05000346/LER-1980-008-03, Gap Discovered in Wall Where Five two-inch Conduits Go from Electrical Penetration Room 2 to Cable room.Six-inch Gap Around Ventilation Duct Also Found.Caused by Improper Initial Installation

Gap Discovered in Wall Where Five two-inch Conduits Go from Electrical Penetration Room 2 to Cable room.Six-inch Gap Around Ventilation Duct Also Found.Caused by Improper Initial Installation

ML19309E577
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	02/13/1980
From:	Chesko R TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19309E568	List: 05000346/LER-1980-008, Forwards Revised LER 80-008/03L-1 05000346/LER-1980-008-03, Gap Discovered in Wall Where Five two-inch Conduits Go from Electrical Penetration Room 2 to Cable room.Six-inch Gap Around Ventilation Duct Also Found.Caused by Improper Initial Installation
References
LER-80-008-03L, LER-80-8-3L, NUDOCS 8004220666
Download: ML19309E577 (3)

LER-1980-008, Gap Discovered in Wall Where Five two-inch Conduits Go from Electrical Penetration Room 2 to Cable room.Six-inch Gap Around Ventilation Duct Also Found.Caused by Improper Initial Installation

Event date:
Report date:
3461980008R03 - NRC Website

text

(7 7H LICENSEE EVENT REPORT a@

U coNTHot Et.ccx: [

]

l l

l l

l (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORP.*ATION)

FTil lo la io i n i s I l igl 010 I-10 ID IN lc ir l-1013 I@!4l1l1l'.l1l@l l

l@

i 8

'.s L40E *.JE E Q.E ll IS LICtNit NU*.1JLH 25 2ts LICtN >L ' YPE JO

'31 L A I b1 CO':'T b

f; l L j@l 0 l 5 l 0 l-l0 l 3 l 4 l 6 @l 0 l1 l1 l6 l8 l0 l@l 0l ?] 1l 3l 8 l 0 l@

7 8

60 61 OGt"K E T NU%3 E a 0$

b3 LVENT DATE 74 TS FEPoHT DATE 50 EVENT DESCRIPTICN AND PROB ABLE COrJSEQUEf4CES h I o l 21 l (NP-33-80-11) On 1/16/80 at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> during the performance of ST 5016.11, a gap was,

~

On 1/19/80 a 4" hole with a Qound around a 1S" conduit which penetrated a fire wall.

io g3; On 2/11/80 j o g. l l2" conduit was found in the south wall of #2 electrical penetration room.

1 ea gap was found in a wall uhere five 2" conduits go from the #2 electrical penetratioc ga;3; l room to the cable spreading room. A gap was also found around the ventilation duct g o 3 lfrom Room 603A to the turbine room. The action statement of T.S. 3.7.10 was entered o 7 I Ola l luntil the hoics were tenporarily scaled.

Fire detection devices were operabic.

EcE susYo$E cop.1PONENT CODE SLBC D'E S

E

1. ^

CoOe E

l A l a l@ Ln_J@ L zJ@ I z i z l z i z i z ! z l@ Iz l@ L21 @

7 8

9 to 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQU E N TI AL oCCUAAENCE FEPCRT HEVISloN VENTVE/R REPOHT NO.

CoOE TYPE NO.

@lEgngy.;,a;, i al el L-J l 01 01 81 IrJ 1013I I t.

I L-]

L. lJ 1l L 23

.' 1 23 24 26 27 23 29

,30 31 32 iAK8N ACT O' PL

'T

.T HOURS S B ITT O F

Pi hu8.

PPLIEtt MAN PA T'J R E R LHJ@l cl@

W@

l z!@

l el el el el LY_J@

lNl@

lzl@

lzl9l9l9l@

33 6

3G 3/

40 46 42 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h l 3 l o l l The cause of these occurrences can be attributed to a procedural deficiency which did l i i l not address the temporary sealing of holes or the gap around the conduit through a l

l hole, especially if the conduit or pipe is not installed immediately after the core t

l,l3l l drill is completed.

The holes were temporarily sealed with Kao-wool. A memo was l

L'_1.d.] I issued v rning against breaching of fire barriers. Procedures have been modified.

7 8'9 60 STA S

%'CWER oTHER STATUS blSCO RY OlSCOVERY DESCRIPTtoN l"i'TTl W@ l 11 el 01@l NA l

lBl@ltestobservation l

'2 0

44 45 de so CcSTENT

.wou.TO,4CTiviTY @ j loc,T,o.yo,REu,SE@

,CTiviTy REu su@- REu2sfLZ J@l NA l

NA l

LZ_J i e 7

8 9 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSUE ES NUP94EA TYPF OESCRIPiloN TTTTi l 010101@l z l@l NA l

80 P4RSausE t iN3c's'i E S OnCn,ncN@

u..m.

_ riTil 101010i@l NA I

8 8 9 11 12 80 LOSS oF oR 04*.' AGE TO FACILITV TY8E CESCRapt'ON in191 l z!@l NA l

o 9 io

,9 nSuf[ 'S NRC USE ONLY f 2 l o l Wh{uE Cm* Tion l

lllllllllllll}

NA 8 9 no 68.69 80 %

419-259-5000, Ext. 274 DVRa 80-014 Richard C. Chesko

. NE:

~

o PH 80-015,c80-0E$9 F PHEPARER f

~

~

800'422o666

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-11 DATE OF EVENT: January 16, 1980 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Pipe and conduit penetrations through fire barriers not scaled properly.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (NUT) = 2772, and Load (Gross MWE) = 920.

Description of Occurrence: On January 16, 1980 at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> during the performance of ST 5016.11, Fire Protection System Barrier Surveillance Test, test personnel found a gap around a 1 " conduit which penetrated a fire wall above the normal entrance to Room 236. The space should have been sealed with grout or silicone sealant or tempor-grily sealed with Kao-wool. This placed the unit in violation of Technical Specifica-tion 3.7.10 which requires all penetration barriers protecting safety related areas be functional at all times. A fire watch was established per the action statement until the penetration was temporarily sealed with Kao-wool.

On January 19,1980 at 1120 hours0.013 days <br />0.311 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.2616e-4 months <br />, test personnel discovered a 4" hole with a 2" con-duit in it through the south wall of the #2 electrical penetration room. The gap was immediately packed with Kao-wool, and thus no fire watch was established.

On February 11, 1980 at 1550 hours0.0179 days <br />0.431 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.89775e-4 months <br />, test personnel found a gap in the wall where five 2" conduits go from the #2 electrical penetration room to the cable spreading room.

Also found was a 6" gap around a ventilation duct going from the control room records 1

cnd storage area (Room 603A) to the turbine room. A fire watch was established until the openings were sealed with Kao-wool.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the first occurrence was procedure deficiencies in that the appropriate procedures did not address the tempor-cry replacing of seals af ter conduit or pipe installation especially if the conduit cr pipe is not installed immediately after the core drill is completed.

1l The cause of the second and third occurrences was improper initial installation by construction personnel.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the. health and safety of the public cr to station personnel. The fire detection devices in the rooms would have provided early' warning of fires in their areas.

Cotr=ctive Action: A memo was issued to all station personnel warning against breach-ing of fire barriers. The applicable maintenance instruction (MI-M-87) has been modified to address the described deficiencies.

ST 5016.11, Fire Protection System 1

Barrier Surveillance Test was completed February 20, 1980.

LER #80-008 e

4

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-11 PAGE 2 A new procedure ST 5016.13, Visual Inspection of Fire Barrier Penetrations, has bien written.

It will provide for inspecting all new fire barrier penetrations as i

wall as any.old penetrations that have been worked on and resealed and now require rainspection.

It will be attached to all maintenance work orders which involve.the above. This procedure will also be used to update the list of penetrations for ST 5016.11, the Fire Barrier Penetration 18 Month Test.

Failure Data: There have been three similar reportable occurrences, see Licensee Event Reprots NP-33-78-137, NP-33-79-61, and NP-33-79-63.

LER #80-008 3

S e

G S

e