ML19309F006
| ML19309F006 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001308 |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1980 |
| From: | Szwajkowski R GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., MAYER, BROWN & PLATT |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004280305 | |
| Download: ML19309F006 (38) | |
Text
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Dated:
April 4, 1980 i
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORL THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 1
In the Matter of
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
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Docket No. 70-1308
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(Renewal of SNM-1265)
(GE Morris Operation Spent Fuel )
Storage Facility)
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RESPONSE OF GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS' SECOND SET OF l
AMENDED CONTENTIONS AND MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS Introduction This memorandum is submitted by the Applicant, General Electric Company
(" General Electric"), in response to the Second Set of Amended Contentions and Motion for Reco1 sideration of
~
Motion to Stay Proceedings of the People of tr.e State of Illinois
(" State").
As demonstrated below, the State by this filing has continued its deliberate efforts to delay needlessly this proceeding and had rejected, once again, its responsibility to inform this Board, the NRC Staff, and General Electric of the specific issues which it seeks to litigate.
In passing upon this filing -- the State's third opportunity to set forth its contentions in compliance with 10 C.F.R.
S2.714 -- the Board may reasonably assume that the State has now perfected, to its fullest ability, its contentions and that opportunity for still further amendment could not serve to l
8 004g 80 2kCI
cure the defects inherent in the second amended contentions. /
Standards For Review Of Contentions In its discussion of standards for review of contentions (Mem. pp. 5-7), the State, in passing, acknowledges the applica-bility of 10 C.F.R. 52.714 but never once discusses the requirements set forth there.
Instead, the State discusses the legal principles applicable to contentions which have been found to satisfy the threshold requirements of 10 C.F.R. 52.714.
This disingenuous approach by the State cannot circumvent the judicially approved requirements of 10 C.F.R. 52.714.- /
- /
The Board expressly stated that this submission would constitute the intervenors' last opportunity to cure the defects in their previous contentions:
"We do want to stress that we discussed this at some length at noon.
We want to stress that this is an opportunity for the Intervenors to refine their existing concentions in such a way that they can be responded to first by us and those which are accepted -- the Applicant and the Staff can respond to.
And, we do envision this, not just envision, this will be the last opportunity for correction of the contentions."
(2/ 29f 80 Tr. p. 138)
(Emphasis added.)
- /
It should be noted that one of the Appeal Board decisions relied upon by the State expressly held that the Commission did not exceed its authority in requiring intervenors to "both identify the specific aspect or aspects of the subject matter of the proceedings as to which intervention is sought and set forth with particularity the basis for their contentions with regard thereto."
Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island 1 and 2), ALAB 107, 6 AEC 188, 191 (1973).
In affirming the subsequent Commission Order, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated:
"The court considers [Sec. 189 (a) ] amenable to a construction which, when considered with section 161(p) of the Act and the nature of intervention, permits the Commission to i
require the party to inform it of the issues j
on which he wishes to be heard, or, as held by the Commission, the contentions to be advanced
)
and the basis therefor. "
BPI v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1974). (Emphasis added.)
l l
l Contrary to the State's assertion (Mem. p.
- 5), the State's " burden regarding contentions" at this stage of the proceeding is succinctly set forth in 10 C.F.R.
S2. 714 (b) to be the submission of "a list of the contentions which petitioner seeks to have litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity."
The standards by which compliance with S 2.714 is determined have been well defined and are discussed below.
In examining contentions the licensing board is not to decide the merits of the issues raised, Duke Power Co. (Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773-Transportation of Spent Fuel from Ornee Nuclear station for Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station),
ALAB (Feb. 26, 1979); Mississippi Power & Licht Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), 6 AEC 423, 426 (1973); Philadelphia Electric, et al. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station 1 Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20 (1974).
Rather, the Board is to determine whether the contention on its face has the required specificity, contains an adequate basis, and raises an issue that can properly be heard in the proceeding.
The Appeals Board said in Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant),
ALAB-182, 7 AEC 210 (1973)
"the intervention board's task is to determine, from a scrutiny of what appears within the four corners of the contention as stated, whether (1) the requisite specificity exists; (2) there has been an adequate delineation of the basis for the contention; and (3) the issue sought to be raised is cognizable in an individual licensing proceeding."
Section 2.714's requirement that the contentions and I
their bases must be set forth with reasonable specificity has a
(
I i
i two-fold purpose -- to assure that the proposed issues raised by the contentions are fit for resolution in the hearing and to give opposing parties adequate notice as to the issues to be addressed.
Peach Bottom, supra, 8 AEC at 20.
Adequate notice is essential to facilitate the necessary preparation of the parties and to avoid needless delay.
The need for assurances that the contentions raise triable issues is of particular importance because of the consequences resulting from a grant of intervention.
"The requirement to specify contentions in 10 CFR S2.714 (a) is a reasonable and necessary requirement which limits the matters in controversy in the pro-ceeding.
The issue is not merely a matter relating to the niceties of good pleading practice.
Unlike a complaint in civil practice, which at best initiates a lawsuit to which a defendant must reply, a petition for leave to intervene, if granted at the operating license stage, in addition to initiating a public hearing, in effect operates as a temporary restraining order automatically delaying issuance of the license with immediate detriment to the license applicant and the public it serves."
Wisconsin Electric Power Company, (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), LBP-72-32, 5 AEC 162, 164 (1972).
As a result, it has been held that the S 2.714 require-ment of specificity is more rigorous than the standard of notice pleading used in Federal Civil Procedure, Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Fuel Receiving and Storage Station), LBP-76-12, 3 NRC 277, 285 (1976); Kansas Gas and Electric Co.,
et al. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1) ALAB-279, NRCI-75-6 559, 575 (1975).
" Barren and unfocused" complaints are not sufficient, Off Shore Power Systems (Manufacturing License for Floating Nuclear Power Plants), LBP-77-481, 6 NRC 249 (1977), and, although a
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detailing of the evidence supporting a contention is unnecessary, Grand Gulf, supra, 6 AEC at 426, the contentions must at the very l
least show the existence of a foundation that warrants further explanation of the issue raised.
Peach Bottom, supra, 8 AEC at 21.
Although the Commission's procedure provides intervenors liberal opportunities to amend and particularize their contentions, the intervenors still bear the ultimate responsibility for submitting acceptably specific and particularized contentions.
A board has no duty to " write or rewrite a contention" or to
" recast contentions offered by one of the litigants for the purpose of making those contentions acceptable."
Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 406 (1974).
A number of rules developed in Commission case law and regulations are pertinent to the requirement that a contentien raise an issue properly hearable by a licensing board.
- First, it is well-settled that the licensing boards lack jurisdiction j
to entertain attacks on the applicable statutes.
Peach Botton, supra, 8 AEC at 20; Potomac Electric Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-74-35, 7 AEC 872 (1974).
Nor, absent special circumstances, / can intervenors dispute the validity of Commission regulations, its regulatory
- /
10 C.F.R.
S2.758(b) expressly provides:
"The sole ground for petition for waiver or exception shall be that special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding are such that application of the rule or regulation (or provision thereof) would not serve the purposes for which the rule or regulation was adopted."
(Footnote continued on next page.)
structure or any Commission rule of general application in a proceeding before a licensing board.
10 C.F.R. S 2.758 (a) states:
"(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c),
and (d) of this section, any rule or regulation of the Commission or any provision thereof, issued in its program for the licensing and regulation of production and utilization facilities, source material, special nuclear material or by-product material shall not be subject to attack by way of discovery, proof, argument, or other means in any adjudicatory proceeding involving initial licensing subject to this subpart."
See, Peach Bottom, supra, 8 AEC at 20; Philadelphia Electric Co.
(Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-75-22, 75 NCRI 451 (1975); Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point
)
Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79 (1975).
Moreover, only contentions that address issues within the scope of the application under consideration and apply to j
the facility in question are admissible.
Duke Power Co.
(Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-74-5, 7 AEC 82, 96 (1974); Allied-General Nuclear Services, etc. (Barnwell Fuel Receiving and Storage Station) LBP-76-24, 3 NRC 725 (1976).
Lastly, licensing hearings are not appropriate settings for resolution of general issues and, therefore, contentions (Footnote cont'd from preceding page)
Such a petition must also be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth, inter alia, "the special circumstances alleged to justify the waiver or exception requested."
Id.
Although, as discussed below, the Septe makes various attacks upon the applicable regulations, it never attempts to provide the showing mandated by 10 C.F.R.
S 2.758 ^(b),
~
an essential predicate to any such proceeding. -
addressing questions of general policy must be dismissed.
As the Appeal Board said in connection with a motion to intervene in a licensing proceeding for a power plant:
"[t]he imposition of reasonable limitations on the scope of full trial-type hearings in administrative proceedings is essential.
The need for limitations in such hearings is a general one which is not limited to hearings which concern the licensing of nuclear power plants.
Tnese limitations do not mean that interested members of the public may not express their concerns before other forums which are appropriate.
If facts pertaining to the licensing of a particular nuclear power plant are at issue, an adjudicatory proceeding is the right forum.
But if someone wants to advance generalizations regarding his particular views of what applicable policies ought to be, a role other than es a party to a trial-type hearing should be chosen."
Duxe Power Company, (McGuire Station,, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-128, RAI-73-6 (1973).
Finally, bearing in mind the admonition of the Appeal Board, the Board should fully assure itself that the contentions of intervenors in proceedings, such as this, involving non-mandatory hearings present a triable issue:
"In an operating license proceeding, unlike a construction permit proceeding, a hearing is not mandatory.
There is, accordingly, especially strong reason in an operating license proceeding why, before granting an intervention petition and thus triggering a hearing, a licensing board should take the utmost care to satisfy itself fully that there is at least one contention advanced in the petition which, on its face, raises an issue clearly open to adjudication in the proceeding. "
(Emphasis added.)
Gulf States Utility Comoany, (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-183, 7 AEC 227, 226 (1974); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station),
ALAB-305, 3 NRC 8, 12 (1976).
Before proceeding to the discussion of the State's Second Set of Amended Contentions, consideration should be given to the fact that this proceeding concerns an existing facility
.with a proven record of operation and, in that sense, is very different from a proceeding involving a facility which exists solely as a design to be constructed and placed in operation at some future time.
The current proceeding does not involve any proposed change either to the facility or its operation.
The only issue is a continuation of the activities which previously were licensed and currently are being conducted.
In these circumstances, the State's engaging in a procedural shell game is a disservice to the public, the Commis-sion and the Applicant.
For, by definition, if the State has identified risks in the continued operation of the facility, the same risks would attach to its present operation.
The State, rather than refuse to provide specific and unambiguous contentions and bases, should treat S 2.714's requirements as a bare minimum and, at the earliest opportunity, provide to the Board, the Staff and General Electric all information which gives rise to the State's concerns.
General Electric views its obligations for the prudent and safe management of the Morris facility with the utmost seriousness.
If there is a problem with the operation of the Morris facility, General Electric and the public deserve to be informed.
To argue against such disclosure, to seek to delay evaluation of its information and to provide only vague and unsubstantiated charges cannot be in the State's or the public interest.
The very nature of the issues which the State purports to raise makes it imperative that this pro-ceeding be conducted expeditiously.
General Objections To All Contentions General Electric objects to each contention 1 through 11 inclusive, on the grounds that each should be stricken for failure to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 52.714(b) because each contention lacks specificity and fails to set forth any basis.
Specific Objections To Amended Contentions In its March 20, 1980 submission, the State set forth only those portions of the five contentions constituting its amendments.
For the Board's convenience, this memorandum sets forth the State's 11 contentions in toto, reflecting the most recent amendments.
AMENDED CONTENTION 1 STATES:
1.
The amended Consolidated Safety Analysis Report (hereinafter "CSAR") prepared by the Applicant does not provide reasonable assurance, as required by 42 U.S.C.
52232 (a) and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 & 70 that the continued operation of the Morris facility will not endanger the health and safety of the public due to accidental release of radioactivity.
The retraction of the risk analysis of the Rasmussen Report, WASH 1400, and the acknowledgement by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff that Class l
9 accidents are indeed a possibility 1/ indicate that accurate accident analyses are necessitated for nuclear facilities of all types.
Without further adequate risk analysis the public cannot be assured that continued storage of spent fuel at Morris will not be hazardous to the public health and welfare.
The CSAR does not adequately describe and analyze the risk of all credible accidents and the conse-quences thereof including:
(a) The effects on the Morris facility of a Class 3 accident at the adjacent Dresden Nuclear Reactor; (b) The consequences of simultaneous accidental radioactive releases from the Dresden Nuclear Reactor and the Morris Spent Fuel Storage Facility; (c) The risks and consequences of the release of radioactive elements in excess of Part 20 regulations as a result of any of the following accidental occurrences at the Morris facility: a tornado-related incident, including the consequences of an accident caused by a tornado impelled missile; a loss of coolant accident, alone and in conjunction with an accident which has caused a rift in the building structure; earthquake related accidents; and sabotage related accidents not analyzed in NEDM-20682.
- / See Statement of Mattson, NRC, TMI Task Force In The Matter of Public Service Company of New Jersey.
(Salem Nuclear Plant Spent Fuel Pool Expansion)
ASLB-Docket No.
(sic). "
., ' g
RESPONSE
The introductory paragraphs are vague and fail to satisfy the specificity and basis requirements of 10 CFR S2.714.
The State neither specifies and defects in the existing analyses nor indicates the "further adequate analysis" required 1 \\
to be performed.
Moreover, the State's assertion is factually inaccurate in that the body of the Rasmussen Report was not retracted by the NRC, only support for its Executive Summary was withdrawn.
Indeed, the Commission has stated:
"With respect to the component parts of the study, the Commission expects the Staff to make use of them as appropriate, that is, where the data base is adequate and analytical techniques permit.
Taking due account of the reservations expressed in the Review Group Report and in its presentation to the Commission, the Commission supports the extended use of probabilistic risk assessment in regulatory decision-making." (NRC Statement On Risk Assessment And The Reactor Safety Study Report (WASH 1400) In Light Of The Risk Assessment Review Group Report, p. 4, January 18, 1979.)
In any event, the State must establish a reasonable possibility of the occurrence of a Class 9 accident and not simply refer to Three Mile Island or the Commission's actions with respect to the Rasmussen Report.
The State has not even attempted to make such a showing.1/
Finally, Chapter 8 of the CSAR sets forth analyses of all credible accidents.
The State fails to identify any postulated accident, Class 9 or otherwise, which is inadequately analyzed in the CSAR.
Subsection (a) of this contention is vague and lacks the requisite specificity in that it fails to identify a postulated accident which has not been adequately analyzed.
- / At the Prehearing Conference, the State indicated that it presently does not intend "to hypothesize a Class 9 accident at Morris per se."
(2/29/80 Tr. p. 40).
The State offers no basis to establish a Class 9 accident as a reasonable possibility at Dresden nor to substantiate any effects at Morris from an event at Dresden.I/
Furthermore, the applicable regulations do not require any analysis of an accident at Dresden for relicensing the Morris facility.- /
Subsection (b) should also be stricken for the same reasons.
Additionally, the State fails to identify the
" simultaneous accidental radioactive releases" to be considered or to provide any basis supporting the possibility that such releases could occur.
^
- /
The State previously represented that it would cure these defects by its amendment.
"DR.
REMICK:
Wouldn't it be difficult for the parties to address a contention if they don't know what accident you were talking about, they would need to look at it at detail and what those effects might be on Morris.
"MS.
SEKULER:
The Class 9 accident presents a problem in specificity all the way along the line.
We can certainly hypothesize certain types of accidents of that type in the T.M.I. model, for instance.
If that would clarify our contention, make it possible for us to present this issue and have the consequences of this type of release considered, we will rewrite our contentions with an attempt to do so."
(2/29/80 Tr. pp. 40-41)
{
(Emphasis added.)
Without explanation, the State apparently decided not to provide the Board with the missing specificity and basis.
--**/
This Board should note that in the recent proceeding relating to the expansion of storage capacity at the Zion site, in which the State was also a party, the " effects of a class 9 accident" at that facility was neither submitted by the State as a contention nor considered as such at the hearing. In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), Docket Nos. 50-295, and 50-304, Initial Decision, February 14, 1980.
Subsection (c) should also be stricken because the CSAR, Chapter 8 particularly, analyzes the consequences of all credible accidental occurrences.
Tornado-related incidents, including the consequences of an accident caused by a tornado impelled missile, are analyzed.
(See CSAR 558.4, 8.8.)
All credible loss of coolant accidents, including those in con-junction with an accident, which cause a rift in the building structure, are effectively analyzed.
(See CSAR 58.2.)
Loss of coolant accidents are analyzed both under the assumption that the enclosure around the pool is intact and under the assumption that it is not.
A rift in the building structure could not result in an accident of any greater severity than one that results in the entire enclosure being absent. Since all credible accidents, regardless of their cause, are analyzed i
by the CSAR, any accident which could be caused by an earth-quake has already been analyzed.
Finally, all credible sabotage-related occurrences are analyzed in " Sabotage Analysis For Fuel Storage At Morris", NEDM-20682.
The State does not identify any accidental occurrences not analyzed nor any defects in the analyses provided in the CSAR.
The State's bald assertion that there are sabotage-related accidents not analyzed in NEDM-20682 should be stricken for lack of specificity and basis.I!
-*/
While the State has made some minimal effort to adding specificity to some of its contentions, its total lack of (Footnote cont'd on next page)
AMENDED CONTENTION 2 STATES:
2.
The CSAR does not provide adequate assessment of credible risks of sabotage related events and the consequences thereof.
The " Sabotage Analysis for Fuel Storage at Morris", NEDM-20682, November 1, 1974, is limited in that it does not prove statistically the
" unlikeliness" of sabotage events nor has it been updated to accommodate advances in the technology of explosives which could make sabotage a more likely event.
RESPONSE
This contention should be stricken because the Morris facility has been determined by the Staff to be in full compliance with 10 CFR 573.50.
At the Prehearing Conference, the State apparently limited this contention to an assertion that the security plan is not adequate and/or that the security plan is not adequately described in the CSAR.
(2/29/80 Tr.
- p. 61.)
In any event, this contention is vague and lacks the (Footnote cont'd from preceding page) concern about any basis for any of its contentions is particularly troublesome in review of Dr. Remick's state-ment regarding the absence of a basis for Contention 1:
"DR.
REMICK:
I think what the State has done as an amendment was speak somewhat to the specificity.
There are questions of what particular acts of sabotage they did not address, what particular loss-of-cooling accident are they addressing.
But, there's an attempt at specificity.
"I did not interpret the change by Miss Sekuler to speak to the basis.
I offer that only as a help of [the] Board's thinking in the contentions."
(2/29/80 Tr. pp. 59-60)
(Emphasis added.)._.
requisite basis in that the State has failed to identify any specific defects in the plan or inadequacies in the CSAR. /
The second paragraph of this contention attacks the sabotage analysis prepared by General Electric.
The State totally ignores the fact that such an analysis is not required by the regulations and is not a license condition.- / Thus, the State seeks to penalize General Electric for the preparation of a meaningful analysis neither required by the regulations nor established as a license condition.
Moreover, General Electric is not required to prove statistically the " unlikeliness" of sabotage.
(In any event, no such sabotage-related incident has ever taken place at the Morris Operation or any other domestic spent fuel storage facility either at or away from a reactor site.)
General Electric has analyzed the effects of the most serious credible sabotage incidents.
The conclusion reached in tha Sabotage Analysis, that a credible sabotage effort would have little or no effect on the public health and safety, is premised on the inert nature of the spent fuel and the protective barriers
- /
This deficiency was expressly discussed at the Prehearing Conference at which time the Board stated:
" CHAIRMAN GOODHOPE:
Well that's right.
As you said before, the burden will be on the State to come up and point out as to how it is inadequate."
(2/29/80 Tr. p. 62)
(Emphasis added.)
- /
The analysis was prepared and submitted to the Commission in an effort to exclude the fuel and waste storage basin area as a vital area under 10 C.F.R. S73.50.
The Staff, (Footnote cont'd on next page)
I _
1 against release provided by the storage pool water, storage hardware and facility structures.
Explosives of different character than those assumed in the sabotage analysis would have potential for only fractional change in the degree of spent fuel damage and insignificant change in the threat to the public.
There is no showing by the State either that there is any need to update the Sabotage Analysis because of " advances in the technology of explosives" or that the Sabotage Analysis is in any way inadequate.
In fact, developments in the technology of explotives do not in any way affect the validity of the previous Sabotage Analysis.
AMENDED CONTENTION 3 STATES:
3.
The CSAR underestimates or does not state fully the projected effects on the health of personnel, their families and the public from exposure to radia-tion:
a)
The CSAR does not state total whole body exposure to occupational personnel for the expected life of the Morris facility; i
b)
The CSAR does not project expected genetic effects on personnel or to the general population caused by such whole body exposures; 1
(Footnote cont'd from preceding page) however, concluded that the analysis, standing alone, was not sufficient to amend the protection _ requirements for the Morris facility.
Accordingly, the fuel and waste storage basin areas are vital areas within 10 C.F.R. 573.50.
i c)
The CSAR includes only irradiated fuel and contaminated basin water as radiation sources.
Other tanks and pipes should be included.
(See G.E.
" Status of Existing Licensing" 2/21/79, Exceptions to Com-pliance With Regulatory Guide 3.44 S7.2
" Radiation Sources".);
d)
The CSAR does not account for additional radiation exposure to occupation personnel during testing or experimentation with fuel disassembly, dry storage or compac-tion, all of which are projected for the near future at Morris; e)
The CSAR does not address the absence of effective effluent monitoring.
i.
There are no devices to measure flows of air.
ii.
There is no routine procedure to measure Kr 85 (See C.E.
" Status of Existing Licensing" 2/21/79, item 16.)
RESPONSE
The introductory paragraph is vague in that it fails to identify the health effects which the CSAR underestimates or does not fully state.
Additionally, there is no specification as to the basis for consideration of such effects on the
" families" of personnel.
3 (a) and 3 (b).
The whole body exposure on occupational personnel has been determined in accordance with 10 C.F.R.,
Part 20 and is within the limitations contained in that part.
See CSAR, 57.5.
Furthermore, by referring to the " life of the facility" this contention attempts to raise matters beyond the scope of the Application and should be rejected.
To the excent that these subsections allege that.those standards are inadequate 1 L
they constitute an impermissible attack upon existing regulations and, accordingly, should be stricken pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S2.758.
Following an extended discussion at the Prehearing Conference, the State finally admitted that these contentions go beyond any existing regulatory requirement and are not limited to compliance with 10 C.F.R. Part 20.
"MS. SEKULER:
And, we would like to have the CSAR give us information not required by any rule now of the Commission."
(2/29/80 Tr. p.
69)
(Emphasis added.)
"MS.
SEKULER:
Part 20 applies, but it is not extensive enough, and we would like to have more information."
(2/29/80 Tr. p.
71)
In support of its challenge to the adequacy of 10 C.F.R. Part 20, the State asserted that the Commission's recognition "that there is a need for a new regulation covering the requirements for extended spent fuel storage" 43 Fed. Reg. 46309 (Oct. 6, 1978) " extends to the question of radiation dosage to occupational workers."
(2/29/80 Tr. p. 70).
This erroneous assertion, premised on the State's selective reading of che Notice, is put to rest by a cursory review of Proposed Part 72.
For, even the Proposed Part 72 expressly refers to and incorporates the radiation limitations set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 20, e.g.,
Proposed Part 72, SS72.15; 72.15(12);
72.33 (d).
3 (c).
This contention is inaccurate and should be stricken because documentation submitted supporting the i
j l
license renewal contains an analysis of the total radiation exposure to employees irrespective of the source.
See
" Operating Experience - Irradiated Fuel Storage at Morris Operation," NEDO - 20969B2/B3, January, 1979 S4.
See also, CSAR, Chapter 7.
No support for any allegation that this discussion is inadequate is provided.
Finally, all radiation exposure levels are well within the limits established by 10 C.F.R. Part 20.
3 (d).
This contention should be stricken as irrelevant to the issues before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board with regard to the pending license renewal application. Testing and experimenting with fuel disassembly and dry storage or compaction are not contemplated in the pending license application.
3 (e).
This subsection should be stricken because the Morris facility is in compliance with 10 C.F.R., Part 20 and more specifically 10 C.F.R S20.106.
To the extent that this subsection is an attack upon the validity of existing regulations, it is improper and should be stricken pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
S2.758.
With respect to subsection 3 (e) (1), the Morris facility continuously measures and records the ventilation exhaust air flow rates (stack air flow).
See CSAR Table 5-2.
Although the Morris facility is not required to measure the flow of environmental diluting air, that information is measured on a continuing basis at the Dre7 den Meteorological Tower and reported to Morris on a monthly basis or upon request. /
See Operating Experience Report, NEDO 20969B]2B3 Ch. 5 and Appendices A/B2 (January 1979).
With respect to subsection 3 (e) (ii),
while the Morris facility does not routinely measure Kr85, appropriate calculations and analyses have established that Kr85 releases are well within applicable limits.- /
CSAR 57.3.3.
No support for any allegation that this discussion is inadequate is provided.
AMENDED CONTENTION 4 STATES:
4.
The CSAR is incomplete in that it does not discuss prospective plans (in 1980) for testing of fuel, reconfiguration of storage, experimentation of storage modes, and other innovative techniques which General Electric has planned in cooperation with other private corporations and Government agencies.
-*/
As the State was informed at the Prehearing Conference (2/29/80 Tr. p. 78), the document upon which the State relies to support contention 3 (e) (i) is a discussion of the General Design Criteria of Proposed Part 72 relating to the measurement of environmental diluting media, either air or water.
See Proposed Part 72, Subpart F, S72.71(16), effluent monitoring.
Without explanation, the State has chosen not to correct its mistaken reliance.
--**/
The GEIS On Handling and Storage Of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel reached a similar conclusion:
" [The NFS] experience indicates that even the rupture of a number of fuel elements in th storage pool would not cause a release of I5Kr in sufficient quantities to be measurable off-site."
NUREG-0575, Vol. 1, S4.2.2.2 at pp. 4-15 (August, 1979).
RESPONSE
This contention should be stricken as irrelevant to the issues before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board because testing of fuel, reconfiguration of storage, experimentation of storage modes and other innovative techniques are not the subject matter of the pending license renewal application.
Additionally, contention 4 is speculative, vague and totally lacking the requisite basis.
AMENDED CONTENTION 5 STATES:
5.
The decommissioning and emergency plans sub-mitted by the Applicant as part of its application cannot be adequately judged at this time. With the assistance of the NRC staff, the Applicant has attempted to adapt its CSAR to the proposed 10 C.F.R.,
Part 72 which they presume will eventually regulate Away From Reactor storage.
However, as the regulation has not yet been adopted by the Commission it is now impossible to judge whether the decommissioning and emergency plans will be adequate to conform to the finally approved regulation.
The NRC Staff is well aware that the Decommissioning plan presented by Applic, ant in the CSAR may demand revision.
See letter of March 1, 1979 to D. M.
Dawson, Manager, Licensing &
Transportation, Nuclear Energy Programs Division, General Electric Co. from Leland C. Rouse, Acting Chief Fuel Reprocessing and Recycle Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NRC, wherein the Decommissioning plan for Morris is referred to and it is stated:
It should be pointed out that new decommission-ing criteria for nuclear facilities are now being developed.
When issued, these criteria may require revision of the plan.
Until the final promulgation of Part 72 the Decommis-sioning Plan must be considered inadequate.
l
RESPONSE
The CSAR and supporting documentation contain decommis-sioning and emergency plans in accordance with all presently applicable regulations.
See CSAR Appendix A.7 and Radiological Emergency Plan For Morris Operation, NEDE 21894 (June 1978).
No support for any allegation that these plans are inadequate is provided.
To the extent that this contention states that the pending license renewal application is subject to the draft rules proposed in 10 C.F.R., Part 72, / it should be stricken as irrelevant because those draft rules have no bearing upon the pending license renewal application.
In any event, General Electric will revise its decommissioning and emergency plans to conform to any changes in regulations to the extent that is required by law.
As presently constituted, this contention is speculative as to what those changes may be.
AMENDED CONTENTION 6 STATES:
6.
The Decommissioning Plan proposed in the CSAR is inadequate for the following reasons:
a)
There is insufficient determination of ultimate decontamination and decommissioning costs.
Costs have not been adjusted for inflation for the projected time of decon-tamination. CSAR pp. A7-13, A7-14. Without an accurate cost assessment GE cannot make a valid commitment to meet decommissioning costs.
- /
At the Prehearing Conference, the State explained the basis for this contention as:
"MR. VAN VRANKEN:
Basically what we are saying, Mr.
Chairman, is we can't consider the decommissioning plan (and the emergency plan] as being adequate when everything l
is under the process of regulatory changes right now."
(2/29/80 Tr. p. 83).
(Footnote cont'd on next page)._
b)
There is insufficient assurance that the applicant will be financially capable to meet decontamination and decommissioning costs.
Other than a general statement regarding GE's present relative solvency there is no verifiable financial statement to show GE can meet future costs as is required by 10 C.F.R.
S70.22(a).
A bond or other assurance of finan-cial capability should be required to provide a guarantee that decontamination and decommissioning costs will be fully covered.
c)
There is no contingency plan to provide de-commissioning of the Morris facility should an emergency, accident or other unforeseen event necessitate immediate and permanent abandonment of the Morris site.
d)
There is no consideration of possible perpetual care and maintenance due to incomplete decontamina-tion or decommissioning including:
1.
Inability to dispose of LAW vault material (See G.E.
" Status of Licensing" par. 19);
11.
residual contamination of waste vaults or other stationary parts of the facility; iii.
ground water contamination which would require maintenance to prevent leaching
'ffsite; o
iv.
unavailability of offsite disposal facilities for dismantled facility and wastes.
" Note:
Contention 6 (d) (iv) does not address the issue of whether offsite disposal facilities will be or should be available when decommissioning occurs.
The intent behind Contention 6 (d) (iv) is to litigate the issue of General Electric's contingency planning if it is found to be the case that no offsite facilities are available when needed.
See Transcript of Prehearing Conference held February 29, 1980, at 84-88."
l (Footnote cont'd from preceding page)
Clearly, the State does not contend that the decommissioning and emergency plans fail to comply with presently applicable regulations. -_ _
RESPONSE
6 (a).
This contention is incorrect and should be dis-missed for want of basis.
The only alleged inadequacy specified by the State is that the cost is calculated in terms of 1978 dollars.
(The plan is dated December 1,1978 and the calculations January, 1979.)
The cost of decommissioning under the decommis-sioning plan, however, can be projected to any future date by use of standard escalation factors.
Under applicable regulations, General Electric's decommissioning plan accurately assesses the cost of decommissioning.
No support for any allegation that this assessment is inaccurate is provided by either the State or the Staff.
6 (b).
This contention should be stricken because there is no showing or support for the contention that General Electric is not financially capable of decommissioning the Morris facility.
The Morris Operation is licensed in accordance with 10 C.F.R.,
Parts 30, 40 and 70 and is in compliance with those Parts.
No bond or other assurance of financial capacility is required under existing regulations / and to the extent that this contention
- /
The State grossly mischaracterizes the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 570.22(a) which only provides:
" Note:
where the nature of the proposed activities is such as to require consideration of the applicant's financial qualifications to engage in the proposed activities in accordance with the regulations in this chapter, the Commission may request the applicant to submit information with respect to his financial qualifications."
(Emphasis added.)
I The State seeks to transform an informational request into a madatory bonding requirement without any basis in statute or regulation.
l l
! (
1
-1
attacks those regulations, it should be stricken pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.758.
6(c).
This contention is vague and incomprehensible in that the phrase " emergency, accident or other unforeseen event necessitate immediate and permanent abandonment" is undefined.
The State fails to identify any such emergency or other event or to establish a basis for consideration in the CSAR.
- Moreover, there is no regulatory requirement that the CSAR contain centingency planning for emergency termination and decommissioning.
Subsection 6(c), accordingly, should be stricken pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.758 as an impermissible attack on existing regulations.
6 (d).
This subsection should be stricken as an impermis-sible attack upon existing regulations pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
S2.758 because General Electric is not required to determine responsibility for the perpetual care of the Morris facility after decommissioning.
More importantly, there is no reason to believe that perpetual care of the decommissioned facility will be required.
See CSAR, Appendix A.7, SA.7.4.2.
Subparts (i) through (iv) are factually incorrect and inaccurate and should be dismissed for want of basis:
(i) material from the LAW vault can be disposed under current regulations and procedures at l
existing licensed facilities, for example, Beatty, Nevada and Hanford, Washington.
(ii) currently available techniques, including detergent scrubbing,and acid etching, exist to i
decon*aminate the vaults (see CSAR, Appendix A.7); (iii) ground water or perched water contamination has been demonstrated not to occur (see CSAR, Appendices B.10 and B.12; SS8.3.1.1 and 8.3.12; see also NEDO-20969B3, supra, 55.3); and (iv) in view of the decision by the NRC to address the question of long-term or permanent storage and disposal of nuclear waste in a generic proceeding, this subsection should not be considered by this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (see Response to Contention 9).
At the Prehearing Conference, the State sought to avoid the guidelines established by the Commission in its pending rulemaking proceeding concerning " Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste", 44 Fed. Reg. 61372 (Oct. 25, 1979).
To that end, the State asserted:
"MS. SEKULER:
The rule making is going to address the question of whether by the year 2007, 2009, there will be adequate permanent storage facilities for high level waste disposal.
"Our concern here is not to determine whether those facilities will be available, but to determine whether GE has -- its exactly as related to (c).
Is there any contingency plan for a situation where decommissioning has been decided upon, but there isn't any place to put the kinds of waste that will occur because of decommissioning."
(2/29/80 Tr. p. 85.)
Consideration of that issue in this proceeding, however, is expressly precluded by the pending rulemaking.
One purpose of the rulemaking is to reassess the Commission's earlier, and j
still controlling, finding that there exists " reasonable assurance that methods of safe permanent disposal of high-level waste would be available when they were needed."
Id. at 61373.
In commencing this rulemaking, the Commission declared that issues covered by that proceeding should not be considered in individual l
licensing actions.
One such issue is "whether radioactive wastes can be safety stored on-site past the expiration of existing --
facility licenses until off-site disposal or storage is available."
Id.
And finally, should the Commission conclude that consideration of on-site storage after license expiration is appropriate, "it will issue a proposed rule providing how that question will be addressed."
_I d_.
AMENDED CONTENTION 7 STATES:
j 7.
The Emergency Plan in the CSAR is inadequate in that:
(a) it does not specify which emergency procedures will be utilized to unload the spent fuel pool and to transport and/or store irradiated fuel in the event that an emergency should necessitate transfer of the spent fuel from the Morris spent fuel pool.
(b)
Figure 9-4 " Emergency Plan Relationships for Morris Operation", NEDO-21326C, January 1979 supplement to the CSAR includes " emergency transportation of irradiated fuel" (sic) as a concept, but nowhere is this concept developed.
The CSAR should be supple-mented to explain GE's plans for emergency transportation.
(c)
There is no reference to tests or other means by which it can be determined that the existing emergency plans are adequate.
Adequate test programs of both communications systems and procedures should be documented prior to licensing.
For further clarification See Prehearing Conference Transcript at 087-095."
RESPONSE
Contention 7 should be stricken in its entirety because it is factually inaccurate, lacks specificity and basis, and is an attack on the applicable regulations.
Subsection (a) fails to provide the requisite basis in that it does not identify any events which wculd necessitate the emergency unloading of the fuel pool.
Additionally, as the State concedes, there is no regulatory requirement for such emergency precedures.
Accord-ingly, subsection (a) should be stricken, pursuant to 10 C.F.R S2.758, as an unjustified challenge to the existing regulations.
As the State was expressly informed.at the Prehearing Conference (2/29/80 Tr. pp. 89-90), the State has misinter-preted Figure 9-4 in the CSAR.
That figure refers to l.
" Emergency Plan Transportation of Irradiated Fuel" and relates to responses to accidents which might occur during transportation of irradiated fuel.
Since the only basis offered by the State is simply wrong, and since there is no requirement for a plan for emergency transportation, this contention should be stricken.
Subsection (c) should be stricken as lacking specificity and the requisite basis.
The State does not attempt to identify
" tests or other means" not currently employed to determine the adequacy of the emergency plans. /
Contrary to the State's assertion, provisions'for testing are set forth in Section 8.1,
" Radiological Emergency Plan for Morris Operation" (NEDE-21894, June 1978) and the State has not identified any deficiencies in that program.
In any event, the existing procedures are in complete compliance with applicable regulations.
Accordingly, this contention should be stricken.
AMENDED CONTENTION 8 STATES:
8.
The discussion of emergency planning in the CSAR is inadequate in that there is no mention of an evacuation plan that would be put into effect should an accident occur at Morris or Dresden which required evacuation of occupational personnel and/or nearby j
residents.
Although Appendix 3 of NEDE 21894 lists
" Evacuation and Personnel Accountability" under
" General Personnel Actions" there does not appear to be any specific evacuation procedure included in the
" Radiological Emergency Plan for Morris Operation" of June 1978 recently submitted to supplement the CSAR.
j It has been proposed that nuclear facilities in highly populated areas may face shut down if adequate plans are not made to evacuate residents
-*/
The existing procedures, in the Staff's view, satisfies the State's concerns:
"MS.
ROTHSCHILD:
I think we do what Ms.
Sekuler says she wants done, which is in fact first to see if there are documents, and secondly to see
)
what the documents say will be done, such as a drill, is actually being done.
And we are concerned, and we inspect to see whether that is the case. "
(2/29/80 Tr. pp. 95-96) l in a 10-mile radius of the facility.
Morris is located near Joliet, a city of 80,000 people, 50 miles south of Chicago.
The Applicant should be required to formulate an updated evacuation plan or include in the CSAR an emergency plan that would service Morris.
RESPONSE
This contention should be stricken because under applicable regulations General Electric is not required, nor indeed authorized, to prepare and implement an emergency evacuation plan for other than its own personnel and facility.
To the extent that this contention is an impermissible attack upon existing regulations, it should accordingly be stricken pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.578.
Moreover, specific procedures for emergency planning are contained in Morris Operation Instructions and other documents, but not in the CSAR in accordance with NRC practice.
See CSAR 59.5.1.
Finally, agree-ments with off-site agencies which would participate in responding to an emergency are evidenced by letters constituting Appendix 1 to the " Radiological Emergency Plan for Morris Operation" (NEDE-21894, June 1978).
AMENDED CONTENTION 9 STATES:
9.
The applicant has failed to analyze the relevant safety and health issues from the perspective of long-term storage.
Although the license applica-tion foresess a licensing period of 20 years, there is no assurance that fuel will not, of necessity, be left for a~ longer period at Morris.
Prior to a finding of the Commission that storage at Morris beyond 20 years will be unnecessary because govern-ment facilities, other than Morris, will then be available for the existing fuel, the license applica-tion is incomplete without a long-term analysis. -..
RESPONSE
This contention should be stricken as irrelevant and inappropriate for consideration by this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in view of the decisions by the NRC to address the question of long-term or permanent storage or disposal of nuclear waste in a generic proceeding.
See Minnesota v. NRC; Nos. 78-1269, 78-2032 (D.C. Cir. May 23, 1979); Virginia Electric
& Power Co.,
(North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2) (August 17, 1979).
In instituting the generic proceeding, the Commis-sion stated:
"The Commission has decided, however, that during this proceeding the issues being considered in the undertaking should not be addressed in individual licensing proceedings.
These issues are most appropriately addressed in a generic proceeding of the character here envisaged."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, this contention should be stricken because it is vague, lacks the requisite basis and seeks to raise an issue beyond the scope of this proceeding.
AMENDED CONTENTION 10 STATES:
10.
The Design Earthquake data in the CSAR are insufficient to meet proposed regulation S72.66.
Morris is designed to 0.2 (sic) and the proposed g
regulation calls for a " peak horizontal ground accel-eration of not greater than 0.25 g.
The applicant has not satisfied the proposed regulation by establishing the CSAR site specific "g value" by the procedures of 10 C.F.R. Part 100.. _.
RESPONSE
The State's Amended Contention fails to correct the typographical error contained in the previous Amended Contention 10.
The reference should be to "0.2 g.a This contention should be stricken because the Morris facility has been found to be in compliance with the applicable regulation (2/29/80 Tr. p. 100) and the State does not dispute that determination.
Moreover, the proposed 10 C.F.R.
S72.66, upon which the State relies, is not in effect and, accordingly, has no bearing upon the pending license renewal application.
In any event, proposed 10 C.F.R.
S72. 66 (a) provides that a site with a peak horizontal ground acceleration of not greater than 0.25 g dudl be deemed to be suitable.
The Morris facility site is located in a region in which the expected peak horizontal ground acceleration does not exceed 0.20 g, / less than that specified by proposed regulation S72.66(a).
Accordingly, even under the proposed regulation, the CSAR for the Morris facility would not be required to utilize the procedures in 10 C.F.R. Part 100.
AMENDED CONTENTION 11 STATES:
11.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has an obligation under the National Environmental Policy
-*/
See, Algermissen and Perkins, USGS, Open File Report 76-416, 1976, "A Probabilistic Estimate of Maximum Acceleration in Rock in the Contiguous United States.
Act (NEPA) 42 USC 4332 (1969) to issue an environ-mental impact statement which will account for normal operation of the Morris facility and for the environ-mental impacts of:
a.
emergency evacuation and its consequences b.
decommissioning and/or residual contami-nation probabilities testing of fuel in the spent fuel pool c.
d.
dry storage of fuel in the canyon e.
expansion of the spent fuel pool f.
contraction of fuel assemblies for compact storage g.
storage of waste products or tools from decontamination of the Dresden reactor h.
any other proposed activity, other than simple storage of spent fuel,in water
RESPONSE
This contention should be stricken as premature at this time.
A license renewal application does not necessarily re-quire that the NRC prepare an environmental impact statement
("EIS").
10 C.F.R. 551.5 Whether an EIS is required depends on the particular circumstances.
10 C.F.R. S51.5.
It is at the discretion of the NRC, guided by the 40 C.F.R.
51500.6, and based upon the findings of an environmental impact evaluation prepared by the NRC Staff to determine whether an EIS should be prepared.
Since that Staff evaluation apparently has not been completed, no decision can be reached as to whether preparation
(
of a negative declaration supported by an Environmental Impact Appraisal or preparation of an EIS is more appropriate.
General l
l i
Electric respectfully submits, however, that a negative declara-l tion will be sufficient as it was in prior licensing actions relating to the Morris Operation.
Moreover, General Electric l
submits that none of the subsections of this contention raise l
issues which necessitate the preparation of an EIS.
To the i
extent that subsections (a) and (b) relate to the pending license l
renewal application they have been adequately addressed in the CSAR and other supporting documentation.
Subsections (c) through j
(h) inclusive raise issues and questions totally beyond the scope of the pending license application and should, accordingly, be l
stricken as irrelevant.
l Additionally, General Electric objects to the Staff's suggestion that the issue of whether an EIS is required be decided subsecuent to a hearing.
To support its suggestion, the Staff cites Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear l
Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-77-51, 6 NRC 265 (1977). /
l That case is readily distinguishable from this proceeding.
The porthern States case involved expansion of the storage capacity at a reactor site; this proceeding relates to license renewal without change to the facility or its operation.
The issue of the requirement of an EIS was admitted in the Northern States case because "no party objected" (p1. at 266, n.
3);
here General Electric objects to the contention.
In the Northern States case, the Staff prepared an environmental impact appraisal
- /
General Electric does not comment upon the other proceeding cited by the Staff since it has not seen the transcript of that Prehearing Conference.
1 and concluded a negative declaration was appropriate (id.)
at 267), which conclusion was affirmed by the Hearing Board.
In this proceeding the Staff has yet to make even a threshold l
decision.
Thus, unlike the instant proceeding, in Northern States an initial determination had been reached by the Staff providing i
some definition for issues to be considered at the hearing.
Here, no such decision has been reached.
Absent some such definition the parties would lack any guidance for issues to be considered.
In Northern States, the Board's affirmance rested upon a finding that the proposed expansion did not constitute an action "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
(pl. at 268.)
Since this proceeding solely concerns the renewal of an existing license without any expansion contemplated, the issuing of the renewal license sought here cannot constitute an action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.
Since each and every amended contention or petitioner, the People of the State of Illinois, is invalid, General Electric submits that each should be stricken from the pending l
license renewal proceeding and requests that this Atomic i
Safety and Licensing Board do so.
l
i The State's Motion For Reconsideration Of Its Motion To Stay Proceedings Should Be Denied The State's motion for reconsideration and to stay this proceeding should be denied because:
1.
The State offers no new information not available to the Board when it initially denied the motion to stay; 2.
The State offers no basis for its assertion that, if proposed Part 72 is adopted, a duplicative hearing will be necessary in the future; and 3.
Such a stay would result in the continued operation of the facility without resolution of the State's contentions which attempt to raise alleged safety 1
issues with respect to such operation.
With respect to points 1 and 2 above, General Electric incorporates by reference its February 27, 1980 Memorandum,
" Response Of General Electric Company To State of Illinois Motion To Dismiss Proceeding And Motion To Stay" and the discussion at the February 28, 1980 Prehearing Conference.
(Tr. pp. 25-32).
l General Electric, however, must register its vigorous l
l objection to the irresponsible effort by the State to stay this proceeding and the attendant consideration of the alleged safety issues which it seeks to raise with respect to the continued.
operation of the Morris facility. /
Based on the very limited disclosure thus far provided by the State, General Electric firmly b 'ieves the State's contentions to be unfounded and without isuis.
More importantly, however, General Electric and the public are entitled to have the State's contentions judged now -- not at some undetermined future time.
To hold otherwise would be to emasculate totally the entire regulatory structure intended to insure the health and safety of the public.
Such a result cannot be permitted.
General Electric's Comments on Scheduling General Electric shares the view of the Board (2/29/80 Tr. pp. 137-138) that the next Prehearing Conference would be appropriate following the Board's ruling on contentions and the completion of discovery, if any.
General Electric strongly urges the Board to establish a schedule to assure the expeditious completion of this proceeding.
As demonstrated above, General Electric submits that the State has not tendered any admissible contentions.
Should the Board find a contention to be admissible, however, General Electric's discovery regarding it would not be substantial.
- /
At least eight of the State's 11 contentions attempt to raise alleged safety issues applicable to the present operation of the Morris facility. l
Since the State did not indicate its discovery plans, as requested by the Board, General Electric's ability to predict the needed period for discovery is limited.
At the present time, General Electric would anticipate sarving a set of interrogatories upon the other parties to this proceeding and taking only the additional discovery precipitated by the responses to those interrogatories.
General Electric believes that it could complete its discovery in a period of 30 to 45 days.
Respectfully submitted, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY By:
)2/te Juli.bA ald W.
Szw w
/
VJ/
0Y~
Matthew A.
Rooney Dated:
April 4, 1980 OF COUNSEL:
MAYER, BROWN & PLATT 231 South LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 (312) 782-0600 l
l t
l l
+
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
)
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
)
Docket No. 70-1308 Consideration of Renewal of
)
Materials License No. SNW-1265 )
Issued to GE Morris Operation
)
Fuel Storage Installation
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that he served a copy of the RESPONSE OF GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY ON THE SECOND SET OF AMENDED CONTENTIONS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, in the above-captioned proceeding on the following persons by causing the said copies to be deposited in the United States mail at 231 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois, in plainly addressed and sealed envelopes with proper first class postage attached before 5:00 P.M. on April 4, 1980:
Andrew C. Goodhope, Esq., Chairman Susan N. Sekuler, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board George William Wolff, Esq.
3320 Estelle Terrace Office of the Attorney General Wheaton, Maryland 20906 188 West Randolph Street Suite 2315 Dr. Linda W. Little Chicago, Illinois 60601 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 5000 Hermitage Drive Marjorie Ulman Rothschild, Esq.-
Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 United States Nuclear i
Regulatory Commission l
Dr. Forrest J. Remick washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 305 East Hamilton Avenue Atomic Safety and Licensing State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Commission Panel Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary Bridget L. Rorem U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Essex, Illinois 60935 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Everett J. Quigley Kankakee, Illinois 60901
/k fog
~
p' R.R.
1, Box 378
/3e JP Matthew A. Rooney f/
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