be evaluated has been expressed to indicate that the group is large enough to employ effective team maneuvering' tactics, unlike the "several persons" single term postu-lated as the adversary in s 73.55. The difference in the design basis for required levels of protection at power reactors and fuel cycle facilities reflects the relative differences in the potential consequences of successful sabotage at a reactor and theft of strategic i
l special nuclear material and subsequent detonation of a nuclaar i
i explosive device. The consequences of reactor sabotage are generally 7
Enclosure "A"
less severe than detonation of a nuclear explosive device. While these considerations are not amenable to precise quantification they have been' reflected in the general performance requirements associated with 5 73.55 and the proposed amendments.
Even though the general performance requirements associated with the proposed amendments postulate a larger adversary group, this does not necessarily mean that a larger facility protection force is required to achieve adequate safeguards.
In addition tc a well-designed defensive system and a well-trained response force, determination of the assurance of successful prevention of theft or sabotage would depend on analyses'of site specific conditions that affect the tactics, maneuverability, and effectiveness of response to the postulated adversary. Numbers of response personnel are an important factor in such response, but of equal and perhaps even more significance would be the use to which such response forces were put. Factors such as those listed in the Statement of Con-siderations to the proposed rule (Enclosure "A", page 8) would be among those considered in establishing the optimum response force size.
possibly the most significant detailed improvements being proposed i
are those involving guard numbers, quality, and equipment. The proposed amendments herein, however, specify only a minimum number of guards and do not specify a nominal number of armed response personnel 7-A Enclosure "A" l
as is done in 5 73.55. The number of armed response personnel can vary markedly at fuel cycle facilities due to the wide variety of site-specific conditions such as plant and process, layout and config-urations and site locatien and configuration.
For this reason it was not practical to specify nominal numbers of response personnel. This number may be the minimum of five for some plants and several times higher for others, depending on considerations such as the following, not necessarily in order of importance:
7-B Enclosure "A"
(a) Selection, training, and motivation of response force.
(b) Availability and construction of defensive positions.
(c) Availability and knowledge of weapons and other equipment.
(d)
Individual site considerations, including size, topography, weather, and number of plant units or buildings.
(e) Location and reliability of initial detection devices.
(f) 1.ocal Law Enforcement Agency response.
(g) Vital and material access area hardening, including plant design, location of and access control to vital areas.
(h) Design and construction of protected area barriers.
(1) Redundancy of security systems.
(j)
Initial screening and continuing reliability assessment of personnel.
(k) Security and contingency procedures.
A separate rulemaking proceeding (42 FR 25744) is addressing requirements for planned predetermined decision and action sequences to take effect in case of safeguards contingencies.
D.esponse to alarms or contingencies is now required but specific detailed planned response is not. The proposed amendments that follow refer to safeguards contingency plans and show the interrelationship of the proposed amendments to the contingency plan criteria published for public coment. Also as a l
matter of separate rulemaking (42 FR 14880) the Comission is con-sidering a pragram to require personnel security clearances for individuals who would have access to or control over special nuclear material.
8 Enclosure "A"
I Ths proposed amendments would be implemented by a revision to the scope of Part 73 to include the performance capability approach; revision of 5 73.2 to change or add definitions appropriate to the proposed new requirements; complete revision and redesignation of sections 73.30 through 73.36 and sections 73.50 and 73.60 to incluoe thu performance capabilities approach for both fixed sites and trans-portation. The revision and redesignation would be accomplished by adding new sections encompassing the revisions and additions but retaining the old sections and designations until the new sections become effective. The system specifications included in 5 73.26 for transportation physical protection systems are based on comments received on the transportation protection requirements proposed for coment on November 13,1974 (39 FR 40036) and subsequent considerations.
1 The implementation of the improved safeguards can occur in two phases. The first phase or " interim upgrade" will require that licensees submit modified physical security plans for increasing their physical protection against theft and radiological sabotage.
Interim measures will increase protection against theft and radiological sabotage by an external attack involving stealth, force, or deceptive action by a small group possibly with inside assistance and by acts of an insider.
In the second phase or " longer-term upgrade" licensees will submit modified plans describing added physical security and material control measures they will implement to protect against theft 4
9 Enclosure "A" 4
or radiological sabotage through internal conspiracies. The licensee may choose to submit a single plan encompassing both interim and longer-term upgrade at the time the interim plan above is required.
The staff has estimated some of the costs of upgrading physical security at fuel cycle facilities to the interim upgrade requirements.
These are presented in Table 1.
Similar estimates have been made for the upgrading of transportation safeguards. These are presented in Table 2.
The cost estimates shown in these tables do not take into account factors such as inflation, depreciation, capital recovery, and return on investment which would ordinarily be considered by licensees.
The Comission is hopeful of receiving from the licensees, as part of their comments on the proposed rule, their preliminary ideas and cost estimates for implementing measures to meet both the proposed interim and long-term objectives.
To meet the longer-tenn safeguards requirements, licensees must also provide increased protection against theft and radiological sabotage by internal conspiracy. Personnel clearances, proposed under provisions of 10 CFR Part 11, will provide substantial protection aga.nst internal conspiracy. Nevertheless, prudent safeguards design warrants the use of technology and procedures to prevent theft or sabotage by conspiracy wherever practicable, even where personnel have been cleared.
10 Enclosure "A"
TABLE 1 FIXED SITE SAFEGUARD IMPROVEMENT COST SUfEARYO Initial Annual Additional GuardsE
$ 45,000
$6,700,000 Semi-Auto Rifles
$ 24,900 2,490 Training'
$ 130,000 26,000 Additional Communications "
$ 12,000 2,400 Construct Guard Ready Rooms
$ 20,000 Harden Access Control Points
$ 120,000 Increase Protection of Primary Central Alarm Station
$ 98,400 9,840 Independent Secondary Alarm Station
$2,420,000
$ 120,000 i
TOTAL
$2,870,300
$6,860,730 O stimate of costs to upgrade physical security at 12 licensed fuel E
cycle facilities to protect against an external attack by stealth, force, or deceptive action by a small group possibly with inside assistance.
Y ese costs are based on the assumption that an average of 3 Th additional guard posts and an average of 10 response guards would be required at each of the 12 facilities currently possessing fonnula qua6tities of strategic special material.
In order to i
man each new guard post around the clock in a 3-shift operation and allow for sickness, and leave, the licensee must hire an average of 4.5 new guards for each new guard post at an estimated annual cost of $100,000 per guard post. Additional personnel may have to be hired for the off-shifts and weekends to keep the response force total at 10. This is estimated to be 11.5 man years per year per licensee.
Initial costs associated with guard employment would involve such things as personnel processing, uniforms, personal equipment, etc.
l 11 Enclosure "A" l
l
TABLE 2 TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS IMPROVEMENT COST
SUMMARY
j a
Initial Ar.aual Item Cost Cost Additional EscortsY
$70,500 Weapons
$ 2,610 TrainingCl'
$24,300
$ 6,100 Communications
$46,000
$15,300 Three Armored Escort Vehicles
$69,000
$12,500 Total
$141,910
$104,400 a/ stimate of co.sts to upgrade physical security during trans-E portation of special nuclear material for a transportation arranger who handles 90% of HEU shipments to foreign cunsignees and who uses a carrier with an approved transportation security plan and contract guard company for domestic shipments.
E ncludes an additional four escorts, four tenninal guards and I
two aircraft escorts per shipment including the per diem they will accumulate.
E/ raining costs were computed on the basis of training required T
dnder license condition of May 12, 1976.
l l
11-A Enclosure "A"
l Such supplementary systems and procedures may require additional people, interfere somewhat with process operations and necessitate physical rearrangements or added security equipment in some plants.
As a general approach, most licensees would be expected to provide increased surveillance of persons having access to material access and vital areas. This might be provided by means of closed circuit television; guard towers affording surveillance and control of large areas of a facility; and other types of internal surveillance.
\\
Other possible measures against conspiratorial acts include:
establishment of independent secondary alann stations; dual manning of material access area points; and regular indoctrination of employees concerning government cash awards.(up to half a million dollars) proffered under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act for information about nuclear conspiracy.
Many of the measures taken to protect against one insider will also provide a measure of protection against malevolent conspiracies or can be extended to provide such additional protection.
If the Commission adopts the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73, each affected licensee would be given a period of 90 days following the effective date of the amendments to submit a revised fixed site safeguards physical protection plan and, if appropriate, a revised safeguards transportation protection plan for the interim-upgrade. A licensee would be given until 180 days after the effective 12 Enclosure "A" l
date of the amendments or 90 days after the submitted plan is approved, whichever is later, to implement the approved interim plan. A licensee may submit longer-tem upgraded safeguard plans concurrently with the interim submission.
If prepared separately, final plans must be submitted within 270 days following the effective date of the amendments. A licensee would be given 540 days after the effective date of the amendments or 90 days after the longer-tem plan is approved, whichever is later, to implement his longer-tem upgrade plan.
The Comission has determined under Council of Environmental Quality guidelines and the criteria in 10 CFR Part 51 that an environ-mental impact statement for the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 1s not required. Concurrentif with publication af this notice of proposed rulemaking the Commission is making available in its Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washi.ngton, D.C. an " Environ-mental Impact Appraisal of Amendments To 10 CFR Part 73," to support a Negative Declaration.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and section 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regula-tions, Part 73 is contemp ated.
4 o
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)f/ 13 Enclosure "A" QO V,
I, W 3#
P i
1.
Paragraph 73.1(a) of 10 CFR Part 73 is revised to read as follows:I 5 73.1 Purpose and scope.
(a) Purpose.
This part prescribes requirements for the establish-ment and maintenance of a physical protection system which will have capabilities for physical protection of special nuclear material at fixed sites and in transit and of plants in which special nuclear material is used, for the purpose of protection against acts of radio-logical [fndustr4a4] sabotage and prevention of theft I [preteetien J f ef] special nuclear material.
[a ga ins t-the f t -by-es ta blis hnen t-a nd ma in t ena nee-e f-a -p hys f ea l-p re tee t ten-sys t em-ef+ --f il-Pre t ee tive baPPfers-and-intrusfen-deteetten-devices-at-fixed-sites-te-provide early-deteetien-ef-an-attaeky-f 3)-detePFenee-te-attaek-by-Feans-ef armed-guards-and-eseerts,-and-f3}-ifafsen-and-emumunfeatfen-with-4aw enfereement-autheefties-eapable-ef-rendering-assistanee-te-eeunter sush-attaeksr]
2.
Paragraph 73.2(c), (f), (h), (k), and (p) of 10 CFR Part 73 are revised to read as follows:
5 73.2 Definitions As used in this part:
l Comparative text is used where underlined portions are those that have been added and bracketed ifned-out portions have been deleted.
14 Enclosure "A" l
i
1 (c) " Guard" means a unifomed individual amed with a fiream whose primary duty is the protection of special nuclear material against theft and/or the protection of a plant against [ industrial]
radiological sabotage.
(f) " Physical barrier" means (1) Fences constructed of No.11 American wire gauge, or heavier wire fabric, topped by three strands or more of barbed wire or similar material on brackets angled outward between 30* and 45' from the vertical, with an overall height of not less than eight feet, including thebarbedtopping[r];
(2) Building walls, ceilinas and floors constructed of stone, brick, cinder block, concrete, steel or comparable materials (openings in which are secured by grates, doors, or covers of construction and fastening of sufficient strength such that the integrity of the wall is not lessened by any opening), or walls of similar construction, not part of a building, provided with a barbed topping described in paragraph (f)(1) of this section of a height of not less than 8 feet [r]
E.
(3) [Ce414ngs-and-fleeFS-GenStFuGted-to-offeF-Fes4E%4nGG-te penetwatten-equ$ valent-to-that-of-butidtag-walls desGathed-4n paragwaph-(f)(2)-of-this-sest4en] Any other physical obstruction constructed in a manner and of materials suitable for the purpose for which the obstruction is intended.
15 Enclosure "A"
(h)
" Vital area" means any area which containa vital equipment.
[within-a-structurer-the-wallsy-reef-and-fleer-ef-whfeh-eenstitute physieal-barriers-ef-eenstrwetten-at-least-as-substantial-as-walls-as deser4 bed-4n-paragraph-ff}f2}-ef-this-seettenr]
(k) " Isolation zone" means any area, clear of all objects which could conceal or shield an, individual, adjacent to a physical barrier.
Ev-whfeh-is-menitered-te-deteet-the-presenee-ef-indiv4 duals-er-vehieles i
within-that-arear3 (p)
"[Industr4M1 Radiological sabotage" means any deliberate act directed against a plant or transport in which an activity licensed pursuant to the regulations in this chapter is conducted, or against a
[te-any] component of such a plant or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation other than such acts by an enemy of the United States whethe.r foreign government or other person.
3.
Section 73.2 of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended to add paragraphs (t) thru(x).
5 73.2 Definitions As used in this part:
16 Enclosure "A" l
l
(t)
" Strategic special nuclear material" means uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent er more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium.
(u) " Formula quantity" means strategic special nuclear material in any combination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 +
gramsplutonium).
(v) "Transporc" means any land, sea, or air conveyance.
(w) " Incendiary device" means any self-contained device intended to create an intense fire that can damage normally flame resistant or retardant materials.
(r.) "Tempcrary exclusion area" means any area, access to which is controlled and which affords temporary isolation of special nuclear material in-transit and/or of the transports for such material.
(y)
" Movement control center" means an operations center which is remote from transport activity and which provides continuous tracking of convoy progress, receives reports of attempted attacks or thefts, provides a means for reporting these and other problems to appropriate agencies and can request and coordinate appropriate aid.
4.
The undesignated first paragraph of section 73.6 is revised to read as follows:
17 Enclosure "A"
5 73.6 Exenptions of certain quantities and kinds of special nuclear material.
A licensee is exempt from the requirements of Eis-7a,39-the ush 73,563-and-ef-fi-73,69r] 55 73.20, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.45, 73.46, 73.70 and 73.72 of this part, with respect to the following special nuclear material:
5.
Section 73.6 is amended to add paragraph (d) to read as follows:
)
5 73.6 Exemptions of certain quantities and kinds of special nuclear i
material.
(d) Special nuclear material that is being transported by the ERDA transport system.
6.
New sections 73.20, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.45 and 73.46 are added to read as follows:
5 73.20 General Performance Requirements (a)
In addition to any other requirements of this part, each licensee who:
(i) is authorized to operate a fuel reprocessing plant pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter; (ii) possesses or uses formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee; 18 Enclosure "A"
(3) A conspiracy of insiders or employees in any position.
(b) To meet the general performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section a licensee shall establish and maintain, or arrange for, a physical protection system that:
(1) provides, but is not necessarily limited to, the performance capabilities described in section 73.25 for in-transit protection or
'in Section 73.45 for fixed site protection unless otherwise authorized by the Commission; (2) is designed with sufficient redundancy and diversity to assure maintenance of the capabilities described in section 73.25 or 73.45; and (3) includes a testing and maintenance program to assure control over all activities and devices affecting the effectiveness, relia-bility, and availability of the physical protection system,17qluding a demonstration that any defects of such activities and devices will be promptly detected and corrected for the total period of time they are required as a part of the physical protection system.
(c) Each licensee subject to the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section shall:
(1) within 90 days after the effective date of these amendments, submit a revised fixed site safeguards physical protection plan and, if appropriate, a revised safeguards transportation protection plan describing how the licensee will comply with the requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section; i
20 Enclosure "A" l
l l
(2) within 180 days after the effective date of these amendments or 90 days after the plan (s) submitted pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) of this section is approved, whichever is later, implement the approved plan; (3) within 270 days after the effective date of these amendments submit a revised fixed site safeguards physical protection plan and, if appropriate, a revised safeguards transportaticn protection plan describing how the licensee will comply with the requirements of paragraph (a)(3) of this section; and (4) within 540 days after the effective date of these amendments or 90 days after the plan (s) submitted pursuant to paragraph (c)(3) of this section is approved, whichever is later, implement the approved plan.
5 73.25 performance capabilities for physical protection of strategic special nuclear material in transit.
(a) To meet the general perfonnance requirement of f 73.20 an in-transit physical protection system shall include, but not necessar-ily be limited to, the performance capabilities described in para-graphs (b) through (d) of this section unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.
(b) Restrict access to and activity in the vicinity of transports.
To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:
(1) Detect and delay any unauthorized attempt to gain access or introduce unauthorized materials into the vicinity of transports by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
21 Enclosure "A" l
(i) Protected areas or temporary ex:1usion areas to isolate shipments or transports at all scheduled and emergency stops to assure that unauthorized persons or materials shall not have direct access to the transports or shipment; (ii) Access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized access or penetration of a temporary exclusion area, or such attempts by persons, vehicles or materials at the time of the penetration or the attempt so that response can be such as to prevent the unauthorized penetration or prevent such penetration from resulting in theft of strategic special nuclear material or radiological sabotage; and (iii) Planning and information systems, to provide for preplanned shipments and updated route conditions to avoid areas which would increase the vulnerability of the shipment and to provide for comunication with the transport in order to maintain the status and position of the shipment and to inform the escort commander of changes in the itinerary.
(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized materials into the vicinity of transports by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(1) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and access criteria for persons, materials and vehicles; and 22 Enclosure "A"
(ii) Access controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons, materials and vehicles and assess.such identity against current authorization schedules and access criteria before permitting access and to initiate response measures to deny unauthorized entries.
(c) Prevent the unauthorized attempts to gain entry or introduce materials into, and the unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material from tr!r: sports.
To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:
(1) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized entry or introduce unauthorized materials into transports by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(1) entry authorization controls and procedures to provide current transport authorization schedules and entry criteria into transports for both persons and materials; and (ii) entry controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons and materials and to permit transport entry only to those persons and materials specified by the current authorization schedules and entry criteria.
(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized entry or introduce unauthorized material into transports by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(1) cargo containers and vehicles to delay access to strategic special nuclear nuterial sufficient to permit the detection and l
23 Enclosure "A" l
l
1 response systems to function so as to prevent the theft of strategic special nuclear material; (ii) tamper indicating devices to detect unauthorized tampering with transport doors or cargo containers; and (iii) surveillance subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized presence of persons or materials and any unauthorized attenpt to penetrate the transport so that the response can prevent the unauthor.ized penetration.
(3) Prevent unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material from transports by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(i) authorization controls and procedures to provide current schedules for authorized removal of strategic special nuclear material which specify the persons authori.ed to remove and receive the material and the authorized times for such removal and receipt; (ii) removal controls and procedures to establish removal proce-dures for transferring cargo in emergency situations; and (iii) removal controls and procedures to pennit removal of strategic special nuclear material only after verification of the identity of persons removing or receiving the strategic special nuclear material, and the identity and integrity of the strategic special nuclear material being removed from transports.
(4) Detect attempts to remove strategic special nuclear material from transports by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
24 Enclosure "A"
(i) cargo containers and transport structure to delay unauthor-tzed strategic special nuclear material removal attempts sufficient to assist detection and pennit a response to prevent the removal; and (ii) detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material so that response to the attempt can be such as to prevent the removal.
(d) Response:
Each safeguards program shall provide a response capability to assure that the two performance capabilities described in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section are achieved.
To perform thiscapability,theiicenseeshall:
(1) Establish a security organization to:
(i) provide trained and qualified personnel to carry out assigned duties and respor.sibilities, and (ii) provide armed escorts to respond to and coordinate transport and escort activities for routine security operations and safeguards contingencies.
(2) Establish a predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency events.
(3) provide communication networks to:
(i) enable.the escort commander to communicate on routine and non-routine situations to a movement control center for assessment of the status and position of a shipment; 25 Enclosure "A" 1
1
^
i i
(ii) enable the movement control center to comunicate to the escort comander to assist in carrying out actions as identified in the safeguards contingency plan; (iii) enable the escort comander.to comunicate with escort vehicles for implementation of the safeguards contingency plan; and (iv) enable both the escort comander and movement control center to notify law enforcement authorities of need for assistance as specified in the safeguards contingency plan.
(4) Provide equipment for the escort forces to provide for a response which is sufficiently rapid and effective so as to achieve the predetermined objective of the response.
5 73.26 Transportation Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Elements, Components, and Procedures (a) A transportation physical protection system established pursuant to the general performance requirements of 5 73.20(a)(1) and (a)(2) and performance capability requirements of 5 73.25 of l
this part shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the measures specified in paragraphs (b) through (k) of this section. The Comission may require, depending on the individual transportation conditions or circumstances, additional measures deemed necessary to meet the general performance requirements of 5 73.20 of this part.
The Comission also may authorize protection measures other than those required by this section if in its opinion the overall level of perform-l ance meets the general performance requirements of I 73.20 and the 1
perfonnance capability requirements of f 73.25 of this part.
26 Enclosure "A" t
l I
4 1
(b) Planning and Scheduling.
(1) Shipments shall be scheduled to avoid regular patterns and preplanned to avoid areas of natural disaster or civil disorders, such as strikes or riots.
Such shipments shall be planned in order to avoid storage times in excess of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and to assure that deliveries occur at a time when the receiver at the final delivery point is present to accept the shipment.
(2) Arrangements shall be made with law enforcement authorities along the route of shipments for their response to an emergency or a call for assistance.
(3) For any series of shipments of strategic special nuclear material by a licensee to the same consignee in which individual shipments are less than the quantities requiring physical protection in transit under 10 CFR 73.l(b)(2), but more than 200 grams computed by the formula, grams = (E-ams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233
+ grams plutonium), the licensee shall confirm and log the arrival at the final destination of each shipment in the series before releasing the subsequent shipment from his facility.
(4) Security arrangements for export and import shipments shall be approved in advance of the shipment by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Information to be supplied to the Commission in advance of the shipment is as follows:
(i) shipper, consignee, carriers, transfer points, modes of
- shipment, l
(ii) point where escorts will no longer be responsible for l
export shipment, (iii) arrangements made for transfer of shipment security, 27 Enclosure "A"
(iv) point where escorts will accept responsibility for import shipment, and (v) security arrangements at point where escorts accept responsi-bility for import shipment.
(5) A licensee who imports fannula quantities of strategic special nuclear material shall make arrangements to assure that such material will be protected in transit as follows:
(i) An individual. designated by the licensee or his agent, or as specified by a contract of carriage, shall confirm the container count and examine locks and/or seals for evidence of tampering, at the first place in the United States at which the shipment is discharged from the arriving carrier.
(ii) The shipment shall be protected from the last foreign terminal until it arrives in the United States and subsequently as provided in this section and 15 73.25 and 73.27.
(6) A licensee who exports formula quantities of strategic 4
special nuclear material shall comply with the requirements of this section and 55 73.25 and 73.27, as applicable, up to the first point where the shipment is taken off the transport outside the United States.
(7) Hand-to-hand receipts shall be completed at origin and destination and at all points enroute where there is a transfer of custody.
28 Enclosure "A" a
(8) Plutonium and U-233 shall be shipped only in containers approved by the NRC. The containers shall be hardened to withstand high velocity impacts, explosives, and small arm fire without release of contents.
(c) Security Organization.
(1) The licensee or,his agent shall establish a transportation security organization, including armed escorts and a movement control center manned and equipped to monitor and control shipments, to comunicate with local law enforcement. authorities, and to respond to safeguards contingencies. Criteria and requirements for security personnel suitability, training, equipment, qualifications, and requalifications are set forth in Appendix B to this part, " General Criteria for Security Personnel" as proposed in 42 FR (2) At least one full time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical security activities of the security organization shall be on duty at the movement control center during the course of any shipment.
(3) The licensee or his agent shall establish, maintain, and follow a management system to provide for the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of transportation security procedures.
The system shall include:
(1) written security procedures which document the structure of the transportation security organization and which detail the duties of drivers and escorts and other individuals responsible for security; 29 Enclosure "A" l
l
~
(ii) provision for written approval of such procedures and any revisions thereto by the indtytdual with overall responsibility for the security function and the management of the organization responsi-ble for the security functions; and (iii) provision for a review at least every 12 months of the transportation security program by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct respons-ibility for implementation cf the security program.
Such a review shall include a review and audit of security procedures and practices, an audit of the security system testing and maintenance program, and a test of the safeguards system along with consnitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities.
The results of the review and audit along with recommendations for improvements shall be documented, reported to the responsible organization management, and kept available for inspection for a period of five years.
(4) The licensee or his agent shall not permit an individual to act as an escort or other security organization member unless such individual in accordance with his assigned duties meets the require-ments of Appendix B as proposed in 42 FR (5) Armed escort personnel shall pass a physical examination, receive training and requalify with assigned weapons at least every twelve months.
(6) Escort armament shall include handguns, shotguns, and semi-automatic rifles consistent with local conditions.
30 Enclosure "A" i
l l
. ~
i 5
(d) Contingency and Response Plans and Procedures.
(1) The licensee or his agent shall establish, maintain, and follow a safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to strategic special nuclear material in transit subject to the provisions of this section. Such safeguards contingency plan shall be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C to this part, " Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plan" as proposed in 42 FR 25744. Such contingency plans shall include provisions for coping with threat assessments, and response to threats, as well as response to transport disablements, unusual weather, natural disaster, and civil disturbance conditions.
(e) Transfer and Storage of Strategic Special Nuclear Material for Domestic Shipments.
(1) Strategic special nuclear material shall be placed in a protected area at transfer points if transfer is not immediate from one transport to another. Where a protected area is not available a temporary exclusion area shall be established for the shipment.
The transport may serve as a temporary exclusion area.
(2) All transfers shall be monitored by at least nine anned l
escorts - one of whom shall serve as escort connander. At least seven of the armed escorts (including the escort comander) monitoring the shipment shall be available to protect the shipment and at least three of the seven shall keep the strategic special nuclear material under continuous surveillance while. it is at the transfer point. The two remaining escorts shall take up positions at a remote monitoring l
31 Enclosure "A"
location.
The remote location may be a radio-equipped vehicle or a nearby place, apart from the shipment monitoring area, so that a sic?le act cannot remove the capability of the escorts for calling for assistance.
Each of the nine amed escorts shall be capable of maintaining comunication with each other.
The escort commander shall have the capability to comunicate with the escorts at the remote location and with local law enforcement agencies for emergency assistance.
In addition the armed escorts at the remote location shall have the capability to comunicate with the law enforcement agencies and with the shipment movement control center.
The escort comander shall call the remote location at least every 30 minutes to report the status of the shipment.
If the calls are not received within the prescribed time,.the escorts in the remote location shall,
request assistance from the law enforcement authorities, notify the shipment movement control center and initiate the appropriate con-tingency plans. Armed escorts shall observe the opening of the cargo compartment of the incoming transport and ensure that the shipment is complete by checking locks and seals. A shipment loaded onto or transferred to another transport shall be checked to assure complete loading or transfer. Continuous visual surveillance of the cargo 1
compartment shall be maintained up to the time the transport departs from the terminal. The escorts shall observe the transport until it has departed and shall notify the licensee or his agent of the latest l
status imediately thereafter.
32 Enclosure "A"
(f) Access Control Subsystems and Procedures.
(1) A numbered picture badge identification procedure shall be used to identify all individuals who will have access to a shipment.
The identification procedure shall require that the individual who has possession of the strategic special nuclear material shall have, in advance, identification picture badges of all individuals who are to
~
assume custody for the shipment.
The shipment shall be released only when the individual who has possession of strategic special nuclear material has assured positive identification of all of the persons assuming custody for the shipment by comparing the copies of the identification badges that he has received in advance to identifica-tion badges that the individuals who will assume custody of the ship-ment carry.
(2) Access to protected areas, temporary exclusion areas, transports, escort vehicles, aircraft, rail cars, and containers where strategic special nuclear material is contained shall be limited to individuals authorized access to these areas after they have been properly identified under paragraph (f)(1) of this section.
(3) Strategic special nuclear material shall be shipped in containers that are protected by tamper-indicating seals.
The con-tainers also shall be locked if they are not in another locked container or transport. The outermost container or transport also shall be protected by tamper-indicating seals.
33 Enclosure "A" l
L
(g) Shipment by road.
(1) A detatled route plan shall be prepcred which shows the routes to be taken, the refueling and rest stops, ano the call-in times to the movement control center. All shipments shall be made on primary highways with minimum use of secondary roads. All shipments shall be made without intemediate stops except for refueling, rest or emergency stops.
(2) Cargo compartments of the trucks or trailers shall be locked and protected by tamper-indicating seals.
(3) The shipment shall be protected by one of the following methods:
(i) The cargo vehicle shall be a specially designed truck or trailer that reduces the vulnerability to theft.
Design features of the truck or trailer shall permit immobilization of the truck or of the cargo-carrying portion of the vehicle and shall prov!de a deterrent to physical penetration of the cargo compartment. Two separate escort vehicles shall accompany the cargo vehicle.
There shall be a total of nine amed escorts with at least two in the cargo vehicle.
Escorts may also operate the cargo and escort vehicles.
(ii) The cargo vehicle shall be an armored car. Three separate escort vehicles shall accompany'such a cargo vehicle. There shall be a total of nine armed escorts, with at least two in the cargo vehicle.
Escorts may also operate the cargo and escort vehicles.
34 Enclosure "A"
1 l
(4) All escort vehicles shall be bullet-resistant.
(5) procedures shall be established to assure that no unauthor-ized persons or materials are on the cargo vehicle before strategic special nuclear material is loaded, or.on the escort vehicles, ime-diately before the trip begins.
(6) Cargo and escort vehicles shall maintain continuous intra-convoy two-way communication.
In addition at least two of the vehicles shall be equipped with a coded two-way continuous voice or digital comunication capability to the movement control center. A redundant means of comunication shall also be available.
Calls to the movement control center shall be made at least every half hour to convey the status and position of the shipment.
In the event no call is received in accordance with these requirements, the licensee or his agent shall immediately notify the law enforcement authorities and the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Comission Inspection and Enforcement Regional j
Office listed in Appendix A of this part and initiate the appropriate contingency plan.
(7) At refueling, rest, or emergency stops at least nine armed escorts shall be available to protect the shipment and at least three anned escorts shall maintain continuous visual surveillance of the cargo compartment.
(8) Transfers to and from other modes of transportation shall be in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
35 Enclosure "A"
(h) Shipment by Air.
(1) Except as specifically approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, no shipment of special nuclear material shall be made in passenger aircraft in excess of (i) 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less, of plutonium or uranium-233, or (ii) 350 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope).
(2) All shipments on cargo aircraft shall be accompanied by three armed escorts who shall be able to converse in a common language with the captain of the aircraft.
(3) Transfers of these shipments shall be minimized and shall be conducted in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
Such shipments shall be scheduled so that the strategic special nuclear material is loaded last and unloaded first.
(4) At scheduled refueling stops, at least nine armed escorts
)
shall be available to protect the shipment and at least three armed escorts shall maintain continuous visual surveillance of the cargo compartment.
(5) Export shipments shall be accompanied by three armed escorts from the last terminal in the United States until the shipment is unloaded at a foreign terminal and prime responsibility for physical protection is assumed by agents of the consignee. While on foreign soil, the escorts may surrender their weapons to legally constituted local authorities.
The shipment shall be scheduled with no 36 Enclosure "A"
intermediate stops.
Import shipments shall be accompanied by three armed escorts from the last foreign port.
These escorts shall provide physical protection for the shipment until relieved by verified agents of the U.S. consignee.
(6) Procedures shall be established to assure that no unauthor-ized persons or material are on the aircraft before strategic special nuclear material is loaded on board.
(7) Arrangements shall be made at all airports to identify an individual with whom communication shall be established prior to landing to assure that the nine required armed escorts are available and that the required security measures will be taken upon landing.
(1) Shipment by Rail.
(1) A shipment by rail shall be escorted by nine armed escorts in the shipment car or an escort car next to the shipment cm-of the train. At least three escorts shall keep the shipment car under con-tinuous visual surveillance.
Escorts shall detrain at stops when practicable and time permits to maintain t.he shipment cars under continuous visual surveillance and to check car or container locks and seals.
(2) Procedures shall be established to assure that no unauthor-ized persons or materials are on the shipment or escort car before strategic special nuclear material is loaded on board.
37 Enclosure "A"
(3) Only containers weighing 5000 lbs or more shall be shipped on open rail cars.
(4) A coded two-way continuous voice or digital communication capability between the escorts and the' movement control center shall be maintained. A redundant means of continuous communication also shall be available.
Calls to the movement control center shall be l
made at least every half hour to convey the status and position of the shipment.
In the event no call is received in accordance with these requirements, the licensee or his agent shall immediately notify :he law enforcement authorities and the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Comission Regional Office listed in Appendix A of this part and initiate the appropriate contingency plan.
(5) Transfer to and from other modes of transportation shall be in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
'(i) Shipment by Sea (1) Shipments shall be made only on container-ships. The strate-gic special nuclear material container (s) shall be loaded into exclu-sive use cargo containers conforming to American National Standards Institute (ANSI) MH5.1 or International Standards ' Organization (ISO) 1496.
Each of these containers shall have at least one similar type container covering each of its five sides.
The sixth side shall either be on deck or on top of another container.
Locks and seals shall be inspected by the escorts whenever access is possible.
38 Enclosure "A"
l (2) All shipments shall be accompanied by three armed escorts who shall be able to converse in a common language with the captain of the ship.
(3) Minimum ports of call shall be scheduled and there shall be no scheduled transfer to other vessels.
Transfer to and from other modes of transportation shall be in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
(4) At all. ports of call where other cargo is transferred, the
\\
escorts shall ensure that the shipment is not removed. At least two j
escorts shall maintain continuous visual surveillance of the cargo area where the container is stored up to the time the ship departs.
(5) Export shipment shall be accompanied by three armed escorts from the last port in the United States until the shipment is unloaded at a foreign terminal and prime responsibility for physical protec-tion is assumed by agents of the consignee. While on foreign soil, i
the escorts may surrender their weapons to legally constituted local authorities.
Import shipments shall be accompanied by three armed escorts from the last foreign port.
These escorts shall provide physical protection for the shipment until relieved by verified agents of the U.S. consignee.
(6) Ship-to-shore communications shall be available, and a ship-to-shore contact shall be made every six hours to relay position i
l infomation, and the status of the shipment.
l 39 Enclosure "A" l
(7) Arrangements shall be made at all ports of call to identify an individual with who communication shall be established prior to arrival to assure that the nine required armed escorts are available and that the required security measures will be taken upon arrival.
(k) Test and Maintenance Programs.
i The licensee or his agent shall establish, maintain and follow a test and maintenance program for communications equipment and other security related devices and equ'ipment used pursuant to this section which shall include the following:
l (1) Tests and inspections shall be conducted during the design, installation, and construction of security related subsystems and components to assure that they comply with their respective design criteria and performance specifications.
(2) Preoperational tests and inspections shall be conducted for security related subsystems and components to demonstrate their effectiveness, availability, and reliability with respect to their respective design criteria and performance specifications.
(3) Operational tests and inspections shall be conducted for security related subsystems and components to assure their maintenance in an operable and effective condition.
(4) Preventive maintenance programs shall be established for security related subsystems ai d components to assure their continued i
maintenance in an operable and effective condition.
40 Enclosure "A" e
.n-,
,m-y n
s 4
(5) All security related subsystems and components shall be maintained in operable condition.
Corrective action procedures and compensatory measures shall be developed and employed to assure that the effectiveness of the security system is riot reduced by failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the security related equipment or structures.
I 73.27 Notification Requirements (a)
(1) A licensee who delivers formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material to a carrier for transport shall immediately notify the consignee by telephone, telegraph, or teletype, of the time of departure of the shipment, and shall notify or confinn with the consignee the method of transportation, including the names of carriers, and the estimated time of arrival of the shipment at its destination.
(2)
In the case of a shipment (f.o.b.) the point where it is delivered to a carrier for transport, a licensee shall, before the shipment is delivered to the carrior, obtain written certification frcm the licensee who is to take delivery of the shipment at the f.o.b. point that the physical protection arrangements required by is 73.25 and 73.26 for licensed shipments have been made. When a contractor exempt from the requirements for a Commission license is the consignee of a shipment, the licensee shall, before the shipment is delivered to the carrier, obtain written certification from the contractor who is to take delivery of the shipment at the f.o.b. point that the physical protec-tion arrangements required by ERDA Manual Chapters 2401 or 2405, as 41 Enclosure "A"
j appropriate, have been made.
(3) A licensee who delivers formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material to a carrier for transport or releases such special nuclear material f.o.b. at the point where it is delivered to a carrier for transport shall also make arrangements with the consignee to be notified immediately by telephone and telegraph, teletype, or cable, of the arrival of the shipment at its destination or of any such shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated. time of arrival at its destination.
(b) Each licensee who receives a shipment of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material shall imediately notify by telephone and telegraph or teletype, the person who delivered the material to a carrier for transport and the Director of the appro-priate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of th.e arrival of the shipment at its destination. When an Energy Research and Development Administra-tion (ERDA) Ifcense-exempt contractor is the consignee, the licensee who is the consignor shall notify by telephone and telegraph, or_
teletype, the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of the arrival of the shipment at its destination imediately upon being notified of the receipt of the shipment by the license-exempt contrac-torasarrangedpursuanttoparagraph(a)(3)ofthissection.
In the event such a shipment fails to arrive at its destination at the esti-mated time, or in the case of an export shipment, the licensee who 42 Enclosure "A" i
l
exported the shipment, shall imediately notify by telephone and telegraph or teletype, the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regula-tory Comission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of this part, and the licensee or other person who delivered the material to a carrier for transport.
The licensee who made the physical protection arrangements shall also imediately notify by telephone and telegraph, or teletype, the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Comi.ssion Inspection and Enforcement R~egional Office listed in Appendix A of the action being taken to trace the shipment.
(c) Each licensee who makes arrangements for physical protection of a shipment of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material as required by 55 73.25 and 73.26 shall imediately conduct a trace investigation of any shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and file a report with the Commission as specified in i 73.71.
If the licensee who conducts the trace investigation is not the consignee, he shall also imediately report the results of his investigation by telephone and telegraph, or teletype to the consignee.
5 73.45 Performance Capabilities for Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems (a) To meet the general performance requirements of 5 73.20 a fixed site physical protection system shall include, but not 43 Enclosure "A" l
i
1 s
necessarily be limited to, the performance capabilities described in paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section unless otherwise authorized by the Comission.
l (b) Prevent unauthorized access'of persons and materials into material access areas and vital areas. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:
(1) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized set.ess or introduce unauthorized material across material access or vital area boundaries by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(1) barriers to channel persons and material to material access a61d vital area entry control points and to delay any unauthorized penetration attempts by persons or materials sufficient to assist detection and permit a response that will prevent the penetration; and (ii) access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and comunicate any unauthorized penetration attempts by persons or materials at the time of the attempt so that a response can prevent the unauthorized access or penetration.
(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized materials into material access areas or vital areas by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(1) access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and entry criteria for both persons and materials; and 44 Enclosure "A"
e (ii) entry controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons and materials and assess such identity against current authori-zation schedules and entry criteria before pemitting entry and to initiate response measures to deny unauthorized entries.
(c) Permit only authorized activities and conditions within protected areas, material access areas, and vital areas. To achieve this capabilitty the physical protection system shall:
(1) Detect unauthorized activities or conditions within pro-tected areas, material access areas and vital areas using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(i) controls and procedures that establish current schedules of authorized activities and conditions in defined areas; j
(ii) boundaries to define areas.within which the authorized activities and conditions are permitted; and (iii) detection and surveillance subsystems and procedures to discover and assess unauthorized activities and conditions and comuni-cate them so that response can be such as to stop tne activity or correct the conditions before strategic special nuclear material is stolen or radiological sabotage committed.
\\ (d) Permit only authorized placement and movement of strategic cpecial nuclear matertal within material access areas. To achiese this capability the physical protection system shall:
(1) Detect unauthorized placement and movement of strategic special nuclear material w Ohin the material access area using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
45 Enclosure "A"
i 4
(1) controls and procedures to delineate authorized placement and control for strat'gic special nuclear material; e
(ii) controls and procedures to establish current authorized placement and movement of all strategic special nuclear material within material access areas; (iii) controls and procedures to maintain current knowledge of the j
identity, quantity, placement, and movement of all strategic special nuclear material within material access areas; and (iv) detection and monitoring subsystems and procedures to discover and assess unauthorized placement and movement of strategic special nuclear material and comunicate them so that response can be such as to return the strategic special nuclear material to authorized place-ment or control.
(e) Pemit removal of only authorized and confirmed forms and amounts of strategic special nuclear material from material access areas. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:
(1) Detect attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material from material access areas by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(1) barriers to channel persons and materials exiting a material access area to exit control points and to delay any unauthorized strategic special nuclear material removal attempts sufficient to assist detection and pemit a response that will prevent the removal; and 46 Enclosure "A" j
l l
l
(ii) detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and comunicate any attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material so that response to the attempt can be such as to prevent the removal.
(2) Confirm the identity and quantity of strategic special nuclear material presented for removal from a material access area and detect attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material from. material a~ccess areas by deceit using the following sub-systems and subfunctions:
(1) authorization controls and procedures to provide current schedules for authorized removal of strategic special nuclear material which specify the authorized properties and quantities of material to be removed, the persons authorized to remove the material, and the authorized time schedule; (ii) removal controls and procedures to identify and confim the properties and quantities of material being removed and verify the identity of the persons making the tanoval and time of removal and assess these against the current authorized removal schedule befora permitting removal; and (iii) comunications subsystems and procedures to provide for notification of an attempted unauthorized or unconfirmed removal so that response can be such as to prevent the removal.
(f) Provide for authorized access and assure detection of and response to unauthorized penetrations of the protected area to 47 Enclosure "A"
a prevent theft of strategic special nuclear material and to protect against radiological sabotage. To achieve this capabilf ty the physical protection system shall:
(1) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized persons, vehicles, or materials into the protected area i
by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
(i) barriers to channel persons, vehicles, and materials to protected area entry control points; and to delay any unauthorized penetration attempts or the introduction of unauthorized vehicles or materials sufficient to assist detection and permit a response that will prevent the penetration or prevent such penetration from resulting in theft of strategic special nuclear material or radio-logical sabotage; and (ii) access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and comunicate any unauthorized access or penetrations or such attempts by persons, vehicles, or materials at the time of the act or the attempt so that response can be such as to prevent the unauthorized access or penetration, or prevent such penetration from resulting in theft of strategic special nuclear material or radio-logical sabotage.
(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized persons, vehicles, or materials into the protected area by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:
48 Enclosure "A" n
(1) access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and entry criteria for persons, vehicles, and materials; an.
(ii) entry crntrols and procedure's to verify the identity of persons, materials and vehicles and assess such identity against current authorization schedules before pennitting entry and to initiate response measures to deny unauthorized access.
(g) Response.
Each safeguards program shall provide a response capability to assure that the five capabilities described in paragraphs (b) through (f) of this section are achieved.
To achieve this capabil-ity a licensee'shall:
(1)
Establish a security organization to:
(1) provide trained and qualified personnel to carry out assigned duties and responsibilities; and (ii) provide for routine security operations and planned and 1
predetermined nesponse to emergencies and safeguards contingencies.
(2) Establish a predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency events.
(3) Provide equipment for the security organization and facility design features to:
(1) provide for rapid assessment of safeguards contingencies; (ii) provide for response by assigned security organization personnel which is sufficiently rapid and effective so as to achieve the predetermined objective of the response; and 49 Enclosure "A"
(iii) provide protection for the assessment and response personnel so that they ca. complete their assigned duties.
(4) Provide communications networks to:
(i) provide rapid and accurate t'ransmission of security informa-tion among on-site forces for routine security operation, assessment of a contingency, and response to a contingency; and (ii) provide rapid and accurate transmission of detection and assessment infonnation to off-site assistance forces.
5 73.46 Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Elements, Components, and Procedures (a) A licensee physical protection system established pursuant to the general performance requirements of 5 73.20(a)(1) and (a)(2) and the performance capability requirements of 5 73.45 of this part shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the measures specified in paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section. The Comis-sion may require, depending on individual facility and site conditions, additional measures deemed necessary to meet the general perfonnance requirements of 5 73.20 of this part. The Commission also may author-ize protection measures other than those required by this section if, in its opinion, the overall level of performance meets the general perfonnance requirements of 5 73.20 and the performance capability requirements of 5 73.45 of this part.
(b) Security Organization (1) The licensee shall establish a security organization, including guards. Criteria and requirements for security personnel i
50 Enclosure "A" l
l
suitability, training, equipment, qualifications, and requalifications are set forth in Appendix B to this part " General Criteria for Security Personnel" as proposed in 42 FR (2) The licensee shall have onsite at all time at least one full time member of the security organization with authority to direct the physical security activities of the security organization.
(3) The licensee shall have a management system to provide for the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of security procedures. The system shall include:
(i) written security procedures which document the structure of the security organization and which detail the duties of guards, watchmen and other individuals responsible for security; (ii) provision for written approval of such procedures and any.
revisions thereto by the individual with overall responsibility for l
the security function and by licensee plant management; (iii) provision for a review at least every 12 months of the security system by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementa-tion of the security program.
The review shall include a review and audit of security procedures and practices, an audit of the security system testing and maintenance program, and a test of the safeguards system along with consnitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results of the review and audit along 51 Enclosure "A"
with recomendations for improvements shall be documented, reported to the licensee's corporate and plant management, and kept available at the plant for inspection for a period of five years.
(4I The licensee shall not pemit an indivdual to act as a guard, amed response individual, or other security organization member unless the individual in accordance with his assigned duties meets the requirements of Appendix B as proposed in 42 FR (5) Guards and amed response personnel shall pass a physical examination, receive training and requalify with assigned weapons at i
least every twelve months.
(6) Guard and armed response personnel armament shall include handguns, shotguns, and semi-automatic rifles consistent with site specific conditions.
(c) Physical Barrier $ubsystems (1) Vital equipment shall be located only within a vital area and strategic special nuclear material shall be stored or processed only in a material access area.
Both vital areas and material access areas shall be located within a protected area so that access to vital equipment and to strategic special nuclear material requires passage through at least two physical barriers. More than one vital area or material access area may be located within a single protected area.
(2) The physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area shall be separated from any other barrier designated as a physical barrier for a vital area or material access area within the protected l
area.
52 Enclosure "A"
1 (3)
Isolation zones shall be.s ataf,,
'.9utdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and shall be large enough to permit observation of the activities of people on either side of that barrier in the event of its penetration.
If parking facilities are provided for employees or vistors, they shall be located outside the isolation zone and exterior to the protected area.
(4)
Isolation zones and all exterior areas within the protected area shall be provided with illumination sufficient for the monitoring and observation requirements of paragraphs (c)(3), (e)(8), (h)(4) and (h)(5) of this section, but not less than 0.2 footcandle measured at ground level.
(5) Strategic special nuclear material not in process shall be stored in a vault or vault-type room.
(6) Enriched uranium scrap in the form of small pieces, cuttings, chips, solutions or in other forms which result from a manufacturing process, contained in 30 gallon or larger containers with a uranium-235 content of less than 0.25 grams per liter, may be stored within a locked and separately fenced area within a larger protected area provided that the storage area fence is no closer than 25 feet to the perimeter of the protected area. 'The storage area when unoccupied shall be protected by a guard or watchman who shall patrol at intervals not exceeding 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or by intrusion alarms.
53 Enclosure "A" l
(d) Access Control Subsystems and procedures (1) A numbered picture badge identification subsystem shall be used for all individuals who are authorized-access to protected areas without escort. An individual not employed by the licensee but who requires frequent and extended access to protected, material access, and vital areas may be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area and which indicates.(1) Non-employee-no escort required; (ii) areas to which access is authorized and (iii) the period for which access has been authorized.
Badges shall be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected areas.
(2) Access to vital areas and material access areas shall be limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipment and strategic special nuclear material and who require such access to perform their duties.
No activities other than those which require access to strategic special nuclear material or equipment used in the processing, use, or storage of strategic special nuclear material, shall be permitted within a material access area. Authorization for such indi-viduals shall be indicated by the issuance of specially coded numbered badges indicating vital areas and material access areas to which access l
is authorized.
l (3) The licensee shall establish and follow procedures that will 6
i identify to access control personnel those vehicles and materials that are authorized entry to protected, material access, and vital areas and those vehicles and materials that are not authorized entry to such areas.
54 Enclosure "A"
(4) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and i
vehicle access into a protected area.
Identification and search of all individuals for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices shall be made and authorization shall be che' ked at such points. ERDA ceiriers c
engaged in the transport of SNM need not be searched. Licensee employees having an NRC or ERDA clearance may be searched on a random basis. The individual responsible for the la'st access control function (control-ling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a structure, with bullet-resistant walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and windows.
(5) At the point of personnel and vehicle access into a protec-ted area, all hand-carried packages shall be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices.
(6) All packages and material for delivery into the protected area shall be checked for proper identification and authorization and searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior to admittance into the protected area, except those Commission approved delivery and inspection activities specifically designated by the licensee to be carried out within material access, vital, or protected areas for reasons of safety, security or operational necessity.
(7) All vehicles, except ERDA vehicles engaged in transporting SNM and emergency vehicles under emergency conditions, shall be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior to entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched shall include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area.
55 Enclosure "A"
(8) All vehicles, except designated licensee vehicles, requiring entry into the protected area shall be escorted by a member of the security oroanization while within the protected area, and to the extent practicable shall be off-loaded in an area that is not adjacent to a vital area. Designated licensee vehicles shall be limited in I
their use to onsite plant functions and shall remain in the protected i
area except for operational, maintenance, security and emergency purposes. The licansee shall exercise positive control over all such designated vehicles to assure that they are used only by authorized persons and for authorized purposes.
(9) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access to material access and vital areas.
Identification of personnel and vehicles shall be made and authorization checked at such points. Prior to entry into,a material access area, packages shall be searched for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or counterfeit substitutes items which could be used for theft or diversion of strategic special nuclear material.
Each individual, package, and vehicle shall be searched for concealed strategic special nuclear material before exiting from a material access area unless exit is to a contiguous material access area.
(10) Individuals not permitted by the licensee to enter protected breas without escort shall be escorted by a watchman, or other individ-ual designated by the licensee, while in a protected area and shall be badged to indicate that an escort is required.
In addition, the individual shall be required to register his name, date, time, purpose j
of visit and employment affiliation, citizenship, and name of the individual to be visited.
56 Enclosure "A"
(11) All keys, locks, combinations and related equipment used to control access to protected, material access, and vital areas shall be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. Whenever there is evidence that a key, lock, combination', or related equipment may have been compromised it shall be changed. Upon termination of employment of any snployee, keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment to which that employee had access, shall be changed.
(e) Detection and Alarm Subsystems (1) The licensee shall provide an intrusion alarm subsystem such that penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area or an j
isolation zone adjacent to the protected area barrier will be detected at the time of penetration or attempted penetration.
(2) All emergency exits in each protected, material access, and vital area shall be locked from the outside and alarmed to provide local visible and audib e alarm annunciation.
(3) All unoccupied vital areas and material access areas shall be locked and protected by an intrusion alarm subsystem which will alarm upon the entry of a person anywhere into the area, upon exit from the area, and upon movement of an individual within the area, except that for process material access areas only the location of the strategic special nuclear material within the area is required to be so alarmed.
(4) All manned access control points in the protected area barrier, all security patrols and guard stations within the protected area, and both alarm stations shall be provided with duress' alarms.
57 Enclosure "A"
I i
(5) All alarms required pursuant to this section shall annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other independent continuously manned on-site station, so that a single act cannot remove the capabil-
)
ity of calling for assistance or responding to an alarm. The alam stations shall be considered vital. areas and their walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and windows shall be bullet-resistant.
The central alam station shall be located within a building so that the interior of the central alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area. This station may not contain any operational activi-ties that would interfere with the execution of the alarm response function.
(6) All alarms required by this section shall remain operable from independent power sources in the event.of the loss of normal power.
(7) All alam devices including transmission lines to annuncia-tors shall be tamper indicating and self-checking e.g., an automatic indication is provided when a failure of the alarm system or a compo-nent occurs, when there is an attempt to compromise the system, or when the system is on standby power. The annunciation of an alarm at the alarm stations shall indicate the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarm, emergency exit alarm, tamper alarms, etc.) and location. The status of all alarms and alarm zones shall be indicated in the alarm i
stations.
58 Enclosure "A"
4 (8) All exterior areas withi. the protected area shall be moni-tored or periodically checked to detect the presence of unauthorized persons, vehicle, materials, or unauthorized activities.
)
(9) Methods to observe individuals within material access areas j
to assure that strategic special nuclear material is not moved to unauthorized. locations or in an unauthorized manner shall be provided and used on a continuing basis.
(f) Connunication Subsystems (1) Each guard, watchman, or armed response individual on d'.ty i
shall be capable of maintaining continuous communication with an individual in each continuously manned alarm station required by paragraph (e)(5) of this section, who shall be capable of calling for assistance from other guards, watchmen, and armed response personnel and from law enforcement authorities.
(2) Each alarm station required by paragraph (e)(5) of this section shall have both conventional telephone service and radio or microwave transmitted two-way voice communication, either directly or through an intermediary, for the capability of continuous communication with the law enforcement authorities.
(3) Non-portable communications equipment controlled by the i
licensee and required by this section shall remain operable from independent power sources in the event of the loss of normal power.
59 Enclosure "A"
(g) Test and Maintenance Programs The licensee shall have a test and maintenance program for intrusion alams, emergency alarms, comunications equipment, physical barriers, and other security related devices and equipment used pursuant to this section that shall provide for the following:
(1) Tests and inspections during the design, installation, and construction of security related subsystems and components to assure that they comply with their respective design criteria and performance specifications.
(2) Preoperational tests and inspections of security related subsystems and components to demonstrate their effectiveness, availabil-ity, and reliability with respect to their respective design criteria and performance specifications.
(3) Operational tests and inspections of security related sub-systems and components to assure their maintenance in an operable and effective condition, including:
(i) testing of each intrusion alarm at the beginning and end of any period that it is used.
If the period of continuous use is longer than seven days, the intrusion alam shall also be tested at least once every seven days.
(ii) testing of ca.munications equipment required for consunica-tions onsite, includi a.uress alams, for performance not less fre-quently than once at the beginning of each security personnel work 60 Enclosure "A"
shift. Communications equipment required for communications offsite shall be tested for performance not less than once a day.
(4)
Preventive maintenance programs shall be established for security related subsystems and components to a:sure their continued maintenance in an operable and effective condition.
(5) All security related subsystems and components shall be maintained in operable condition. The l'icensee shall develop and employ corrective action procedures and compensatory measures to assure that the effectiveness of the security system is not reduced by failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the security related equipment or structures.
(h) Contingency and Response Plans and Procedures (1) The. licensee shall have a safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provi-sions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans shall be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C to this part, " Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans" as proposed in 42 FR 25744.
Contingency plans shall include, but not limited to, the response requirements in paragraphs (h)(2) through (h)(5) of this sect' ion.
(2) The licensee shall establish and document liaison with law enforcement authorities.
(3) A minimum of five (5) guards shall be immediately available at the facility to fulfill response requirements.
In addition a 61 Enclosure "A"
l force of guards or armed, trained personnel also shall be imediately available to provide assistance as necessary.
The size of the additional force shall be determined on the basis of site-specific considerations that could affect the ability of the total response force to engage and defeat the adversary force.
The rationale for determining the total number of response personnel shall be included in the physical protection plans submitted to the Commission for approval.
(4) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles within an isolation zone, a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area, or upon evidence of intrusion into a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area, the facility security organization shall:
(1) determine whether or not a threat exists, (ii) assess the extent of the threat, if any, (iii) inform law enforcement authorities of the threat and request assistance, if necessary, I
(iv) require guards or other, armed response personnel to interpose
- themselves between vital areas and material access areas and any l
\\
adversary attempting entry for purposes of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic special nuclear material, and (v) instruct guards or other armed response personnel to prevent or delay an act of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic special nuclear material by applying a sufficient degree of force to counter that degree of force directed at them, including the use of deadly l
force when there is a reasonable belief it is necessary in self-(
defense or in the defense of others.
62 Enclosure "A" l
(5) To facilitate initial response to detection of penetration of the protected area and assessment of the existence of a threat, a capability of observing the isolation zones and the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area shall be provided, preferably by means of closed circuit television or by other suitable means which limit exposure of responding personnel to possible attack.
7.
Section 73.55 is amended to change the term " industrial sabotage" to " radiological sabotage" wherever it appears.
8.
Paragraphs 73.55(b) is revised to read as follows:
73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against [4ndustrial] radiological sabotage.
i l
(b) Physical Security Organization (1) The licensee shall establish a security organization, including guards, to protect his facility against [4ndustria4] radiological sabotage.
Criteria and requirements for security personnel suitability, training, equipment, qualification, and requalifications are set forth in Appendix B to this part " General Criteria for Security Personnel" (as proposed in FR
).
(2) At least one full time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical security activities of the security organization shall be onsite at all times.
63 Enclosure "A" l
r w
~.
l i
(3)
[The-lisensee-shall-establish,-mainta4R-and-fellow-wP444en l
s eGWF4 %y-PF4GedW Fes-wh46 h-d46 Wmen %-4he-s % FWG %WFe-of-%he-seGW F4 %y 4
eFgan4aa44en-and-wh4eh-deta41-the-dW44es-et-gWaFds,-watehmen,-and otheF-4nd4V4dWals-Fesponsible-f4F-se6WF4%yr] The licensee shall have a management system to orovide for the development, revision, imple-mentation, and enforcement of security procedures. The system shall include:
(i) written security procedures which document the structure of the security organization and which detail and duties of quards, watchmen and other individuals responsible for security; l
(11) provision for written approval of such procedures and any revisions thereto by the individual with overall responsibility for the security functions and by licensee plant management; (iii) provisions for a review at least every 12 months of the security system by individuals independent of both security program managment and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementa-tion of the secu-ity program. The review shall include a review and audit of security procedures and practices, an audit of the security system testing and maintenance program and a test of the safeguards system along'with commitments established orogram and a test of the 4
safeguards system along with commitments established and audit along with recommendations for improvements shall be documented, reported to the' licensee's corporate and plant management, and kept available at
'the plant for inspection'for a period of five years,
64 Enclosure "A"
'I
{
(4) The licensee shall not permit an individual to act as a guard, watchman or armed response individual unless [such-4ndividua4-has-been properly-tra4ned-and-qua44f4ed-and-has-demonstratedt
( 4 -)--a n-u nd e rs ta n di ng-of-the-44 een s eels-s e c u rity-p rec ed u re s s-a n d
( 44-)--the-a b444 ty-to-exeeu te-a 44-du ties-req ui red-e f-him-by-s u ch presedures,--Eaeh-guardy-watehmany-and-armed-response-4ndiv4 dual-sha44 be-requa44f4ed-at-least-annua 44yr--Sweh-requa44ffeat4en-sha44-be desumentedr] the individual in accordance with his assigned duties meets the requirements of Appendix B (as proposed in FR
).
(5) Guards and armed response personnel shall pass a physical examination, receive training and requalify with assigned weapons at least every twelve months.
(6) Guard and armed response personnel amament shall include handguns, shotguns, and semi-automatic rifles consistent with site specific conditions.
9.
Paragraph 73.55(h) is amended to renumber paragraphs (h)(1) through (h)(4) as (h)(2) through (h)(5) and add a new paragraph (h)(1) as follows:
I 73.55 Requirements for phy:;ical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against [4ndustrial] radiological sabotage.
(h) Response requirement.
(1) The licensee shall have a safe-guards contingency plan for dealing with threats, and radiological sabotage related to the nuclear facilities subject to the provisions 65 Enclosure "A" l
l 1
of this section.
Safeguards contingency plans shall be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C to this part, " Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans" as proposed in 42 FR 25744.
Contingency plans shall include, but not be limited to, requirements in paragraphs (h)(2) through (h)(5)ofthissection.
10.
The prefatory language of 5 73.70 and paragraphs 73.70(c) and (g) is revised to read as fo'llows:
1 73.70 Records.
Each licensee subject to the provisions of [is-73,30,-through 73,36] 73.20, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, and/or 55 73.45, 73.46, and/or 5 73.55 [and/or-4-73,60] shall keep the following records:
(c) A register of visitors, vendors, and other individuals not employed by the licensee pursuant to [6-73,50feff 5)] s 73.46(d)(10) and 5 73.55(d)(6).
(g) Shipments of special nuclear material subject to the require-ments of this part, including names of carriers, major roads to be used, flight numbers in the case of air shipments, dates and expected 66 Enclosure "A" l
times of departure and arrival of shipments, [ names-and-addresses-ef the-meniter-and-ene-alternate-meniter-at-eaeh-transfer-peint,] verifi-cation of communication equipment on board the transfer vehicle, names of individuals who are to comunicate with the transport vehicle, container seal descriptions and identification, and any other informa-tion to confim the means utilized to comply with 55 [73,30-thFeW9h 73,36] 73.25, 73.26 and 73.27.
Such information shall be recorded prior to shipment.
Information obtained during the course of the shipment such as reports of all comunications, change of shipping plan including monitor changes, trace investigations and others shall also be recorded.
- 11. Paragraph 73.71(a) is amended to change the reference to 5 73.36(f) to reference 5 73.27(c).
12.
Paragraph 70.22(g) is amended to replace references ".. 55 73.30 through 73.36...." with the reference ".. 55 73.20, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27...."
13.
Paragraph 70.32(d) is amended to delete the reference to para-graph 73.30(e).
14.
Paragraph 70.32(f) is deleted.
l 67 Enclosure "A"
I ENCLOSURE "B" l
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT APPRAISAL OF AMENDMENTS f
TO 10 CFR PART 73 i
INTRODUCTION The Comission has determined that safeguards upgrading at certain existing fuel facilities and transportation activities should be under-
~
takin and implemented through public rulemaking. This action was based, among other things, on the findings of a joint ERDA-NRC task force on safeguards. The Task Force Report issued in July 19761 contained conclu-sions and recomendations which comprisa the basis for rulemaking. To accomplish this safeguards upgrading, NRC regulations to 10 CFR Part 73, are being issued for public coment to specify physical security require-ments for fuel cycle facilities and transportation involving significant quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM).2 The proposed amendments are not intended to change routine plant or transportation operations.
They should not affect the likelihood of operational accidents or malfunctions, or mitigate or increase the consequences of such accidents or malfunctions.
It is the expressed purpose and intent of these amendments to deter and to the extent possible prevent:
(1) theft of strategic quantities of special nuclear material which could be used in the manufacture of an explosive device, and (2) acts of radiolo ical sabotage 3 to special nuclear facilities or special nuclear durino transport.
The major benefit of these amendments Ts the re on of rf'sk to the environment from either radiological sabotage or maievoient acts subsequent to theft of special nuclear naterial.
The proposed amendments would include general.perfomance require-ments stated in tems of capabilities to protect against adversaries. They would also describe nonnal elements expected in physical protection systems, such as a security organization including a guard force trained and equipped to respond to the design basis events; subsystems of barriers, access control, detection mechanisms and comunications networks; proce-dures for construction, operation, testing, and maintenance of the security systems and subsystems.
The normal elements described in the proposed rule have been developed on the basis of the elements presently required of licensee physical protection systems.
The proposed require-ments consist of additions to or upgrading of present elements and not the addition of entirely new elements.
For example, improvements in guard 4
selection, training, and equipment would be required.
While these same basic safeguards system elements would apply to both fixed site and transportation, they would be identified separately and differently in the regulations.
For example, barriers for fixed sites would be fences or walls while the transportation the barrier would likely be a' penetration-resistant cargo vehicle.
i
DISCUSSION' A joint ERDA-NRC task force was formed on March 17, 1976, to propose a plan of action for improving safeguards at certain nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The task force concentrated on physical protection and i
control of SSNM.
It did not address the matter of nuclear material l
accou'ntability or the problem of protection against sabotage.
It confined its examination to a limited number of facilities possessing significant quantities.of strategic usable special nuclear material and did not I
consider safeguards at nuclear reactor.s or for nuclear materials in~
transport.
The task force found no e' idence of any imediate threat to these v
facilities, government or private.
Nevertheless, because of the conse-quences which might arise from theft of significant quantities of weapons-usable special nuclear material, as well as the uncertainty about future threats to these facilities and the demonstrated willingness of some individuals and groups to resort to violence to achieve their goals, the task force concluded that prudence requires that future safeguards be designed to provide more effective protection against internal conspiracies and determined violent assaults.
The Comission endorsed recomendations of the Task Force Report that, as a matter of prudence, safeguards should be upgraded to provide enhanced protection against both internal conspiracies and determined violent assaults more severe than those previously used to judge safe-guards. The approach to establishing such increased levels of safeguards for strategic special nuclear material would be a continuation of current upgrading programs and would be accomplished through the NRC regulatory process.
It should be noted that the program endorsed by the Comission is one of incremental changes to an existing safeguards regulatory base and not the establishment of a new system. This in itself would tend to eliminate or minimize environmental effects.
The Ccmmission directed that a part of these upgrading actions j
include a clearance program for employees having access to or control over strategic'special nuclear material in fuel cycle facilities and during transport.
This action is being accomplished in a separate rulemaking action (42 FR 14880) which included a separate Environmental Impact Appraisal.
The Comission is also considering separate amendments to its regu-lations (
FR
) which would require certain licensees to develop and I
fo1 Tow colitingency plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage l
relating to significant quantities of special nuclear material licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
A separate Environmental Impact Appraisal has been prepared for those amendments (NUREG-0142).
ENC 1.05URE "B"
EVALUATION I.
Environmental Impact A.
Direct Impact-The direct impact of implementing the subject amendments must be cons /'dered in the context of a generic safeguards framework because of the. general performance approach taken.
This approach permits the licensee flexibility within a basic framework of safeguards functional elements to develop the required performance ' capabilities.
The direct impact of each detailed system would need to be considered in the context of its specific environment..Nevertheless, within the generic framework the impact of the amendments can be considered in three broad aspects:
procedural requirements, hardware and construction requirements, and requirements calling for larger guard forces.
B.
Procedural Impacts Inasmuch as many of the changes resulting from the new rule will be procedural and do not require construction or emplacement of special equipment, with the possible exception of cannunication systems noted below, no significant impact on the quality of the human environment is anticipated from implementation of this aspect of the proposed require-ments.
It should be noted that, practically all procedural items in the new rules are also required by current regulations.
The proposed regula-tions would require only incremental changes in the level of protection afforded by these procedures.
The most significant procedural changes involve guard selection and training.
Hardward and Construction 1he hardware and construhtion which licensees m'ight add or change to meet the new safeguards requirements may involve some or all of the following for fixed site systems:
Perimeter barrier emplacements and clearing of areas to a.
provide isolation zones, b.
Illumination of perimeters and clear areas, Electrical / electronic detection and survelliance systems, c.
d.
Alarm systems, e.
Radio communication systems, ENCLOSURE "B"
- ^ ~ '
- f.
Hardened alann station and access control stations, g.
Appropriate placement of material access areas and vital areas.
In addition, licensees, may employ devices to detect concealed weapons, explosives, or special nuclear material.
They also may include hardened defensive positions for guard response actions.
's The amount of additional land used for clear areas, isolation zones, and enclosed areas for protection systems would be a small fraction of the total site area.
However, in most cases, additional land that is needed probably would not extend beyond existing site boundaries, and, as such, native vegetation or wildlife habitat would remain undisturbed.
Any aesthetic impacts on the land resulting from construction of physical barriers and isolation zones beyond existing or planned buildings, lots, transmission lines, and switchyards can and should be reduced by landscaping and planting of grasses to prevent erosion.
Additional illumination at locations of nonna11y low natural light levels would have little impact on natural wildlife and surrounding vegetation because of the localized nature c/ the illumination.
Installation of perime'ter intrusion alarms should result in temporary disruption of the environment no greater than that resulting from the installation of a fence.
Furthermore, landscaping and triming of foliage (as may be necessary for microwave or infrared alann systems) should have a beneficial effect an the aesthetics of the locale.
Installation of interior intrusion aTarms, alarm stations, access control stations or defensive positions will require no additional land usage nor be damaging to or render less useful the environment within which the plant is situated.
Radio communication systems may require erection of antennae which could be considered somewhat aesthetically offensive.
However, no l
other effects upon the environment should result.
It would, of course, be necessary that any such antennae would be of such type, construction, and operation so as not to interfere with other communications systems ~
t including local radio and television broadcasts.
The hardware and construction requirements for transportation i
are limited, but can be categorized to include:
l i
)
a.
Additional escort vehicles (assume two) 5.
Specially designed cargo vehicles or containers ENCLOSURE "B" 1
1 a
The most likely significant direct impact on environment caused by the above are the possible road accidents that could occur because of the additional two escort vehicles.
Available statistics on this possible cause of injuries or death are as follows:
Accidents Due To An Assumed Two Additional Escort Vehicles The table below presents the casualty rates in road accidents.
Casualty Rates
[FrequencyperVehicle-Mile]
Type of Casualty I
Injury...............................<.
9.0 x 10 4
Death.................................
6.6 x 10 l
If one were to assume 20 protected shipments a year of privately owned licensed strategic special nuclear material in 1980 with an average distance of 500 miles per shipment, using the above statistics, we might expect an increase of about.018 injuries a year or about one every fifty years attributable to the increased escort of nuclea' shipments. The r
number of deaths that might be attributable to increased escort require-ments for nuclear shipments would be about.0014 every year or less than one death in every 700 years.
In relation to present national road accident casualties, these are clearly insignificant.
The amount of motor vehicle air pollution that would be intro-duced by two additional escort vehicles is considered negligible in the context of the total U.S. motor vehicle population.
It would be less than that caused by the daily operation of a single motor vehicle.
It should also be noted that of the listed hardware and construc-tion items, all except hardened access control and alann stations are i
presently required for licensee security systems.
Consequently, environ-mental effects related to hardware and construction would be incremental to that already experienced.
Fcr example, perhaps a double fence or wider isolation zone would be required for implementation of the proposed upgrading requirements.
These additions would be expected to have less environmental effect than the original installations.
Effects of Larger Guard Forces l
The upgrading of nuclear facility safeguards is expected to increase the number of guards employed by the nuclear fuels industry from l
ENCLOSURE "B" l
300 to about 450, a net increase of about 150.
Such an increase would have an extremely small but positive effect on national employment opportunities.
On the other hand, some critics have charged that upgrading measures, of which larger guard farces are an important element, would give the nation the appearance of an ' irmed Camp." This notion is dispelled, however, when the number of nuclear guards is seen in relation to other kinds of t
l armed guard employed in the U.S. private sector.
For example, more than i
800,000 private security force personnel are currently estimated to be serving in the United States. Approximately 500,000 of them are employed to~ protect valuable shipments in local or' interstate commerce.
j Accidents Attributable to Larger Guard Forces i
The AEC's experience.at fixed sites in the use of armed' guards is based on the time period of 1965 to 1974 involving 62,400,000 guard hours.
During this period there were 3 accidental discharges and 1 misuse of a firearm by armed guards resulting in 2 injuries.
Proper training and qualification programs will keep such incidents to a comparable minimum.
Two available sources of information on the effects of misuse of weapons by armed guards or escorts during transit are AEC's experience and an armored car company's experience.
There has been no accidental discharge of weapons by armed escorts of AEC's shipment during transit, dating back to 1947. The armored car company's experience during one year and 20,000,000 miles of travel has been 8 accidental weapons discharges with no resulting injuries. This is about 1,000 times the distance that the assumed two escort vehicles would travel in one year based on the 20 ship-ments (1980 estimate) at 500 miles per shipment assumed previously.
It is concluded that the use of armed escorts and/or additional escort vehicles will not have a significant direct impact on the human environment.
C.
Societal Impacts 1.
Introduction In proposing upgraded safeguards for strategic special nuclear material, the NRC does not intend to foster a governmental presence which could interfere unduly with the American~ social system and its i
emphasis on freedom of the individual.
Consequently, proposed safeguards measures have been reviewed not only for their effectiveness in meeting safeguards objectives, but also for their potential impact on society.
The treatment of the varCet sccietal issues in this section is by the nature of the subject, more vial:ratory than definitive.
It is difficult to make an accurate asses!6e,t eid determination of the potential severity of societal impacts on ti.e. avtrij citizen or on special groups.
Perceptions regarding acceptability of impacts are shaped by subjective or intangible factors (e.g., personal value systgns). These are probably ENCLOSURE "B" 5
best addressed through field surveys or by polling expert panels. Never-theless, an attempt has been made to identify the potential impacts of upgraded safeguards and issues they raise.
In summary, the NRC is keenly
~
aware of the importance of societal issues and will continue to weigh them-in its decisions and actions concerning nuclear safeguards.
2.-
Impacts on Civil Liberties
[
The potential impact of safeguards upgrading measures upon.the entire range of individual rights and freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution is of continuing concern.to both the Government and to the private citizen. This concern s'tems not only from the direct affects which might be produced by nuclear safeguarding techniques but also from the indirect erosion of civil liberties which might occur generally in society if si nuclear area.gnificant restrictions were permitted to be introduced in the 1
In the past, when constitutional rights were allegedly infringed in the name of some real or perceived governmental need, the courts have required a clear showing of that.need and have inquired into whether there were alternative, less restrictive means to meet it.5 This'"least restrictive alternative"6 has been considered in the develop-ment of proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.
a.
Effects on' Industry Employees 1)
Inspection and Searches Routine inspections and searches of employees who have access to sensitive areas of a plant have often been cited as repre-senting an invasion of privacy.7 Such searches are currently conducted in the nuclear industry and serve the dual function of monitoring contamina-tion and preventing internal sabotage or theft of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM).
In many respects they ar not unlike searches already conducted by high-precision industries, such as the computer and gyroscope industries where clean rooms operate to such close tolerances as to require assurance against introduction of even the smallest foreign particles.
The proposed amendments of 10 CFR Part 73 are not expected to increase the overall frequency or scope of employee searches in the nuclear industry.
The inspection and search procedures to be implemented on the basis of the demonstrated safeguards need, are designed to impact as little as possible on individual privacy and rights..
b.
Effects on the Public
- 1) Surveillance for Intelligence Operations The upgraded safeguards sytems envisioned in the new rule stress self-contained defense in depth through access denial ENCLOS'JRE "B"
a
. barriers, intrusion alarms, armed guards, a trained response force, and internal materials accounting and control procedures that would give indications of thef t or diversion.
Domestic intelligence activities would presumably complement such systems, serving primarily to bolster law enforcement and investigative agencies in their detection and preventive rales.
It is the responsibility of law enforcement and inveftigatory agencies to maintain, within. legally permissible boundaries, surye111ance of individuals and groups that are deemed, or have been shown, to have perpetrated illegal acts. We might expect such surveillance to be carried out by law enforcement and investigative agencies independent of safeguards measures and regardless of whether we have a safeguards system--
upgraded or otherwise.
2)
Search and Seizure in Recovery Operations Serious concern has been expressed about the violations of civil liberties and Fourth Amendment rights that might occur in an intense effort to recover missing material after a successful theft.10 The proposed upgraded safeguards are designed to minimize such impacts by attempting to prevent theft of SSNM. The FBI has primary field responsibility for recovery operations and would be supported by ERDA technical experts trained in the detection and handling of nuclear materials and the disarming of nuclear weapons.
ERDA's detailed emergency plans for quick development of special " Nuclear Emergency Search Teams,"
established for its own nuclear program, would be ~ activated during an early.
phase of any emergency.
These are not premised upon wide-scale entry and search of private premises.
No changes are anticipated in current operational and procedural guidelines as a result of the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.
Substantial civil liberties effects are not anticipated.
3.
Open Society Practices adopted in nuclear fuel cycle facilities could conflict with the traditional open quality of U.S. life. There might be secrecy surrounding certain aspects of this industry which would manifest itself by reducing the public availability of industry-related information, particularly in the area of security operations.
ENCLOSURE "B" l
D.
Indirect Impact It is the purpose of these amendments to protect against deli-berate acts extrinsic to normal operation of a plant, i.e., acts which in no way could be considered " accidental." True, there have been no verified acts of industrial sabotage, high-jacking of SSNM in transit, or theft of significant quantities of SSNM from plants in this country.
Furthennore, such vents seem unlikely.
However, there have been bomb threats, sabotage threys, and hoaxes purportedly involving enough SSNM for a nuclear explosive device. Furthermore, the scope and frequency of terrorist activities throughout the world appears to be on the rise.- Thus, it is only logical to conclude that the risk of sabotage to a plant or theft of SSNM, though small., is real.
If we could predict when and where such events would occur, measures could be taken to pro' vide nearly impregnable protection at the time and place of attempted sabotage or theft of SSNM and thus obviate-much of the need for these amendments.. However, no means are currently available to measure the risk of sabotage or theft of SSNM r.r enable any statistical estimate of the probability of such an occurrence, much less predict time and locale. Although the risk to the environment may indeed be slight as such acts appear unlikely, the purpose of the proposed regulatory amendment is to reduce that risk by further reducing the like-lihood of their successful perpetration. To accomplish this, prudent judgment indicates that SSNM and the plants and transports in which it is used and handled should be provided with increased physical protection.
In short, the indirect effect upon the environment of promulga-tion of the subject amendment is expected to be an incremental reduction of risk to the environment.
An indirect impact on these amendments, however, is the residual risk of sabotage or theft that might still remain when these amendmen'ts have been implemented.
II. Al ternatives The alternatives to the subject amendments are:
(1) do not publish such rules and hence do not. upgrade nuclear safeguards physical protection, (2) publish more stringent requirements, or (3) do not publish general performance requirements but detailed system requirements.
A.
No Amendment Present regulations provide a lower level of protection than that which would be required to meet the stated performance objective.
In light of increased terrorist activities over the past few years, prudent judgment dictates that a higher level of protection should be provided than is now the case. The alternative'of not publishing the amendment could effectively increase the future risk to the environment.
ENCLOSURE "B"
o.
B.
More Stringent Amendment Publishing requirements more stringent than those in the subject amendment might further reduce risks associated with nuclear theft and sabotage.
However, requirements beyond the perfomance objectives stated in the proposed amendments would escalate nuclear physical protection programs beyond the scope or capability to be reasonably expected of pri,vate licensee systems under conditions of general civil order.
C.
More Specific Requirements More specific requirements might assure with more certainty the intended level of protection.
However, more specific requirements 'would not provide the flexibility l'icensees need to optimize their security systems for specific sites.
By providing such flexibility, the same or greater overall benefit might be achieved with fewer adverse impacts.
III. Adverse Environmental Effects Which Cannot be Avoided As stated previously, the amount of land use for additional isolation zones, storage areas, etc., would be a small fraction of the total site Furthennore, any aesthetic impacts on the land can be raduced by area.
landscaping.
The additional protective measures and hardware for transport protec-tion except for the additional escort vehicles which could be involved in road accidents and the misuse of weapons by armed guards is minimal, and-is not greater than the frequency of the national average for similar security conditions.
There would be minimal adverse effect due to intentional discharge of firearms by security personnel or local law enforcement officials.
Indeed the current potential for attempted sabotage, theft of SSNM, or truck high-jackings should decrease with a concomitant decrease of potential firearm dischage. On the other hand, the accidental discharge of a firearm that might result from application of these amendments is not expected to increase the national average.
Testing and maintenance of noise emitting alarm systems contributes to a noise impact which is localized and considered to be insignificant.
Moreover, dictances from the alarms and site boundaries in addition to the surrounding terrain and foliage should reduce such noise to a negligible amount beyond the site boundary.
IV.
Relationship Between Short-Term Uses of the Environment and Long-Term Productivity The objective of the amendments is to assure protection of licensed facilities and transport activities against acts of radiological sabotage ENCLOSURE "B"
or theft of SSNM.
It follows from the nature of these regulations that their effect is to minimize danger to the environment potentially posed by radiological sabotage or theft of SSNM, a'nd thus permit its use productively over the long term.
Implementation of the procedural and hardware require-ments are considered to have insignificant impact so in effect they do not constitute even a short-term use of the environment.
V.
, Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources
/ Although nominal life spans are proiected for most nuclear facilities, becatise of the increasing demand for electricity, land enclosed by the site boundary can~be considered as committed for an indefinite period of time to plant use. Therefore, the small amount of additional area required for i
isolation zones, etc., constitutes an additional land comitment but only if the site boundary is extended. At the end of a finite expected life of a plant, the subject area could be reclaimed for other purposes if desired.
These amendments may require the production of a limited number of specially designed vehicles.
However, the trucking industry is so large that the comitment of additional resources necessary to obtain these specially designed vehicles is insignificant.
Further, the specially designed vehicles can be profitably used for the carriage of other valuable cargo.
VI. Cost-Benefit Analysis Due in a large measure to the general performance nature of these amendments, they do not readily permit cost-benefit analysis.
Costs of detailed subsystems and components which would be required at a given facility are highly dependent upon the facility size, location, layout and other site specific factors.
Some representative cost estimates have been
' included in the statement of considerations published with the proposed new safeguards.unendments. The incremental costs of the subject amendments also would depend on the security system presently in being at a given site or for a 'given transportation s.ystem. Moreover, the benefit is not realized in any usual manner such as fewer product rejects, lower produc-tion costs or high produ~ction rates, but rather in an unquantifiable reduction in risk to the public and the environment.
CONCLUSIONS i
Based upon the foregoing evaluation in the matter of proposed physical protection amendments to 10 CFR part 73, the Regulatory staff has concluded that an environmental impact statement is not required.
ENCLOSURE "B" l
l
NOTES 1.
Joint ERDA-NRC Task Force on Safeguards (U), Final Report, July 1976, NUREG-0095, ERDA 77-34.
- 2. - As specified in the scope of part 73, i.e., 73.2(b).
3.'
Radiological Sabotage" is a new term to be used instead of "indus-trial sabotage" to more clearly indicate the sabotage of concern is that having radiological consequences.
4.
The American Civil Liberties Union, for example, in its 4/10-11/76 Board of Directors' meeting, adopted a resolution opposing the licensing and operation of any facility designed to convert and deliver energy to consumers where governmental suppression of information or the infringement of any constitutional guarantee accompanies the licensing and/or operation of the facility or of associated facilities (e.g., mines, fuel reprocessin mixed fuel preparation plants)g plants, waste disposal units, and Before a license is granted for the operation of any energy facility, a comprehensive statement should be presented showing that protection of civil liberties has been considered and implemented.
5.
U.S. v. Davis 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.1973); b.S. v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769-(4th Cir.) Cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972T.
6.
See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) for Supreme Court discussion of the "least restrict'ive alternative" test.
7.
For example, in an extreme case of abuse, in which personal searches were carried out in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, such searches might be considered accusatory, embarrassing, and stigma-tizing, and in violation of the subject's Fourth Amendment rights.
10.
Such concerns were prevalent among participants in the conference on the Impact of Intensified Nuclear Safeguards on Civil Liberties (Ref. 1).
REFERENCES 1.
R. Bartkus and G. Block, "Rapporteurs' Report on Conference on the Impact of Intensified Nuclear Safeguards on Civil Liberties,"
October 17-18, 1975, at Stanford University, Stanford, California.
ENCLOSURE "B"
+
Enclosure C FURTHER UPGRADING OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS PROPOSED BY NRC Extensive changes in requirements for protecting strategic quantities of highly enriched uranium and plutonium were proposed today.by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The new upgrading program would affect companies licensed tg fabricate nuclear fuel and conduct scrap recovery operations, and organizations which transport the materials.
The proposed requirements would not apply to nuclear power plants.
Regulations significantly upgrading physical security at these plants were adopted by the Commission earlier this year.
The proposals would further strengthen NRC requirements in effect since late 1973 for fuel cycle facilities and transporta-tion activities, and supplemented over the last year by con-ditions added to individual NRC licenses.
In other actions earlier this year, the NRC proposed new
-criteria for the training and qualification of security personnel; background checks and NRC clearances for licensee personnel having access to or control over special nuclear material; and the devel-opment of licensee contingency plans outlining specific actions for handling an attempted theft or sabotage.
Changes being proposed today include general performance requirements to protect against the following.
v[
(1) a determined violent external assault, by stealth, or decepti.ve actions by a small group which is well-trained (includ-
!.ng military training and skills) and dedicated; these persons could have the assistance of a knowledgeable insider and be armed c.e,na,,,.
e
with automatic weapons equipped with silencers; they also could have incapacitating agents and explosives to gain entry or other-wise destroy plant or transport integrity and to operate as two or more teams;
/
(2) acts of theft or sabotage by an insider, including an i
employee; and
/ (3) a conspiracy of insiders or employees in any position.
Also included are basic performance capabilities that reflect the inherent differences in protecting nuclear materials at fixed facilities and during transportation.
Performance capabilities for facilities are proposed to assure that only authorized personnel, materials and vehicles are admitted to areas housing strategic nuclear materials and to other areas designated as protected or vital areas; to provide controls
~
on movement or placement of nuclear materials; and to assure that
.any breach or attempted breach of security is detected and a response is made.
More detailed measures for various aspects of security plans, such as che security organization, communications and alarm systems, barriers, detection systems, access controls and response plans also are included in the proposed regulations.
Proposed new requirements for protecting strategic quantities l
of highly. enriched uranium and plutonium in transit involve
{
the number of armed escorts, frequency of communications, types of vehicles and containers, route information and reporting of shipments.
Basic safeguards performance capabilities would be required for transportation activities to assure that the physical security
__n
,n_
.e--
- ~ =
. system is capable of restricting access and activity in the vicinity of a shipment and of preventing unauthorized access to or removal of nuclear material from the carrier.
New testing and maintenance programs also are proposed to assure the continuing operation and effectiveness of security systems for fixed sites and transportation.
Based on rough NRC staff estimates, the initial cost to the nuclear industry for the proposed upgrading could be abodt
$2.8 million, with annual total costs in the range of $6.8 million.
There are 12 nuclear fuel cycle facilities subject to NRC physical security requirements.
They are located in California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia and Washington.
Three firms have approved security plans to transport highly enriched uranium and plutonium which would have to be cnanged to meet the proposed physical security requirements.
The proposed amendments, to Part 73 of NRC regulations, appear in the Federal Register.
Persons wishing to comment should submit their comments to the Secretary of the Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention:
Docketing and Service Section, not later than NOTE TO EDITORS:
Attached is a fact sheet on the proposed rule and a list of licensees authorized to possess strategic quan-tities of special nuclear materials.
cn,n...--
e
FACT SHEET PROPOSED UPGRADING OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND FACILITIES BACKGROUND In early 1976, the NRC staff began a series of assess-ments of the adequacy of existing safeguards to protect nuclear fuel cycle facilities from attempts. to s teal highly enriched uranium and plutonium.
These assessments 1ed to a general
~
upgrading of physical protection requirements in effect since 1973 by application of conditions to individual NRC licenses.
Among the changes were additional guards, improved communica-tions, improved alarm systems, better search and surveillance procedures, formalized procedures for support from local law enforcement agencies, and strengthened controls over access to nuclear materials.
Also last year, a joint Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Energy Research and Development Administration task force was organized to develop a plan for improving controls over, and protection of, stra'.egic quantities of special nuclear materials.
- The task force report was released publicly last Februa ry.
The proposed changes now being made in safeguards regulations are based, in part, on these efforts.
- Strategic quantities of special nuclear materials are defined as (a) two kilograms of plutonium or U-233 or (b) five 1
kilograms of uranium eariched to more than 20% in the U-235 isotope or (c) a combination of these materials.
These quantities are established at a level substantially below that required for the manufacture of nuclear explosives.
Enclosure C
' proposed rules already have been published that would (1) require licensees to develop contingency plans for responding to attempted sabotage of a nuclear facility or theft of nuclear materials; (2) upgrade training and qualifications of security personnel in the nuclear industry; and (3) require background checks and NRC clearances for certain nuclear industry workers.
The amendments now being proposed describe basic per-formance capabilities for fuel cycle facilities (not power plants) and transportarion activities.
Basic differences inherent in protecting material at facilities and in trans-portation are defined.
Also included are more precise measures for systems within a physical security plan.
Common to both fixed sites and transportation are the following systems:
authorization controls, access and removal controls, barriers, detection systems, security organization, response plans, c'ommunications, and test and maintenance procedures to assure continuing effectiveness of the safeguards program.
The proposed rule is performance oriented to provide licensees with flexibility ir. meeting its provisions.
Licensees would have the option of employing safeguards measures different from those in the rule, provided the proposed substitute measures meet the basic performance requirements.
PHYSICAL PROTECTION IN TRANSIT The proposed regulations describe the systems and sub-systems required in physical security plans to meet the follow-ing performance capabilities during transportation:
(1) restrict access to, and activity in, the vicinity of transports ;
Enclosure C
.g
. j (2) prevent unauthorized attempts to gain entry or introduce materials into, and the unauthorized removal of, strategic special nuclear materials from transpor.ts; and, (3) provide a response capability.
The major elements of security plans are detailed.
They cover planning and scheduling of shipments; the structure of the security organization, including guard training, qualifica-tions and equipment; procedures for responding to emergency situations; actions required in transferring or storing ship-ments and for shippin; the materials by various modes--road, rail, air and sea; procedures and controls for access to vehicles and materials; and test and maintenance programs to assure that elements of the plans are properly functioning.
7 Shipments by road either would be in specially designed, penetration-resistant vehicles capable of being immobilized in an emergency, or in armored cars.
In both cases, there would be nine armed escorts accompanying the shipment.
If an armored car is used, three bullet-resisting escort vehicles would accompany the shipment.
Two escort vehicles would be required for shipments in the specially designed trucks.
All shipments would be over primary highways, not secondary roads, without intermediate stops except for refueling, rest or eaergencies or to transfer the shipment.
Cargo and escort vehicles would maintain continuous two-way communications and have continuous communications capability with a control center.
There would be a back-up communications system.
Calls to the licensee's control center would be required at least every half hour.
Enclosure C
o.
g
. During any stops the nine guards would be available immediately and the shipment would be under continuous surveillance.
Shipments by air, including imports and exports, would be accompanied by three armed guards.
At least nine armed escorts would be available at any scheduled refueling stops in the United States.
Two escorts would keep the shipment under surveillance at all times.
On overseas shipments, the escorts would be capable of conversing in a common language with the t
captain of the aircraft.
Shipments by rail would be escorted by nine armed escorts in the shipment car or an escort car next to it.
At least two escorts would keep the shipment car under continuous surveillance.
Continuous communications between the shipment and control center would be maintained and there would be a back-up communi-cations system.
Every half-hour the control center would be I
contacted on the status and position of the shipment.
Shipments by sea would be on container ships only.
Con-tainers vith nuclear materials would be used exclusively for that purpose.
All shipments would be escorted by three armed guards.
They would be capable of conversing with the ship's i
i captain in a common language.
Ship-to-shore communications would be available and a contact would be made every six hours between the ship and an on-shore contact.
PHYSICAL PROTECTION AT FIXED SITES The following are performance capabilities that physical security programs at fuel cycle facilities would be required to meet:
Enclosure C
(1) admit only authorized personnel and materials into material access areas and vital areas; l
(2) permit only authorized activities and conditions within protected areas, material access areas, and vital areas; (3) permit only authorized placement and movement of i
strategic special nuclear material within 'the material access area; (4) permit removal of only authorized and confirmed forms and amounts of strategic special nuclear material from material access areas; and (5) detect and respond to unauthorized penetrations of the' protected area to prevent theft of strategic special nuclear material.
j As with the proposed requirements for physical protection in transit, the major elements of security planning for fixed sites are detailed.
Vital and material access areas would be located so that access requires passage through at least two physical barriers.
Isolation zones, with illumination, would be adjacent to the barrier at the perimeter of a protected area and be large l
enough to permit observation of activities on either side of that barrier.
A numbered picture badge identification system would be used and badges would be coded to indicate whether an individual has access to vital or material access areas.
All points of Enclosure C i
6-personnel and vehicle access to protected, vital and material access areas would be controlled and all individuals and vehicles passing into protected areas would be searched.
Alarm systems would immedf.ately detect penetration or attempted penetration into a protected area, or the isolation zone.
Emergency exits,would be alarmed.
Unoccupied vital and material access areas would be locked and protected by alarms that would detect entry, exit or any movement of any-one in those areas.
Duress alarms would be provided at all manned access control points in the protected areas, at security patrol and guard stations, and in alarm stations.
There would be two continuously manned alarm stations designed so that a single act could not remove the capabilities of both stations.
All alarms would be operable from independent power sources in the event normal power was lost.
Alarm devices would have tamper-indicating and self-checking systems.
Security personnel would be required to have the capability of maintaining continuous communications with both alarm stations.
The alarm stations would have'both conventional telephone and radio or microwave systems to communicate with off-site law enforcement officials.
These systems would have'an independent power source to back-up normal power.
Tests and inspections would be conducted during design, installation, and operation of the alarm and communica-tions systems, physical barriers and other security-related devices and equipment.
The systems would be subject to a maintenance program to assure continued operation and effectiveness.
Enclosure C
~ b.!
COMPANIES HAVING NUCLEAR I4EGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSES THAT POSSESS STRATEGIC QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Companies Operations 1.
Atomics International Ganoga Park, CA 2.
Babcock and Wilcox Apollo, PA (Nuclear Materials Division)
Parks Township, PA Babcock and Wilcox Lynchburg, VA (Naval Nuclear Fuel Division) 3.
Exxon Nuclear Company Richland, WA 4.
General Atomic Company San Diego, CA 5.
General Electric Company Vallecitos, CA 6.
Nuclear Fuel Services Erwin, TN
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Texas Instruments Attleboro, MA 8.
United Nuclear Corporation Uncasville, CT (Naval Products Division)
United Nuclear Corporation Wood River Junction, RI (Fuel Recovery Operation) 9.
Westinghouse Cheswick, PA COMPANIES HOLDING NRC-APPROVED TRANSPORTATION PLANS FOR SHIPMENTS OF STRATEGIC QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL 1.
Tri-State Motor Transit, Joplin, MO 2.
Transnuclear, Inc., White Plains, NY 3.
Edlow International Company, Washington, D.C.
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