ML19312B771
| ML19312B771 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1978 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Case E, Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911190561 | |
| Download: ML19312B771 (7) | |
Text
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REOULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIEUTION SYSTEM
- l>ISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL (RIDS 50-2A9' /0/287 REC: CASE E G ORG: PARKER W O NRC DOCDATE: 02/17/78 DUKE PWR DATE RCVD: 02/24/7t DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO
SUBJECT:
' COPIES RECEIVED RESPONSE TO NRC"3 REQUEST FOR ADDL' INFO RECEIVED LTR 1 ENCL 1 ISSUES.
02/01/78 ON FIRE FROTECTION PLANT NAME:OCONEE - UNIT 1 OCONEE - UNIT 2 REVIEWER INITI AL:
XJM OCONEE - UNIT 3 DISTRIBUTER INITIAL:
- +++**++*+*** DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS ***************
NOTES:
1.
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CUNNINGHAM - ALL AMENDMENTS TO FSAR AND CHANGES TO TECH SPECS FIRE PROTECTION INFORMATION (AFTER ISSUANCE OF OL).
(DISTRIEUTION CODE AOO6)
FOR ACTION:
GR CW'cr ocID**w. '3 ENCL INTERNAL:
EG FILE **W/ 3"~
NRC PDR**W/ ENCL
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MURANKA**W/ ENCL HANAUER**W/ ENCL EXTERNAL:
LPDR'S WALHALLA, SC**W/ ENCL TIC **W/ ENCL NSIC**W/ ENCL ACRS CAT'B**W/16 ENCL j u1STRIBUTION:
LTR 38 ENCL $7
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780580008-4**+4*****+************************
THE END
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373-4093 February 17, 1978 Mre Edson G. Case, Acting Director
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Oftice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation f'r.-
79,73.A;--I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D. C.
20555
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Attention:
Mr. R. Reid, Chief N/
Operating Reactors Branch #4
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Reference:
Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-269, -270, -287
Dear Mr. Case:
Please find attached a response to your requests for additional information on fire protection received informally on February 1, 1978, and as discussed with your staff in our telephone con;ersation of February 3, 1978.
Ver[trulyyours,.
I W'
/ web.fa William O. Parker, Jr.
LJB:vmb Attachment
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Oconee Nuclear Station Response to NRC Request for Additional Ir. formation on Fire Protection Received February 1, 1978 Question 3 Describe whether the separation is adequate to assure that a cable tray fire will not affect the minimum number of instrumentation inside containment, including pressurizer heater cables.
Where redundant cables are in proximity, was potential for exposure by a cable tray fire considered?
Response
The safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) will provide a separate means to bring units to a safe shutdown condition. The SSF will be separate f rom the existing structures at Oconee utilizing additional cables to provide the necessary power, control and instrumentation for the facility.
A three hour fire wall will be constructed in the west penetration room to provide separation between the SSF cables and the normal unit equipment and cables in the east penetration room.
This wall will assure that the unit can be shut down using either the SSF or normal unit equipment and cable.
Maximum possible separation of existing and additional cables will be a design consideration for the SSF.
Question 5 Provide additional information on radwaste fires.
Response
This information was provided in a telephone conversation on February 3,1978.
Question 13 Justify the sealing of pipe penetrations of critical barriers with "Armaflex" only, such as the barrier between the Turbine and, Auxiliary Buildings.
Response
The EP and LP injection pumps are located on the 758+0 elevation of the Auxiliary Building and are required for safe shutdown of the unit. The pump locations.are below the lowest Turbine Building elevation. No penetra-tions connect this level with the Turbine Building.
9 3
The power cable required for operation of these pumps runs vertically up through elevations 771+0 (no Turbine Building elevation), and 783+9, to the equipment room on elevation 796+0.
Pipe penetrations sealed only with Armaflex in the Turbine / Auxiliary Building wall are at least fifty feet f rom these safe shutdown cables.
Therefore, the penetrations will have no affect on the safe shutdown of the unit.
In addition the. proposed SSF will provide a safe shutdown system independent of these areas.
Question 14 a.
What is the affect of loss of control air on the auxiliary boiler?
b.
What is the reason for the sequence as described?
Response
The auxiliary boiler is equipped with photoelectric cells to shut fue' off if air flow is statoff.
An automatic timad purge fan assures complete purge prior to restart.
Question 19 Provide drawings which are referenced but were omitted.
Response
These drawings were provided on February 6, 1978.
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s Position 1 The capability to reach all areas of significant combustible and safety related equipment at Keowee with a maximum of 100 feet of fire hose should be provided.
Response
Hose stations will be provided at Keowee with capability to reach all areas of significant combustibles and safety related equipment with a maximum of 100 feet of fire hose.
Position 9 Detectors should be located in all safety related areas containing combustibles.
Response
Smoke detectors will be located in all areas containing equipment required for safe shutdown which contain combustibles.
Position 11 Doors separating the Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings with the exception of the rolling fire doors should be locked or alarmed in the control room.
Response
Access to all areas in the Auxiliary Building containing safe shutdown equipment is controlled by either rolling fire doors or doors that are locked and alarmed to the guard facility.
Position 12 How many purge fans will be provided? Flexible ductwork should also be provided.
Response
Two 5,200 cfm smoke purge fans and flexible ductwork will be provided.
Position 14 Fixed repeaters should be provided in the Reactor Building.
Response
Fixed repeaters will be provided for communication inside the Reactor Build-ing unless it is determined that the use of repeaters will affect the opera-tion of nuclear instrumentation.
- Additional Items 1.
The loss of instrument air will not affect the capability of the units to safely shutdown.
2.
Non-labeled fire doors will be replaced with rated frames and door assemblies equivalent to the barrier penetrations.
3.
Fire brigade members will receive a pre-employment physical examination and periodic physical examinations as required by other programs established at Oconee Nuclear Station.
4 The fire protection program either meets or will be revised to meet the provisions of Attachment #3 of the NRC's " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Control and Quality Assur-ance," entitled " Control of Combustibles."
5.
A program for fighting fires will be established which addresses the items outlined in Attachment #5 of the NRC's " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance,"
entitled " Fire Fighting Procedures." This program will utilize drawings of all levels within t lation and yard area to the extent practicable to assure this information is readily available.
6.
The instrument storage room located off the Turbine Building does not have a three hour rated fire door. This area is used only for instrument stor-age. Walls, ceiling and floor are rated.
7.
The schedule for implementation of fire protection modifications is as follows :
(1) smoke detectors Second refueling outage from SER issuance for each unit (2) fire header piping and Second refueling outage hose stations inside from SER issuance for containment each unit (3) fire header piping and July 1, 1979 hose stations outside containment (4) portable hand lights
- First refueling outage occurring af ter six months fron SER issuance (5) water flow alarms Same as (4)
(6) propane tanks
'Same as (4)
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Additional Items (cont)
(7) fire barrier penetrations July 1, 1979 (8) portable extinguishers Same as (4)
(9) portable smoke exhauster Same as (4)
(10) emergency breathing air Same as (4) supply (11) oil collection system Second.*efueling outage from SER issuance or each unit (12) cable penetration fire stop April 30, 1978 tests (13) safe shutdown facility 30 months from NRC approval (14) fixed repeaters First refueling outage for each unit occurring after six months from SER issuance (15) administrative controls a) all controls except those in (b)
Same as (4) b)
controls to address NRC fire fighting September 1, 1979 guidelines
- At the end of the first refueling outage for any unit which occurs after an initial six month period, all three units will be completed.
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