ML19309G269

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
IE TMI Investigation Interview of Id Porter on 790702 Middletown,Pa.Pp 1-21
ML19309G269
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 07/25/1979
From: Ian Porter
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR 324, NUDOCS 8005050490
Download: ML19309G269 (22)


Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

8 0' d 5 050 f O

~'

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A/ / r //L4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1

In the Matter of:

2 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3

of Ivan D. Porter Instrument Control Engineer 4

5!

+

8 Trailer #203 9

NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!

July 2, 1979 12 (Date of Interview) 13 July 25, 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 14 324 15l (Tape Numcer(s))

16 17l i

18l i

19!

i 20l 21)\\

i NRC PERSONNEL:

22I Owen C. Shackleton James S. Creswell 23 Anthony N. Fasano i

24j 25 e

_^ ; 7 ~,__

, ", A v-t t

[

l l

l' SHACKLETON: The time is now 2:04 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time.

This Owen 2

Shackleton speaking.

This is an interview of Mr. Ivan D. Porter.

Mr.

3 Porter is employed as an Instrument Control Engineer for the Metropolitan 4

Edison Company, presently assigned to Unit 2 at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station.

This interview is taking place in trailer #203, 5

which is parked just outside the south security gate at the Three Mile 6

Island installation.

Present from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7

to Conduct this interview is Mr. James S. Creswell.

Mr. Creswell is a g

Reactor Inspector assigned to Region III.

Also present is Mr. Anthony N.

i g

Fasano.

Mr. Fasano is an Inspection Specialist in the Performance Appraisal O

Branch presently assigned to Region I.

My name is Owen C. Shackleton.

I'm an Investigator assigned to Region V.

Just before gcing on tape, I presented I

to Mr. Porter, the two page document from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 13l l

Commission, which explains the scope and purpose of this investigation, and 14l i

identifies the authority of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to this 151 i

investigation.

And also explains to Mr. Porter his right to be refused to 16i be interviewed; his right to have someone of his choice present during the course of the interview, and his right to not to have to submit a signed statement.

On the second page c*.' this document there are three questions, 19 and Mr. Porter responed to all three questions with an affirmative "yes" 20' At this time, for the purpose of record on tape, I'm going to ask answer.

21 I

Mr. Porter these questions orally.

Mr. Porter do you understand fully the 22 document I'm referring to?

23 24 25 I

2 1

PORTER:

Yes, I do.

2' 3

SHACKLETON:

And do we have your permission to tape this interview?

4 I

PORTER:

Yes.

S 6

SHACKLETON:

And would you like... you have it marked here that you would 7

like a copy of the tape.

Is that correct?

8 9

es, sir.

10 11 SHACKLETON:

And also a transcript.

13 PORTER:

Please.

14 15 SHACKLETON:

All right. We'll provide you a copy of the tape at the close of the interview, and a transcript when it's completed.

And now I'll turn the interview over to Mr. Fasano and Mr. Creswell.

18t 19 CRESWELL:

Ivan, in our previous interview with us, you stated that you 20 were involved with the reactor coolant pump start that took place approx-21 imately 7:00 o' clock.

I wonder if you could go back to that period of 22 time, and tell us what your involvement was with that... the starting of 23 that pump?

24 25 l

4 l

I k

{

i

3 1,

PORTER:

Well, as I recall, attempts had been made to start pumps, and 2,

without successfully closing the breaker... and it was called to my atten-3 tion.

I was requested to go down to the 7 KV breaker to see if what we 4

call now... what is called the K3 relay, which must be picked up and the 5

relay to be picked up.

Several service systems for the pump have to have interlocks satisfied.

And, I did go down to the breaker,' and was looking 6

7 for any pump with a K3 relay picked up.

I didn't do anything positive at that time to cause a pump to start.

I believe the pump that they had first 8

tried to start... the K3 was not picked up on... but whichever pump it g

1 was eventually was started apparently the relay was satisfied and picked 10 up.

It's a little unclear in my mind. We tried several times during the day to start pumps, and I made several trips to the breakers.

And to sort out what I did each given time, I guess is a little difficult.

I know at one point I hit a relay to try to coax it to pull in and.I broke the glass out of it.

And I know at one point in time, we did try... I believe we 15{

j tried to close the breaker holding the flashligh on the relay to actually hold the contact in.

I do remember those sequences.

Later in the day, we put jumpers in to positively pull the relay in.

We bypassed the contacts 18{

cn the start sequence.

But, the jumper was not installed that early in the 19 day.

It's difficult for me to recall precisely what I did at any given 20 trip down to the breakers.

21 22 CRESWELL:

0.K. Ivan, the time when the glass was broken and I believe you 23 l

said you used a flashlight one time to hold the contacts up.

Would that 24 l

have been on the pump with the broken glass, where you could reach in and 25 hit the contacts?

O 4

1 PORTER:

I'm not sure on that.

I'm not sure that it's relevant, but I'm 2

not sure.

3 4

CRESWELL:

Would you have taken the open relay out to...

5 6{

PORTER:

I think the one we did it on we took the cover 'ff the front, and o

7 held a flashlight on it, but I just, you know, pushed up on starter and the 8

the relay with the butt of the flashlight.

But, I'm not clear as to which trip down, what was done.

g 10l g

CRESWELL:

Let's see... on one of your trips down, I think, Mr. Wright was there at the breaker.

13' PORTER:

Could have been, yeah.

I 15j l

CRESWELL:

This is the start where the they drew very, where the pumps drew very little current maybe 100 amps.

18l PORTER:

Yeah, in fact, I... due to the indications on the local amp 19 i

meters is difficult to read 100 amps.

I wasn't sure it was drawing any 20 current.

21 22' CRESWELL:

0. K.

What was your reaction whenever you saw that low reading?

24 25

5 1.

PORTER:

Well, at anytime when I saw that, I just felt that we didn't have 2:

water up in the pumping tower.

I wasn't moving any water.

3 CRESWELL:

So that the pump itself would have been voided?

4 5

PORTER:

Yeah.

6 7

CRESWELL:

8 What did that mean.to you as far as the condition of water level in the reactor coolant system?

g 10 PORTER: Well, I guess the only thing it could mean and it did at that day, I guess, that there wasn't water out in the loops.

But, I think, by that time, it was due to the temperatures in the loop.

We thought that.

13 14)

I CRESWELL:

But, it would have indicated that the water level was below the 15l pump... the level corresponding to the pump?

17 PORTER:

Yeah.

18 19 CRESWELL:

In our previous discussion with you, I guess we determined that there were some measurements made down in the cable room by use of a thermo-couple reader and a digital voltmeter.

23 PORTER:

Uh, uh.

24 1

l 25 i

i

.a

6 1.

CRESWELL:

Do you recall when those measurements were made that anyone 2

stated that they felt the core was undercovered, by the temperature indica-3 tions they were seeing?

4 PORTER:

No.

I don't know that that statement was made.

5 6;

CRESWELL:

7 So, you don't recall if Mr. Wright... if Mr. Bennett, or Mr.

Yaeger ever told you together or separately that they felt that temperature 8

indications indicated the core was uncovered?

g 10 PORTER:

I don't specifically remember them saying that, no.

I'd... I think everybody involved with it was probably concerned about the water 12t level and they were seeing, seeing the temperatures we were seeing but I guess I don't recall if of anybody stating that specifically.

But, I might of myself, I guess.

I just don't recall that clearly, right now, what 15i anybody said at any given time.

161 17 CRESWELL:

You don't recall making any kind of a statement like that to Mr.

18j Miller?

19 20 PORTER:

I don't believe I did, no.

As I recall, of course the hot tempera-21 tures bothered me, but on also the low temperatures caused me to suspect 22 the condition of the readings.

And I didn't know if it was due to the 23 thermocouples themselves, or steam in the... you know, the humidity in the 24 building affecting the readings or what the problem was.

25 1

I

7 1.

CRESWELL:

But, didn't you believe the higher ones?

2 3

PORTER:

I can't say that I really believed them, no.

They concerned me.

4 But the fact that we had such low readings also, to me just confused and 5

made the whole thing somewhat unreliable.

I guess in retrospect, we're all 61 a lot smarter about why they were lower maybe, but...

7 CRESWELL:

8 The reason that you'd be a lot smarter about them being lower is what?

g 10 PORTER:

Well, I gue.s we acknowledge now that the temperture is probably hot enough to have actually affected the thermocouple metals, themselves.

13 CRESWELL:

Do you recollect that any of the thermocouples that were measured l

down in the cable room reading at 75 millivolts?

15!

16i PORTER:

I don't, no.

I believe Jim Wright said later that he did have a reading that high.

I don't recall that.

In looking at the data that Skip had recorded down Acre, none of them are quite that high.

I think.

56 is 191' the highest.

"0 21 CRESWELL:

You don't recollect anything?

22 23 PORTER:

I don't recall seeing 75.

I do know Jim has mentioned later he 24 did see a reading that high.

I don't recall seeing one that high.

That's 25 1

8 1.

really too high to be reliable at all.

Even the 56 is above the melting 2

point for the metals, or right in the region of the melting point.

3 4.'

CRESWELL: After our interview with you, you supplied me with some names of 5,

people that are involved in evaluating thermocouples, and one of those 6

people I believe was Don Robertson.

He's a consultant with L&N.

Apparently 7

you discussed with him on the 29th, certain...

8 PORTER:

Have you talked to him?

g 10lg CRESWELL:

I have been in touch with Mr. Robertson, yes.

12.

PORIER:

All right.

I wasn't sure what date it was.

It was one of the following days.

I thought that it was either Friday or Saturday, but 0.K.

It could have been the 29th, too, I guess.

151 1dj l

CRESWELL:

Did you contact anybody else on the 28th about the thermocouples?

171 f.

18l l

PORTER:

No.

19 20 CRESWELL:

Did you contact anyone else about the thermocouples, rather than Mr. Robertson?

22 l

23 l

PORTER:

No.

He, in my mind confirmed what I felt about them.

So I didn't see any need for myself to pursue it much more.

25 i

9 l

1)

CRESWELL: When you had discussions with him, was it mainly though about 2.

the conditions of the thermocouples on the time period like the 29th?

3 PORTER:

Yes.

4 5

CRESWELL:

As opposed to the conditions that you had seen on the 28th, 6l 7

where you had very high temperatures?

8 PORTER:

Yes.

g 10 CRESWELL:

On the 29th, temperatures would have been considerably lower.

12 PORTER:

Yes.

13 14 I

CRESWELL:

Tony, do you have some questions?

15l 16

[

FASANO:

I'd like to just go back a little.

You mentioned when you saw the 17 current, it was 100 amps even less, when, the first time you starteu, when l

Mr. Wright was with you. ~You tried to start the first pump, the low 19l i

current.

20 21 PORTER:

Yes.

22' 23 FASANO:

And you said that this indicated possible low water in the loops, 24 but you said, "We thought this already." Who are the "we thought this 25{

1

{

l already"? Who are the "we"?

l l

l l

m m

10 1

PORTER:

I had this trouble last interview.

I think everyone in the Control 2

Room, the people looking at the plant and stuff, knew that we had temperatures 3

considerably off-scale in the hot legs and stuff.

And it wasn't feasible 4

for it to be, you know the hot legs to be full of water.

And I don.... I 5

believe that I thought that pump wasn't even running when I came up from the breakers.

It was... I was even suprised later to find out that, you 6

know, that they shut it off manually.

I thought the breaker had tripped 7

free.

8 9

10 very low current?

12:

PORTER:

Yes.

13 14 15l FASANO:

So now you have confirmed that in your mind, on the 28th, that 1

there is a low current and the general consensus of the people in the Control Room was that they had a lack of water in the loop. When you first came in, if I remember, one of the things you did was to look at the RTD.

18t 19 PORTER:

Uh, uh.

20 21 FASANO:

Did... and at that time they seemed to be high, and if I remember 22 right, you kind of believed these temperatures when you actually measured 23 them?

24 25 l

11 1

PORTER:

Yes, it was sometime later before I got a good measurement on the 2.

temperature.

But, from looking at the redundant indications, I believe...

3 I just didn't believe that just one instrument was high that they were all 4

giving basically the same information.

I 5

FASANO:

6 Then as I remember about 8:30, or so, you did confirm this.

Approximate the time.

8 PORTER:

Yeah.

I'm not sure what time it was.

It was either 8 or 8:30, g

s m<' thing like that. We put the digital voltmeter on the RTD to read it.

10 11, I

FASANO:

So, now you had, in your mind, the high RTD's and the high temper-ature, and the idea of void.

You had fluid missing in the pump casing.

I l

mean these are things that are going through your mind.

Now, during intra-14!

15l ment interwound, was the measurement of the thermocouples?

t 16!

PORTER:

Yes, I only physically witnessed... I guess 4 on the digital voltmeter and maybe 3 or 4 more with the voltmeter.

I was not down there 18{

for the whole period of time that they took the complete set of data.

19 20f FASANO:

Yes, but the reason they did a redundant measurement was because 21 you had doubt in the first measurement and-you wanted to confirm that.

22 Correct?

23 24 25

12 1.

PORTER: Well, we couldn't get readings on the computer, so that's wiry we went downstairs.

And we took the readings of the digital indicator.

On 2;

3 the digital indicator you have to disconnect and hook up each one. And 4

with the numbers I was getting, I couldn't see the value in reading them 5

that precisely.

So, they went ahead.and took a complete set with just reading the millibles on the terminals.

6 7

FASANO:

The second set confirmed the first?

1 8

1 9

PORTER:

I don't recall seeing 7 millible readings again, at that time.

In fact, it was sometime later, I was even aware that they existed.

I guess I forgot they took them, quite frankly.

I'm sure they must of have told me.

Well, they do confirm it though.

Their still scattered anywheres from 200 degrees to 2,500 which is about what.I saw on the digital readout.

There are just more of them.

15i 16l l

CRESWELL:

When you say digital readout, Ivan, you're speaking of the thermocouple reader?

18' 19' PORTER:

Right.

Now, the voltmeter is digital, also, yes.

20 21 FASANO:

By this time, do you recall having any thought oh, well, I can't 22 say thought.

With all of these pieces of information, how did you relate 23 this to Miller.

I believe you were dealing with Mr. Miller.

And did you j

24 come to... I mean in you mind now, you had at least three points there 25 that seemed to confirm some concern for that core?

f,

13 Il PORTER: Yeah, I guess.

I'm not sure what we're driving at here, but...

2' 3

FASANO: Well, I want to know if Mr. Miller had the same information that 4

you had, and the people making decisions had this information and could use 5

it possibly?

6 PORTER:

I think we all had it.

But, I'm not sure what differently we 7

w uld have done with it, either.

And assuring the core was covered, I 8

guess, was the prime concern in trying to get water in the loop so we could g

10' run a pump.

But, I felt like I wasn't deciding what should be done with the plant.

But I felt like everything they were trying to do was...

that's what was aimed at anyway.

And I don't...

13 FASANO:

Okay, one other piece of data that may or may not have got in the Control Room, I don't know, but Floyd had been in Lynchburg, and I believe 15 l

he made some calculations based on information that was given to him early 16 in the morning.

And came up with some estimates, based on computations he 17 1

made on Unit 1.

I think this was related to the activity in the dome...

some detector.

And I think that he estimated that maybe one quarter, one 19 eighth of the fuel cladding might have been damaged.

Did you know of this 20 information or did...

You're shaking you head no?

21 22 PORTER:

No.

I heard that first when I heard this testimony.

23 24 25

14 l

1.

FASANO:

0. K.

2:

3 PORTER:

The President's Commission.

I had not heard that before then.

4 FASANO:

I have no further questions right now.

5 6'.

CRESWELL:

Ivan, before you went down to look at the K3 relays, first had 7

the operators been trying to start the pump.

Were they observing all 8

pressures, cooling water flow, in the Control Room?

g 10 PORTER:

You can't really observe the pressure and stuff.

It either picks g

i j

up the pressure switches or don't... or doesn't, excuse me.

The things like the pressure switches and stuff you don't really know they haven't l

picked up, unless you can't start the pump.

141 15 16ll CRESWELL:

So, before you went down there, you didn't know whether the Control Room people had been observing these things.

You had to go down there to that area to find out?

18(

19l 20 We've had trouble with them occasionally in starting the pump.

l PORTER:

There's quite a few interlocks involved.

And we've had trouble with them 21 in the past.

I guess that's why the first thing you go to look at is the 22 K3 relays that has been a problem, at in times in the past.

23 24 25 I

i

15 1

CRESWELL: What caused the problems in the past?

2 PORTER:

I'm not sure specifically.

I think any one of them has maybe, you 3:

4 know, the, lift pressures and tackstop oil pressures, nuke service flows, 5

and stuff like that.

I'm not sure...

6 7

CRESWELL:

As the Instrumentation Engineer in charge of this sort of thing 8

... instrumentation, would you be apprised of these problems that happened in the past.

g 10 PORTER: We might if it was chronic, and any one component.

I don't know that we've had to change the design of any switch or anything like that.

It's just that there are quite a few interlocks, and they'd pick up the one relay to allow the pump to start.

I 15j CRESWELL:

But you don't recollect what the problem has been in the past?

17 PORTER:

Not specifically, no.

CRESWELL:

Well, when you got down there, were you able to determine that 20 there was low oil pressure or low cooling water flow, or anything like 21 that?

22 23 PORTER:

No, you'd have to take voltage readings to figure out which 24 contact it was.

I was just looking to see if relay was picked up or not.

25' i

i 16 1

CRESWELL:

As I remember, there's a fair of numbers of relays on the panel 2.

there for the breaker, and what maybe eight different relays?

3 4

PORTER:

That's possible.

Between your protective relays and control 1

5 relays, yes.

6 7

CRESWELL:

Do any of these other relays indicate what the problem was?

8 Whether it was low oil pressure, or low cooling water flow?

9 PORTER:

No. Of course, a protective relay trip... it should drop a 10 y

target and indicate.if you have an overcurrent, oc a differential, or y

something like that.

13 CRESWELL:

Are there any targets on any of the breakers?

I 15l

  • "Y ***
  • I "Y

" *"Y "Y'

16 dropping any targets on relays.

18f l

CRESWELL:

Tony, unless you have something else, we'll let Owen look at 19l l

that.

1 20 1

21 FASANO:

Well, just some background.

I'd like to ask about, in particular the reactor coolant pump vibration instrumentation.

One of the reasons for shutting the pump in some of the past interviews, included the vib:ation units.

Okay.

Are you familiar with those? The shaft vibrations and, I 25 think they say, IRD?

i l

l N

__a_

17 1

PORTER: Well, the IRD is the vendor that builds the equipment.

I believe 1

... I'm not sure... I think the alarm... the alert alarm... the alarm 2!

setpoint had been 15 mils on that.

The alert came in at ten on the shaft 3 :

i f

vibration.

I think the operating limit was 3 on the frame vibration.

4 S

FASANO:

I guess these were set.

You set them based on the manufacturer's 6

7 recommendation for the particular motor or pump?

8 PORTER:

B&W provides the guidance for those.

I think the operating limit g

I is either 20 or 25 mils on that.

But, I'm not precisely sure of what we 10 were using at that time.

I 12!

FASANO:

In the limits and precautions, I think they are something like 14.!

that.

I noticed on the panel, they were 26 and 30 mils.

I think that's on

)

the shaft.

15 l

16i i

PORTER:

Yeah, it's the shaft if it's that high.

Yes.

18 FASANO:

This would be... I mean would you or could you make a decision on 19 i

your own to actually change your limits, or would you go by the B&W recom-20l mendation.

21' 22 PORTER:

No, you'd use the B&W recommendation, I believe.

23 24 25 I

18 1

FASANO:

It's going to be a safety-related kind of thing.

Would it?

l 2l 3

PORTER:

Mostly for a very expensive pump... for the safety of the pump 4l itself, of course you could destroy the seal, if you shook it hard enough,.

5 I guess.

But, I'm not familiar enough with what vibration limit might 6

damage the seal, or whatever.

i 7

l FASANO:

I had looked over some problems reports that were in.

I noticed g

g that you had done some work on eccentricity... and I think it was you, it could have been.

10 11 PORTER:

I did quite a bit of the work on the init al calibration on this, Y**'

13 14 15l FASANO:

0. K.

Were you familiar with the hot well level indication problem?

16 l

PORTER:

To some extent, yes.

We'd been working on that.

18)

FASANO:

Was that an ongoing problem?

20 PORTER:

It had been, yes.

What we were getting was a loss of level 21 indication when the main steam bypass valves were open.

And we've been for 22 sometime trying to figure out exactly what was causing it.

23 24 25 ;

l' I

i t

19 1

FASANO:

It's still under study?

2 PORTER:

On March 27th it was.

It's not really known at this time.

I had 3

4 been down to the condensor vendor, discussing what we had seen, and the 5

pr blems with it. What we done to try to track it down, the week before that.

6 7

FASANO:

How would that have affected the or would that have affected the g

hot well level, say, the on th 28th? Would there be the correlation there?

g 10 i

PORTER:

Well, it could, yes.

The level switches we had on one or two occasions, I won't try to eleaborate as to exactly which one, but the level had gone... or the irdicated level had gone low enough so that it had caused emergency makeup valves to open, and add water to the condenser.

I And we didn't really know for sure whether the water was in there or not.

15j It was false indication that we... although it would appear it was somewhere in the condenser, because when the bypass valves are closed, when then j

you'd get high water level indication.

It appeared to be an indication 181 problem versus an actual low level, although the two section condenser, we.

19 weren't sure whether the water was really in the other water box and the 20 level indication was proper or whether we were doing something to the 21 indicated level and water was in the same box that the indicator was in.

22 23 FASANO:

So you could be getting water in when you didn't need that water 24 in.

In essence?

25 l

l l

20 PORTER: We had definitely had that happen at time or two, yeah.

1.

I 2'

FASANO:

0. K.

Do you have anything else?

3 4

CRESWELL:

5 Ivan, one thing, I have already asked you whether any of the

?eople that were measuring the in Core thermoCouples down in the Cable room g

tad mentioned to you that the core was uncovered, and you have answered no.

7 Iw id like to talk then hypothetically, if each technician had made a 8

statement like that to you, would you have accepted that, or would you have g

questioned that? I trying to get an idea what kind of an impression that would make on you.

12 PORTER:

Has one of them said they told me that?

14l CRESWELL:

Excuse me.

151 16l PORTER:

Has somebody said they told me that?

17 18!

l CRESWELL:

We have certain indications that statements like that were made.

19l Yes.

21 PORTER:

I don't know how to answer that question.

I'd think everybody was 22 concerned about the core.

I don't know whether they were concerned... but 23 I was... to the best of my recollection, I was concerned that we didn't 24 have water in the hot leg, anywhere back to the vessel.

I can't even begin 25 I

l l

1

21 1

to think that I was thinking of slightly tncovered, or 10% uncovered, or 2

50% uncovered, or whatever.

To me the ind'caticins were that we couldn't 3

have water in the hot leg, and I don't... I recall being rather upset at 4

everything I was seeing.

And I just... I can't answer what they did 5

specifically... what the discussions were.

6 CRESWELL:

7, But to get back to what I was saying though, let's assume that hypothetically they did tell you that. Would you accept it, or would you 8

reject it?

g 10 PORTER: Well, I certainly don't think I'd just reject it on the spot.

12 CRESWELL:

0.K., Owen?

14 l

SHACKLETON: Thank you, Mr. Porter.

Do you anything you want to say at 15 l

this time, before we close off?

16!

17 PORTER:

No.

19 SHACKLETON:

All right.

At this time, we'll close this interview.

The 20l time is 2:35 p.m., Eastern Daylight Tirre.

And the reading on the meter is 21 537.

22 23 24 25 t