ML19309F964
| ML19309F964 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1979 |
| From: | Levine S NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-79-669, NUDOCS 8005020071 | |
| Download: ML19309F964 (11) | |
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M0050 0 2
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o December 18, 1979 UNITED STATES
_S E'C'Y-792669 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D.C.2W53 INFORMATION REPORT For:
The Commissioners From:
Saul Levine, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Thru:
Executive Director for Operations M Lvt
Subject:
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AMONG NRC, DOE, EPRI, GPU
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FOR POST-ACCIDENT EXAMINATIONS OF TMI-2
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Purpose:
To infonn the Comission of the agreement among NRC, DOE, EPRI, and GPU on the methods of interaction and coordination of efforts to achieve comon goals in TMI-2 data gathering as represented by a completed Memorandum of Understanding i
among the parties.
1 Discussion:
Following the letter from Chairman Hendrie to DOE Under Secretary Deutch (copy enclosed) concerning the need to develop a coordinated program for the post-accident examination of TMI-2, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was developed through several meetings of senior representatives of NRC and the other organizations. As described in the enclosed MOU, a Joint Coordination Group (JCC) has been forned which has appointed members to a Technical Working Group (TWG). The Technical Working Group has had several meetings during which planning has teert. developed toward meeting the common goals defined by the JCC and the-TWG.
Also, as set forth in the MOV a Technical Integration Office has been established at TMI headed by a DOE representative and s~taffed by personnel from EG&G (Idaho) to coordinate the implementation of the plans.
The first of the early examination efforts prescribed by the TWG has been accomplished. A 9-inch disk has been cut out of a containment penetration cover,' allowing optical access to the containment and allowing for a detailed examination of the containment wall surface.
120555004747 1 9A9C9E9N
Contact:
N3N Ronald Foulds, RSR FFI DIRECTOR WAS INGTON DC 20555 7 * " ". P.
4 The MOU will be signed by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research when DOE has the final draft prepared, by the end of December.
Coordination:
This paper has been concurred in by NRR.
ELD has no legal objection.
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'M Saul Levine, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research i
Enclosures:
1.
TMI-2 Post-Acciaent Examinatiop MOU 2.
Chairman Hendrie Letter to Under Secretary Deutch
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r November 2,1979 f.
l MENORANDUM OF UNDEPSTANDING 1
TMI UNIT 2 INFORMATION AND EXAMINATION PROGRAM i
1.
INTRODUCTION The TMI Unit 2 accident of March 28, 1979 was and is of great concern t
to the electric power industry, its customers, regulatory and other While the accident government agencies and the country as a whole.
resulted in only limited radiation exposure to the population surrounding the power plant, the plant itself suffered extensive
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damage with high radiation contamination within the nuclear and other supporting systems and facilities. TMI Unit 2 currently presents opportunities to provide information for the enhancement of nuclear power plant safety and reliability of generic benefit to nuclear power technology. Four organizations, the Department of Energy (DOEi, the Electric Power'Research Institute (EPRI), the General Public Utilities Company (GPU), and the Nuclear Regulatory 4
Commission (NRC), have a common interest in assuring that this
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information is obtained during the course of recovery. This memorandum of understanding identifies the broad areas of consnon interests, and objectives to which the signatories subscribe, and lays out in broad terms meth. ids by which the signatories have agreed to interact in an effort to achieve these objectives consistant with the other obligations of the signatories.
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OBJECTIVES The TMI Unit 2 accident represented one of the most severe integral tests of nuclear plant safety philosophy and safety systems ever 3
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- encountered in a commercial light water reactor. The extent of damage to the reactor core and the subsequent release of fission products to the primary system, containment, and elsewhere is the most extensive experienced in any known light water reactor power system.
The environmental conditions within containment and the reactor systes pose one of the most technically challenging decontamination i.
and radioactive vaste management situations ever encountered. These circumstances represent opportunities for state of the art advancement i
not availabic through normal research, developent, and test programs.
Thus, it is our common objective that:
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significant applicable information stesuning from the TMI Unit 2 g
accident be obtained and made available for the general improve-l ment of light water reactor plant safety and r:11 ability, unique 4* a and experience at TMI Unit 2 that will be obtained during the plant decontamination and assessment of status be integrated into ongoing govermuent and EPRI research and develop-ment programs as may be beneficial. This information will be
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made generally available to others engaged in the design, con-I
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struction, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants.
information and experience of value to all parties be obtained I,
during GPU's planned return to service program.
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. The signatories believe that the stated objectives above should be interest pursued to the benefit of the country and are in the best
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of the Nation. To this end, most effective use should be made of the available resources of government and industry.
3.
COMMON INTERESTS Major areas of couunon interests are, and work is expected to be undertaken in the following:
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The development and reporting of information on the performance a) of instrumentation, electrical and mechanical equipment within the reactor containment and auxiliary buildings during and af ter l
the accident. This ef fort will er.ompass work on plant systems and components whose performance is of importance to general generic improvements in light water reactor safety and reliabi-lity. Information which could lead to improvements in component and system designs and standards and plant operability, especially under abnormal conditions will be included.
b) The development of information on fisaion product behavior, transport and deposition, particularly as this may contribute to a better understanding of nuclear plant accident scenarios.
c) The development of information and the development and testing of new technology of potential industry wide application in the fields of plant, system and equipment decontamination A.
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. l radioactive waste processing and disposal methods and systems
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post-accident pressure vessel and other primary coolant system
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pressure boundary testing and qualification technology removal, packaging, transportation, storage and disposal of damaged nuclear fuel.
d) The development and reporting of information on the nature and extent of physical damage to surfaces, structural components a.
and equipment within the reactor containment and auxiliary buildings as a result of the accident.
f e) The establishment and effective utilization of a common data bank for all information gathered under this agreement.
f) The development and reporting of information on the nature and extent of core damage, with the objective of understanding the chemical, metallurgical and physical behavior of fuel, clad, core components, and related reactor internals during and after
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the accident.
Recognizing that other areas of common interest may arise, that the 5
possibility exists for discovering conditions not previously antici-pated, or of new questions arising at some future time not presently 3
being considered, the signatories agree that an archival system be astablished under which specimens of hardware or other aseples may be stored off-site for possible future examination and testing.
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JOINT COORDINATING GROUP To provide a forum for effectively guiding and reconciling, where necessary, the various activities which may be undertaken in asso-ciation with TMI recovery, a Joint Coordinating Group will be formed The to which each signatory will appoint one senior representative.
group will act to provide an integrated overview of activities associated with TMI, to provide a means for priority assessment of the expected large numbers of peripheral data and technology tasks, and to provide a means for the review and integration of activities ancillary to the recovery of the Unit. The Joint Coordinating Group will function to permit the fullest necessary management interaction of the parties. It will serve as one means to identify facility, equipment, personnel and financial resources for the accomplishment of conunon goals.
The Joint Coordinating Group will meet periodically (initially about once every two months) to consider policy matters, with responsibility for chairing each meeting alternating between the EPRI and the DOE representatives.
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The Coordinating Group will develop a charter to implement the general understandings contained in the ammorandum, and to form such subgroups or interact with such other parties as to facilitate A
common interests herein identified.
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6-5.
TECHNICA1, WORKING GROUP To assist the Joint Coordinating Group,'the signatories agree to establish a Technical Working Group (TWG) whose functions are:
(a) define the technical work to be done and prepare an integrated plan for such work.
(b) to provide detailed technical scope of v-4k for specific tasks to be performed under the plan, and (c) to provide technical over>;~r.e of such work, including recom-mandations for necessary changes and additions.
The TWG shall consist of technical experts appointed by each signatory. Three members shall LAitially be appointed by each signatory but the composition may be changed to meet specific needs or altered conditions. The TWG shall meet periodically as needed and the meetings shall be chaired by DOE and EPRI representatives.
The results of these meetings shall be reported to the Joint Coordinating Group.
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TECHNICAL INTEGRATION OFFICE To assist the Joint Coordinating Group, the signatories further agree to establish a Technical Integration Office (TIO) with functions as noted Since some of these functions are expected to involve onsite below.
work, the parties agree to the following understandings regarding such a
onsite activities:
a (a) All work within the reactor and auxiliary buildings will be arranged for, controlled, and executed by GPU and its contractors.
(b) GPU will make office space available, on a reimbursable basis, within or proximate to the site boundary, for the Technical Integration Office.
The functions of the Technical Integration Office shall include:
(a) The TIO shall be the interface between GPU and its contractors on the one hand, and the Joint Coordinating Group and its repre-sentatives on the other, for all matters related to work carried on pursuant to this agreement. This shall in no way be interpreted to extend to the normal requirements for information required for licensing or inspection and enforcement activities of the NRC, where existing channels shall continue to be used as appropriate.
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(b) In coordination with GPU, the T10 shall assist in identifying the schedule of specific activities to be conducted onsite pur-susnt to this agreement, arranging for the carrying out of these activities, the monitoring of these activities, and the reporting of data, selection and shipment of samples, etc.
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(c) Review, in coordination with TWC ac:.1?U, proposed procedures related to activities conducted pursuant to this agrement so as to assure high likelihood of success of task objectives.
(d) For all activities, whether onsite or offsite, actually carried out pursuant to this agreement, provide for the systematic collection and collation of information obtained so that such information may be freely accessible to any interested party.
To this end, tha 210 vill mainta*.n liaison with the TWG to 4
define data to te collected, report format, and reporting schedule.
(e) Work performe1 pursuant to this agreement which is sponsored
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by the Goverment shall be contracted for by the TIO.
(f) Work performed pursuant to this agreement which is sponsored i
by EPRI shall be contracted. for by appropriate t s*ns and the T10 shall be f ully cognizant of the contractural c.rregw.nts so that it can perform its other integration, schedulius. n.terf ace, and information collection functions listed above.
(g) The TIO shall establish, and maintain, a system for controlling This changes to the work scope that may arise from time to time.
system shall be approved by the TWG.
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The TIO will be established, manned sad funded by DOL. Representatives of organisations in the TWG may be attached to the TIO to assist in administering the functions of the TIO, including technical oversight of specific tasks conducted pursuant to this agreement.
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9 7.
STATEMENT OF LIMITATIONS It is understood that the TMI Unit 2 owners and customers.* ave a strong interest ia the return to safe commercial service of TMI Unit 2.
Each party of this Memorandum of Understanding will implement their own individual programs.
Nothing contained in this document shall be construed to imrose upon any party hereto liability for injury to persons or property arising in the course of the activities under this Memorandum of Understanding.
Nothing is intendad to affect, modify or to act to change the internal management, structure or responsibilities of each of the participating groups individually.
Signed:
DOE EPRI GPU NRC (This page has been re-typed per ELD comments; DOE has agreed to this version.)
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o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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October 19, 1979 CHAIRMAN I
i The Honorable John M. Deutch Under Secretary U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D. C.
20545
Dear Mr. Deutch:
I am writing you concerning the need for developing and implementing 0 plan for the post-accident examination of the Three Mile Island Unit-2 (lil-?)
power station. The accident was a highly regrettable occurrence, but the infomation that can be derived from a careful examination of the facility before and during cleanup can be invaluable in providing both understanding of the accident and reactor safety information.
Several discussions have been held on this subject. At a meeting of senior staff representatives of DOE, EPRI, GPU and NRC, it was concluded that it would be useful to develop a coordinated program under the aegis of a joint Coordinating Coninittee.
I support this approach and reconinend that DOE give
~ strong consideration to the allocation of funds and other resources for this effort.
Some areas in which such information can be obtained are:
(a) fission product behavior, transport, and plateout; (b) the extent and location of core damage from thermal and chemical degradation; (c) other primary system structural damage, if any; and (d) damage and deterioration of equipment in the containment.
Such infonnation is not only valuable to the mission of the NRC and DOE, but will be equally valuable to the international consnunity. The enclosure hereto contains a more detailed preliminary listing of data needs.
C D f C.
19 ll% ) )35b
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The Honorable John M. Deutch.
In essence, TMI-2 can provide a large amount of information which.Mght not.
be available from limited scale experiments or simubtions. It is important that these data not be lost in the recovery of the facility. Your attention to this matter is appreciated.
If you have any questions in this regard, please do not hesitate to contact me or Dr. Charles N. Kelber of our Division of Reactor Safety Research, 1
- incerely,
\\.A.A.
M. Hea'.fe
Enclosure:
1.1 stated
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Safety Related Examinations Suring TMI Recovery Operations The TMI-2 plant, in its present accident aftermath state, contains a wealth of infomation of potentially great value to the NRC for understanding the nature of accident initiated effects on plant, equipment, and fluids. To guide future activities in preventing and mitigating the effects of accidents and to identify sources of potential decontamination and requalification difficulties it is of great _ importance that careful attention be given during recovery operations to obtaining data which could othenvise be forever lost without adequate planning and control. An early objective should be to detemine and compare the values of alternative data needs and to establish their relative priorities prior to the various recovery operation steps during which they would take place.
A preliminary listing of desired information examples by category is given as follows for early planning purposes (taken from a more extensive list co:: piled from all sources within NRC staff):
Listiag of Data Interests for TMI Recovery Examinations General Guidelines 1.
The recovery plan should be integrated with safety related examinations to minimize the loss of valuable information. A management mechanism has been suggested to assure proper coordination.
2.
Provision should be made for careful recording and filing of photographs, TV t. pes, voice records, etc., made during the recovery process.
3.
Provision should be made for library samp1es for possible future tests.
Examples of Specific Examinations A.
Cortainment Building Interior Prior to Start of Decontamination 1.
The disposition of radionuclides on walls and operating floors, and adsorption on concrete, should be sampled by swipes, trepanning or similar techniques.
2.
Examination for damage associated with hydrogen burn.
3.
All glass light bulbs and glass covers should be collected, identified for specific location and saved for eventual analysis. These items could provide an excellent indication of integrated dose to various parts of the containment since it is known that the amount of darkening (or change in optical density) is related to dose.
4.
Check operating floor areas for any evidence that the containment spray was limited in lateral extent.
5.
Assess debris in sump to determine type, size, and initial and final locatior if (and how) clogging took place.
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B.
Tests after Decontamination of Containment Building
'lo' 1.
Perfom a detailed examination of safety grade electrical equipment including cables, instruments, and motors.
2.
Check condition of themal insulation.
3.
Check condition of valves, blowdown lines, valve packing and gaskets.
4.
Detemine extent of external corrosion on reactor pressure vessel (including head), steam generators, pressurizer, piping and carbon steel valves inside containment.
5.
Identify radionuclides and their location within the damaged steam generator.
6.
Perfom containment leak rate test to ascertain containment integrity subsequent to hydrogen explosion and intense radiation exposure.
C.
Core and Reactor Vessel 1.
Reactor Vessel, CRDM's, etc. (External) extent and location of sites of contamination; characterization a.
of radionuclides present, b.
ex:.mination for signs of overheating, thermal distortions.
2.
Reactor Vessel, CRDM's, Instruments (Internal) melting, distortion, fission product entrapment, etc., effects a.
on control systems, thermal shields, upper and lower core support structures,
b.
examination of vessel interior for damage and for signs of various accident conditions.
3.
A visual examination of the core geometry with appropriate photographs; precise axial and radial locations of abnomalities.
4.
Detemination of extent of gross assembly-to-assembly core damage /
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distortion; estimation of flow blockages or other hydraulic phenomena, and distribution of themal effects.
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5.
Detemine distribution of (fuel and clad) debris and fomation and composition of debris deposits and debris beds.
6.
Assessment' of the conditions of core instrumentation prior to removal.
7.
Removal and inspection of fuel bundles to detemine if ruptured or melted.
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Poolside examination of any i-tact fuel bundles for degree of ballooning and flow restrict 5:a.
9.
Removal and examinations of portions of guide tubes, control rods,
- instrumentation tubes, and upper and lower core structural components.
- 10. Removal of small samples from selected regions of the core.
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- 11. Hot cell examination of samples for:
i a.
an estimate of the maximum clad and fuel temperatures reached in different portions of the core; b.
extent of oxidation of cladding in different temperature zones; c.
extent of damage to grids spacers; d.
evidence of U0 melting ;
2 e.
evidence of Zr/UO liquid phase formation; 2
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evidence of hydriding of zirconium cladding and the extent of hydride formation; g.
structural integrity of fuel pins as a function of temperatures reached; and h.
geometry of damaged fuel to assist estimates of coolability.
D.
Survey Auxiliary Building and Contents 1.
Radionuclide deposition 2.
Flooding damage 3.
Contamination of steam relief valves, lines and let-down heat exchangers.
E.
Primary Coolant
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Coolant before and during decontamination to provide archival samples for analysis.
(It may be desirable to interrupt decon-E tamination to dissolve lanthanides to.obtain a sample of their E
abundance.)
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