ML19309G297
| ML19309G297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1979 |
| From: | Owen W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309G293 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR TRAN-791016, NUDOCS 8005050530 | |
| Download: ML19309G297 (10) | |
Text
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s Interviev Sumrrary G
Warren Owen Senior Vice President, Engineering and Construction Duke Pouer Company P. O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 (704) 373-4391 The information listed below is a summary of an interview of Mr. Warren Owen, of Duke Power Company, conducted by Mr. Hartmut Schierling of the U. S. NRC Special Inquiry Group (SIG) for the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (Tt11-2) accident.
The intervieu vas conducted on September 12, 1979 in Room 602, Phillips Building.
Bethesda,Itaryland.
Mr. Owen was shown a copy of the SIG UITNESS NOTIFICATION (Attachment A).
He was told that the interview vas voluntary, that notes would be taken and that he vould be provided with a copy of this report.
The follow-ing information was given by Mr. Oven in response to questions by Mr. Schier11ng on the subject of his participation in and knowledge of the industry support effort.
Uarren Owen called his office in Charlotte, N.C.
at about 10 a.m. on Wednesday, March E, 1979, from the airport in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. He vas advised by R. Dick, Construction Vice President of Duke, that some sort of an event had occurred at THI-2. While earoute from Ft. Lauderdale to Phoenix, Arizona via Atlanta, Georgia, he advised Bill Lee, President of Duke, of the news and rec-ommended that he check with the home office in order to be informed should there be any interest by the news media.
Owen felt the " event" was more than a turbine and reactor trip but not an accident.
Oven arrived late in Phoenix on March 28
F.
2 to attend a meeting of the EPRI Research Advisory Group on March 29.
At breakfast on March 29, he talked with Barnoff of Jersey Central (a GPU subsidiary) who confirmed the TMI event but had little additional informa-tion. During the morning session, attended by approximately 40 management representatives of the nuclear power industry (Met-Ed and GPU vere not represented), Floyd Culler and Milt Levenson both of EPRI, were frequently called out of the meeting for phone calls.
Sometime during the morning session at the request of Ellis Cox, Executive Vice President of PEPCO and Chairman of the EPRI grcup, Culler and Levenson gave the group a ten-minute briefing of the event and plant status based on information available to them. During the day the group began to develop an understanding of the cir-cumstances and the severity of the accident as a result of other information that became available to EPRI. While the developing neus gradually created a " subdued atmosphere in the meeting" it did not cause the group to terminate the session until the meeting ended on Friday, March 30.
While driving to the airport, on Friday Chauncey Starr of EPRI commented to Duen that the industry should make a concerted effort to develop an industry-vide emergency management support similar to the industry-wide research effort at EPRI.
This was not intended, however, as a TMI-2 support but for potential future emergencies.
On Saturday morning, March 31, Bill Lee received a call in Charlotte, N.C.
from H. Dieckamp, GPU President, requesting assistance from Duke Power (con-ceivably because Duke also operates B&W reactors and it is a large organiza-tion).
Owen does not think Dieckamp requested assistance in a specific area but asked for support in general.
Lee directed Oven to assemble and direct
3 the Duke support effort and take with him uhatever talent he felt was neces-cary. By nou Oven had a definite understanding that it was a severe accident.
He assembled good technical talent:
C. Sansbury (Systems Engineer), U. Rasin (Nuclear Engineer), N. Pope (Operations Superintendent for Oconee Units 1, ?
and 3), and K. Canady (Duke Licensing Department). Whilethegroupvasavagl-duc, lo lacdt of the were unable to leave beoeuce of 2-ci;lir.e ablewithinlessthan2 hour [sligh S, S
on CommvCMd
'*e.
Arrangements were made for a charter plane, but it was too late to leave on Saturday.
The group finally left Sunday morning and arrived at the Harrisburg airport at about 8 a.m.
They were met by a Met-Ed representative and escorted to the National Guard Building No. 26 near the airport.
There vas great confusion around the airport due to the scheduled visit to TMI by President Carter.
They joined a group of individuals which eventually developed into the Industry Advisory Group (IAG), sometimes also referred to as the "Think Tank".
This original group of about 35 people exchanged information which they had available as individuals.
However, in their effort to be of any assistance, they were struggling for information.
They decided they needed a complete update of the plant condition before they could begin to evaluate the situation and be of any assistance to GPU/ Met-Ed.
Problems and issues were identified which they considered to be important and where they could be of assistance.
Some individuals took the lead in these areas, both from a technical and a management aspect, and others joined these efforts according to their interest and expertise.
The issues identified as important at that time vere (1) core status, (2) "what if" considerations and
(
4 (3) "everything else".
Tne group at this time (Sunday afternoon) was trying to develop concepts or recommendations that could be used by the GPU/fiet-Ed organization (manage:nent and the plant staff) in their decision making process.
Houever, necessary input information was not available. On Sunday afternoon, the IAG advised H. Dieckamp of their concern and requested a briefing, includ-ing the attendance by a representative of Babcock and Wilcox.
On Sunday evening at about 6 p.m. the IAG vas briefed on the plant status by H. Dieckamp and R. Keaten of GPU and D. Ross and R. Mattcon of the NRC.
W. h the briefing provided the group with urgently needed information there vere also instances when the necessary information was not available at that time.
Subsequent to this briefing, '" Er- -y the group organized itself under the direction of M. Levenson of EPRI as the IAG.
It was a very loosely structured group of "high povered experts" vith very diverse backgrounds.
Originally the IAGalsoincludedplantoperationsorienteqpeoplesuchasN.PopeofDuke techniul.\\ support Dxdz. \\Aldson m
who later oved to the cpcreticcmbghdization under Jac!
or 4crbeir,:.et-Ed, as-of shib opaR riS So o
the gchnical cuperintenden_ for 91ft Operators.
Individuals also vere assigned and reassigned to various elements in the recovery organizatior according to where they were needed most urgently.
One of the original efforts within the IAG vas the determination of the cora sta-tus.
Individuals involved were Ed Zebroski of EPRI and N. Kaufman of EG&G.
Necessary information for this effort was provided by R. Keaten, GPU and J. Holman, NRC.
The objective was to develop a concept for the core status to estimate the degree of core damage.
Another effort immedia'ely initiated was the evaluation
~
3 oftheexplocionpotentialofthehydrogenbubbleinthereactorvessel[
o numh6r o For this purpose Ed Zebroski established contact with. Srcy-cf CE-in Sen indtVI cldM S Cib bee, Cel-iforni2, to "H1 he his experience and expertise.
CE offc cd t6h halp, end indiw 4uele-werc.2d cucilable 24 Mere 2 s y.
W. Riehl of NASA, Huntsville, Alabama also participated in this effort as an expert on the hy-drogen explosion potential.
70cM 3
On +iondey night (April % Oven talked with H. Denton, Director of the NRC Tf!I-2 effort at the site. Denton expressed his concern about the GPU/Het-Ed capability to respond to the many and diverse issues they were facing and about their manpover availability to keep on going around the clock, including management manpover.
Tuo b l Oven attempted to call Lee of Duke Power Co. on Monday night to brief him on the TMI-2 situation, including the NRC concerns.
He was not able to reach Lee until early Tuesday morning (7 a.m.).
He recommended that Lee arran a wa$ che cc bd for additional industry-wide sup@ port. hY Oven assumes that Lee cell:d W. Kuhns, c
Chairman of the Board, GPU to effer Sie support.
Wedon4H 4
In a meeting o1 T h y morning (April /) the structure for the overall TMI-2 recovery organization was developed.
In at.tendance were H. Dieckamp of GPU, J. flacMillan of Babcock & t!ilcox,and W. Owen of Duke.
The need for specific elements within the organization vere identified. Also discussed was the assignmentofindividualstospecific&_nN1E6 p.21;; s, in particular the management (Onbtn peebaems.
Oven recommended that Byron Lee of Commonwealth Edison be included in a management position.
l
6 L
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0 Oven remained at the THI-2 site until about Sat-tirdey, April 7, (he is un-certain about the exact date) and served on the staff of R. Arnold of GPU uho managed the overall GPU/ Met-Ed recovery organization.
The primary re-sponsibility of Oven uas to recruit the necessary industry expertise for specific problems and fill management positions in the organization uith the anq ogang b n$ d r d k dif MMd M best talent, 00 a f4-ll bCdts,
rnede, their SM) tor forV)nnel ctV4Ltl1b}c bitD The outside support personnel was integrated into the GPU structure, however they did not assume a line responsibility in plant operations.
Their function vas to advise and recommend. Reactor operators from other utilities did not perform active operation functions but provided technical support to the Met-Ed operators licensed on THI-2.
This freed the Met-Ed operators and more reasonable I
chift durations could be assigned.
The Technical Working Group (TWG) provided daily assistance to Arnold as the GPU Operations Manager.
The managers or their representatives of all elements of the recovery organization vere members of this group. Also represented vere the NRC, Babcock and Wilcox,and Carns & Roe. This group met twice a day of whileOwenvasfthesiteandadditionalmeetingswereconvenedasparticular needs arose.- Problems and issues related to the daily specific plant operations vere discussed, task assignments uere made to groups or individuals,and alternat-ives uere evaluated. Wnile a consensus of opinions usually uas the result, on rfkduz.
occasion it uas necessary that Arnold mede the decision. He provided excellent leadership to the group.
Ouen provided tuo examples of the tremendous industry support.
The IAG needed expert assistance in evaluating the possible use of in-core ncutron detectors
7 d, h\\mus as thermocouples.
Duen contacted P. Ciay of GE in San Jose, California.
lig_ in hirn conneM aMtim-in the middle of the night vitt N. '.:1;;; who within less than an hour located T. Unianle, a GE instrumentation expert, H^uever,pple Id r vJhi
.e>yn oh!= tr Icat: the.cet t tysst imme-who was on vacation.
distelyforPhiladelph(awhereheupspickedupthenextmorningbyheli-drry 64Y)M1?c uyM Wdde d5-copter.
Similarly, :::: tin du-ing au uc s of April 1,a need for addi-As ow evawelc,Ocen contacted Florida Power c...
c tional operators was identifed.
rompany who immediately sent to Harrisburg some of their best operators that had just come off shift.
During the time that Quen was at THI he not once heard any mention by anyone the industry support organizations of a concern of being reimbursed for their effort or equipment they provided.
Reactor operators from other utilities were also utilized in the plant mod-ifications group.
Because of their expertise in the plant operations they ecaluated proposed plant changes from a practical operations point-of-view.
Owen stated'that uhen he first met the GPU/ Met-Ed personnel he noticed phy-cical evidence of their exhaustion and signs of experiencing strains and o{
Sop:pbrl1VC.
harrassment.
He considers that the arrival of Denton, NRC, was :
_ _icf f:r l
the GPU/flet-Ed management. He considers the GPU/ Met-Ed organization to in-l clude very highly qualified individuals, however, the effectiveness of the i
organization in responding to the accident from its beginning could have been better.
This can partially be explained by the fact that an accident l
of these dimensions and of such duration was not expected by the industry
8 in general. Owen believes that vith a pre-existing and structured organiza-tion, including identification of individuals in management positions, the response can be more effective and can be accomplished with less manpouer.
An inductry-vide pre-planning effort for such situations is one of the lessons to be learned.
Quen believes that the recponse within the Duke Power Company to a similar L
accident under similar circumstances possibl /would have been more organized and disciplined. For example, the great number of people that were permitted access to the control room contributed to the confusion in information exchange with the control room. He feels that the structure of the GPU organization, being composed of an operating company (Met-Ed) and a service company (GPUSC),
complicated the overall response.
Duen stated that he had frequent contacts with NRC officials at the site, including H. Denton, R. Mattson, and V. Stello.
Together with W. Lee of Duke Power Company he discussed with the NRC the potential for using one of the Duke Oconee Units under simulated TMI-2 conditions to evaluate the natural circulation potential.
Appropriate arranoements had been made, including notification of the Governor of South Carolina.
While at the TMI site, Owen did not keep any notes or records on his activ-ities.
He had a list of names and telephone numbers which he had used.
Those he turng ovpr to F. Smith of GPU who succeeded him in his position on fild Ebtetit of ee en :::ict;nt i: Arnold.
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NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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A r TA CH/n & A)T A July 30,1979
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T0:
All Special Inquiry Group tienbers FROM:
George T. Frampton, Jr.
RE:
WITriESS If!TERVIEWS Arid DEPOSITIONS Attached is the standard Witness I;otification we will be using for all interviews and depositions, including both informal interviews and depositions under oath. Ann will be making sufficient copies so that everyone who will be conducting interviews can have a small pile of these to carry around and keep in his desk.
At a deposition or personal interview, the individual being interviewed should be given a copy of this flotification prior to the interview.
If the interview is being taped or transcribed, the witness should be asked on the record if he has read the f;otification and understands it.
It is not necessary to read this I;otification to every person you talk to on the telephone.
However, pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974, the fictification should be read to any witness interviewed over the telephone from whom you expect to extract any personal information or any information concerning that individual's own personal role in the events during and after the accident.
George T. Frampton, Jr. -
Attachment:
As stated l
a
e-4
,...t This interview is being conducted by members of the hu lear Regulatory Comission's (ND.C's) S;9cial Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
This Group is being dire: ed independently of the !;RC by an outside law firm, Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both fiRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys.
Through a delegaticn of authority from the fiRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Incuiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommendations for change.
At the conclusion of its investi-gation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unless ycu have been served with a subpoena, your participation in this interview is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you.
However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.
Any per-son interviewed -- whether he has been subpoenaed.or is being interviewed informally -- may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at the interview as his representative.
Witnesses should realize that while we will try to respect any requests for confidentiality in connection with the publi:ation of our report, vie can make no guarantees.
flames of witnesses and the information they provide may eventually become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made avail-able to the t:RC for whatever uses it may deem appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public voluntarily, or become available
- o the public through the Freedom cf Infcrmation Act.
Moreover, cther departments and a;encies of government may recuest access to this infcrmation pursuant to the Driva y Act of 1974.
Tha information may also be ma:e available in whole r in
- ar: :D comittees or subcomi::ees of the U. S. Cong-ess.
.