ML19309G328
| ML19309G328 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1979 |
| From: | Klingaman R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309G322 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050553 | |
| Download: ML19309G328 (10) | |
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., Q 'Interviev Summary 8005050f B Richard Klingaman Manager of Generation Engineering Metropolitan Edison Company Reading, Pa.
The intervieu vas can'ucted by Mr. Hartmut Schierling and Mr. Dennis Allison d
of the NRC Special Inquir'y Group, on August 30, 1979 in Trailer 203 at the TMI site from about 7:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m.
Mr. Klingaman had previously been interviewed by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement investigation team on May 31, 1979 (TMI Tape 287).
A transcript of the previous interview which described Mr. Klingaman's basic involvement, had been reviewed prior to this interview.
Thus, some of the matters discussed in this interview followed matters discussed in the previous interview and do not stand alone.
Mr. Klingaman was shown a copy of the standard witness notification (Attachment A).
He was advised that the interview was voluntary on his part, that notes would be taken and that he vould be provided with a copy of our summary. Mr.
Klingaman stated that the information provided and discussed by him in the in-tervieu vas based on his memory and is the best to his recollection.
He stated that there could be inaccuracles, primarily with regard to dates and names of individuals.
During the first day, Wednesday, March 28, 1979, Mr. Klingaman had worked in the Met-Ed headquarters offices in Reading, Pa., primarily obtaining information from the plant site and passing it on to various Met-Ed and GPU employees.
He also assisted some outside callers by relaying their messages to the plant.
2 (According to the transcript of Mr. Klingaman's previous DIE intervieu, Klingaman had notified Mr. Creitz of the situation at about 7:55 a.m.,
including informine him that a site emergency and then a general emergency had been-declared.) We asked Mr. Klingaman if he had conveyed to Mr. Creitz any greater sense of urgency than was known to several other company offi-cials and officers at that time.
Mr. Klingaman answered no.
Klingaman stated that on March 28, he received telephone calls from a number of organizations offering their assistance.
However, he was unable at that time to identify any specific needs to the callers.
He did recall the fol-loving organizations contacting him:
Burns & Roe (Scott Dam), Babcock &
Uilcox, Penn State University, Westinghouse and General Electric.
He also received a telephone call from Babcock & Wilcox in Lynchburg, Va. requesting his assistance in establishing a telephone contact with the control room.
One specific activity Klingaman had been engaged in on March 28 was to locate and obtain respirators.
He had received a call from Dave Limroth, Superintendent, Administration and Technical Support, at the TMI site advising him that respir-ators were being used onsite and that additional respirators vould be needed.
Klingaman called a number of utilities and respirator vendors requesting that they provide Met-Ed with respirators.
One of the results was that Bill Potts, L
TMI-l Superintendent who was at Oyster Creek, brought some equipment back with him.
Klingaman did not keep a record of whom he called, who provided any res pirators or when and how they arrived. He stated that Mr. Dreibelbis of Met-Ed probably would have that information.
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From about 6:30 on the evening of March 28 until after midnight, Mr. Klingaman assisted Met-Ed public information personnel in answering telephone inquiries.
Messrs. Troffer, Hilbish and Buring also assisted.
He recalled that most inquiries were from the neus media or concerned (apprehensive) individuals.
Most callers simply inquired about the situation rather than probing as to u";t uas behind Met-Ed's statements or insisting on interpretations.
Mr. Klingaman stated that there was no official guidance or company position
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on uhat to say.
He simply fielded the questions as best he could from what he kneu of conditions at the plant.
By that time, a rough chronology of events had been obtained by Mr. Hilbish from Mr. Kunder at the site.
This chronology, along uith several communications received from the' site during the day, had formed the basis for his knowledge.
Mr. Klingaman stated that he had not tried to downplay the accident. He did not release some information such as the containment dome radiation monitor readings.
These readings had been third or fourth-hand by the tirae he had received them, he did not believe them and thus, was concerned about providing inaccurate information.
He stated that, generally, callers were told that there had been a turbine trip, a reactor trip and the operators vere trying
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to cool the plant down.
Radiation levels vere given along uith a statement that nobody had been hurt.
About 1:30 a.m. on March 29, when Mr. Klingaman and the others who vere ansver-ing telephone inquiries vent home, they provided a statement for the Met-Ed telephone operators to read to callers.
Mr. Klingaman said he vould provide us uith a copy of the statement.
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During the day on March 29, Mr. Klingaman's duties were similar to those on the day of March 28.
He continued to receive offers for help en March 29.
However, he had no clear recollec' tion on the details except that the calls vere very many.
He finally advised the secretary of Jack Herbein, on whose phone most of those calls came, to keep a rec'ord of those calls. We requested a copy of that information and Klingaman said he would provide one through the normal SIG information channel vith Met-Ed. Later, maybe in May 1979, he prepared a summary of those early telephone calls based on that record.
On March 29, Klingaman initiated a location search for tanks for potential storage of liquids.
He knew there was a lot of wat'er in the auxiliary building and in the containment building that eventually might have to be stored or trucked off site. He directed his and Dreibelbis' staff to contact any possible source for such tanks and obtain data (capacity, pressure, location, transportation).
During the night of March 29, Mr. Klingaman again assisted Met-Ed public informa-tion personnel in ansvering telephone inquiries.
Once again, there was no offi-cial policy on what to say and he was fielding questions as best he could based on what he knew.
However, during the day he had been avare of the contents of several Met-Ed press conferences and these statements, along uith telephone calls f rom the plant site, formed the basis for his knouledge.
Generally, he recalled that his statements that night indicated that the plant was not cooling down in a normal manner and addressed the offsite radiation levels.
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5 On March 30, Mr. Klingaman revieued the information on tank availability, selected those to be purchased, and directed his staff to get these tanks to the site as soon as possible. He recalls that in one case a potential tank supplier had advised Met-Ed that Burns & Roe had inquired shortly before about tanks for the same purpose.
Klingaman believed that Burns &
Roe could have received an order to purchase tanks originating separately with H. Dieckamp.
anks began to arrive at the TMI site shortly and -
caused confusion because of storage problems.
Klingaman stated that Dreibel-bis of Met-Ed maintains the promurement files for~this effort.
Klingaman stated that following on a variety of subjects:
He vent to the TMI-2 site a week or later after the accident happened.
Prior to reporting to the site, he had assumed charge of the Generation Division at the Reading office.
He considered I
this to be an implicit instruction from Mr. Herbein based on i
several telephone conversations.
Around-the-clock shifts were set up in the Generation Division Office in Reading to support i
i site activities on March 28 or March 29.
Outside of normal vorking hours the duty person vould ansver calls on four key phones (which included Mr. Herbein's phone) and knew where to contact others in the " duty section" if needed.
A different duty officer procedure had been in effect in the Generation Division office in Reading, Pa. at the time of the accident.
The purpose of the procedure was to ensure that technical support would-be available from the Reading office for a power plant in various disciplines (Mechanical Engineer-ing, Electrical Engiinering, etc.), if needed.
It was not employed
6 on the day of the accident because it was not appropriate to the situa-tion.
Its intent was to ensure that appropriate people vere available on call if needed during nights, weekends and holidays.
On March 28, the entire staff was available and thus there was no reason to invoke the procedure. Hr. Klingaman said he would provide us a copy of the procedure.
GPUSC's nominal functions with respect to pover plants were primarily new construction and major modifications to existing plants. Houever, GPUSC customarily worked on or provided engineering advice to Met-Ed on numerous smaller matters, since Met-Ed would generally turn to GPUSC as a first step vhen additional expertise vas needed.
Thus it seemed natural for GPUSC to feel responsible and to become involved.
The fact that GPUSC under R. Arnold took charge of the recovery effort was no surprise to him.
H. Dieckamp had stated tr.st Arnold was in charge early after the accident (possibly within the first two days).
We asked Mr. Klingaman about the extent to which the Reading office be-came involved in critical review of decisions and actions at the plant.
He indicated, when ti were being briefed by personnel at the plant such as G. Miller or J. Herbein, Reading personnel did sometimes ask questions about whether certain things had been considered.
- However, Reading personnel did not attempt to influence the decision making to a great extent for a variety of reasons:
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1.
Mr. Herbein was at the site reviewing and making decisions (after about 11:00 a.m.)'.
2.
Usually, site personnel briefed them on the situation and told them of the planned future actions at the same time.
The planned future actions generally appeared reasonable at the time.
3.
Generally, not much detailed information was available.
The reports were usually on overall plant status such as "the plant has tripped and is being cooled down" rather than spe-cific readings such as T, T, or pressurizer level.
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4.
It was not felt appropriate for the Reading office to try to obtain specific detailed readings in order to make an
" independent" diagnosis of the situation, since this would
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interfere with operations personnel and those in the plant were in a far better position to dia'gnose conditions in the first place.
5.
Reading personnel were kept quite busy performing communication functions.
With respect to support arrangements that existed prior to the accident with organizations outside Met-Ed/GPU, Klingaman stated:
Details on any such contracts can best be obtained from Jtc. Dendler of the Met-Ed Contracts Department.
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1 Met-Ed does have a Master Services Contract which applies to TMI Unit 1 and Unit 2.
Under this contract individual tagks are initiated by the plant operating staff or the Read'ing office and are then released to B&W Lynchburg over Klingaman's signature.
The contract is principally for engineering assistance rather than equipment.
There existed an Engineering Service Contract with-Burns & Roe for Tf11-2 under which specific tasks could be requested. He thought that contract had existed on the day of the accident, 3/28, and was still in effect be-tween GPU and Burns & Roe.
Other contracts existed between Met-Ed and MPR for engineering services and Radiation Management Corporation.
The statement in the FSAR-(Chapter 13) regarding arrangements for support by other utilities appeared to refer to an agreement between Het-Ed and Jersey Central Povet and Light Company and Pennsylvania Electric Company and GPU Service Corporation-(all part of General Public Utilities).
Subsequent to the interviev, in a letter dated September 10, 1979 from M. Diaz to G. Frampton, Met-Ed provided to the NRC Special Inquiry Group the items dis-cussed above which Mr. Klingaman had said he would provide us.
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WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 E N 5 V,/
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July 30, 1979
/o T0:
All Special Inquiry Grocr Members FROM:
George T. Frampton, Jr.
RE:
WITNESS INTERVIEWS AND DEPOSITIONS Attached is the standard Witness Notification.we will be using for all interviews and depositions, including both informal interviews and depositions under oath.
Ann will be making sufficient copies so that everyone who will be conducting interviews can have a small pile of these to carry around and keep in his desk.
At a deposition or personal interview, the individual being interviewed should be given a copy of this Notification prior to the interview.
If the interview is being taped or transcribed, the witness should be asked on the record if he has read the Notification and understands it.
It is not necessary to read this Notification to ev5ry person you talk to on the telephone.
However, pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974, the Notification should be read to any witness interviewed over the telephone from whom you.
expect to extract any personal information or any infonnation concerning that individual's own personal role in the events during and after the accident.
George T. Frampton, Jr.
Attachment:
As stated b
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This interview is being conducted by m:mbers of the Nucis ar Regulatory -
Commissior.'s (NRC's) Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
This Group s'
is being directed independently of the NRC by an outside law firm, Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys.
Through a delegation of authori'ty from the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Inquiry Group has a broad nandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommendations for change.
At the conclusion of its investi-gation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in this interview is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you.
However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.
Any per-son interviewed -- whether he has been subpoenaed.or is being interviewed informally -- may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at the interview as his representative.
Witnesses should realize that while we will try to respect any requests for confidentiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can make no guarantees.
Names of witnessas and the information they provide nay eventually become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made avail,
able to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Information Act.
Moreover, other departments and agencies of government may request access to this information pursuant to the i
c i es:y Act of 1974.
Tha information may also be made available in whole or in r
car:
a committees or subcommittees of the U. S. Congress.
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