ML19309G853

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Responds to Util Supporting Util 10CFR50 App J Requirement Exemption Requests.Addl Info Required for Technical Reviewers to Complete Containment Leakage Testing Program Review.Response Required within 30 Days
ML19309G853
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 04/21/1980
From: Ippolito T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Parris H
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
References
NUDOCS 8005070686
Download: ML19309G853 (3)


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April 21, 1980 Docket Nes 50-259 50-260 and 50-296 Mr. Hugh G. Parris Manager of Power Tennessee Valley Authority 500 Chestnut Street, Tower II Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Dear Mr. Parris:

Reference is made to your submittals of February 26, 1976 and July 8, 1977 in response to our letter of August 4,1975 regarding compliance of Browns Ferry Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3 with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J and your evaluation of the containment leak testing program for the Browns Ferry Plant. Your letter of July 8,1977 provided detailed discussions in support of your requests for exemption from certain requirements of Appendix J.

On one of your requests, we need additional information to complete our review. Our comments on your submittal are enclosed. We now have technical reviewers assigned to this and other leak testing programs with the objective of wrapping up these items.

Your assistance would be appreciated by responding to our comments within 30 days.

Sincer y I

ThomasA.Ippo1[to, Chief l

Operating Reactbrs Branch #3 Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc w/ encl:

i See next page l

s Mr. Hugh G. Parris April 21,1980 cc:

H. S. Sanger, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority 400 Commerce Avenue E llB 33 C Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Mr. Ron Rogers Tennessee Valley Authority 400 Chestnut Street, Tower II Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Mr. H. N. Culver 249A HBD 400 Commerce Avenue Tennessee Valley Authority Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Robert F. Sullivan U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 1863 Decatur, Alabama 35602 Athens Public Library South and Forrest Athens, Alabama 35611 S.

- - - *~

e ENCLOSURE l

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BROWNS FERRY UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX J CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE TESTING

1.0 BACKGROUND

On July 8,1977, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) submitted its evaluation of the containment leak testing program for Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3, in which detailed discussions were provided in support of its requests for exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

20 INFORMATION REQUIRED 2.1 CONVERSION OF WATER LEAKAGE TO EQUIVALENT GAS LEAKAGE In one of the exemption requests, item 2.3.2.1, regarding water testing of certain valves, the TVA states that:

The feedwater, standby liquid control, reactor water cleanup, RHR shutdown cooling suction valves, and control rod drive isolation valves, including the RCIC, HPCI, and RWCU system isolation valves which connect between the feedwater isolation valves, will be tested with water; and the resultant water leakage rate will be converted to obtain an equivalent gas-leakage rate.

For us to determine that this approach is acceptable, you must provide justification for the validity of the gas / water correlation.

However, since the leakage involved in generally quite low and the leakage path characteristics are esser.tially unpredictable, it is extremely difficult to correlate water leakage to equivalent gas leakage accurately. To date, no acceptable correlation has been demonstrated.

Neverthekss, hydrostatic testing of these valves may be acceptable because a nudar of systems are designed to remain intact and liquid-filled following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.

For these systems, testing with water as a medium is more appropriate than testing with air or nitrogen since it. approximates the post-accident environment more closely.

If you choose to use hydrostatic testing, you must provide justification verifying that the available fluid inventory is sufficient to maintain a water seal on the isolation valves during and following an accident, based on the leakage-rate limit of the test.