ML19309G276
| ML19309G276 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1979 |
| From: | Barrett L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050497 | |
| Download: ML19309G276 (81) | |
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DEPOSITION OF:
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July 28, 1979
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Acme-Reportin~g= Company.
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1411 X Street. N.W.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
PRESIDENT'T COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT
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THPJEE MILE ISLAND 3
4 5
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6 7
DEPOSITION OF:
LAEE H. BARRETT S
9 10 11 Rcom 714 12 2100 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
13 July 28, 1979
~
14 2:15 o'cicek p.m.
I 15 16 APPEARNANCES:
17 On Behalf of the Commission:
is ERIC PEARSON Asscciate Chief Counsel 19 2100 M Screet, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037 20 21 22 23 24 25 I
I Acme Reporting Company g
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7 4 7
1 2
WITNESS.:
DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS.
Lake H. Barrett 3
3 4
_E _X _H.I 3.I T _S o
NUMBER:
FOR IDENTIFICATION O
i Decositier. No. 1 3
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14 15 16 17 15 i
19 20 21
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24 25 Acme Reporting Company
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1 EEEEEEEEEES MR. PEARSON:
Mr. Barrett, are you aware that this 2
3 is a deposition taken prior to your testimonv and in preparation for your testimony before the President's 4
Commission on the Accident at Threa
'H'e Island?
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THE NITNESS:
Yes, I do.
i MR. PEARSON:
If there are any questions that I 3
ask you that are unclear, or if you don't understand anything that I say, please stop me and I will be more than hac.o.v.
9
,0 to rephrase the question as necesrarv..
I would first like to identifv this document which 11 12 I have noted as Deposition Exhibit No.
1.
13 (Deposition Exhibit No. 1 was s
marked for identification.)
14 Whereupon, la-LAKE H.
BARRETT 16 having been duly sworn, was called as a witnes,s herein, and 1.
testified as follows:
l e-i f
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l DIRECT EXAMINATION 19 l
l BY MR. PEARSON:
20 1
1 Q
Would you tell me what this document is, please?
gt A
Thiat is a summary of my professional qualifications i
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for my present job.
3.,
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Q Is this au::. mary to the best of your knowledge 34
..I accurate?
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.,a I
i Acme Reporting Company l
4 1
A It is.
2 Q
Is it accurate to the present time?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
Does this summary contain any infcrmation concerning 5
your educational background?
6 A
Yes, it dces.
7 Q
Does that cover your educational background to the 3
present time?
9 A
I had some other courses, but it is details.
It 10 is covered.
11 Q
Okay.
Thank you very much.
For the reccrd, would 12 you tell us your full name and address?
((
13 A
Lake H 3arrett, 7805 Potters Mill Court, Cerwced, 14 Maryland.
15 Q
Would you give us a brief description of your 16 education since high school?
17 A
I received a bachelor degree in mechanical IS engineering in 1967, and I received a masters degree in i
i i
19l mechanical nuclear engineering in 1971, both from the i,
20 t University of Connecticut.
21 Q
Eave you taken any educaticnal courses since 22 your masters degree?
I 23 '
A Yes.
I ccmpleted about a third of a masters of I
l 24 business administration degree and varicus courses as par:
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20 c: training in my job.
I i
Acme Reporting Company
5 1
Q Does your educational background include any 2
training with respect to emerc. enc.e o. rec.aredness or evacuatio,n 9
3 of communities or anyth.ng related to those areas?
4 A
Not specifically.
I am more of a systems engineer, 5
rad waste systems, not emergency planning.
6 Q
Could you characterize again briefly cur 2
I employment e xperience ?
3 A
Do you want to go backwards or forwards in time?
9 Q
Either.
10 A
In 1967, I jcined the Electric Boa: Division of it General Dynamics where I was a fluid systems engineer.
In 1970, I transferred to the radiological control 12
(.
13 department of General Dynamics, and for two years I worked 14 on the design and operation of shore-based rad waste systems.
15 In 1973, I joined the Bechtel Power Corporation 16 where I was senior nuclear engineer in the design of rad t-waste systems.
At Bechtel I became a group leader in 13l charge of six professional people in the design of rad waste f
f 19 systems.
20 In 1974, I joined the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2t as a senior nuclear engineer in the Effluen: Treatment I
i i
Svstems 3 ranch where mv orincipal-duties were the review
.so
,I of proposed rad waste systems.
3.,
l In 1976, I was transferred to the Environmental 24 l
.,a Evaluation Branch of operatine Reactors.
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Acme Reporting Company
6 t
In April of 1976, I was appointed section leader l
in the Environmental Ivaluation 3 ranch.
My duties in the 2
1 3
InvironmentalIValuation 3 ranch are generally reviewing radioactive waste treatment syst*ms, radiological assessment 4
of effluents, radiation protecticn, and overall safety and a
I envircnmental assessment and analv.ses as chev.certain to
-o ocerating reactors.
Q Would you briefly tell us what a rad waste system 3
is?
9 A
A rad waste system is a system either air, licuid 10 or solid which is used to control any radioactive materials 11 within the reactor plant in general.
13 O
So when v.ou review a rad waste system, what do vou
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13 do?
,4 A
You technically look at the various components and la-the way the system is designed to assure that the licensee 16 or the acclicant has adequate control over radioactive 1.
materials within the reactor to prevent their uncontrolled
- i. s.
19l release to the envir:nment.
Q You indicated that your job responsibilities also
.,0 include an assessment of radiation effluents or something
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of that regard?
gg A
That is correct.
3 t
l Q
Would you explain that for us, please?
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l A
In my duties as section leader, one of the functions 3-.a i
Acme Reporting Company
7 1
of the section is to perform does estimates of the releases of radioactive material from nuclear power plants in the 3
environment.
Given a certain release, people that report 4
to me are responsible for making calculations to determine 5
does rates in the environment and the impact of those dose 6
rates upon members of the public.
7 Q
Do you perform these assessments of dose estimates 3
and so forth during the period at which a propcsed reactor 9
is being considered by the Commission?
10 A
Usually there are changes to an operating reactor.
11 For example, if an operating reactor wishes to install a new 12 piece of rad waste equipment or run the facility differently
((
13 than he initially proposed, we would review that.
14 I do not do reviews for constructicn permits or 15 operating license applications.
16 Q
If I can understand, you would review a. modification 17 to a plant to determine whether the radiation that might IS be emitted from that plant due to the modification would be 19 within scte specified range?
20 A
That is correct.
21 Q
And you would only approve the modification an presumably if that range was within the limitations allowed 23 by the NRC?
24 A
That.is correct.
05 0
You indicated before that as part of the dose Acme Reporting Company
8 l
t estimate that you do, you consider the impact to the public.
2 Nhat did you mean bv that?
3 A
What we will do, we will usually for a given release calculate the maximum individual dose, that is, the highest 4
5 dose any individual in the environment would receive, and very often we will calculate a population does which wouid 6
he the integrated dose to the environment, usually 3
specified as a 30 mile radius around the facility.
9 Q
Is it fair then to say that your concern with 10 radioactivitv. releases from plants is not only with rescect 11 to the total amount of radioactivity that would leave the 13 plant, but also how that radioactivity would affect the 13 surrounding vicinity and the pecople living there?
s A
That is correct.
14 Io-0 So you do essentially two separate calculations?
A Yes.
16 G
You indicated vou had a third responsibility with 1.
19 respect to radiation protection.
I don't have a clear note of it here.
tg A
Radiation procection is the protection of the plant 33l workers from radiation sources.
One of the basic functions 21 22 is to implement the ALARA as low as reasonably achievable
.,3 chilosochv with regard to occupational exposures, so verv t
1 often we will evaluate proposals for changes in the licensee's 34 1
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l plant with regard to the impact it may. have upon the
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Acme Reporting Company
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occupational exposures.
Q I see.
Does the ALARA test only apply to 2
occupational exposures?
3 A
No.
The ALARA also has to do with the releases 4
to the environment.
We also have the same philosophy, the
.a ALARA philosophy, for radioactive effluent in the power O
I plant, as well as the in-plant exposures.
Q How do you determine what is an appropriate ALARA a
level?
g A
For radioactive effluent, our guideance is provided
,0 in Appendix I (10 ) (c) FR, part 50 of the Commission's tt regulations, which specifies various dose limits and a 12 13 method of doing cost-benefit analysis for in-plant g
ccupational exposures.
14 g
There is no specific regulation other than licensees is should maintain their doses as low as reasonably achievable.
Guidance.- on various methods of doine that is provided in 1_4 a Nuclear Regulatcry Cc= mission guide which has a number le, of regulatory guide 8.8.
g Q
Is it fsir to sav chat vour determination with
,,0 respect to ALARA level for occupational exposures is
.,1 l
gg judgmental rather than haced upon a regulation?
i 1
A Repeat the question again.
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Q Is it fair to say that in determining what would 3
1 be an ALARA level with reso.ect to occus. ational ex=. csure, it
.,.o Acme Reporting Company
10 is based upon the judgment of the decisien maker, that is, 2
yourself or others within NRC, rather than based upon a 3
regulation that the NRC has previously promulgated?
4 A
That is correct.
There is no specific numbers for 5
it, 6
Q Lastly, you indicated that your job responsibility 7
involved protection of operating reactors with respect to 3
radiation.
Is that a fair characterization of your testimony?
9 A
I don't remember saying that.
10 0
Okay.
11 (A discussion was held off the record.)
12 BY MR. PEARSON:
13
,(
0 Uould you tell us hcw your present job responsi-s 14 bilities felate to radiological accident analysis?
15 A
Okay.
Scme of my people evaluate the accident, 16 potential accident analysis, evaluate potential accidents 17 at the reactors.
IS This would involve things like failures of waste 19 gas systems, failures of liquid tanks and the consequences 20 that these would have on the environment.
i 21 Scme of my people also perferm analyses for the 22 classical accidents, the LOCA, loss of cooling accidents.
23 0
When ycu are analyzing consequences to the 2'
environment, how do you do that?
l l
25 A
Generally in terms of radiation doses, again similar l
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Acme Reporting Company
11 to what I described before, the maximum individual dose, 1
2 as well as the overall population dose.
3 Q
Do your current job responsibilities involve in any.
way dealing with the area of emergency preparedness?
4 5
A Not directly; in the Environmental Evaluation Branch there are two sections.
One is called Section A.
One is g
called Section 3.
I am section leader of Section B.
Section A is the section that has responsibility 3
9 for emergency planning.
Very often the section leader for Section A may not be there or thebranch chief may not be to there, and consequently I may be called upon to handle it emergency planning issues as they may come up, but it is not tg 13 a primary function of mine.
It is a secondary function.
((
0 What does your section of the Environmental 14 Evaluation Branch do?
15 A
Generally rad waste systems.
16 t-Q Okay.
A Radiation protection, offsite dose impacts.
13 19 Q
Could you tell us who your immediate superior is?
A George Knighton.
go 21 Q
What is his title?
A Branch chief, Environmental Evaluation Branch.
gg 23 Q
Who is his superior?
A Do you want it now or do you want it at the time 24 of the accident?
Ne have changed.
33 Acme Resortina ComRonw J
12 Q
At the time of the accident.
1 A
At the time of the Three Mile Island accident, 2
Brian Grimes was the assistant director.
3 Q
Who is his superior?
4 A
Victor Stello, who is the director of the Division
.a 6
of Operating Reactors.
Q Who is Mr. Stello's immediate superior?
o A
Harold Centon, who is director cf the Office of
,a Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
9 Q
Let's focus a little more on the events relating to to Three Mile Island.
11 Can you tell us when you first knew that an incident 13
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13 or some croblem might be arising with respect to Three > Ele Island?
14 A
Wednesday, March 28th, in the morning.
13 0
Do you know what time in the morning?
16 A
About 8:30; I was in Brian Grimes' office and he 1_
got a call to go to the Incident Response Center--sone:hing 13 to do with Three Mile Island.
1g Q
C you know who called?
20 A
I'm not sure.
g1 Q
What did you understand as being the information 22 relayed to Mr. Grimes during that telephone conversaticn?
33 A
I saw him in his office.
It wasn't a telephone
.,4 conversation.
He just said that he had to go to the Incident
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Asmo RnporP0hg Cmmoony
i 13 t
Response Center, and t was Three Mile Island, and that o
was all.
3 Q
At that point did you do anything with respect to this?
4 A
No, I didn't do anything with that.
I went about 5
6 my business, normal day's work.
Q When was your next involvement personally with the incident at Three Mile Island?
a A
About shortly after 9 o' clock, Eleanor Adensam 9
who was the section leader of Section A, asked if she could" 10 use some of my people to do some dose calculations for 11 12 Three Mile Island, and I said yes, so we were doing calculations at that time, and also I did some work with 13 i
my people en the dose calculations.
This was in the morning 14 of the 28 th, about 9, 10 o' clock.
15 Q
After your conversation with Ms. Adensam, what did 16 vou do with respect to Three Mile Island?
1.
A I didn't do anything other than what anyone needed 13 i
i some help on.
I was trying to get some other work out.
19 l
Q Can you characterize for us your general involvement g
throughout the day of Wednesday, the 23th?
21 l
A Yes.
The questions kept getting more complicated 33 l
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as far as doses and radiation levels, and I went up to 23 Victor Stello's office in the same build.ing where I am, 3
that is che Phillips Building, where Eleanor was to get 25 Acme Reporting Company
14 1
more firsthand information on what was going on.
o Victor Stello was at the Incident Response Center,\\
3 so he was not in his office.
I talked to her, checked what 4
information she had, and we discussed it a little bit.
5 At that time, we did some dose calculations as far 6
as given a certain dose rate offsite, what might be the I
releases or how out of the.Lordinary the radiation levels 5
were.
It seemed like it was developing, so I stayed up in 9
Victor Stello's office starting about 11 o' clock.
10 Q
That is 11:00 a.m.?
11 A
Qn the 28th; I stayed in the office there with 12 the phone lines to the Incidence Response Center answering 13 various questions as they were phoned in to us of a 14 radiological nature, and at 4 o' clock, I went home in my 15 carpool because I needed to get them home, and came back 16 about six.
17 Q
What was your impression at the outset?
What was 13 your impression as to what was happening at TMI?
i i
i 19 A
At the very beginning, in the morning, I personally 20 did not knew if this was a drill or if this was a real event.
21 Q
Why was that?
22 A
I asked 21eanor and she didn't know, and she was 23 closer to it than I was.
I asked George Kni.,Thron and he 24 said he didn't know, and he said it really didn't matter if 25 i
was a drill or was not a drill.
You respond in the same Acme Reporting Company
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s t
way.
2 Q
Had there been instances in the past where you 3
would be called.upon to respond in situations where it turned out to be a drill at a particular nuclear facility?
4 A
I had never been directly involved in any incident 5
g response actions at the NRC.
0 I see.
Had others with whom you were speaking that 3
morning been involved with past incidents?
A There was one other incident tha't was at Fort 9
St. Vrain which I believe was in '76 or '77 where there was to a reported high release rate of radioactivity, but there 11 tg really wasn' t one.
Eleanor was involved in doing some dose calculations on that.
13 I.was not usually on incident response things.
14 Eleanor would go before I would because I was more on the 15 systems side, and she was more on the hard accident analysis is and she had the emergency planning section, and she would g_
call me as she needed assistance.
13 Q
Why did the thought strike you that this might be 19 a drill, it might not be the real thing?
20 A
Somebody had told me that there was supposed to be
..I an exercise of the Incident Response Center several days gg just beforehand, and it had been postponed because various 23 management people could not attend.
They were out.f town 34 cr y mething, and I thought it might have been possible that 25 i
I Acme Reporting Company
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I this was the drill that was described to me, and I had no 2
reason to believe otherwise, but again, it didn't matter if.
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it was a drill or not a drill as far as the actions that we -
3 did.
4 3
Q Eow can you characterize your impression of the 6
state of the system at TMI on Wednesday?
A What dme Wednesday?
It depends on very much what time.
Was it early or late?
.a 9
Q How about the morning when you first heard of the 10 problem?
A I guess around noontime it appeared that we knew tt that they had a turbine trip and a reactor scram, and that 12 there were some releases.
13 The reason we felt that there was some release, 14 they were getting some radiation levels of a few millirems 15 per hour in the parking lot, so consequently I felt they 16 were.having some problem and having some releases.
1-That is basically the extent of our knowledge, that 13,
we asked a lot of questions like what were the fail-fuel 19 monitors reading, but we didn't get'any response back.
20 Q
To whom were you asking those questions?
21 A
We would ask those via the telephone to Brian 22 Grimes who was in the Incident Response Center who then 23 via telephone could talk to either Region 1, that is the 24 King of Prussia, Philadelphia, or to I believe they had an 23 l
Acme Reporting Company
17 open line to the site.
1 0
D you know why there was difficulty in getting 2
- e.,
inf rmati n r answers to your questions?
3 A
No, I do not know why.
I assume just standing 4
communications problems they were having.
We did start--
5 the times escape ne now--this was four months ago.
Sometime 6
in the morning there were discussions about some monitors in the dome monitor in the containment around noontime or 3
1 o' clock, as to the readings on that monitor.
g During that af ternoon, there were reports that the 10 monitor was reading 20,000 R per hour.
11 0
Were those reports, to the best of your knowledge, 13 from TMI itself?
13
(
A The information must have come from TMI.
It had a 14 long pathway to get to us, but it must have come from there 13 I believe.
16 There was some question was it a real reading?
1 There were many people who did not believe that was a true 13 reading, that the monitor wasn't operable, so we did not 19 know exactly what the situation was.
20 I
Q Did this uncertain situation and your understanding 21 of the uncertainty with respect to TMI persist throughout
.,3 the afternoon?
.,a.
t A
The uncertainty as to whether it was a drill or not?
A
' The uncertainty as to the state of the system at TMI.
3.o.
Acme Reporting Company
13 I
A Yes.
We were uncertain as to exactly what the n
situation was.
We answered various questions as they were '.
3 phoned to us, and we did not have all of the information.
4 We just had small pieces of information.
5 There were others in the Incident Response Center 6
and onsite that knew far more than we did.
Ne were just a small auxiliary group off to the side doing specific tasks.
S Q
When you returned at 6:00 p.m. or thereabouts on 9
the evening of Wednesday, what did you do?
10 A
I went back to Victor Stello's office and we were 11 involved in doing various tasks as they were phoned to us--
la dose calculations, trying to keep abreast and figure out
'(
13 what was happening.
We would get various information, 14 dose rates here, dose rates there, that sort of thing, tried 10 to make assessments as to which mbnitor mightt be right, is which m6nitors might be wrong.
17 Q
Nculd it be fair to characterize your riole at that 18 time as a responsive one where you would be asked to do a 19 specific task and you wculd perform it and relay the ao information back?
21 A
That is correct.
--~:_
Q How long were you back at the NRC after you returned 23 at 6:00 p.m.?_
44 A
I stayed there until about 1 o' clock in the afternoon.
25 I stayed all night and the next morning.
Acme Reporting Company
19 1
Q During that period, did you stay within your 2
offices?
3 A
No.
About 11 o' clock at night Bria" Grimes, who 4
was at the Incident Response Center, went home, and I wen:
5 to the Incident Response Center to replace him.
6 0
Did you go at Mr. Grimes' request?
7 A
That is correct.
3 Q
When you arrived at the Incident Response Center, 9
what was the general atmosphere within that room or area?
10 A
Very busy.
The Incident Response Center had, I 11 don't know, 10 to 20 people in it.
It was physically very 12 hot I remember because the door was open and the fan was I
13 propped on the door blowing air into the room to try to cool 14 it dcwn sc=ewhat.
15 There were phones ringing.
There were several 16 squawk boxes, which is a telephone intercome box.
There 17 was one of those working where the telephone message coming 15 in, which I believe was Region 1 or the site, I am not sure 19 which, was very soft, but the response back from the man on 20 the telephone was very loud and becuing.
It was a very busy 21 place.
I' 22 Q
Was it a spacicus rocn?
23 A
It was a good-sized rcom.
I don't know the 1
24 dimensions or the room.
I think it was a little bit over-25 loaded when I was there, but people were funct/oning.
There l
Acme Reporting Company
s 20 I
was inconvenience with various noise and people had made the best of the situation.
They brought in some partitions'.
3 and put them around.
Several people brought headsets so 4
they could hear better to keep out some of the background 3
noise.
6 Q
Did you have windows in the room at all?
~
A No.
This is an inside room.
There is no windows 3
at all.
There is one window in the Incident Response Center.
9 That is generally called the technical side.
There is a 10 window that goes into the EMT.
That is the Executive i
11 Management Team room.
I believe that is what they call it.
I ta There was a window so you could look into the other room l (I 13 and they could look at us and there was a doorway next to 14 the window and the doorway was always open so you could walk i
15 in and out.
J
. 16 Q
Eow was the Incident Response Center se: up?
l~
A There are two rooms.
There is the Incident Response 13 Center.
Then there is the Executive Management side where 19 the management people are.
00 The Incident Response Center technical side had I 21 believe four tables, one long table in the front where the nn phone calls would all come in, and there the person who 23 administratively ran it, who was Bernie Wiess, would sit 24 with several secretaries and an assistant who would direct 3
the phone calls to the right people--what I call the Acree _R ep ortina Comnany
21 administrative table.
I Then there was what I call the I&E.
That is the o
3 Office of Inspection and Enforcement, operations table where they had direct lines hooked into I believe Region 1, and 4
I believe also to the site at one time or another.
There
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were several people there, and then there was the radiological table where the I&E radiological people operated from, and that is where I went and sat with the I&E 3
radiological people.
3 There was another table that was, ort of a catch-all 10 table that I know the state programs people used sometimes 11 and some of the I&E operations people also used.
12 The Incident Response Center is operated by the 13 Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
14 NRR ceople in the Incident Response Center are la.
basically there to assist the I&E people so when I went 16 there, I talked with Jim Snee ik who is an I&E director of g.
something or other.
He was the head of I&E radiological.
18 I said how do you want me to function?
What can I 19 do to help?
It was a rather informal organization.
I would 3
do whatever someone basically asked of me.
gt Q
You indicated the phones were ringing when you gg were there.
Can you tell us a little more about what the 23 noise level in the room was?
24 l
l A
I don't remember phones ringing real loud, but it 25 l
Acme Reporting Company
I 22 i
was just general office noise, but it was I guess fairly o
louder ~than most offices. I have worked in much worse 3
places than that,but it was loud.
You could think.
When 4
you talked, it was loud enough that you put a hand over 5
your other ear when you talked on the telephone.
I guess 6
that might be indicative of the noise level.
You could carry on a conversation with somebody without difficulty if you 3
put your hand over the other ear.
9 Q
You also indicated that the squawk box was very to loud.
' when the information was coming in I believe, 11 very soft as it was going out.
How was the information flow between TMI and the 12
[
13 Incident Response Center, to the best of your knowledge?
A Okar.
There were many telephone lines in the 14 Incident Response Center and the EMT.
The ones that I 15 was most fe~iliar with, the direct line to the 'E&I operations 16 table, they had one person with a pair of headsets on who 17 g
would listen and write things down, and then they had other people that would gather around the scuawk box to listen 19 to what the talker on the other end was saying.
They were 20 21 a major source of information to me.
22 In addition, on the radiological table we had 23 telephones that we would talk to various people at the site, 1
l the radiological people at the site, and at Regica 1 or any 24 other places we needed to call.
We would call from those 25 Acme Reporting Company 3
23
- elephones, so it was telephone communication.
We would
~
1 make the calls ourselves and receive calls, and the I&E operati ns people had open lines.
3 0
Was there any difficulty sometimes in hearing the 4
message that was coming in?
.o A
If I was on the telephone, no, I could hear it 6
coming in all right.
Q Okay.
When you arrived that evening at the S
Incide'.t Response Center with whcm did you speak to find g
ut the situation at TMI?
to A
There was no formal shift change Or anything like that.
When I got there, I spoke with Brian Grimes and he 12 briefed me as to what he knew was happening and I talked to t,
(
o the various I&E ceople, and thev would tell me what was 14 happening.
g Q
What did Mr. Grimes tell vou; if you recall?'
16 A
I don't remember at this stage.
It was probably g
technical things, what various monitors were reading, what t o, monitors thev thought were working and what enes were not.
19 Q
Did his conversation relay to you any cause for 20 a greater sense of urgency with respect to the on. going
.n problems at the plant?
e g
s a fairly minor release.
It 23 was fairly minor as far as a major accident situation.
Doses
,4 were fairiv low, and they were all basically onsite at that 25 t
l
24 time.
We ware starting to get some offsite readings.
I can i
3 try to look up some times if vou wish.
3 Q
If you can approximate the times that would be fine.
4 5
A Generally offsite readings were less than one MR per hour.
About at 1930 on the 28th, we had a readinc
-o, 1
of 12 MR per hour at the Harrisbur-Airport.
That was when w
3 it was reported.
I am not sure that wns the time we had received the information.
9 to There were during that evening various numbers, with varbus offsite sources.
The Office of I&E kept records of 11 tg these things and I am sure they are available.
,(
13 0
Was it during that evening that you received the
\\
~
14 information frem the plant with respect to the sample of 15 primary coolant they had taken?
A No.
This was Wednesday evening, Wednesday night we 16 1-are talking.
During Wednesday day, we had various pieces 15 of information coming in that we were digesting.
I 19 Cne of the things we had been asking for all along 20 was a sample of the primary coolant so we could try to determine how much radioactivity was in the coolant which
.' 1 would indicate the amount of fail fuel that we had and the 22 amount of core damage.
23 24 We could not get samplec taken.
The word we got back for the re'. son was the radiation levels were too high and i
25 j
/\\ar. m J h :v.v a h
25 peopic would bacome overexposed trying to cbtcin the samples.
We did obtain some information that, samples that were taken earlv Wednesdav morning before 7 o' clock that indicated 3
that fairly small amounts of fuel damage, less than 1 percent fuel damage, had occurred.
Q You speculated concerning the degree of fuel damage o
based ucon the information on the crimarv. coolant?
A That we had early in the morning, assuming that--we were not aware ofthe fact that on-going fuel damag,e was happening during Wednesday day.
We assumed that any damage that had happened had happened early and things should be decreasing, but we were informed the core was covered, at least I had thought it had, though I think other pecple at
\\\\
the Respon,se Center on the systems side may nave had more information than I did.
15 We were trying to look at the radiation monitor information that we did have and try to make some sense out t,o of that as to what the current conditions were, kept pushing i
trying to get primary ecolant samples taken during Wednesday and Thursdav.
20 Old you have any cause for belief during Wednesday G
i and Thursdav that the situation at TMI was deterioratinc?
A No.
I didn' t think it was deteriorating,: hough what was the big question was why the offsite doses were I
just up and down. with no seeming logic to it.
The activity Acme Reporting Company
i 26 was coming from scmewhere.
I guess it was probablv late 1
We dne sday, Thursday morning we established some theories as to what might be ha=cening, that thev were keecine the reacto:
3 coolant letdown system in operation, and they were bringing 4
primary coolant, which always contains some of the
.o radioactivity, into the auxiliary building, and that there D
i l
was various leaks in the letdown system, in he makeup system which =ume.ed the primary coolant back into the g
reactor system.
g That would allow some radioactivitv to escape into 10 the building atmosphere which the ventillation systems then g
sweet the.c radioactivity out into the environment af ter it 12 passed t' rough filters.
c g
We were concerned about any leaks in containment, 14 and we always questioned enat.
We were told that the la, containment was, the atmospheric pressure was slightly sub-radioactive pressure, so we weren' t too concerned about radioactivity escaping -hat way.
14 i
l Q
Did you have other concerns or are these basically 19 the theories you had postulated?
A We were concerned about occucational exposure for
.u.
pecple in the plant.
We were concerned with offsite doses, trvinc to cet a hand on were these significant or were they 23 small.
We were trying to get an understanding of what was hac.c.eninc.
That was our big 3est problem.
We didn't i
.,a l
l j
Acme Reporting Company
27 understand why we should be getting these kind of 1
radiation readings.
Also one thing t'st did happen Nednesday evening, 3
the c.roblem with the wam 3r on the ficors is probab1v worth 4
mentioning.
It was racorted that, we knew that water had a
gotten on the containment floor from the pressuri er power e
operator relief valve, and that the sump pumps were reported to us to have been on earlier in the accident and cumc.ed 3
some of that water on to the auxiliary building floors and g
flooded the building floors to a depth of an inch or so of to water, and this water was highly ridioactive, with a direct 11 gamma measurement in the 10 R per hour range over puddles on g
the floor, and the licensee had isolated the sump pump s so g
\\
that was not occurring any more.
14 Ne were to find out later that the major reason for lo.
that activity was not the sumo cumns, but something else, but is we were concerned about that.
Ne had learned abou: that g
chronologically when I was home changing cars about 6 o' clock that evening.
g Q
This is Nednesday evening?
.,o A
This was Nednesday evening because I had a call g1 at home abou: the sume..cume. s beine. linad uc..
That happened before 7 o' clock in the morning, so that just is indicative 23 of hcw long it took sometimes to get information.
3 l
O Nhen you were there on Thursday, did any change in
.,o I
Acme Reportina Comrsonr/
28 t
circumstances or information arrive that would alter your assessment of the situation at the olant?
2 3
A Yes.
Thursday I went hcme at 1 o' clock in the 4
afternoon on Thursday, tried to get some sleep, and I got 5
a call about 6 o' clock that evening from Stewart Bland, who g
would relieve me, saying that they had obtained a primary coolant sample, and the only information they had was S
rat.iation measurements taken on the sample using hand-held 9
survey meters, which is a very crude way of determining the 10 radioactivity, but it was the best they had, and he had the 11 radiation reading of over 1,000 R per hour contact on a 12 100 milliliter sample.
He asked me to help him convert that 13 into millicurie per milliliter, which is a determination of radioactivity concentration in the water.
g The amount of radioactivitv in the water would t o-be indicative of the amount of failed fuel and the amount 16 t-of core damage.that had occurred.
These were extremely 13 high numbers, much greater than what we thought we would see, 19 which was indicative of that we had severe core damage with
.30 possibly the rupture of most of the ains in the core, with 21 the release of substantial amounts of radioactivity.
.m.
I c. erformed a c.uick calculation usine. - a little 33 card I kept in mv. wallet from av. dav.s eight years ago at 34 General Dynamics that I also kept as a handy conversion table to calculate out the millicurie milliliter concentration.
n.o.
Acme Reporting Company
29 1
All we could say was it was greater than 10 to 2
the fourth millicurie per milliliter.
t 3
I had to base this on Cobalt 60, which was the 4
isotope we worked with in the Naval Ship Yard where it would 5
be different for Three Mile Island, which would have a 6
different spectrum.
We later got some information an hour or so after 3
concerning the sample which was one milliliter of the sample 9
had a radiation reading of 100 MR per hour at a distance cf to one meter from the sample.
11 Again making a quick calculation, this would indicate a concentration of about 10 to the fifth millicurie 12 13 per milliliter.
Q' That would be higher than the earlier calculation?
,4 A
That was higher than the earlier calculation.
13 16 Q
Was the second information concerning the radio-g activity of the primary coolant more reliable than the first?
A Yes.
You get a better readinc if you have a small 1a tg sample a distance away from the meter.
Q You indicated a moment ago that this information 20 indicated to you that there might be " severe core damage."
21 Can vom be a little more specific on that?
You
.m 23 indicated there would be damage to the pins?
A What I mean by severe core damage was that the 24 fuel which consists of about 200 bundles of pins, each
.,a Acme Reporting Company
l 30 l
bundle would have about 200 pins in a bundle, that the core 2
had overheated enough that these pins had probably burst 3
or fractured open or allowed the radioactive fission product's 4
that are normally contained within the pins,to escape into 5
the primary coolant.
6 What I mean by severe is we had significan core
~
fractions of radioactivity probably in the water.
What 3
I mean by significant is maybe over half of the nobel gases 9
and probably substantial fractions, by substantial fractions to I mean maybe in the 10 percent range, of radioactive icdines 11 or other fission products, a considerable amount of core 12 inventory.was out into the primary coolant.
13 0
Explain one thing for me that I am not clear on.
(
14 You would have the primary coolant, as I understand it, 15 and you would get a measurement as to its radioactivity?
16 Is that accurate?
l~
A That is correct.
13 Q
And then after you perform your calculation, ycu 19 ;
would have a reading of ten to the fourt of millicurie?
20 A
Per milliliter concentration.
21 Q
How do the two figures relate to each other?
If 5
the first one indicated radioactivity, what. does the 1
23 second one indicate?
24 A
While they both are figures of the quantitative 25 amount of radioactivity that is in the primary coolant, the Acme Reporting Company
31 1
higher the direct radiation from the sample, the greater the activity concentration within that sam =le because vou have,
3 a known volume.
4 Q
So it is just a more specific analysis or an assessment of the radioactivity?
o A
That is correct.
o Q
Okay. 'Now if you can explain it in layman's terms, 3
how do you go about making this calculation?
You indicated 9
that you used a conversion factor contained on a card for 10 Cobalt 60.
Could you be a little more specific there?
11 A
That was an empirical formula.
What we used to do in the shiovard--I have to c.o back a little bit.
When I was
,o 13 at General Dynamics, one of my duties was to respond to
- r. (.
incident r'esponse drills.
We never had an incident at the 14 10 shievard, but we had periodic drills,and one of the thines I 1
j 16 had done was a card made for the various other radiological 1-engineers that we could use as a crutch to perform on-the-1 tg spot quick calculations.
You didn't have time to have 19 access to cometters or calculators and that sert of thing, l
.y)
What we had surmised may happen in some situation o_1 is that vou might have a spill and you would quickly take i
~~ h.-
a samole in a bottle and want to be able to assess what that n.
3 meant as far as people drinking the water er fishing the i
o4 water or whatever, so what we did is we tock a sample of
\\
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water and spiked, put a known amount cf radioactivity in i:
Acmo Ropert5eq Cepp asy_
U
i 32 and measured it with a hand-held survev meter and were able 1
2 to say for so many millirems per hour on the survey meter, 3
we would correspond to a specific radioactivity concentration in the bottle.
I was able to use that conversion which is 4
5 goed for a particular isotope, Cobalt 60, to approximate what concentration we had for Three Mile Island.
g For the second analysis, very crude analysis, but 3
analysis nonetheless of the one millileter sample, we used 9
a rule of thumb for Cobalt 60 that one curie would yield a 10 radiation level of one a per hour, one meter, from a point source.
A one milliliter sample is sufficiently small frem it an engineering point of view to consider a point source, so tg that is how we calculated the 10 to the fifth number.
13 Q
Do you consider these conversion factors to be 14 fairly reliable or not?
15 A
The order of magnitude could be off by a factor of 16 10 either way.
If anything, we might have been low because t-Cobalt 60 puts out a higher energy than the spectrum that we tg would expect to see at Three stile Island; in the power tg reactor accident we would expect to see basically radioisotopes 20 of iodine and radioactive nobel gases of Xenon.
These have
~31 l
22 lower energy emissions per disintegration than Cobalt does, so the conversions don' t go exactly together, but it probably 23 was not underestimated.
y Q
Would you consider this conversion factor to be 05 Acme ResortinEL Co mFxanW
's 32 reliable if you were having a Cobalt 60 problem or release?
A Probably within a factor of 2.
Q Then you think that, if I could characterize what 3
you have said, that it would be on the conservative side when we are considering releases of Xenon or nobel gases,
,a but it could be offset by a factor of 2 or up to a factor O
of 10?
A It could be offset bv a factor of 10.
For the 8
one milliliter sample, which gave the 100 millirems per hour g
a e me e a
a culated 10 to t.he fifth 10 millicurie per CC.
Since tSc fissica product spectrum gives a lower energy than the Cobalt would, the concentration waa probably greater than 10 to the fifth, maybe up to, at s
the time I* thought it could be as high as maybe a factor of 10, so if someone were to specifically say what was it, I to, would probably say between 10 to the fifth and 10 to the sixth.
t~
At this stage of the game, with the information we to,}
had, if we were in a factor of 10 on a calculation, we felt pretty good about that.
O Did you feel that even with the margin of error with rescect to your calculations v.ou could still reasonablv.
33 conclude this was highly radioactive material?
33 t
1 A
Ch, *ves.
24 Q
When you had this calculation, what did you do with
,,a AcmeJeoortina Commany J
34 1
it after you calculated the radioactivity of this?
2 A
These calculations--I was at home.
I was not at 3
the Incident Response Center at that time.
This is probably.
4 between 6 o' clock and 10 o' clock.
5 Q
Cn Thursday night?
6 A
Yes, on Thursday night; Stu 31and and Brian Grimes 7
were in the office so I assumed that this information was 3
being passed on to the EMT so they knew that we had 9
significant amounts of failed fuel.
10 When I came in about 11 o' clock that evening, I 11 knew that everybody knew that we had real hot primary 12 cooling sample and had a lot of failed fuel.
A(
13 Q
When vou arrived at the Incident Response Center 14 at 11 o' clock Thursday night, was the atmosphere within 15 the center changed from when you were there previously?
16 A
It was about the same.
It might have been a little 17 less noisy.
People had improvised more.
They turned the IS,
squawk box off I remember at that time.
I think it was a l
19 little more quiet.
People were getting more used to it, but i
20l I think people were cettine more tired, too.
Maybe that 21 l-was one reason they were quiet.
I 1
l 1
1 22 0
Were vou getting different information from TM l
23 from what you had received earlier at that point?
24 A
We had more information at that time.
Again, in 25 the various radiation level readings, we had been getting Ame Reportina Comoany
s 35 t
scme information frem some of the DOE, Department of 2
Energy contractors who were flying the helicopter flights, 3
phoning in information, concerning' radiation levels offsite -
4 and some of cur inspectors were phoning in radiation levels, 3
so we were getting lots of data coming in, and we were trying g
to assess that data.
Also we used this data to determine what the f
3 maximum radiation levels were offsite to people.
Mr. Denton g
had asked on Thursday morning, which Wednesday night I had to to prepare estimates of maximum individual doses and total 11 population doses about 6 o' clock Wednesday morning, cnd also 12 I did it--excuse me--6 o' clock Thursday morning, and also g
t3 6 o' clock Friday morning I briefed Mr. Denton and Mr. John 14 Davis, who was the acting director of the Office of 15 Inspection and Enforcement.
16 Q
Can you tell us generally what the information that 1,
you relayed concerning dose estimates was on that Thursday 13 and Friday morning?
A I can tell vou for Thursday morning.
For Thursday 19 morning, I told Mr. Centon that the maximum individual dose 3
was well under 500 =illirem for any individual.
My best 31 l
l 22 estimate was 100 millirem range.
I also estimated the occulation dose could be less than 2,000 man-rems for a 50
.v.
_a mile radius over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
24,
1 O
That was the information vou relayed on Thursdav 3o I
JL
36 i
morning?
2 A
That is correct.
Friday morning, I do not have 3
a copy of what I gave them.
It should be in the log book--
4 about ten copies to various people.
My recollection was the 5
population doses had gone up.
It was less than 3,000 man-rems --
6 again conservatively calculated, and the maximum individual dose I think was something less than 300 millirem at that time.
It was just small amounts of radioactivity that was 8
9 being released, but it wasn't large amounts to be concerned to about that we had to do anything other than we just wanted 11 to try to get them stopped somehow.
12 Q
When you relayed this information, are you saying
/
13 that there wasn't a great sense of' urgency or a great sense i
14 that we had an imminent problem?
A That is correct.
There was no immediate concern 15 16 that we needed to do scmething or anything like that.
14 There was no significant risk to the public.
79 Q
Was Mr. Gossick at the Incident Response Center i,
at that time?
tg l
A He was there a lot.
I don't reme=ber when.
At 20 i
21 one of the briefings he was there.
I remember I gave him I
.,o.
a coov.
He was there most of the time.
He was there a lot.
~-
23 I dcn' t know exactly when he was there and wasn' t there.
24 Q
At this time did you have a better sense as to wha:
l 25 was going on at the plant?
Before you indicated you had to Acme Reporting C o m poray
's 37 costulate some theories as to what the problems might be.
1 1
l 2
A We were getting more, the information we were 3
getting was bearing out more of the theories that it was leakage from the letdown system that was going into the 4
5 building air.
We were following things like pumping the 6
water off the floor and getting it into tanks that would decrease the rate of radioactivity evolution out of the 3
water which was a primary concern we had.
g Also the licensee was putting down sheets of 10 plastic over the floor in which they pumped the water off to it attempt to minimize the amount of iodine that would drif t off the floor, 12 c
13 We were concerned with iodine,always being very
\\
concerned -about, with the iodine level in the environment 14 going up because we had no effluent information.
Effluent 15 monitors, these are radiation monitors that determine the is amounts of radioactivity being released from the plant, t-were all off scale high, so we didn't have any useful 19,
information from those.
19 Ne would do things if it started to rain--be sure 20 the state ins =ector would take samcles of rain water and 31 g
g also look for rain that might wash the iodine - out of the
.,3 air on to the grass where it would become picked up in the i
1 24 cow mi& chilled pathway.
25 Q
Did you have any information ut that time with Acme Reporting Company
s 38 1
respect to the valve letdown of the primary coolant?
o.
A Yes.
That is when I often asked the I&E ocerations N
3 people, and the letdown was very variable.
Sometimes it was:
4 just a few gallons a minute.
At other times it was higher--
5 20, maybe 30 gallons a minute.
The licensee was having 6
trouble with plugging in the letdown line so the letdown flow was very erratic.
The best estimates were between 10 3
and 20 gallons per minute was the letdown flow.
9 Q
To the best of your knowledge, did I&E get their 10 information concerning the leedown flow directly from TMI?
A I do not know.
They got information from TMI I 1
12 believe sometimes and got it from Region 1 sometimes.
f, 13 Q
When you determined the estimate of the flow to be
.\\
between 10-and 20, did v.ou simo.lv. take into account the 14 13 readings that you had and add them up and divide them by 16 the number, or was there some other process?
A I didn t estimate the 10 to 20.
I was told the 17 18 10 to 20 by the I&E ceccle.
0 Okay.
You have described the situation thus far 19 i
i 00 early on Friday morning.
As I understand it, on Friday I
I l
21 morning the situation changed.
I 23 Could you begin addressing that subject?
l 03 A
Okay.
One of the things that we had been working 24 on prior to late Friday morning was getcing the DOE contractor who was going to receive the primary coolant 25 Acme Reporting Company j
i 39 i
sample to do a spectrum analysis on that sample so we would 2
have a better handle on exactly what isotopes were in the i
3 sample to better determine core conditions, so we had carried 4
on several conversations with Bettis people, the people to 5
analyze those samples.
One of the primary things we were concerned with
-o was where the radioactivity was coming from to be sure that 3
all possible actions were being taken to minimize the 9
release of radioactivity.
10 In conversing with the I&E people in the Incident 11 Response Center related to the site about any ideas that 12 we had or recommendations that could shed light upon the 13 situation to them so they could maybe relay it to the
\\
licensee, we inquired several times about the filter systems 14 15 as to were they operating.
16 The air samples upstream and downstream, we got 1
basically very little information back that they couldn't 3g get samples, and the air was going through the charcoal filters.
19 0
When you speak of the filters, do you know whether 20 21 it was chose that are related to the waste gas decay tanks or others?
.v, A
No.
The releases to date were coming out from 23 24 various leaks from the letdown sy: tem, the makeup system, and what we call the reactor cooling bleed tanks that were 23 l
l Acme Reporting Company
5 40 1
part of that system where liquid is sometimes stored in it, 2
and it was, radioactivity was stored in these tanks during
(,
3 the activity of the various floor drain sumps.
4 Also we are probably evolving some radioactivity 5
through building air.
The building air is collected by a 6
building ventilation system, and exhausted through special 7
filters to remove radioactive materials.
3 These filters contain a charcoal bed which will 9
remove any radiciodines.
Most of the radiciodines in the 10 air and also two sets of particulate filters, these have 11 special filters that we call HEPA--high efficiency particulate 12 air filters.
The releases were being filtered.
The waste
((
13 gas decay tanks can be released by opening special valves 14 and these tanks would be released to the environment also 15 through its own separate HEPA and charecal filter, but there 16 were no releases from the gas tanks to the environment 17 through the entire accident through that pathway.
13 We assumed that for all the nobel gas that we were 19 seeing, we would be having radiciodine releases to the 3) environment, but we were not seeing any in the environmental 21 samples, and we were very concerned about that becoming a 22 major pathway.
23 We figured we were probably not seeing it because 24 the charcoal filters were filtering the air.
We did have 25 problems and we were advising people that many of the iodine A,,.
n o --.+ :
r.____.,
i 41 i
samples that were being taken offsite were erroneously 4
high because nobel gas was contaminating the whole cartridge and giving people readings that were being 3
4 interpreted as radiciodines but in reality they were nobel 5
gases, so we interpreted many of the reported high iodine 6
numbers offsite as not being real numbers.
I Another thing we were asked about many times was 3
the status of the waste gas decay tanks.
When they were 9
letting down the primary coolant from the primary coolant to system, the water would enter into a tank called the makeup 11 tank.
The makeup tank has to operate at a lower pressure 12 than the primary coolant system,. normally 50 PSI, where 13 the primary coolant system would run at 2,000 PSI, so that
't 14 any gases would come out of the primary coolant as the 15 pressure was reduced in the makeup tank and these gases 16 would have to ge some place.
17 The normal system is any gases that evolve out of 15 the primary coolant as it is sprayed into the makeup tank 19 enters into a piping arrangement called the vent header 20 system, and the vent header system connects to a waste gas 21,
compressor, and the compressor would compress the gas in a 22 waste gas header and put i: into a large tank called the l
i 23 waste gas decay tank, which is a tank that could take a 24 cressure un to over 100 PSI and store the radioactive
\\
l
- 5 1
gases.
n m
i
's 42 Under normal reactor operations, one tank is aligned to receive gases from the makeup tank, and the other tank is left isolated with gas from the previous time such 3
that you get several months decay such that the 4
radioactive gases would decay away and the gas in the tank 1
o would be released to the environment through filters at e
inconsequential levels because the radioactivity had all decayed away.
We were concerned about the gas that would he going to these tanks, but we knew under the failed fuel conditions 10 that we had, based on the primary coolant sample, that the gas entering the waste gas decay tanks was highly radioactive and we were concerned that these tanks had enough capacity to keep receiving this gas, that we would not have this gas being released directly to the environment.
15 As long as it was being stored in the waste gas decay tank, it would not be released.
Ne knew the licensee 17 4
had plans underway to hook a temporary connection to allow the waste gas decay tank to be vented back inside the 19 containment building.
It was very logical that you had a 20 lot of radioactive air in the building and it was a tight i
21 building, subatmospheric pressure, to put the radioactivity i
.m.
I back in the containment, and then you could use the other tank to keep receiving this and basically run the radioactivity 24 back to containment again.
25 Acme R enorfin a Comm anv U
i i
43 We could never seem to cet anv firm information 1
on the status of the waste gas decay tanks.
3 Q
Do vou know why?
3 A
I don't know why.
I think it was a matter of 4
communications.
We would.get numbers now and then, but get
.a different numbers.
-o O
Did you ever learn whether they did establish this pipe to vent material from the waste gas decay tank 3
back into containment?
g A
They did I believe.
They finally did that Friday 10 afternoon.
It was used, but it was a fairiv long task to 11 put it in because people had to work in highly radioactive 12 areas with protective equipment on, and had very limited stay
(
g times beca6se of the high radiation levels inside the 4
auxiliary level.
10 Q
How would the utility have known if the capacity 16 in the waste gas decay tanks had been used?
g A
There were pressure cauges on the waste gas decav 13 i
tanks such that as you kept adding cas to the tanks, the 19 cressure would keen rising.
You wculd eventually reach the 20 design pressure of the tank; g
To protect the tank, there are relief valves on the gg waste cas decay tanks which would lift at a ceixain set 23
-cressure before the tank would rupture to protect the tank 24 t
I l
under any transient conditions.
25 t
. __.... /M5.n fbr;v-v&c* var;t_S;vr.wv;r.m
s
's 44 1
Q This would lift automatically?
2 A
Automatically.
They cre spring-loaded valves thati 3
you would have to go to the valves to try to stop them from '
4 opening.
5 Q
Would that have been feasible under these situations?
6, A
Probably not.
Thev were located in an excessively 1
7 high radiation level area.
I am not exactly sure where they 3
are', but there was no discussion about trying to get to those 9
valves, so we were concerned constantly through this since to Wednesday about the status of those tanks.
11 Q
But at this time had you ever heard reports from 12 the utility indicating that those tanks no longer had
,f 13 capacity?
14 A
No.
There were always numbers like 50 PSI.
I 15 don' t remember new what the relief pressures are, something 16 like maybe 80, but they were below the set pressures en the 17 relief valves.
19 We also locked at the various system diagrams to 19 determine "what if" questiens.
One of the "what if" 20 questions we locked at was what if you lifted the relief 21 valves, where would the gas go?
Ne pulled the drawings out 22 and they would bypass the filters and would go straight up 23 the vent stack, released into the environment, so any 24 releases from the tanks wculd bypass the filters.
2 0
You had drawings of the TMI facility with you in Acme Reporting C@m pomy
s
's 45 the Incident Response Center?
A That is correct.
2 Q
When you say we looked at them--
3 A
We--mysc;f and some of the I&E operations people 4
and other radiological people.
5 Q
Did your information change at some point?
6 A
Yes.
On Friday morning, just a couple of minutes 7
before 9, not very much before 9, one of the engineers at 3
the I&E operations desk, that was the fellow who had the 9
phone lines, called me over and said he had some information 10 on the waste gas system for me because he was one of the 11 fellows I had been talking with all through the night as to 12 the status of the system.
' ((
13 Q
Who was this person, do you remember?
14 A
I do not remember his name.
I know wao he is.
15 There are various people at various times.
I i:ould find 16 out I suppose.
17 Q
Fine.
13 l l
A One thing,you never ask people's names necessarily.
19 You know who they were, and you talk to each other, you-knew the names and the faces, but they didn' t necessarily go 21 together.
22 1
Slightly before 9, he mentioned he had some 23 i
information, so I walked over since his table was four feet 1
24 from my table.
I just moved my chair over and he said he 25 1
1 Acme Reoortina Commany J
l
\\
46 1
had just received information from some place, the some place was probably Region 1, but it could have been straight, o
from the site.
I'm not cure.
3 O
He 'didn' t mention with whom he spoke?
4 A
He just said I have this information on the waste 5
6 gas system,- so I did nou question where his information came from.
2
- tank cressure His information was that the makeue had risen, and it had to be vented, which would be what g
10 the physics would have to be as time goes on, as you kept 11 the letdown ha:pening.
12 The gas was being vented to the waste gas vent header, and the waste gas compressors were on and were
(
13 pumping the gas from the waste gas vent header into the 14 waste gas decay tanks, that the waste gas decay tanks were 15 16 now full and could not receive any more gases, and that the relief valves on the waste gas decay tanks were open and t-15.
consequently letting the gas that was being pumped into I
the waste gas decay tank from the makeuptank to be allowed tg to be released directly to the environment.
This would 20 bypass the filters and go on out.
3 I
0 would this have been the first discharge of 22 radioactivity from the plant that you know of that was 23 unfiltered?
3 A
Yes.
There might have been ve ry, very small amounts 23 Acme Reporting Company
i 47 t
of radioactivity that came frcm the primary, secondary leak 2
we had earlier exitir.g through the turbine building.
Those 3
were not significant whatsoever.
This was much, much higher.
4 Q
Given the fact that there was a steady letdown of 5
some quantity, was it your assessment that this discharge 4
would continue or would it be sporadic?
A This is one of the major concerns, that this was 3
a significant change in the status of the plant, that before 9
we had had gases leaking to the auxiliary building through 10 various little leaks around seals, leaking valves, this sort 11 of thing.
12 Now we had a direct path that unless you stop
/(
13 the letdown or could get the pipe hooked back to containment, s
14 there was no way you were going to ha able to stop this.
15 We discussed a little bit about how could you stop it.
We didn' t have any collective answers on how to stop 16 it other than reduce the letdown.
t-
, e.
We knew letdown was important because you needed to 19 have the letdown running to keep the main coolant pumps 20 operating and the operation of the asin coolant pumps was 21 very important at this stage because you wanted to keep 22 forced flow through the core to keep the core cook, so you i
23 could cool through the steam generators.
i 34 It wasn't clear if.vou could run a main coolant I
n.o-pump without letdown without damagine the main coolant pump Acme Reporting Company.
i 48 1
shaft seals, and if you damaged the seal, ycu may not be able to run the pump.
4 2
3 Q
Did you suggest to anyone directly or indirectly 4
that they perhaps should reduce or shut down the letdown?
5 A
I did not.
I am not sure if any of the I&E people 6
did or not.
I think there was a discussion.
We discussed 7
the alternatives on the letdown.
It is hard to tell.
3 I am not sure.
It is obvious that _f this 9
situation was happening, that the TMI people, the licensee,
10 were aware of it, and that they were assessing the situation 11 that they had and would try to minimize the release in any 12 way they could without--maybe that was the lesser of the
(
13 evils, dependi.g on what the situation was at the plant.
14 What I did do was try to assess what the consequences 15 of that might be.
I just quickly in about 30 seconds time 16 made a calculation of how many curies per second would be 17 coming out of the makeup tank and being transferred directly 15 to the environment basedontheconcentrationofradioactivityl 19 in the primary coolant sample.
20 Q
And based upon the estimated flow?
21 A
I asked them what the flow was, and he said between 22 10 and 20 gallons a minute.
I used 10 because it was a 23 round number and I could do it without a calculator, so I 24 multipled the numbers together and came out with a release 05 rate of about, the number was 63 curies per second, and I
\\
l l
l A.
- n...i:
i I
49 don't know if I said anything, but I turned around and 1
John Davis who was the acting director of the Office of 2
3 I&E who normally was in the EMT was standing by my shoulder, and he said is this new information?
I said yes, it was new 4
information different than what we had before concerning
.a 6
the status of the waste gas system.
He said whv don't you come in the EMT and tell me 4
about it.
3 Q
When you computed the 63 curies per second, did g
you again use the card with the conversion for Cobalt 60?
to A
No.
I didn't need the card.
It was just straight 11 10 gallons a minutes, and you multiply by 500 to convert to 12 pounds per hour, and convert from hours to seconds, times 13 10 to the fifth millicuries per second.
9 Q
It is a rather simple calculation?
la.
A It is a simple calculation.
16 Q
When you came up with the reading of 63 curies per 1
second, was that your assessment of the amount of g
1 radioactivity that would be leaving the plant?
- g A
With the tanks full and the release valves opening, 20 I
l that was what was coming down, that would probably eventually 21 go back.
It might have been a little bit on the high side, gg but probably not too much--depends upon the temperatures in g
the makeup tank.
j 3
Q This would have been an assessment right at the plant 05 Acme Reporting Company
50 t
release point?
A Okay.
This would have gone out, what came out of.
o 3
the makeup tank would have gone we felt to the release tank.
Q Okay.
Mr. Davis indicated that you might share your 4
calculation and information with people in the EMT?
5 A
That is correct, so I went with him into the EMT e
and he said tell the people in the. IMT what is going on.
0 What time was this on Friday morning again?
3 A
This' was a couple of minutes after 9.
9 0
Okay.
When you entered the EMT, who was there?
10 A
Okay.
I don't remember everybody who was in the 11 EMT.
I would estimate there were 10 to 20 people in the 12
(
13 EMT, and they-were all located around a horseshoe type table.
14 Q
They were all seated?
15 A
I think everybody,was seated.
Some people got up.
16 There was a lot going on in the room.
I was back by the t-door which was at a corner of the horseshoe, not the center, 13 19 so I could see everybody, so I had from the base of the horseshoe on one side, people's backs were to me, I could 29 see the people mainly that were on the far side.
21 People that I remember being there, I know Lee 22 Gossick, the executive director for operacions, was there, 23 and then Harold Cencon, the director of the Office of :Tuclear 24 Reactor Regulations was there.
23 Aem.
D a n n, H.,,, rN,
51 4
1 Edson Case, deputy director of the Office of 2
Nuclear Reactor Regulation was there.
John Davis, acting 3
director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement was there.
Harold Collins, assistant director in agreement 4
state responsible for emergency clanning was there.
o Also Victor Stello, who was the division director
-o for the Division of Ocerating Reactors, in the Office of s
3 Nuclear Reactor Regulation, was there: also five or ten more oeople that I just didn't notice their faces.
9 Q
Did you notice anybody there that wasn't within 10 the NRC?
it A
I don't know.
There could have been some.
We had 12
,i 13 various people from EPA and FDA and other cecole around.
s.
I don't recall anybody that I recognized, but it is very 14 15 p ssible there might have been someone other than NRC in the room.
is Q
Where was Mr. Denton seated?
t-A He was sitting across, I could look at him; he 13,
was on the far side of the horseshoe so I could see his face, 19 and Mr. Case's face.
Scmebcdy else was sitting over there, 20 21 and those are the only people I think I could directly look at.
.x, I
23 Q
Where was Mr. Collins seated?
l l
A He was seated to my left, next to Mr. Davis.
His 34 back was to me.
3.a A cme Rec ortin a Comennv
52 1
Q When you went into the room, what happened then?
o A
.str. Davis asked me to tell them what information 3
I had.
I told them that the I&E Cperations people had told me that the waste gas decay tanks had finally filled up 4
and that the relief valves were open, and that any of the a
gases that were in the makeup tank were being vented, and
-0 the gases from the makeup tank would be flowing out through
.a the open relief valve and the waste gas decay tanks and out 9
to the environment, bypassing the filters, to I explained this appeared to be a continuous release that wouldn't be stopped until either the tanks it 12 were vented back to containment, or the letdown was secured or decreased.
(
13 14 I think I might have said is it possible that we to-can stop the letdown and control reactor pressure throuch 16 using the block valve on the cressurizer, power operated relief valve, which would be another way to control the 1.
primarv system cressure.
le 1 i
I think I might have made a statement like let's 19 try to keec the radioactivity inside containment.
It is a
.30 21 good building.
Let's keep it there.
3 ringing it out into the anxiliary building is now causing problems because we
~..,
23 can't control it if the waste gas decay tanks are full.
24 Q
Were questions asked of you?
A Yes.
There was a discussion by some of the systems 3
I Acm. 9 pe n rtin n (nmnanu l
s
's 53 1
people first about how letdown was important and they n-didn't want to stop letdown.
I don't remember who was 3
talking.
It might have'been Vic Stello.
It could have 4
been Danwood Ross I believe might also have been there.
5 (A brief recess was taken.)
6 THE WITNESS:
Someone asked me a~ question.
Scmeone I
asked how much was the release if the waste gas decay tanks S
were full and it was being directed out.
9 I think I, responded the effluent monitors were to off scale so the only way we could do it would be to make 11 calculations to determine what the release rate might be, and I said I would roughly calculate it based on the info'rmatio:
l'-
13
(
we had from the primary coolant sample the other' day.
The 14 release could be 60 curies per second.
15 I said I didn't have numbers for radiciodi-but is the radioicdine numbers should be considerably less.
17
~
Q You indicated that this calculation you had made 13 mic.ht not ac. o. lv. to this particular isotope being released?
19 A
Sixty curies of nobel gas could be released.
For
.,0 l
radiciodine I said I have to make a calculation,
't it
-'1 would be considerably less than the, less than t' e 60 curies l
nn per second, but I did mention that the release ould bypass n3 any of the.. charocal filters i
Q It was your understanding of, or was it\\not, the 24
-,5 situation that the release would mainly be nobel gases?
l 1
Aems Donartinn Famnanu
o
's 54 l
A My understandine. was the release would be main 1v i
j 2
nobel gases.
There would also be increased iodine.
The s
i 1
curie quantity would be much less than 60 curies per second..
i 1
4 At this stage, I thought we were going to discuss 5
the various alternatives about trying to keep radioactivity l
6 inside the containment.
Up to this stage, evacuation had 7
never entered my mind ~whatscever.
5 Someone then asked, I believe it was Mr. Denton, 9
asked what the offsite consequences would be with the to 60 curie per second release rate, and I believe I said I 11 hadn't made a calculation of offsite doses because I just 12 got the information, but I said I could make a real crude
((
13 assessment by ratioing information we had from the previous 14 day.
15 The previous day, we had estimated about a curie 16 per second release rate, which under similar mececrlogical 17 conditions had resulted in about a 20 MR per hour radiation 15 field.
19 The latest information I had on the meteorlogy 20 was we had a slow wind toward the north gate which was 21 similar to the other da'1, very unfavorable meteorological 22 conditions, so that we could just straight ratio the 20 by 1
l 23 60, or result in the 1200 MR per hour at the north gate.
1 t
24 0
When Mr. Centon asked you for "offsite consequences,"
i l
23 did you understand him to mean what the consequences would Acme Renartino camnnnv
N
__oc be at the border of the TMI propertv or farther out into 1
the surrounding vicinity or what?
2 A
I assumed he meant what it would be at the maximum 3
individual offsite, which would be at the north gate.
4 At the north gate,. there is a series of houses, a
five or ten houses right across the street from the north 6
gate on Pennsylvania 441, so che north gate was synoncaous a
with offsite, the nearest members of the public where the g
wind was blowing at that time.
g Q
You had computed previousiv using the information 10 available that there would be an offsite exeosure of 20 11 millirems, is that correct?
g A
We went the other way.
The previous day several of
\\ ('
lo.
us had bee'n around the planninc board and we had a 20 MR cer 14 hour1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> reading from one that I believe might have been g
Goldsbo ro.
I'm not sure where, and the meteorologists had is given us a dispersion constant for that location called g
Chi over Q, for that location, and we made sc=e estimates
,a.
that might have been a curie per second release rate.
g The meteoroloev conditions, as I understood then
.,0 to be at'the time, Frida.v mornine., slighti.v afuer 9, was
.,1 similar to what probably existed at the north gate, so i:
l I
would be simpiv a matter of raticine the release rate.
I
-,3 4
was 60 times higher, the dose would then be 60 times higher.
3 I think I spoke it as I went through because I hadn't made
.,a i
Acme Reoortino Comnnnv i
'e N
56 a calculation and I didn't have the 1200 BIR per hour number when I walked into the IMT.'
~.
Q You^just calculated in your head without the help 3
of een and pad?
4 A
That's richt.
I calculated as I stood there.
I o
think I said it aloud as I did it, as I went along.
g Q
When you said that the offsite reading might be 1200, did you at that coint indicate your sense of reliability of 8
that judgment?
g A
I don't remember.
I think I had elwavs out 10 qualifiers in front of these things--the estimate is 1200, u
could be 1200.
I think I assumed that they knew as we went throuch the uncertainties of the system that these were
((
13 nothing that were hard and firm.
It was the best guess was basically how I could categorize that number.
la.
I didn't expect to talk about doses when I first lo, went in there.
I expected it to be a systems discussion 1_.
about alternatives to letting down and that sort of thing.
, s, i
As soon as I said the 1200 :1R cer hour, someone 19 sa
, my g sh, or ch, my God, something 1C<e that.
That 20 is over the PAG's.
The PAG's he was referring to were the IPA protective action guidelines which one 2 is the lower boundarv for initiatino offsite actions.
23 Q
De vou remember who said that?
24 A
I don't know.
I think it might have been Harold
,,o, Acme R ep ortin a_C omnany
P 57 Collins.
It came from that side of the table I believe.
2 Q
Where vou could not see who was speaking?
3 A
I didn't look down.
After it was said, if I looked:
4 that way, his head was the other way anyway.
Bob Defiat was around the Incident Response Center, and he could have
-a 6
heen there, too.
I think it was the state programs guy that had said that, but I am not sure.
I don't recall seeing 3
him in there, but there were several people in there I don't 9
recall seeing.
He might have been there.
10 Thcn within just a few seconds of ch, my gosh, that's over the PAG's, somebody said the licensee is 11 12 measuring 1200 MR per hour.
(
13 Q
Was that someone in the room who said that?
A I thought initially semeene walked in from the 14 15 Incident Response Center, the technical side where I had 16 come from and announced that, but I was talking to some of t-the other people at the Ccmmission who had access to the tapes and they said that a phone call came in en one of the
~
19 phone lines that was in - the EMT.
It was most likely the 20 person who said that was sitting in the EMT.
O Nhen vou first heard someone say it, whv. did you 3,
assume it was semebody entering the room?
3 A
Secause I assumed information usually came in 23 through the Incident Response Center, which is the technical 24 side.
Those are the people who have direct lines and that 3.o Acme Reoortina Commanv
d 58 sort of thing.
I know the information came from Region 1.
1 I believe Carl Abraham was the name I heard associated with.
2 that piece of information, and it came in on a line that was-3 in the EMT, a telephone line that was in the EMT.
4 O
When somebodv first stated in the EMT that there 0
was a reading of approximately 1200, where was that person O
situated physically with respect to you?
A I kind of thought behind me, which would have been 3
the door.
Some people walked in behind me, and I stepped g
f rward.
It could have been someone to my left which would to have been where John Davis and Hal Collins was sitting, or 1
someone who walked in behind me.
I thought someone walked g
in behind me and said it, but maybe it wasn't.
You should
(
g
~
be able to reconstruct that from the tapes.
g Q
But at the time vour impression at the time this 10 was all occurring was that someone was entering the room?
16 A
I thought someone walked in and said it, but I en g
not sure.
l e, Q
Let me 'iust get off the storv for a moment and find 19 un who did tell you later that it might have been a reading 20 l
that the IMT received on their own telephone.
3 A
I was talking about Bernie Wiess who was the fellow I
who was kind of overall in charge of the Incident Response 24 l Center who has done various things with variocs oecole on the Three Mile Island followup.
3
_ _ ___ A cm e Reportina Comoany
59 He is the guy that knows all the tapes, and I 1
was talking to him about it and he said that that message I
was on a tape and'it was on a phone line that went into 3
the EMT.
4 That line could also have been, some of those had
.a joint lines, it could have been picked up in the IRC.
I am g
not sure, but either someone walked in with it, or someone in the EMT said it, but the licensee is measuring 1200 MR 3
per hour.
9 l
l Q
Was it your impression when this information arrived 10 from whatever source that it was the first time that the 11 people within that room knew of this reading?
g
(
A Yes.
That was news to everybody.
13 O
It was news to evervbcdv?
14 A
I felt it was news to everybody.
I think everybody 15 was a little shocked by it.
16 Q
Would it have been possible given the structure of g
the EMT that a phone call could have been coming in at the 19 sametime that you were briefing the people in the room with g
respect to your calculations and so on?
gg A
That'.s right.
During my very short briefing, 3
there were several phone calls going on simultanecusly.
g There were several side conversations I believe going on
.a simultaneously as well.
It wasn't that I was delivering a 34 briefing to everybcdy and everyone was paying attention.
05 A2m. n.nneti-h mu
60 t
That was not the case.
I would say, I don' t know what 2
percentage were listening to me.
I know Mr. Denton and g
3 Mr. Case were.
4 Q
And Mr. Collins?
5 A
I think Mr. Collins was paying attention.
I am 6
not sure John Davis, if somebcdy wasn't talking to John 7
Davis on another subject.
I don't know.
I just don't 3
remember.
There were several side conversations and there 9
were telephone conversations and everything was going on 10 an the same time.
11 Q
You don' t remember who announced into the room 12 this new reading?
13 A
No.
s 14 Q
I' don't want to lead you, but is it or is it not 15 your impression that this information was arriving for general 16 consumption for the first time while you were there?
A Yes.
It was sort of announced, like it had 17 is considerable impact when that number was spoken out--the 19 licensee is now neasuring 1200 MR per hour.
I don't recall go it saying where it was taken.
21 Q
Is that as good a quote as to how the announcement 22 was made as possible--the licensee is now reading 1200 MR
.33 oer hour?
24 A
The licensee is measuring 1200 MR per hour, or 25 the licensee is--measure was used I think, or reporting, or l
Acme Reporting Company
5 61 I
seen or something like that--the licensee is measuring 1200 a
MR per hour.
3 Q
Was it only one sentence made in this announcement, 4
or was it a longer description of what the licensee's 5
information was?
6 A
I think it was just a short sentence.
It came I
chronologically very. c.uick1v, within let's say 10 or 15 3
seconds of my stating that my best estimate was 1200 millirem 9
per hour.
It was almost like in the same context, like 10 someone supplementing my sentence.
It was like my gosh, 11 the licensee just reported or measured 1200 MR per hour, 19 and.t was received by me, and I believe cuite a few others,
(
13 it was just confirmation of a hypothetical situation, which 14 was a real situation.
15 0
What was your impression as to the understanding 16 of the people in the room with respect to the location at 17 which that reading was made?
IS A
Okay.
I don't remember the message specifically 19 saying the location.
I_ den't remember if it said it was 20 a helicopter reading or not.
It is very possible it was 21 announced as the helicopter is measuring 1200 MR per hour, i
43 i
or it may have been, I remember licensee, the word being i
1
,3 there somewhere because the licensee is measuring 1200 MR l
I 24 per hour.
It is possible they said north gate.
I just do l
I a.5 not remember if they said north gate or just didn': specify Aem.
2.n n r+i n n enmnnnu
1 I
y' 62 1
a location.
I don't remember any location being specified.
I o.
It was, I believe it was taken bv manv of the 3
people to be the north gate because that was the topic 4
of discussion just prior, beforehand, that was the oh, my 5
gosh, it is over the PAG's was in the context of that, and 6
I think most people thought it was the north gate measurement.
I Q
Was there any discussion or questioning as to where 3
the measurement was taken?
9 0
There was none that I can recall.
It was just that it seemed that I had made an estimate of 1200, this came to 11 through and like it made mv. 1200 hvoothetical calculation 12 thing, it burned it in stone and put it on the mountainside 13 as the gospel.
\\
14 It could have been, if it was a helicopter or ground 15 survey measurement, I just can' t tell you.
I don't know, but it was assumed to be at the north gate.
16 t-Q All t1ght.
After this announcement concerning the 19 reading occurred, what happened?
19 A
Again, this announcement came within 15 seconds 1
20 after my initial 1200 MR per hour number, and it just i
reinforced that.
.,1 22 Now the next thing that happened, I think someone 23 again said something about the PAG's again.
It is over
.34 the PAG's or something like that.
It was repeated.
I am 25 not sure it was the first person, whoever said it the first Acme Reporting Company
63 time.
I am not sure that same person said it a second 1
1 1
i time, or someone else picked that up and repeated it.
Q You don' t know who the someone else was?
A No.
It was a voice.
It stood out enough over
'the general noise in the room, though I think some of the a
side conversations had stopped at this stage of the game and O
people paid attention to the matter at hand.
Someone, I chink someone, again I don' know who, g
said something about moving people.
The topic of discussion had now immediately shifted from one of a systems point of view of containing the radioactivity to one of moving offsite people.
Q Do vou remember who made the first mention of
((
13 moving people?
A No, I don't.
It could have been Mr. Centon or Mr. Case or it could have been anybody.
I just don't recall who said that.
It is just too long ago.
1,,
O Co you remember if the comment concerning moving people was an exploratory one or an additional type of a statement?
20 A
I don' t know.
I can't sav one wav or the other on 21 Someone said that,and there might have Seen some that.
ceneral word spoken about that.
Some things I do remember.
~
23 I remember Mr. Denton and Mr. Case socke and made some 24 I
comments concerning the rew topic of discussion of moving Acme Renortina Commanv
64 I
offsite people.
I remember a few phrases like it is time 2
5 to bite the bullet or if we are going to err, let it be en 3
the side of public safety, better safe chan sorry, some 4
concerns like that from Mr. Centon and Mr. Case.
I think 5
they both said something to those efdects.
6 The tone of the statements were all pcsitive toward I
moving people.
No one mentioned any opposition whatsoever i
3 to moving people.
It was also.st as if no opposition was 9
an affirmative decision.
I think Mr. Denton in my opinion 10 anyway seemed to be the center of attention, even though 11 there were still several phone calls going on and still a 12 couple of side conversations at this time, and maybe some
,i 13 O
systems people asking what a PAG was.
I am really not sure, 14 but I think the center, I perceive the center of attention 15 shifting to Mr. Centon at this stage.
16 Mr. Denton had a rather calm, self-assured manner I.
that he generally has, and I think he commanded attention 15 of the room.
t 19 Q
After these comments had been made concerning
-30 let's be safe, et cetera, did the focus then shif t back to 21 Mr. Centon?
3.,
A I believe in did.
At least mine did anyway.
He
- )3 is my supervisor a couple of times removed so maybe I looked 24 to him maybe more, but I think it did shif more toward him, 25 and I don' t remember John Davis ever saying anything, who 1-.
i 65 i
was en cac.er in charge of the EMT.
I guess I was rather sur=.rised at the quick, rac.id, verv. rao.id o.rogression of 3
3 events.
I did not voice immediate opposition along with 4
everybody else.
5 Q
Okay.
6 A
The next thing I remember occurring was Mr. Denton asked me, he said how far should people be moved?
3 Q
Did this occur in the time immediately af ter the earlier ccmments?
9 A
Yes.
I mean the whole thing from the 1200 MR per 10 11 hour1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> phone announcement to when Mr. Denton asked me how far 12 should people be moved I would think was less than 60
,(
seconds.
It was very quick.
13 Q
Okay.
14 A
It almost appeared to me at this stage of the game to.
16 that the EMT had decided to mova.ceople or recommend to move people, to recommend to the state, and now it was a u
o matter of how far.
is Q
Thi; shift in thinking occurred you say in less 19 than 60 seconds?
20 A
Well, okay.
From the time of the phone anncunce-3, ment of 1200 MR per hour came through to Mr. Centon asking 3
me how far we shculd move people was chronologically about
.0 60 seconds, and prior to the 1200 MR per hour phone 24
,5l announcement I don' t chink any'one was talking evacuation yet.
. l I
r l
Arm.
D a a,6
- - r
66 t
Q Okay.
2 A
Though I think if we could have verified the e,
3 1200, we might have been talking about it-- certainly not two 4
minutes from the time that I first came up with this 1200.
5 Q
okay.
4 A
Mr. Centon asked me hcw far people should be moved.
I responded, I said I can't recommend the specific distance.
3 Q
Were you surprised you were asked that question?
A I was rather surprised I was asked that question.
9 to That is why I didn't give him an answer.
I said I can't 11 tell you.
I don' t know a specific distance to move people.
The reason I said that was the individual states 12
{.
13 were the ones to do with the emergency planning, and there was a plan".
Pennsylvania had a plan.
I was not familiar 14 15 with he plan.
I had never seen the plan.
I had never worked 16 with the plan.
My system responsibilities and offsite doses t-is not emergency planning, but I was maybe the closest to it.
13 I was from the branch that was involved in that.
19 In addition, I didn' t give him a number the first i
l l
29 time because I didn' t have very much information on this l
21 1200 number and it might be a continuous thing.
I was 22 thinking to myself about sectors, which was the wind was 23 blowing, a million things went through my head very quickly, 24 and I could not digest them all to.give a number.
05 Mr. Centon immediately asked, when I told him I l
l Asse_R eno2tinn_C omm any J
t
6'7 couldn't give him a specific distance, he asked me a 1
second time in a rather commanding voice to tell him how fa; people should be moved, i==lving that mv first no specific 3
distance answer was totally unacceptable.
4 Q
Did vou feel a sense of.oressure on v.ou at this a
coint?
o A
Yes, quite a bit.
It appeared to me that he was not going to accept no, a no response as an answer.
One of g
the thoughts that went through mv mind was navbe he knew a 9
1 t more than I knew, which was true I think because he 10 received sources from like the systems people that are g
cencerned possibly with the non-condensable bubble blocking g
(
the core, and things like the reliability of the main cooling g
cumes under radiation and things li that.
Maybe what 14 I knew was a piece of what he knew because he did have 10 access to much more information than I had.
Mavbe when you 16 put it all together the situation was worse, so I said g
basically who an I to question that decision, so I felt he
,S probably hac a clearer picture of the situation chan I, and g
needed to make a response, so I chose to make a qualified 20 scrt et resjonse.
.n
~ ~ ~ ~ }
'he best as I can remember, I think I said something !
like it it hard to tell, or I don't know, but, or some 23 uncertain qualifier in front of it, but che 10 miles was more 3
than enough or less chan 10 miles or something like that.
It 25 Aema D o n n a;n n rnn,nneu
68 had the number 10 in it, but that was a real outside number.
t 0
You were the fiist to mention a specific suggested 3
distance?
3 A
That is correct.
I came up with the first 4
quantitative number, okay, that I felt was a very conservative 5
number, and I guess also if we are going to err, let us err 6
cn the side of safety, better too much than too little or something I had heard I guess influenced my thinking because 3
this whole thing went on in less than 10 minutes.
This was g
a very rapid development.
10 After I said that, a prompt general discussion 11 took place by several people, and I can't remember who spoke gg what.
Several things were said all at once, the pros and
(
13 cons of hok far to move ceocle.
14 I cuickl-f realized 10 miles would include the south lo.
section of Harrisburg.
16 Q
Did somebody state that?
1 A
Somebodv said that.
Thev said 10 miles is cart le, i o
a s
gc something IL%e that, a.7d someone said 5 19 miles.
Again, I don't know who, and that was briefly discussed-20 yes, that is okay, it is not okay.
21 Q
When somebody said 5 miles, you mean they suggested 22 that as a counterpreposal of sor s?
23 A
Yes.
That is a reasonable way to clarify that.
g4 Then there was a short discussica on 5 miles.
It seemed tha 25 Acmo RopSrtnrag Cc-) cmp a n y
i 69 1
nobody objected to 5 miles.
2 Q
Do you remember if Mr. Centon said anything 3
specifically with respect to either the 10 mile or the 5 mile suggestion?
4 A
I don't remember his saying anything to the 10 mile 3
sugcestion.
I reme=her, I think he said something favorable o
to the 5 mile su7c.estion.
There was some oc.cosition to the 3
10 mile suggestion because it included parts of Harrisburg.
9 There didn't appear to be any opposition to the 5 mile number.
to Q
The question at that point wasn't whEther to 11 12 evacuate, but how far?
(
A That's right.
It shifted.
The phone report of the 13 14 1200 shifted completely, after a couple o.' little statements about erring, which way we are going to err, and we have to 15 16 do something and those kinds of words, it was not a matter to do it or not.
It was a matter of how far.
1.
Q De vou remember if Mr. Collins made any statement tg with respect to either of these suggestions?
A I don't remember.
He probably said something 20 because this is his field, but I don't remember scecifically 3,
what he said.
The only statements I really remember were 22 23 Denton's and Case's initially when they sort of gave short 24 soliloquies and statements about which way we: are coing to err.
.,o.
i 70 1
O When you were asked questions by Mr. Centon with o
respect to how far should the evacuation go, did you at any',
3 time expect that Mr. Collins would at any time make a 4
comment at that point?
5 A
I don't know.
I kind of hoped he would.
I guess 6
I really hadn't thought about it.
The time was the whole I
thing.
It developed so quickly.
I was thinking of all 8
the things about emergency planning and documents that I 9
wished I had read ahead of time.
I guess I would have 10 appreciated any help on the situation when Centon pressed 11 me for a number, but I didn' t get any.
I had to stand on l'
my own.
t(
13 0
0kay.
14 A
Anyway, on the 5 miles, nobody objected to 5 miles.
15 I don't remember a motion bei~g presented, and agreement n
16 to move people to 5 miles or something like that.
There was l~
never any clear, concise procedure or statement as to what
."- i the IMT was actually doing.
!9 There certainly wasn't any parliamentary type 20 procedure involved, but there was no, I don't remember'anybod-g y
having any objection to moving people to 5 miles so it was 22 sort of an approval by non-objection.
.,3 I believe Mr. Centon told Mr. Collins to go and N-call the state.
I'm not sure.
Something tells me, I think 25 he said something to Coc Collins to go up and call.
I am A,.
D..4:
ta.
le not so sure of that, but I will tell you what I think i
2 happened.
e, 3
Q You are not so sure Mr. Centon had said anything to Mr. Collins?
4 A
He probably said something to him.
He was talking 3
to the other side of the horseshoe table and.ur.
Collins 6l was at the other side of the horseshoe table.
He would have S
been the one to go call the state, but I couldn't say with 9
absolute certainty he told him to go call, what he told him.
10 I think it was something to the effect go call the state with our decision.
it Q
Did Mr. Collins then get up and leave the room?
12
((
A I believe he did.
I am pretty sure he got up and 13 walked because there was a little anteroca where there was 14 telephones.
I think he got up and left the room, though he 15 16 could have called from where he was sitting.
He had a telephone there, but I tink I remember him getting up and 1
IS going into che other rocm, though it is very possible he didn't leave the room.
19 0
Is it possible there was no instruction of any 20 sort to call the governor given, or is that not within the 21 22 range of possibility?
A It is possible.
I don' t know about the governor 23 though.
I don't ever remember hearing the word.
Maybe the 2;
word governor was said.
I just don't honestly remember.
I 25 Arm.
Dma.6*--
t.----..
N 72 t
thoc7ht there was some communications between Mr. Centon 2
and Mr. Collins, that side of the table, let's cut-it that.
r.
3 way.
I know Mr. Collins got up and went over, and f I 4
were to give you my best guess, I thought he got a 3
message from Mr. Centon, though I could very easily be mistaken in that.
6 Q
Was it your best recollection that Mr. Collins 3
would get up and call the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with a recommendation?
9 A
Yes, and my interpretation of what happened was that 10 Mr. Collins was to call the state and say that the EMT, I it 12 am not sure how he phrased it, EMT or the NRC whose Commissioners were not involved at this time, was recommend-
.g 13
.(
ing that he evacuate to 5 miles.
14 13 Q
Okay.
I don't know if you are in the position to 16 make a judgment on this question, but was it your sense 17 that the recommendation for 5 miles would be routinely 13 accepted by the State of Pennsylvania, or was it your sense that that would purely be a recommendation that would 19 20 have no greater force than that?
A Ask the question agaun.
21
._3o_
0 Was it your sense that a recommendation from the 23 EMT with respect to evacuation would be implemented by the I
24 state, or was it your sense that it would be purely treated 23 by the state as a recommendation only?
1 Acme Resortina Comanraw b
73 1
A I guess I don't really--on paper we recommend, but 2
an awful lot of the time an NRC recommendation is very i
strongly accepted.
I don' t know how the state would have 3
4 received it.
I think the state--well, I would just be saying 5
what I think the state would do.
l l
6 Q
Okay.
Fine.
After Mr. Collins got up and left, I
which I believe is your best recollection?
S A
Yes.
If anything, I would bet on that one.
9 Q
What happened after that?
10 A
Mr. Denton and various people stated to make 11 telephone calls to I think get hold of the Commissioners.
12 There was'some problem getting the Commissioners or whatever.
(
13 They started making phone calls.
14 Q
To relay this information?
15 A
I assume so, to talk to the Commissioners and let 16 them know what was going on or get their thoughts or whatever.
17 People were making phone calls all though this whole thing, 13 like maybe people had been trying to get ahold of the 19 Commissioners for the last hour.
I couldn't really tell you, l
l 20 or trying to get ahold of them to discuss the issue before I
21 it was decided.
I don't know why, but people's attention l
22 then went to themselves and to their telschones to make i
l 23 telephone calls.
24 There seemed to be no more EMT.
It disolved into 25 a bunch of people *doing their own separate things.
Before A c m e_R e c o rtin e_Co m o any
- o 74 1
the majority of EMT I felt was discussing the issue before it, which was the movement of people.
The whole scenario 2
from the first mentioning of the 1200 to Mr. Collins leaving-3 the rocm was three to five minutes.
It was very short.
It 4
was very rapid.
5 I had received,meanwhile I had someone who came 6
in and told me that there was a phone call in the IRC for me from the site.
As I stood there, I saw people were now g
~
doing their thing, and I decided I would take the call because g
I had been trying to get a phone call into the site to find to out more of what was happening.
11 I thinki.I.. walked out of the EMT and walked through 13 the doors.
As I was walking out, I think it was Mr. Collins 13 was walking back from, I saw him standing there and it 74 looked like he was heading back the other way.
I think he 15 left his to, seat to go ca,ll from the anteroom.
As I was walking out the door, Brian Grimes who was 1
my superior at work was coming in the door, who I had 1g relieved.
g Q
Mr. Collins was re-entering the EMT.
Did you two
'o speak to each other at all?
3 A
I don't recall it.
I don't think we talked.
I 3,
l don't think he mud I ever talked directly during this time.
- 3 Other times during the incident we had, but now now.
I just t
.,4 very briefly, about 30 seconds, told Brian what was going on, 3
Acme R nar+ inn t" n m n a n u
'o i
73 t
i and he went into the EMT and he knew radiological issues so 2
he could discuss emergency planning better than I could.
He 3
would holler to me if he needed me, so I went.to answer the I telephone call and took the phone call from the site.
4 5
That is the kind of events as they happened, as I g
saw them anyway or interpreted them in the EMT.
It turns out an awful lot of the basic information that we had used a
3 was not true.
Q When did you discover that?
9 A
I can't tell you what EMT is doing.
dhey are getting 10 feedback from the state and all kinds of other feedback 11 12 probably better than what I was getting, but I was able to
](
13 let's say over the next couple of hours, I got information that it was not,the waste gas decay tanks were not full.
14 That was a bad message.
15 16 The relief valves in the waste gas decay tanks t-were not open.
That relief valve"had opened, but it was 13 the relief valve on.the liquid side of the makeup tank and that they were venting the makeup tank at the time they 19 wanted to vent the tank to ge.t the water level back in tha 20 had been lost through the valve opening, so releases were 21 increased.
l
._m_
You could see on the charts that releases had jumped l
23 24 up over.what they were, so there was a spike of activity.
If we had known, if.I had known that, I think i:
25 a.
- n...a.
r....
S 76 would have had a considerable different light on the 1
situation, that it was a transient release.
It was not a 2
continuous, long-term release that was going to keep going 3
on for some period of time.
4 Also that we didn't knew that the 1200 MR per o
hour readine* was a measurement taken 300 feet over the too
,o 7
of the containment building, 130 feet over the top containmend 3
building.
If we had known that, it would have been considerably different because doses would be much less where 9
10 any member of the =ublic was.
Also the wind had stopped and the wind, this was in the morning, and the winds were 11 light and variable.
The wind was basically a flat calm, so gg you built uo a cocket of radioactivity, and that is what t,o the helicopter was measuring.
14 to.
If we had known any of those pieces of information, 16 it would have negated the concern that everybody had at the time.
17 I think we thought the conditions were as thev had
,e, j
i been described to us.
They can probably resurrect a lot of 19 1
l these messages and things, message forms and whatever, but 20 3
that was what we thought the situation was.
Q As you were leaving the EMT and Str. Grimes arrived, 33 23 what was his reaction to your description of what had just happened?
34 A
I think he was surprised.
I forget what he said.
25 Acme Reportieg Cormp omy
r 77 1
It was sort of an expression of hey, what, or something like 2
that, an expression of disbelief that it had done that, ands, 3
he talked with them,'and I know he was very much involved 4
in discussions for the remaining of the morning concerning 5
what to do, what not to do.
That was the part I was not in 6
there, and I didn't know what ensued.
7 O'
When you spoke to Mr. Grimes, did he tell you at 3
that point why he was surprised of the decision?
9 A
No.
He just went in there.
10 0
On your way back to your desk, cid you speak with 11 anyone else?
12 A
I think I saw Hal Collins, Harold Gaut, who works for 13 Harold Collins.
I think I might have mentioned to him 14 because he was a state program guy, very interested in 15 evacuation, that's his line of work, that Harold Collins was, 16 just had called the state to recommend evacuated people,and 17 he was surprised anyway I guess, or something.
15 Q
Did you speak to anybcdy else before you got back 19 to your desk to take this phone call?
20 A
I don't recall.
I d.on ' t think so.
If I spoke 21 to Hal, it was a four or five second conversation.
Ioc
-AL j
22 just called the stata to evacuate people cut to 5 miles.
23 He went in and talked to the other state people.
24 O
After this point, did you have any occasion to speak 25 with people in the EMT again concerning the area of evacuation A r m.
n.mm a -
r -----..
7 78 1
2 A
No.
Brian was in there at that time and Brian 3
talked to them about that, and it was a matter of just Brian-4 was in there the rest of the morning and af ter that, it was 5
the President told them to get the helicopter for g
Mr. Centon to go to the site and Mr. Centon left, and we were trying to get the stuff with Centon straightened out on g
getting the samples analyzed, so I was busy.over in the 9
other room, so I never talked to Mr. Denton or Mr. Collins or.Mr. Case on this.
I never have talked to Mr. Centon 10 about this.
it 12 Q
Is it fair to say that Mr. Grimes from that point 13 forward replaced you in the capacity of advising the EMT?
A That is correct.
t4 15 Q
Did you have any other direct involvement with 16 decision making with respect to evacuation or emergency t-preparedness during the remainder of the incident?
A Just on a far periphery I saw some various things 13 '
19 and made some comments on the stuff that Brian had done, some comments on some side issues.
20 Q
But.they wouldn't be comments of any policy nature?
21 A
No.
33 Q
Is there anything that we have net covered in our 23 discussions this gerning that you would like to. bring out, 3
25 any areas that you feel you may not have described fully or a
a
ar
,9 e
i in any other way?
2 A
No, I can't think of anything.
It is just the 3
situation, the information that we had that we thought to he the case turned out not to be the case, and we acted on 4
5 information that was there more rapidly than I would like to have seen happen, but I think everybody's intentions were
-o, good.
I wouldn't think otherwise anyway.
3 No.
I have no more.
MR. PEARSON:
Okay.
That concludes the discussion.
9 10 (Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m.,
the deposition of Mr. Barrett was concluded.)
11 l'
~
I have read the' foregoing pages, 1 13 through 79, and they are a true and 14 accurate record of my testimony 15 therein recorded.
16 LAKI H.
BARP2TT 1.
19 Subscribed and sworn to before ne g
"Y 20
'l Notary Public i
i 3e My Cotanissicn Expires :
23 9
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