ML19312C723
| ML19312C723 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/06/1968 |
| From: | Grimes B US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Boyd R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912190933 | |
| Download: ML19312C723 (6) | |
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SEP 6 1968 Roger S. Boyd, Assistant Director, Reactor Projects Division of Reactor Licensing
':"dRU: Charles G. Long, Chief, RFB-3, DEL
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ICI!G WITII DUKE PCWER CCIMIY CN STATUS CF U GESCLVED ITEMS - DOCKIS 50-269/270/287 On August 29,1%8, a meeting was held with representatives of Duke Power Company to discuss items which were left uaresolved at the time of issuance of Construction Permits for the Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 (reference
=y =e=o to P. A. Morris, dated July 29, 1968). An attendance list is attached.
It was agreed that Duke would submit writ +an documentation on those items which vere resolved at this meeting with enough copies to distribute to all holders of the PSAR.
The schedule for submittal of the operating license Safety Analysis Report is June 2, 1969 The general content of SAR's was discussed, ami Duke said that they would like us to look at an early draft of the report for centent.
A.
RESOLV'iD AREAS The following ite=s were discuar,ed ami ve and Duke Power feel that these subjects can be substantially resolved by documentation of the work done to date.
1.
Underwater Weir Design The applicant has increased the thickness of rip-rap frcm 274 to 36 inches with a 35-foot coverage as a result of further studies of potential erosion of the top of the veir during postulated drawdown of the lake. Erosion on the slopes was minimized by excavating to =sterial equivalent to the das material.
Stability analyaes have shown that excess pore pressures are not a problem.
2.
Detailed Desir;n of ECS Duke Power interprets the ACRS comment that the staff should
" review the detailed design of the ECS and the analysis of its perfor=ance for the entire spectrum of break sizes as soon as the information is available" to refer to the functional design rather than the actual physical ecmponents.
I agree with this interpretation. The spectrum of break sizes has been adequctely treated la subseque:.t construction persit applications for which i
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FN>rIn A.EC*318 (Rev, S43) u.s.sosMust Pet lNT1h4 0FFK2 : Int-O-214429 7 912190 9 3 3 g
Roger S. Boyd SEP 6 1968 B&W is the nuclear stens supply vendor. The functional design of the EC3 has been revised by Duke to substantially cc= ply with the " single passive failure during the recirculation = ode" i= posed on recent applicants (cur interpretation of Criterion hk). We indicated that the propcsed isolation valving between the high pres-sure injec*1on trains shculd be frther reviewed for all operating modes.
The design of the piping from the su=p area dces not meet the passive failure criterion up to the first isolation valve outside the sump. Duke indicated that Unit 1 piping was already in concrete. We recc== ended that Duke look at other seans (such as the water-tight rces preposed by VEPCO) as a =eans to cope with the failure in Unit 1.
We indicated that while Unit 1 sight be accepted without the passive failure capability in this area (since it is a recent requirement), Unita 2 and 3 should have the provisicca required on currently licensed plants.
The sertice water system has also been redesigned to cope with a passive failure. The high pressure in'eution system can operate in the recirculation =cde by taking suctica frc= the icy pressure pu=ps.
3 Preoperational Menitoring Prcgram
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The precperational =cnitoring progra= vas discussed althcugh Duke stated that since this area vas not listed as a resertation in our Safety Evaluation, they did not feel obligated to document the discussion. Duke indicated that they have not cceplied with the Fish & Wildlife requests for docu=entation of their progran to the Federal Agency but are coordinating their program vith the ic:al Fish & Wildlife office, the South Carolina Pollution Control Authority and the South Carolina W"
""a 7escurces Department. We urged that they also eccperate with de yederal Fish & Wildlife office.
Sa_.gling vill be condu:ted within tha
- d usica area and in villages up to 13 miles away.
Sa=pling vill tesin in early 1939 (2 years before startup).
h.
Earthqunka and Accident Loads 3&W has acabiaed the earthquake and accident leads in the design of this plant in the sa=e sanner as subsequently licensed plants. A report on the stresses imposed by blevievn forces on the reactor internals is scheduled for September 1963.
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N AEC-315 (Rev. 9-4) u.s.cowawtwT et:4TLes crFICI:19E6 214-429 i
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Roser S. Boyd SEP 6 1%8 5
Tornsde Design of the Fuel Pool The spent i'ael pool has been designed to vithstand the effects of turbine missiles and tornado effects by a concrete roof (2 9 ft thick) and concrete valls. Entrance doors to the structure also serve as blowout pancia to withstand the effects of a pressure drop of 3 pai,
in 5 seconds. There vill be 1 ft2 of blovout panel for each 1000 fts of volune.
The concrete valls vould withstand the postulated missiles 2nless specifically directed through the blevout panels. The thinest vall (1 ft thick) would not withstand the heaviest missile but this va]l is not critical to the protectica of the pool at the he'.ght 'Inid the heavy missile could occur.
6.
Steam Generator Research and Development B&W stated that all R&D has teen ecmpleted on the steam generators and that a report is scheduled by the end of 1968.
It was stated that the tests have confir=ed the ability to control the steem generators and that there is nothing to indicate concer: in the primary and secondarf side bicviovn tests.
7 Independence of Pcuer Supplies The d.c. power supplies were reviewed b-Duhe and found susceptible
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to tripping two units as a result of a short on ene of the d.c. panel boards. This vill be overco=e by lastallias the power supplies for Unit 3 as well as Unit 1 and 2.
It una stated that there are now no intenctions or single failures that could affect safety.
The physical separation of the batteries in Units 1 and 213 atcut 30 feet between each of the four batteries. Cables which feed redundant circuits are physically separated and armored cable is used as a fi_m retardant.
I. cads for cable trays are planned by Duhc engineers and ncs acte in the field. Cable tray loadings vill be la accordance with IPCZA table. These tcpics and the red d:-ive bus arrangement were also discussed with C. '#/ 1e of Duke and 1
D. Sullivan of DFL after the meetin6 The use of an averaging cir-cuit en the flux detectors was also discussed, and Duke indicated that they =ay want to talk to us again on this topic.
8.
Control Rod Drive Scram Bus The arrangement prcpesed for the control red drive scram bus is the same as for Cr/stal River and other recent 3&W plants. Mr. Sullivan m mi n m ten but that it apparently met our rM m* < t
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4-SEP 6 1966 Roger S. Boyd 3.
U'IRESOLVED AREAS Tne folloving areas were not resolved at the =ceting and MW vill have to perfom further work.
1.
Diversity of ECS Actuation Si.:;nals B&W indicated that a 10 psi contai: ment pressure signal has been We added to serve as a diverse actua* ion signal for the ECS.
stated that an analysis showin6 that the 10 psi signal would indeed be a valid bacinip signal over the entire break size spectr=1 vould MW indicated that they had not intended to do an be required.
analysis since they felt that the contain=ent pressure signal was not a goed signal and added it only in response to the ACRS request We do not consider this item resclved and believe for diversity.
that an atte=pt = ant be made to inecrpcrate a diverse sig.al of value to the safety of the plant.
2.
Core 3arel Check Valves MW stated that the final sining was eight valves, each 1h inches in dia=eter and stated that this was documented on the SMJD appli-We stated we did not feel that this resolved our prior cation.
resertations since no analysis had yet been presented to show that extra relieving capacity was available as discussed at the time of the Duke review.
Mr. Levine stated that we were not satisfied with the B&W calcula-tion of the interaction of blowievn and injection ficv in the annulus and would require further analyses.
3 Themal shock Current 3&W continues to work on the ther=al shock calculations.
estimates are fractu'e propagation through about 3c% of the plate.
Duke has reviewed the prcposed Zion solution and finds it impossible
- To to apply to the Oconee Units because of space limitaticas.
calculations have been ende on the time required to fill the cavity around the vessel to a level above the core after a break in the vessel but my estinate, including full E CS ficv and vessel invento:y, is about 10 to 15 minutes.
4.
Xenon Oscillations 3&W indicated that studies on xenon oscillations vculd be completed in the next few months.
It is not yet clear that part length rods j
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SEP 6 1968 5-Roger S. Boyd 5
The~al-Hydraulic Analyses B&W stated that they have switched to the W-3 correl, tien and vill license the plac.: on the basis of the W-3 correlatic:
6.
C.ualitf Accu-ance Mr. Lee stated that he veuld have further conversations with Dr. 3ech on the subject of quality assurance.
/5 3rian K. Gri:aes Reacter Pro,'ects 3 ranch No. 3 Division of Reactor Licensing
Attachment:
Attendance List Dictribution:
P. A. Merris F. Schroeder S. Levine O. F. Sullivsn-W. S. Seidel, CO, Atlants W. 3. 3utler E. L. Waterfield R. J. y.attsen R. R. ?cwell v.
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- 3. K. Grimes H. J. Richings
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Foran AEC-818 (Rev. 9-53)
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ATTENDANCE LIST MEEPING WITH DUKE POWER COMPANY AUGUST 29,1968 Duke Power wapany Austin Cole Thies
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Edwin Dean Powell Paul Hodges Barton John Edvin Smith Lionel (None) Lewis Linvoed Clayton Dail Themas Fulton '#ke Warren Herbert Owen Charles Joseph '#11e Edward Castle Fiss William States Lee William Humphrey Grigg Roy Baker Snapp
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3&W Donald Wheaten Montgomery William Reuben Smith DRL P. A. Morris S. Levine C. G. Lcng
- 3. K. Grimes
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W. R. Butler R. L. Waterfield R. J. Mattson
.R. R. Pcvell
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