ML19310A613
| ML19310A613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/13/1979 |
| From: | Ross D NRC - TMI-2 BULLETINS & ORDERS TASK FORCE |
| To: | Israel S, Rosztoczy Z NRC - TMI-2 BULLETINS & ORDERS TASK FORCE |
| References | |
| IEB-79-05C, IEB-79-06C, IEB-79-5C, NUDOCS 8006200549 | |
| Download: ML19310A613 (9) | |
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SEP 13 !S79 MEMORANDUti FOR:
Z. R. Rosztoczy, Group Leader, Analysis Group, S&O Task Force S. L. Israel, Group Leader, Systems Group, B&O Task Force CROM:
D. F. Ross, Jr., Director, Bulletins & Orders Task Force
SUBJECT:
REVIEW 0F RESPONSES TO BULLETIUS79-05C and 79-06C Please take the following comments or questions into consideration in ycur review of the 05C-06C bulletins.
A.
B&WResdons 1.
In general the new guidelines seem very complex and demanding on the operator. He should observe some dry runs at the siculator with prospective licensed operators.
2.
Is a pressure set point several hundred psi below ES, preferable?
3.
Do we have a thermal analysis of a feedwater transient v;here, at ES, RCp are tripped and 0TSG is filled to emergency level set point?
4 Why is RCP restart ccupied to feedwater to at least cne OTSG?
5.
Why aren't there thermal limits on pump restart (oil temp., stator temp., etc.) or mechanical limits (such as loss of seal integrity)?
6.' Table 2 does not mention SLB inside containment; why not?
7.
Why, in lable 2, are the same pump vibration limits given for
. all types c# RCPs?
8.
Does ICC override pump restart precautions?
9.
Does each operating plant have a procedure for going to cold shutdown withcut forced primary circulation?
10.
Step 3.2 should cite SLB.
11.
Step 3.3, part 2, needs clarification; the three and statements are not obvious. Also, the "50CF subcooling" could refer to primary or secondary.
12.
Is Figure 1 applicable to all plants?
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 800620064Q P00R QUALITY PAGES e
Z. R. Rosztoczy S. L. Israel SEP 131979
- 13. Why does'not Fig. 1 apply to SLB7
- 14. Do we want HPI terminated (or throttled) according to Fig.1 if there is no FW and heat removal is by feed-and-bleed?
- 15. Step 3.6:
Is AFU " isolated"?
- 16. Step 3.11.1: Basis for 30 mins. (all pumps)?
- 17. Step 4.1.4: SLB?
Are these procedures written in real time?
- 19. Step t.2.3:
If no FW, do we want PORV open <2300, or if pressure is decreasing?
- 20. Step 4.2.5 is confusing; is FW cn or not?
- 21. Step 4.2.7 is confusing; has FW been restored?
- 23. Step 4.3.4.2: Why " wait"?
- 24. Step 4.4.3:
Is there substantial voidage in hot leg, and, if so, is Thot reliable?
25.
Is homogeneous assumption conservative? (See WCAP-9584, p. 10) where hemogeneous break model gives 17110F PCT, separated model gives 21620F.
26.
Is Davis Besse covered by the no AFW guidelines?
- 27. Justify the statement on p.11 of Part II that B&W NSS provides design features with automatic protection during the early part of small break transients.
- 28. P.13 is confusing; are steps A, B, C iff, or and?
29.
P.14, next to last line:
Is the word assumes supposed to be assures?
- 30. On the coincident logic (low pressure and RCP current), if one (or two) RCP is inadvertently tripped, do tne other three draw enough extra amps to negate 80',' trip set point? How can circuits like these be qualified to " gold-plated" standards?
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s I. R. Roszteczy.S. L. Israel gp l 3 BN B.
C-E Report Cell-115P 1.
Why does C-E get HL limiting, vs CL limiting-for W7 2.
If horizontal pipes stratify (river flow), it seems that break could be vapor, or liquid, or mixed, dependent on azimuthal location (with pumps on).
3.
Does C-E inject into HL at early times?
4.
From Table 3-2, the case 8 meets App. K and justifies the SIAS
+ 6 min. Why isn't case 2 (i.e., p. 3) worse, as it uncovers to the same depth (3.1 ft/and much longer (1450 vs 950 sec))?
5.
Some SI-tanks are located high enough in containment such that the gravity head may be significant (say s50 psi); should this be modeled?
6.
Should the BE cr the EM be used for guidelines?
(Or,what are the significant conservatisms of EM?)
7.
Did Table 4.1-2 use 16 kw/f t and Atis x1.2?
8.
What is "High" on Table 4.1-3?
9.
P. 4-28:
Isn't SLB modeled with and without offsite power already?
If so, why speak of reduction in margin?
10.
P. 4-28: Do C-E plants all have a procedure for cooling down following LOOP?
11.
P. 4-28:
Isn't SG tube rupture already analyzed assuming LOOP?
12.
Is seal water, CCW maintained during ES?
13.
P. 4-31:
C-E takes credit for model verification of Semiscale' Also, the weasel-words of the last sentence need clarification.
14.
P. 4-36, Step 4.
AFW should be established ASAP, so as to avoid last minute discovery that things aren't working.
15.
P. 4-36, Step 5: Too loose; too general; seems to give carte blanche.
- 16. Don't we need a pressure vessel integrity argument?
17.
P. 4-37, Step da: What is the role of pressurizer heaters?
9
I. R, Roszteczy
- 4'-
- 5. L. Tsrael Stp 131979 19.
P. 4-37, Step 4-c: What PORV for ANO-27 20.
P. 4-38:
Precaution 1 is so vague as to be ' useless.
21.
P. 5-1: Does U data controvert the homogeneous claim? Are these remarks for vertical or horizontal flow?
(Same comment top p. 5-3.)
22.
P. 5-7: Again cites Semiscale for model comparison; "These simularities in responses tend to support the calculational models developed to analyze small break LOCA with operating reactor coolant pumps."
C.
Westinchouse (WCAP-9584) 1.
P. 4: Why don't we get a complete description of these pump tests?
2.
Has the EPRI-C-E pump data been incorporated into anyone's model?
4 3.
P. 9: Could we get Froude numbers for scaling typicality?
4.
P. 9:
If separated model is ccncluded to be appropPiate, wculd it not follow that azimuthal break location would be a (new) important parameter?
5.
Where is model verification?
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B&W SMALL BREAK GUIDELINES PART I - OPERATING GUIDELINES FOR SMALL BREAKS 1.0 Symptoms and Indications (Immediate Indications) 2.0 Immediate Actions 3.0 Precautions 4.0 Followup Actions 4.1 Identification and Early Control 4.2 Actions if Feedwater is not Available 4.3 Actions with Feedwater Available tc One or Both Generators 4.4 Non-LOCA Overcooling Transi ent wi th Feedwater Available 4
i 4.5 Actions for Ir. adequate Core Cooling Appendix A - LPI Cooling PART II - Small Break Phenomena - Description of Plant Behavior 1
Introduction 2
Impact of RC Pump Operation on a Small LOCA 3
Small Breaks with Auxiliary Feedwater 3.1 LOCA large Enough to Depressurize Reactor Coolant System 3.2 LOCA Which Stabilizes at Approximately Secondary Side Pressure 3.3 LOCA Which May Repressurize in a Saturated Condition 3.4 Small LOCA Which Stabilizes at P grer.ter than Psec.
3.5 Small Breaks in Pressurizer 4
Small Breaks without Auxiliary Feedwater 1
4.1 LOCA's Large Enough to Depressurize Reactor Coolant System 4.2 LOCA's Which Reach a Semi-Stabilized State 4.3 Small LOCA's Which do not Actuate the ESFAS l
4.4 Small Breaks in Pressurizer 5-Transients with Initial Response Similar to a Small Break 6
Transients : hat might Initiate a LCCA
7 HPI Throttling Appendix A - Inadequate Core Cooling - Description of Plant Behavior 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Loss of RCS Inventory with RCPs Operating 3.0 Loss of RCS Inventory without RCPs Operating 4.0 Inadequate Core Cooling Resulting From Loss of S/G Heat Sink
.